In November 1956 Fidel Castro and 82 revolutionaries departed Mexico aboard the yacht Granma. Their destination was Cuba. They were one of several groups determined to overthrow Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Landing at Las Coloradas, they were quickly ambushed, and only a handful escaped into the scarcely accessible Sierra Maestro. Promising justice, land reform, education and health care, Castro won the support of the peasantry. A formidable revolutionary army was formed. After defeating Batista’s attempt to destroy their strongholds, the revolutionaries went on the offensive in December 1958. As Castro’s forces swept through Santiago de Cuba and through Santa Clara towards Havana, Batista fled Cuba. Castro’s revolution had triumphed.
Initially this was generally welcomed in America. Batista had been an embarrassing ally to support. His regime was extremely brutal and corrupt. The economy was stagnating. Major reforms were decades overdue. There were, however, problems in instigating reforms. Nearly all industry and a very large proportion of agriculture was American owned. Reforms, especially land reform, were impossible without harming American interests. But the problem went deeper than this. To Castro, and indeed to a great many Cubans, the USA was a fundamental part of the problems they faced. To them, America had dominated Cuba for far too long. America intervened at will in Cuban politics. The economy was American controlled. A central aim of Castro’s revolution was to free Cuba from this domination.
From the very start there was bitter anti-Americanism in Castro’s rhetoric. His conduct also showed a scant regard for American democratic values. Castro’s defeated enemies were executed in large numbers, with little pretence of proper trials. Moderates were driven from the government and elections postponed as Castro secured his grip on power. This was precisely the sort of conduct likely to convince Eisenhower that he was dealing with a Communist.
Eisenhower could never tolerate a Communist state in the western hemisphere. He decided to repeat his success in Guatemala, and ordered the CIA to bring down Castro. The CIA put out subversive propaganda and reputedly recruited the Mafia to assassinate Castro. They organised raids on Cuba, to sabotage the economy and murder Castroists – schoolteachers proved to be a particularly vulnerable target. They also recruited an anti-Castro brigade of Cuban exiles. An invasion of Cuba by these exiles, it was blithely assumed, would provoke an anti-Castro rising and solve the problem without direct American involvement. Though the plans were drawn up, Eisenhower never gave them his final approval. He had, after all, been
Supreme Allied Commander during D-Day, and was well aware that a sea-borne invasion was a far more risky proposition than driving across the frontier, as had been done in Guatemala. The decision was postponed until newly elected President Kennedy took office.
If Castro hoped that a new president might improve relations, he was quickly disappointed. Kennedy was even more hostile than Eisenhower. Cuba was an issue he had used in the election, winning him extremely vocal Cuban-American support. He also felt that nationalising American property could not go unpunished – it might give ideas to others in Latin America. But far more offensive was that a western hemisphere government was blatantly defying America. In his hostility to Castro, Kennedy employed far more energy than Eisenhower, and much less caution.
On hearing of the proposed landing, Kennedy was enthusiastic. It seemed a quick and easy solution to the problem without overt US involvement. None of the experts he consulted seem to have clearly explained the risks involved. It was assumed the landing would provoke a popular rising; if not, the exiles would withdraw into the interior and fight a guerrilla war identical to Castro’s. But the chosen landing-ground, the Bay of Pigs, faced a swamp. Withdrawal into the interior would be impossible. Kennedy did not realise that success depended utterly on a popular revolt. Nor did he realise that Castro was at this time immensely popular in Cuba. Castro was addressing very real needs and very many Cubans entirely agreed with his anti-American rhetoric. There would be no rising.
On 17 April 1961 the exile brigade, numbering about 1400, landed at the Bay of Pigs. The operation was already going seriously wrong. Their airforce had failed to destroy completely Castro’s airforce on the ground, sacrificing surprise uselessly. The exiles proved to be poorly trained and equipped. The ship carrying most of their radios and ammunition was destroyed before it reached shore. There was no rising. Castro’s experienced troops fought well and enjoyed complete popular support. The exiles found themselves trapped; they received no American military support and surrendered within three days.
