One of the old style SSG computer games, ground-breaking at the time late-1980s was the Decisive Battles of the American Civil War. I still play these, and even Panzer Battles on my XP PC. You either liked or hated these systems, with the program A.I. carrying out your orders. Here is my favourite scenario, Koniggratz (Sadowa) from the Run 5 magazine issue 15. Ever since I read the 1956 Encyclopedia article on the Seven Weeks War and Koniggratz I have been interested in the period. The Command Magazine #21wargame ‘Blood and Iron’ by Paul Dangel, which I still play, seems to have been the inspiration for this scenario. I’m pro-Austrian playing them twice as often against the Prussians.
July 3rd, 1866
A Scenario for the Decisive Battles System
by Ian Trout and Stephen Hart
The Austro‑Prussian (Seven Weeks’) War, fought in June‑July of 1866, was a result of some aggressive power politics by Prussia. The occupation of Holstein was condemned by Austria but in the shifting world of German State politics this was hardly an unprecedented move.
The Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, however, had overstepped the mark by concluding a secret treaty with France and this met with widespread condemnation from all the German states. Bismarck responded by dissolving the Germanic Confederation, calling on Italy to honour the offensive‑defensive treaty signed in April and mobilizing for war. The scene was set for a confrontation in Bohemia.
THE OPPOSING ARMIES
Prussia
At the Treaty of Tilsit, signed in 1807 after defeats at Jena and Auerstadt,
Prussia was limited to a very small standing army. She responded by introducing universal conscription,wherein every able‑bodied man was required to serve for two years and remain in reserve indefinitely, thus guaranteeing a large supply of trained soldiery. The army was well organized with Corps raised for each region. Each Corps consisted of 2 Divisions with additional corps troops. Each Division consisted of 2 Brigades plus an attached cavalry regiment and attached field artillery ‑ 4 batteries each of 6 guns.
Infantry were armed with the breechloading needle gun. It was not a powerful weapon, having a range of only 600700 paces but it could be fired rapidly and reloaded from a prone position.
Artillery was the weakest arm, being only 40% rifled and with an effective range of about 1500 paces. It was badly handled tactically, being generally kept behind the infantry and arriving in action too late to be of much use.
At the Battle of Koniggratz the Prussian forces were in three separate Armies under the nominal command of His Majesty King William and the effective command of the Chief of General Staff, General von Moltke. The 1st Army under the command of HRH Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia consisted of 6 infantry Divisions and 2 Cavalry Divisions. The 2nd Army, under the command of the Crown Prince (in reality, General Blumenthal), consisted of three regular Corps, the Guards’ Corps and a Cavalry Division. The Army of the Elbe, under the command of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, consisted of three infantry Divisions and 2 Cavalry Brigades.
Austria
The Austrian Army was maintained by a conscription system which allowed the buying of substitutes. The Army as a whole was not as homogeneous as the Prussian, taking in units from across the empire and it was not as well organized, having no Divisional level of command. The peacetime organization consisted of seven Army Corps, each of 4 brigades, plus cavalry and artillery. For the Austro‑Prussian war this was expanded to 10 Corps, resulting in considerable disorganization.
Infantry were armed with a muzzleloading rifle. This out‑ranged the Prussian needle gun but was much slower to load. Moreover, since a soldier was only allowed 20 practice rounds per year, the standard of accuracy was appalling.
Artillery was strong. All guns were rifled and had an effective range of about 2000 paces, again out‑ranging the Prussians.
At the Battle of Koniggratz, the Austrian Army was under the command of Feldzeugmeister Ritter von Benedek. The Army consisted of seven infantry Corps of which one (VIII Corps) was made up of mostly allied troops (assorted Bavarians, Wutemburgers, Badish, Hessians, Nassovians and Hesse ‑ Kasselans), and five cavalry Divisions, together with the Royal Saxon Army Corps under the command of HRH the Crown Prince of Saxony which consisted of 2 infantry Divisions and a cavalry Division plus artillery.
