Eastern Europe was experiencing considerable tension in the early 1950s. Whatever prestige Communists had enjoyed by association with the defeat of Hitler had been lost. Stalin, by imposing Communist regimes, had turned Communists into servants of foreign domination. Such regimes could never have the legitimacy of the Soviet state. Even more harmful were the Stalinist economic programmes these regimes had been required to impose. Five-year plans, requiring rapid development of heavy industry and the collectivisation of agriculture were ordered without heed to the consequences. The social and economic costs were disastrous.

After 1953 the new Soviet leaders did order reforms, but only of the leadership of the Communist parties. They wanted to purge hard-line Stalinists. Hungarian Party leader, Matyas Rakosi, was forced to make Imre Nagy prime minister. Nagy had been responsible for land reform after 1945, and had been disgraced when he had opposed suggestions to collectivise agriculture. He was, in fact, a deeply committed Communist of many years’ standing. But he was prepared to be more moderate, flexible and reformist than his peers. He was also jovial, charming and his record gave him an exaggerated reputation for heroism.

Under Nagy a degree of liberalisation was introduced, with greater economic freedom and the release of some political prisoners. But no more: the hated AVH, the secret police, was certainly not reformed. In January 1955, Rakosi felt strong enough to dismiss Nagy, though his reforms were not completely reversed. This did not save Rakosi; Erno Gero soon replaced him. But there was a growing demand for ever greater reforms. Reformers were strongly encouraged by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in February 1956.

Gero’s government seemed oblivious to the rapidly developing crisis. On 23 October they took no action against a planned student demonstration until it was too late to prevent it. Marching passed the Bem statue (a potent nationalist symbol) the students went on to Parliament. Their demands amounted to an open challenge to their government. They called for multi-party elections; the release of political prisoners; the removal of Stalin’s statue from the City Park and the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary. What concessions they might have wrung from the government is uncertain, because that evening a crowd attempted to seize control of the radio station, shots were fired, and a rebellion had begun.

The government soon lost control of Budapest and the rising spread into the provinces. Nagy was hurriedly brought into the government, but the situation was too chaotic, and he too hesitant for that to end the rising. Soviet troops were then invited to intervene, perhaps with Nagy’s agreement. It was here that the Red Army made a major error. Believing that a show of force would cow the rebels, tanks, without infantry support, were sent into Budapest.

Unable to enter the narrower alleys and lacking infantry, the tanks could only drive past as determined rebels used anti-tank weapons and even Molotov cocktails against them. Rebels fighting from Corvin Passage, the cinema at its end, and nearby Killian Barracks earned renown for their furious resistance. After four days and several tanks lost, the Soviet troops were happy to be ordered out of Budapest. Nagy formed a new government on 27 October, and opened negotiations with Soviet representatives.

The Soviet leadership seems to have been divided on how best to respond to events. Perhaps they were influenced by the Anglo-French attack on Egypt over the Suez Canal, and the expectation of a general war. Whatever the reason, after a few days the USSR concluded that they could not tolerate an undependable regime in Budapest. Preparations to intervene began again, but this time to do it properly. Troops and tanks poured across the frontier.

Nagy was now in an impossible position. He had become identified with a rebel cause that could not hope to prevail. The only chance his government had of survival was from outside intervention. Eisenhower had, after all, talked of ‘rolling back’ Communism since his 1952 presidential campaign. This appeared to be a promise of American aid for a state attempting to win its freedom from Soviet domination. As Soviet forces encircled Budapest Nagy made a dramatic radio broadcast on 1 November. Announcing that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and proclaiming its neutrality, he appealed to the world at large for help in securing that neutrality.

Washington was not impressed. Eisenhower had used the rhetoric of ‘roll back’, but had never intended to go to war to achieve it. With the bloodcurdling threats of nuclear war that the USSR was making over the Suez crisis, it seemed certain any US intervention would lead to war. With Soviet troops poised outside Budapest, Eisenhower chose to use American economic strength to whip Britain and France into line over Suez. It allowed him to ignore increasingly frantic appeals from Hungary.

On 4 November the Red Army invaded Budapest in such force that heroic resistance in the city centre was soon crushed. Outlying districts such as Csepel and Ujpest saw considerable bloodshed, but the fighting was over in a few days. Savage repression followed. The message was clear: no matter what the west said, Eastern Europe was accepted as part of the Soviet sphere.

Over 2,500 Hungarians and 722 Soviet troops had been killed and thousands more were wounded.

Note on Casualties

Hungary’s bloody losses were greatly exaggerated at the time. On December 14th in New Delhi, Pandit Nehru quoted evidence gathered by his diplomats in Hungary that 25,000 Hungarians and 7,000 Russians had been “killed in Budapest”. But in January 1957 the Central Statistical Office issued an interim estimate of the casualties which listed 2,500 to 3,000 killed (including 1,800 to 2,000 in Budapest itself) not including Soviet troops. These figures agree closely with the agency’s subsequent confidential report, which listed 16,700 injured in Budapest and 2,526 injured elsewhere by the end of 1956, while 1,945 had been killed in Budapest and 557 elsewhere; the heaviest casualties in Budapest were taken by the VIIIth District, with its Corvin Passage and Republic Square (435 dead) and the IXth, with the Kilián Barracks and the rebel area commanded by Stephen Angyal (234). Specific provincial statistics included fifty dead in Magyaróvár, forty-six in Salgótarján, twenty-five in Miskolc, and twenty-four in Dunapentele.

Monthly figures for rebel deaths in Budapest were: October, 757; November, 926; December, 36; January, 6; not classified, 220. The document’s December 31st figure for the wounded tallies well with the government’s statement that up to December 1st, the Budapest hospitals had registered 12,961 injured; but such figures are a poor guide, as rebel casualties sometimes preferred to get injuries tended privately. Of the injured, one-quarter were under eighteen, and three-quarters under thirty.