Detail of Military Operations
Arguably, a handful of T-33s, Sea Furies, and B-26s saved Castro (and doomed Brigade 2506) at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. This led to the Cuban Missile Crisis, one of the most significant events in recent world history.
17 April 1961 Cuban Hawker Sea Fury pilots Douglas Rudd Mole and Enrique Carreras Rojas and T-33 pilots Alvaro Prendes Quantana, Alberto Fernandez, Rafael del Pino Diaz, each shot down a CIA B-26C Invader operating in the Bay of Pigs invasion.
18 April 1961 Cuban T-33 pilot Alvaro Prendes Quantana shot down a CIA B-26C Invader operating in the Bay of Pigs invasion.
19 April 1961 Cuban T-33 pilots Alvaro Prendes Quantana and Enrique Carreras Rojas, each shot down a CIA B-26C Invader operating in the Bay of Pigs invasion.
17 April 1961 Para Jump: San Blas, Cuba Cuba Exiles. The Bay of Pigs invasion saw the Liberation Parachute Battalion of the CIA sponsored 2506 Brigade, perform a semi-successful blocking operation for the beachead. 178 men dropping from C46 transports flown by “on leave” USAF aircrews!
Invasion
On the morning of April 15, 1961, three flights of B-26B Invader light bomber aircraft displaying Cuban Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR – Revolutionary Air Force) markings bombed and strafed the Cuban airfields of San Antonio de Los Baños, Antonio Maceo International Airport, and the airfield at Ciudad Libertad.
Operation Puma, the code name given to the offensive counter air attacks against the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, called for 48 hours of air strikes across the island to effectively eliminate the Cuban air force, ensuring Brigade 2506 complete air superiority over the island prior to the actual landing at the Bay of Pigs. This failed because the air strikes were not continued as was originally planned.
The second wave of air strikes, designed to wipe out the remainder of Castro’s air force, was canceled. President Kennedy wanted the operation to look as if the Cuban exiles could have planned it, so that his administration could claim “plausible deniability” and avoid responsibility for the invasion as a U.S. operation. This was the same reason for which the landing site had been moved from Trinidad, which was close to the Escambray Mountains, an anticommunist rebel stronghold, where the anti Castro forces would have been able to reach sanctuary in case of failure. Moreover, Trinidad not only had great port facilities for landing the invasion force, armaments and supplies, but more importantly, was a counterrevolutionary fervent of activity, where a rising of the population could have been possible. President Kennedy, despite the CIA’s objections, moved the landing site to the Bay of Pigs area. CIA Chief of Operations, Richard Bissell, had chosen this site wisely for the above reasons, but the President, upholding plausible deniability, insisted it be moved. The cancellation of the air strikes, the change of the landing site, and ultimately, the lack of U.S. air cover and support during the invasion, sealed the fate of the mission and the lives of many of the men of the invasion force.
Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, had been embarrassed by revelations that the first wave of air strikes had been carried out by U.S. planes despite his repeated denials that this was so. He contacted McGeorge Bundy who, unaware of the critical importance to the mission of the second wave, canceled the air strike despite Kennedy’s earlier approval for it. Although Castro had prior knowledge of the invasion, the Cuban air force planes were virtually a sitting duck force on the ground and could have been wiped out, if the second and third waves of attack had been launched as originally planned.
Of the Brigade 2506 aircraft that sortied on the morning of April 15, one was tasked with establishing the CIA cover story for the invasion. The slightly modified two-seat B-26B used for this mission was piloted by Captain Mario Zuniga. Prior to departure, the engine cowling from one of the aircraft’s two engines was removed by maintenance personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight.
Captain Zuniga departed from the exile base in Nicaragua on a solo, low-flying mission that took him over the westernmost province of Pinar del Río, Cuba, and then northeast toward Key West, Florida. Once across the island, Captain Zuniga climbed steeply away from the waves of the Florida Straits to an altitude where he would be detected by U.S. radar installations to the north of Cuba.