THE BATTLEFIELD
The Battle of Koniggratz was fought in a hilly part of Bohemia, between the Castle of Koniggratz and the village of Sadowa, after which the battle is also sometimes named. The River Bistritz flows North‑South by Sadowa and represents the effective western border of the major fighting area.
East of the Bistritz for two to three miles the ground is hilly and uneven with a number of small wooded areas and many small villages and hamlets. East of this again the ground is more even, sloping gently down to the River Trotina and Koniggratz where there is a north-south railway line and denser habitation. Most of the fighting took place on the ridges.
THE BATTLE PLANS
Prussia
Von Moltke conceived an ambitious plan for a double‑envelopment and annihilation of the Austrian Army. The lst Army was to occupy the enemy attention in the centre, giving the impression of impending massed attack there. The 2nd Army was to attack the Austrian right flank from the north and the Army of the Elbe was to attack the Austrian left flank.
Austria
Von Benedek planned a defensive battle forming his army into a rough triangle on the high ground to the east of the River Bistritz. The Saxon Corps would be in the south and the remaining Corps in a curve from Langenhof to Lochenitz. The 8th Corps would be in reserve behind the Saxons and the 1st and 6th Corps (plus some cavalry and artillery) would form a general reserve in the centre near Wsestar and Rosnitz. Prussian sources severely criticize the Austrian plan, on the grounds that such a concentration made the double enveloping action easy. Prussian sources are somewhat biased however and the plan of a solid defense on high ground with a large mobile reserve does not seem such a bad one. Factors other than the initial deployment play a strong part in the resulting Austrian defeat.
THE BATTLE
At dawn on July 3rd, the battlefield was covered with a thick mist and the Prussian lst Army was able to move under its cover. The 8th Division engaged the Austrian outpost at Sadowa and the 7th, already stationed on the east bank at Cerekwitz to the north, started to move south ‑ and took the village of Benatek.
The Army of the Elbe has been late setting off due to a delay in the transmission of their orders. By 8 am the advance battalions had taken the village of Neckanitz on the east bank of the river but the rest of the Army had yet to arrive.
The 2nd Army was even more delayed. The 12th Division was halfway across the Elbe on another mission when it was recalled. The 1lth Division, on the same mission, had not yet set off and so was available to move towards Racitz on the northern edge of the battlefield. The first Corps, however, was still in its billets at distant Prausnitz as the battle got under way.
About 8.30 am, the 7th Division under Lieut‑General Fransecky, was following its orders to move towards and support the fighting at Sadowa. Due to its initial placement east of the river, however, it was making this move entirely unsupported against the bulk of the Austrian army. The advance battalions swept into the Maslowed Wood (or Swiepwald) and even briefly occupied the village of Cistowes to the south before being forced back into the wood. The Austrian 4th and 2nd Corps, which were supposed to form an east‑west line through Chlum and Lochenitz, moved to a north‑south line up to Horenowes. The unlucky 7th Division was soon opposed by two full Austrian Corpsl Unfortunate as this was for Fransecky’s men, it was a poor line‑up for the Austrians. It seems that Benedek had neglected to send cavalry scouts out to the north and was thus unaware of the forces descending, however tardily, upon him from that direction.
Throughout the morning, Fransecky’s men held on grimly against a series of brigade attacks by the 4th and 2nd Corps. They were aided by the tactical superiority of their needle guns in such a short‑range tactical situation but they were also fully aware that retreat from the wood meant annihilation in the open. Fortunately for them, the Austrians never made the general attack that would have swamped the wood.
There was very little that could be done in the way of support. The 8th Division advanced to the edge of the Sadowa wood but were pinned down there by the massed Austrian artillery. The 3rd and 4th Divisions also crossed the river south of the 8th but could render little material assistance. The 5th and 6th Divisions were brought up to Sowetitz with a view to perhaps reinforcing the troops in the Maslowed Wood.
