One of the reasons that the Germans succeeded in 1939-1942 was that the infantry knew that their role was to take and hold ground. Their offensive tactic/technique was based on the infantry group (section, squad). In the advance the machine gun led with the group commander, the assault squad (the rest of the group armed with rifles) followed behind. This was only altered if there was a danger that the MG might be disabled in ambush, when the riflemen led. (Naturally the same tactic applies no matter what the size of the unit or formation involved, but the larger the unit the greater the support available, so that artillery and tanks come into play).

On contact with the enemy the machine gun immediately opened fire on the defenders, and the assault squad started to manoeuvre to whichever flank was appropriate – orders were given on each bound establishing the operational flank and the length of the bounds. This meant that instead of all the men in the group engaging the enemy with fire, the machine gun won the fire fight while the assault troops moved into their assault position under the protective fire of the machine gun. So the machine gun performed two tasks simultaneously: it suppressed enemy fire and commanded the immediate battlefield to allow manoeuvre by the assault troops.

German training pamphlets of the period also emphasise the need to be aware of fire from alternative positions. If such was the case another group would immediately be tasked with winning the second firefight and the assault. The essence of German Command and Control at this level was the system of pre-planning, so that in any advance guidelines were given: objective and route, action when fired on (machine gun to engage, assault troops to move to left or right, or go straight in if the range was short), action at the end of the bound and so on.

It was for this reason that their assault tactics were seen as being extremely fast; in actual fact the Germans had merely applied logic – the machine gun can cover ground and targets far more quickly and effectively than individual rifle fire, so their tactics reflected this. There was also the advantage that the machine gun was under the direct tactical control of the group leader, who stayed with the gun until the assault was over. The gun, crew and group leader then moved up to rejoin the assault troops. In the defence the machine gun was the centre of local defence, and the riflemen of the group were its close range protection. It was for this reason that the Germans chose firepower from one weapon rather than the less effective aimed single shots from the rifle as the heart of their infantry tactics.

As the pressure of large scale Russian attacks began to have its effect, linked with a growing manpower shortage, the Germans started using assault rifles. The main aim was to increase the firepower of front line units in relation to manpower available, but the MG42 was still the centre of tactics, as I am sure some readers may still remember.

Other armies were slow to comprehend the leading role of the machine gun, and even today machine guns are seen as part of the rifle group/section/squad and not as the firepower provider enabling riflemen to manoeuvre ab initio. Training has to be good for this to become second nature, and there has to be an intense aggressive spirit in the infantry to be able to make these tactics work. Unfortunately although the Germans maintained their aggressive spirit in the years 1943-45 manpower shortages and a less rigorous training period meant that they were no longer able to sustain their successes of the earlier period.