The Sino-French war was an undeclared conflict between France and China that took place in 1884-1885 over the kingdom of Annam, and more specifically the province of Tongking, This country existed in the area now known as Vietnam. The war lasted nine and a half months, although there was some fighting and a number of battle-deaths prior to the “official” beginning of the war in 1884. More than twelve thousand people were killed in the war, with the approximately ten thousand of the deaths being suffered by the Chinese. China’s population was much larger than France’s and in proportion to their population, France suffered slightly heavier losses.

During the war, the land battle consisted of a back-and-forth battle with the French and Chinese both claiming and reclaiming the same territory. Finally on April 4, after more than nine months of undeclared war, an armistice was signed and the fighting stopped. In the end both sides agreed to the original stipulations of the Li-Fournier convention, a pre-treaty written by Chinese and French diplomats early in the conflict.

The main reason that the war broke out was that the French signed a number of treaties with the Annamese government that gave the French control of the territory. Annam would also have been forced to conform its foreign policy to that of France. The Chinese government was strongly opposed to these treaties, especially because Annam had for a long time been a protectorate of China. This and several other factors lead to the escalation of the war, eventually “won” by France. Although a clear military victory could not be claimed by either side, after the war, the French achieved the goals it had attempted to achieve through the treaties with Annam.

A number of theories expressed in class apply to this war, with the most important being conflict over territory and resources, theory of misperceptions, and diversionary theory. A number of other theories might also apply, but with the limited information available on this war, these were the most relevant.

The most obvious is the conflict over territory and resources. This theory states that countries are more likely to go to war when territory and/or resources are involved in a dispute and that these types of disputes are more dangerous than others. The main dispute of the entire war was the control of the territory and resources of the country of Annam. The French had a strong desire to control the markets of Annam in order to export products to the local people. Imperialist sentiments were also very high in France during the time period the war took place. Meanwhile, the Chinese also had interest in the markets of Annam and wanted to keep them in Chinese control and away from the French. As it turned out, both sides wanted the territory, resources and markets of Annam bad enough to go to war over them. While each side was willing to give some minor concessions in trying to reach a peaceful settlement prior to the war, neither was willing to give up control of Annam, and this led to the war.

A second theory discussed in class that applies to the Sino-French War is the theory of misperceptions. This theory contends that when national leaders misinterpret the actions, intentions, motives, etc., of other nations, crises escalate into wars. These misperceptions can also worsen wars that are already occurring or cause one side or the other to be defeated in the war. The Sino-French War was full of misperceptions by both the Chinese and the French.

From the beginning of the war, the French underestimated the hostility and resolve of the Chinese in the dispute over Annam. This is best illustrated by the actions of French naval officer Henri Riviere who was sent on an expedition to the Tongking province in order to secure the Hanoi area for peaceful trade. When Riviere attempted to capture Hanoi in 1883 with limited forces, he was defeated and killed. This caused a sensation in France and the French public cried for revenge.

The largest misperception involving intentions occurred when the Chinese began demanding that French troops evacuate Annam and recognize that China was the top authority in the area. This demand puzzled French leaders, who had believed for the eight years since the first French-Annamese treaty that China had recognized and accepted French sovereignty in Annam. Apparently there had been a translation error in the message China sent to France. In actuality, the Chinese had not recognized the Philastre Treaty between Annam and France and accepted no Western influence in the area.

There was also a misperception by France of a third party. During this same time period, China was in the middle of a dispute with Japan over the territory of Korea. Japan had a strong interest in obtaining the territory, which was held by China. France mistakenly believed that because of Japan’s interest in Korea that Japan would attack China in the event that China and France went to war. This belief proved to be false. This belief, however, made the French feel more capable of fighting China, because they expected help from Japan, and increased their desire for war.

French leaders were pressured to fight the war because the French public, on the basis of a misperception, wanted to fight China. A French diplomat, Bouree, told Chinese leaders that in order to avert war, China should make a show of how strong their feelings were about the Annam situation. Bouree contended that this would discourage the French people from wanting war with China. The Chinese took Bouree’s advice and decided to build up military strength in order to bluff the French people.

The Chinese leaders placed the country in a state of emergency and ordered what appeared to be a massive military build-up. Chinese armies were mobilized southward. The Chinese armies already in Tongking were ordered to advance further into Annamese territory. The Cantonese navy began commencing maneuvers near Annamese waters. The French people, however, called the bluff. The French people, perceiving the military build-up as hostile action on the part of the Chinese, called for war with China.

These various misperceptions were only a few of the total number that occurred in connection with the Sino-French War. Others occurred during the war that lead to the escalation of battle-deaths and to the French “victory.” Misperception played a large part in the origins and outcomes of the war.

A third theory discussed in class that lead to the beginning of the Sino-French war is the concept of Diversionary Theory. This theory states that when the leaders of a country are having domestic or policy problems, the leader instigates or engages the nation in a foreign conflict in an effort to increase his or her levels of domestic support by virtue of the “Rally-round-the-flag” effect. This theory claims that when a country goes to war, the citizens “rally-round-the-flag” and support national leaders.

During the time period that the war began developing, the French government was suffering through much turmoil on the home front. France was also facing military threats on their own borders from other nations in Europe. It is highly likely that the Sino-French War was at least partially instigated because the leaders wanted to divert the French public’s attention away from domestic affairs. If this was indeed one of the motivations of the French leaders, it was successful in the short term, as the French public strongly supported war against China over the territory of Annam.

The Sino-French War, while important in the relations of Southeast Asia, is not studied extensively throughout the world. Therefore resources on the war are limited. However, based on available resources, the three most plausible causes of the war are territory and resources, misperception and diversionary theory. Evidence of each of these theories are present in this war and it is likely that each contributed to the occurrence and outcome of the war.

The Sino-French War

Aftermath of the Sino-French War

Bibliography

Class lectures, by professor Paul Hensel, INR 4083, Spring 1997.

Throne and Mandarins, Lloyd E. Eastman, Harvard Press, 1967.