The Army of the Elbe, meanwhile, was completing its crossing of the river at Neckanitz, covered by advance battalions at Lubno and Hradek. Austria’s Saxon allies made no attempt to contest the crossing.
The 2nd Prussian Army was marching south in a piecemeal fashion. The 11th Division took Racitz with little opposition and the Guard Corps was approaching fast but the 1st Corps was still many miles away.
At this point, towards the end of the morning, the Austrian position was a strong one. Its line had not been threatened, its reserves were uncommitted and its artillery dominated the heights. It was also about to fall apart.
In the south, the Army of the Elbe continued in textbook fashion. The Saxons had taken up strong positions on the heights at Problus, Nieder‑Prim and Ober‑Prim but Von Bittenfeld carefully marched his troops around them behind covering ridges and woods and in mid‑afternoon launched attacks on both ends of their lines.
The Saxons were forced back in some disorder but soon rallied to a position slightly further back in the wood of Bor. They were then ejected from this wood to the heights behind it. All this took most of the afternoon and, about 4 pm, while Von Bittenfeld was reorganizing his men for further efforts, the Saxons received the order to retreat and did so in good order.
The southern part of the battlefield was almost a private fight between the Army of the Elbe and the Saxons. Both sides performed quite well, with the decision going to the Army of the Elbe on points but the overall effect on the battle was small. It was in the north that the Austrian disaster occurred.
As early as 10 am, Benedek learned of the offensive movements of the 4th and 2nd Corps. He immediately ordered them back to their original positions. He received a reply to the effect that the attack was going well and there was hope of a victory on the Prussian left. A second order, in more forthright terms, repeated the order which reached his commanders about noon. At the same time Benedek received a telegram informing him that a strong column of Prussian troops had passed Salney, to the north.
Count Thun, commander of the 2nd Corps obeyed his order and had started to move by 12.30pm. Mollinary, commanding the 4th, rode over to headquarters to request permission to continue the attack (he was refused) and he did not start moving his troops until about an hour later.
It was now too late to move the troops back to their original position. Between noon and 2pm, the Prussian Guard arrived and took, first the village of Horenowes and, by 2pm the village of Maslowed. The 11th Division continued south from Racitz, took Sendrasitz, Rodow and Trotina. The Austrians were thus attempting to manoeuvre across the face of the Prussian troops.
The Guard were not content to rest on their laurels and continued onwards taking the highly strategic village of Chlum by 2.30 and rolling on to Rosberitz by 3.00 pm. The 11th Division meanwhile took the village of Nedelist, taking the strong garrison by surprise as well they might have been.
The 2nd and 4th Corps, taken unexpectedly on the flank put up only a feeble resistance to this attack which in fact only consisted of 5 battalions (2 Guard, 2 llth Division and a single battalion from the 12th Division). Benedek still had at this time two intact Corps (the 1 stand the 6th), two cavalry divisions and a strong artillery reserve. A force one would have thought capable of dealing with any five battalions.
A counter‑attack on Rosberitz forced the Guard back to Chlum but when the Austrians attempted to follow up they were met by heavy artillery and rifle fire which drove them back to Rosberitz. Matters remained stationary here until, about 4.30 pm the advance battalions of the 1st Corps finally arrived. The Prussians attacked Rosberitz again and regained it.
The inglorious Austrian 2nd Corps meanwhile had continued re‑deploying and obviously wasn’t going to stop redeploying until it reached the other side of the Elbe. Benedek had had enough and gave the general order to retire.
The Austrian Army had lost 150 guns and 20, 000 prisoners as well as a huge quantity of materiel. It was forced to retreat before the Prussians in order to save itself, losing the campaign as well as the battle.
OBSERVATIONS
Like many battles, Koniggratz was won by the side that made the most productive mistakes. It was Prince Frederick Charles’ atrocious placement of the 7th Division that made the Prussian victory possible. It induced the Austrians to turn their line and present an exposed flank to the advancing 2nd Army.
