General Eichelberger had moved his Eighth Army Command Post from the eastern coastal plain of Leyte to Okinawa on 26 August. On Okinawa both the 11th Airborne and the 27th Division were stalled on the scheduled airlift to Japan by the succession of typhoons.

All available troop transports of the Far East Air Force and dozens of the huge “Skytrains” and “Skymasters” of the Pacific Air Transport Command had been mobilized at Okinawa for this mammoth air operation-the greatest aerial movement during the Pacific war. The initial target date was officially postponed from 26 August to 28 August because of the adverse weather. [1]

Then the weather cleared and a cool, refreshing breeze, “very refreshing to the spirit,” blew over the Kanto Plain. [2]

At Atsugi airfield near Tokyo, Japanese planes sat helplessly stripped of their propellers. A picked detachment of the Naval Security Corps, armed with clubs, guarded the Atsugi airfield where Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Lt. Gen. Senichi Kamada, Captain Chuzaburo Yamazumi and Ken Tsurumi of the Foreign Office awaited the arrival of the American advance forces.

The heralds of that advance force, American Corsairs and Grummans, had appeared with the dawn of that historic day and continued to fly in strong formations over the entire Tokyo Bay and Atsugi area.

The first American formations flying from Okinawa were not expected until 0900, but half an hour earlier a twin-engined aircraft appeared in the skies from the south. It was a C-46 transport. The plane circled the field and then came in from the south to touch down upon the center runway at 0828. This plane was followed by fifteen others. [3]

From the leading plane debarked Colonel Charles P. Tench, GSC, of the G-3 Section of GHQ, commanding the advance party.66 Waiting automobiles conveyed Colonel Tench and party to the Japanese reception group.

General Arisue stiffly saluted Colonel Tench and, after introductions, the group entered a tent in the center of the field. General Arisue offered food, but Colonel Tench who had brought his own rations, declined with thanks.

Colonel Tench explained that his party consisted of approximately 150 officers and men and that their directive from the Supreme Commander was divided into four main divisions. It was as follows:

a. Reconnaissance of the Atsugi airdrome area to determine its suitability for the airborne operation to follow.

b. Establishment of required air installations and supplies to support initial phases of the air operations in the area as provided by the Commanding General, FEAF.

c. Supervision and coordination of improvements required at the Atsugi airdrome.

d. Establishment of communications with GHQ, AFPAC, without delay and reporting on suitability or non-suitability of the Atsugi airdrome for the purpose intended. All messages to be transmitted in code. Reporting over signal communications net additional information desired by the Commanding General, FEAF.

While this initial conference took place, soldiers debouched from the planes coming to earth every few moments, unloaded jeeps, and prepared to form exploratory parties. Colonel Hutchinson, who had been assigned as billeting officer, led the first of these on an inspection of the former Sagamigahara Air Unit barracks at the west end of the airfield. It was proposed by the Japanese that this barracks should serve as accommodations for the advance party. Other inspection teams immediately deployed over the entire airfield area.

A second flight of fifteen C-54′s, C-46′s, and C-47′s arrived at 0935 and a third group of fifteen C-54′s landed at 1100. These planes, carrying a total of 30 officers and 120 men wearing regular combat equipment were escorted by ten carrier-based Seventh Fleet F6F liaison planes flying from Sagami Bay.

The Japanese were amazed by the efficiency with which these Grumman fighters, landing on the grass, folded their wings “like cicadas,” even while the planes were taxied into position. [4] The Japanese made no attempt to conceal the degree to which they were impressed by the speed with which the Americans motorized themselves and invested the entire field area. Their amazement was outspoken when within forty-five minutes after the leading planes had touched down, portable Signal Corps transmitters were on the air establishing communications with Okinawa. The last planes of the party brought fuel, lubricants, and maintenance equipment to make the intrepid little unit compact and self-sustaining until the anticipated arrival on 30 August of the main airborne force which would constitute the first of the Occupation troops for Japan.

The Eve of Occupation

While the air lift of the main initial force was in progress on 30 August, GHQ, AFPAC, issued an amendment to Operations Instructions No. 4, which materially altered the missions assigned to the Army commanders who soon would be arriving on the Nippon homeland. Instead of actually instituting “military government,” Army commanders were to supervise the execution of the policies relative to government functions which GHQ, AFPAC, was to issue directly to the Japanese Government; [5] likewise the functions of the Armies with respect to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces were changed from “operational control” and direction to “supervision of the execution” of orders, as transmitted to the Japanese by GHQ, AFPAC. In contrast to the original concept the headquarters of the Japanese Government and its armed forces were required to shoulder the chief administrative and operational burden of disarmament and demobilization. The new plan was designed to avoid possible incidents which might result in a renewed conflict; no seizures or disarmaments were to be made by Allied personnel.