Of itself, however, this would have been insufficient to cause disaster. Benedek could easily have moved one of his reserve Corps up to cover the flank, had he posted the proper scouts and been aware of the real situation. It was this failure of intelligence that led him to attempt to manoeuvre the 2nd and 4th Corps across the face of the advancing 2nd Army, inviting the entire disaster to happen.
The Austrians also failed to use their troops to the best advantage. Although their rate of rifle fire was inferior, they had superior range in both small arms and artillery and could have used both to great advantage. Instead, they made every attempt to rush to close range when attacking, when a rapid‑firing Prussian needle gun came into its own. Lack of a Divisional structure also made it difficult to launch attacks in anything other than a piecemeal fashion.
This is not to say that the Prussian army did not have its faults. It was particularly bad in its use of artillery and, in fact, it revised its whole artillery system as a result of this campaign. On the whole, however, the Prussian army was both better structured and better trained than its Austrian opponents. When all the mistakes had canceled out, this probably made the critical difference.
A NOTE ON THE SCENARIO
This is the first time we have looked at a European battle using the Decisive Battles system. At Koniggratz there were upwards of 200,000 men on each side who took part (or should have) in the battle. That’s about three times the number who fought at Gettysburg; and on a smaller battlefield) European armies still employed highly trained shock cavalry and went into battle shoulder‑to‑shoulder, much as they had in the Napoleonic period. In fact, so impressed was the Austrian General Staff with the French successes against the Italians in 1859 that they actively discouraged musketry practice and concentrated on massed bayonet attacks as the best method for breaking up enemy.
We have decided to double the manpower scale (i.e. about 180 troops equal 1 strength point instead of the usual 100 troops) to better reflect the formations used. Shock cavalry are simulated by reducing range value of their small arms type to 0. Terrain scale is about 600 yards to the hex. Prussian units are North, Austrian units are South.
Prussian Forces
The Prussian Army
King William of Prussia
(General von Moltke)
Frederick’s Corps (1st Army)
Attached to Corps HQ
Ramm’s Bty (Ram; 600 crew, 24 guns),
Lilienthal’s Bty (Lil; 600 crew, 24 guns)
Werder’s Division (3rd)
Buddenbrock’s Bde (Bud; 1,300 inf, 6 guns),
Borke’s Bde (Bor; 2,000 inf, 6 guns),
Winterfeld’s Bde (Win; 1,600 inf, 6 guns),
Stahr’s Ble (Sta; 1,700 inf, 6 guns)
Bittenfeld’s Division (4th)
Wietersheim’s Bde (Wie; 1,700 inf, 6 guns),
Michaelis’ Bde (Mic; 1,900 inf, 6 guns),
Krane’s Bde (Kra; 2,100 inf, 6 guns)
Kamienski’s Division (6th)
Diringshofen’s Bde (Dir; 1,600 inf, 6 guns),
Berger’s Bde (Ber; 1,800 inf, 6 guns),
Barres’ Bde (Bar; 2,100 inf, 6 guns)
Manstein’s Division (6th)
Gersdorf’s Bde (Ger; 1,700 inf, 6 guns),
Goertz’ Bde (Goe; 2,100 inf, 6 guns),
Hacke’s Bde (Hac; 2,200 Inf, 6 guns)
Fransecky’s Division (7th)
Gordon’s Bde (Gor; 1,800 inf, no guns),
Medem’s Bde Wed; 1,900 inf, no guns),
Bothmer’s Bde (Bot; 2,000 inf, no guns)
Horn’s Division (8th)
Valentini’s Bde (Val; 1,600 inf, 6 guns),
Avemann’s Bde (Ave; 1,800 inf. 6 guns),
Wedell’s Bde (Wed; 1,600 Inf, 6 guns)
Albrecht’s Cavalry Division
Pfuel’s Bde (Pfu; 2,400 cav, 6 guns),
Weyhern’s Bde (Wey; 1,700 cav, no guns)
Bittenfeld’s Corps (Army of the Elbe)
Attached to Corps HQ
Goltz’ Bde (Gol; 2,100 cav, 6 guns)
Schoeler’s Division (Adv. Gd)
Koblinski’s Bde (Kob; 1,600 inf. 6 guns),
Conrady’s Bde (Con; 1,600 inf, 6 guns)
Munster’s Division (14th)
Schwartz’ Bde (Sch; 2,500 inf, 6 guns),
Hiller’s Bde (Hil; 2,200 inf, 6 guns)
Canstein’s Division (16th)
Steuckradt’s Bde (Ste; 2,100 inf, 6 guns),
Glasenapp’s Bde (Gla; 2,400 inf, 6 guns)
Etzel’s Division (16th)
Senden’s Bde (Sen; 2,200 inf, 6 guns),
Wegerer’s Bde (Weg; 2,700 inf, 6 guns)
Blumenthal’s Corps
(2nd Army)
Attached to Corps HQ
Kameke’s Bty (Kam; 600 crew, 24 guns),
Oertzen’s Bty (Oer; 600 crew, 24 guns),
Hohenlohe’s Bty (Hoh; 600 crew, 24 guns)
Gartringen’s Division (1st Gd)
Alvensleben’s Bde (Alv; 2,100 inf, 6 guns),
Obernitz’ Bde (Obe; 2,000 inf, 6 guns),
Kessel’s Bde (Kes; 1,800 inf, 6 guns)
Plonski’s Division (2nd Gd)
Pritzelwitz’ Bde (Pri; 1,700 inf, 6 guns),
Budritzki’s Bde (Bud; 2,500 inf, 6 guns),
Loen s Bde (Loe; 1,900 inf. 6 guns)
Grosmann’s Division (1st)
Pape’s Bde (Pap; 3,100 inf, 12 guns),
Bredow’s Cav Bde (Bre; 2,000 cav, 6 guns)
Clausewitz’ Division (2nd)
Malokti’s Bde (Mal; 2,500 inf, 6 guns),
Boswell’s Bde (Bos; 2,600 inf, 6 guns),
Barnekow’s Bde (Bar; 2,800 inf, 12 guns)
Zastrow’s Division (11th)
Hanenfeldt’s Bde (Han; 3,000 inf 6 guns)
Hoffmann’s Bde (Hof, 2,900 inf, 6 guns)
Prondzynski’s Division (12th)
Ruville’s Bde (Ruv; 1,200 inf, 6 guns),
Kaminski’s Bde (Kam; 1,600 inf, 6 guns)
Lowenfeldt’s Division (9th)
Below’s Bde (Bel; 2,900 inf, 6 guns),
Horn’s Bde (Hor; 2,200 inf, 6 guns)
Kirchbach’s Division (10th)
Tiedemann’s Bde (Tie; 2,800 inf, 6 guns),
Witlich’s Bde (Wit; 2,700 inf, 6 guns)
Hartmann’s Cavalry Division
Wnuck’s Bde (Wnu; 1,900 cav, 6 guns),
Witzleben’s Bde (Wit; 1, 700 eav, 6 guns),
Borstel’s We (Bor; 1,600 eav, no guns)
Austrian Forces
The Austrian Army
FZM Ritter von Benedek
Attached to Army HQ
1st/Res Bty (1/R; SOO crew, 28 guns),
2nd/Res Bty (2/R; 800 crew, 28 guns),
3rd/Res Bty (3/R: 800 crew, 28 guns),