Actually, with the arrival of the advance party, the toe-hold of occupation had been established. But less than 200 men with light weapons could hardly be described as constituting an occupation force in a country where three to four million soldiers of all classifications were still under arms, and as far as the Americans knew, were only precariously held in discipline by the proclamations of one man-the Emperor.

It was imperative that every effort be made to insure the early and safe arrival of the 11th Airborne force of some seven thousand men. An inspection of Atsugi revealed the necessity for the immediate construction of landing strips long enough to accommodate B-29s and C-54s which would be landing in rapid succession once the movement had started. Only one night could be devoted to this construction work involving strips one and one-half kilometers in length. Under the supervision of the small American force, the Japanese workmen recruited by the indefatigable General Arisue became efficient to a degree apparently never before experienced by the Japanese officers. [6]With the break of dawn, the work was near enough to completion to enable the advance party to signal GHQ at Manila for relay to Okinawa that everything was in readiness for the initiation of the real Occupation of Japan-the first by a foreign army in the recorded history of that nation. [7]

[1]Maj Gen Seizo Arisue, in charge of the preparation of Atsugi airfield, reported in his unpublished Memoirs of Atsugi ” that for ” some strange reason ” this aircraft and the following ones came in downwind despite the fact that the Japanese had painstakingly erected an air sock for their guidance. The Americans probably preferred to take their chances with a slightly unfavorable wind than to nose helplessly into some prepared Japanese armoured trap.

[2] Col Tench was followed by his immediate staff comprising Capt C. B. Jones, USN, Col E. K. Warburton, 5th AF, Cols C. R. Hutchinson and D. M. Dunne, CE, Cols S. S. Auchincloss and L. Park, SigC, and Maj F. Bowers, ATIS interpreter.

[3]Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, 29, 31 Aug 45; Mainichi Shimbun, 29 Aug 45.

[4]GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, 15 Aug 45 (S), Amendment No. 12, Doc. App. IV. This type of military government is known as “passive” as contrasted to the “active” type introduced in Germany.

[5]G-2, GHQ, was charged with the development and surveillance of plans for the demobilization and disarmament of the Imperial Forces, in view of expert knowledge of the internal structure of the Japanese Army. The first step was to be the abolition of the Imperial General Staff but the cautious retention of the Army and Navy Ministries which were Z of I agencies. (See Ch. II, p. 42.)

[6]In his informal “Memoirs of Atsugi,” General Arisue states : “I may say that through this all from the first to the final building of the runway, as long as I have been in the Army, I have never had to use my head and body for so long to such a great extent.”

[7]The communications unit established for this purpose actually was installed in the command plane in which Col Tench had arrived.

The Spearhead

While the advance party secured Atsugi airstrip and made arrangements for the landing of additional troops, the 11th Airborne Division on Okinawa prepared itself for airlift to Japan. Its first echelon began landing at Atsugi early on the morning of 30 August, and troop and cargo-carrying aircraft continued to arrive at three-minute intervals throughout the day.

Immediately upon his arrival, Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, Commander of the Division, conferred with Lieutenant General Arisue, making final arrangements for the arrival of General Eichelberger and later, General MacArthur.

Simultaneously with the development of this airhead at Atsugi, elements of the Third Fleet anchored in Sagami Bay supported the landing of the 4th Regimental Combat Team of the 6th Marine Division at Yokosuka. The First and Second Carrier Task Forces (Task Forces 39 and 38) patrolled the coastal waters of the Empire, prepared to make a show of force if necessary. Forts and shore batteries on Futsusaki, a narrow spit jutting out from the eastern shore into Uraga Strait, were occupied by small landing parties.3 The main Fleet landing party went inland and established headquarters at Yokosuka Naval Base. While United States forces were securing these important points in the Area of Initial Evacuation, not a shot was fired, although the Marines, like their airborne counterparts at Atsugi, took no chances and were ready for immediate combat should there be the slightest attempt at deception by the Japanese. It soon became apparent that the Japanese had meticulously followed the requirements stipulated in Manila. The area had been cleared of all military personnel except for a small detachment which policed and guarded the area. Coastal defenses and antiaircraft had been demilitarized and were marked with white flags which were visible for some miles. Courteous Japanese officers and guides were available for further instructions.

In the missions outlined in “Blacklist,” Eighth Army was assigned responsibility for occupying the Tokyo Bay area. Therefore, upon landing at Yokosuka, the Marine forces came under the command of General Eichelberger. Hardly had the Marines established themselves when an infantry patrol from the 11th Airborne arrived from Atsugi to effect contact. The liaison patrol was from the 511th Parachute Infantry of the 11th Airborne, a unit which, after landing at Atsugi, had moved eastward to secure the Yokohama dock area in preparation for large scale amphibious landings in that vicinity.