4th/Res Bty (4/R; 800 crew, 28 guns)
Edelsheim’s Light Cavalry Division (1st)
1st/ 1LC Bde (1LC; 2,100 cav, 4 guns),
2nd/ 1LC Bde (2LC; 2, 100 cav, 4 guns)
Thurn’s Light Cavalry Division (2nd)
1st/2LC Bde (3LC; 2,300 cav, 4 guns),
2nd/2LC Bde (4LC; 2,000 cav, 4 guns)
Schleswig’s Heavy Cavalry Division (1st)
1st/ 1HCBde(1HC; 1,800cav, no guns),
2nd/ 1 HC Bde (2HC; 2,000 cav, no guns)
Zaitsek’s Heavy Cavalry
Division (2nd)
1st/2HCBde(3HC; 2,000 cav, no guns),
2nd/2HC Bde (4HC; 2,200 cav, no guns)
Coudenhove’s Heavy Cavalry
Division (3rd)
1st/3HC Bde (5HC; 2,300 cav, no guns),
2nd/3HC Bde (6HC; 2,000 cav, no guns)
Gallas’ Corps (1st)
Attached to Corps HQ
1st/1C Bde (1/1; 2,900 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/ 1C Bde (2/ 1; 3,000 inf, 8 guns),
3rd/ 1C Bde (3/ 1; 3,000 inf, 8 guns),
4th/1C Bde (4/1; 2,800 inf, 8 guns),
Cav/1C Bde,(C/1; 1,600 cav, 4 guns)
Thun’s Corps (2nd)
Attached to Corps HQ
1st/2C Bde (1/2: 3,100 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/2C Bde (2/2; 2,600 inf, 8 guns),
3rd/2C Bde (3/2: 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
4th/2C Bde (4/2; 2,900 inf, 8 guns),
Cav/2C Bde (C/2; 1,700 cav, 4 guns)
Ernst’s Corps (3rd)
Attached to Corps Hg
1st/3C Bde (1/3; 3,000 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/3C Bde ,(2/3; 3,000 inf, 8 guns),
3rd/3C Bde (3/3; 2,600 inf, 8 guns),
4th/3C Bde (4/3; 3,100 Inf, 8 guns),
Cav/3C Bde (C/3; 2,000 cav, 4 guns)
Festeticz’ Corps (4th)
Attached to Corps HQ
1st/4C Bde (1/4; 3,100 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/4C Bde (2/4; 2,800 inf, 8 guns),
3rd/4C Bde (3/4; 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
4th/4C Bde (4/4; 2,500 inf, 8 guns),
Cav/4C Bde (C/4; 1,800 cav, 4 guns)
Ramming’s Corps (6th)
Attached to Corps HQ
1st/6C Bde (1/6; 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/6C Bde (2/6; 2,900 inf, 8 guns),
3rri/6C Bde (3/6; 2,800 inf, 8 guns),
4th/6C Bde (4/6; 2,800 inf, 8 guns),
Cav/6C Bde (C/6; 2,100 cav, 4 guns)
Leopold’s Corps (8th)
Attached to Corps HQ
1st/8C Bde (1/8; 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/8C Bde (2/8; 3,100 inf, 8 guns),
3rd/8C Bde (3/8; 2,800 inf, 8 guns),
4th/8C Bde (4/8; 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
Cav/8C Bde (C/8; 1,900 cav, 4 guns)
Gablenz’ Corps (10th)
Attached to Corps HQ
1st/10C Bde (1/X; 3,000 inf, 8 guns),
2nd/10C Bde (2/X; 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
3rd/ 10C Bde (3/X; 2,700 inf, 8 guns),
4th/ 10C Bde (4/X; 3,000 inf, 8 guns),
Cav/ 10C Bde (C /X; 1,900 cav, 4 guns)
Royal Saxon Corps
Attached to Corps HQ
Schimpff’s Bde (Sch; 2,400 inf, 6 guns),
Stieglitz’ Bde (Sti; 2,200 inf, 6 guns),
Kohler’s Bde (Koh; 2,100 inf, 6 guns),
Fritsch’s Cav Bde (Fri; 1, 700 cav, 4 guns)