At altitude and a safe distance north of the island, Captain Zuniga feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the engine cowling, radioed a mayday call and requested immediate permission to land at Boca Chica Naval Air Station a few kilometers northeast of Key West. This account differs from Cuban government reports that Sea Fury, B-26 fighter bombers and T-33 trainers flown by the few Cuban and some left-wing Chilean and Nicaraguan pilots, loyal to Castro attacked the older slower B-26s flown by the invading force.
By the time of Captain Zuniga’s announcement to the world mid-morning on April 15, all but one of the Brigade’s Douglas bombers were back over the Caribbean on the three and a half hour return leg to their base in Nicaragua to re-arm and refuel. Upon landing, however, the flight crews were met with a cable from Washington ordering the indefinite stand-down of all further combat operations over Cuba.
On April 17, four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe, and Atlántico) transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the Southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing crafts (LCI’s), called the Blagar and Barbara J, containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The small army hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to Havana. The CIA assumed the invasion would spark a popular uprising against Castro. However, the Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel. By the time the invasion began, Castro had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign (notably two former “Comandantes” Humberto Sorí Marin and William Alexander Morgan. Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano, a catholic youth leader. April was a bloody month for the resistance. Several hundred thousand were imprisoned before, during and after the invasion.
After landing, it soon became evident that the exiles were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles involving heavy USSR equipment. Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion U.S. air support (though four U.S. pilots were killed in Cuba during the invasion) because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy also canceled several sorties of bombings (only two took place) on the grounded Cuban air force, which might have crippled the Cuban air capabilities and given air superiority to the invaders. U.S. Marines were not sent in.
Air action
Aviation is commonly considered the deciding factor during the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Cuban government navy forces had been destroyed early with much loss of life while still in port at Rio de Las Casas base.
Initially the CIA planned a surprise air attack using B-26Bs on the Cuban Air Force, the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR). This took place in the early morning of April 15 with eight B-26s attacking the Antonio Maceo airport and various air bases. The attack left Cuban forces with “two B-26s, two Sea Furies, and two T-33As at San Antonio de los Baños Airbase, and only one Sea Fury at the Antonio Maceo Airport” while two of the attacking bombers were damaged. However, these surviving FAR aircraft, though few, were of good quality and, with a mix of fighter/bombers and ground attack aircraft, still a well-balanced force to use in defense against an amphibious invasion. By contrast, the CIA-provided aircraft mix lacked the flexibility necessary to achieve air superiority. However, the leadership of the air-forces of the Cuban government was in disarray former driver for Raul Castro “Maro” Guerra Bermejo, was replaced on the second day of action by Castro’s Minister of Communication Raúl Curbelo Morales; at this time the Hispano-Soviet pilots had not yet arrived.
After this initial success, the CIA/Exile air force suffered considerable reverses. When the invasion started, the remaining FAR Hawker Sea Furies were able to engage the Exile forces on the beaches within 15 minutes. When the FAR B-26s arrived to take over bombing the beaches, the Hawkers changed targets to the amphibious support ships, damaging the flagship “Marsopa” and sinking the “Houston”, which was the main supply ship, for the loss of one aircraft.
In response the invaders ordered four B-26s to resume bombing and strafing missions using napalm, but two were quickly shot down and the other two retreated, one badly damaged. However, at least one of these attacks is believed to have caused at least nine hundred casualties to the Castro forces. Thereafter, the FAR enjoyed almost total air superiority. The next day, the FAR shot down two opposing B-26s, and the day after that, ten were shot down.
Land action
In the beginning, the militia on the beach surrendered, and the invaders moved to control the causeways. There the fighting became intense, and Cuban army causalities were very high, both as a result of firepower from the invaders and the strafing B-26. A photo of a burned bus, presumable one of those used to transport militia, can be seen on page 154 of Wyden (1979) However, once their air support was eliminated and after expending all ammunition, the invaders were forced back to the beach (summarized from Lynch, Grayston L. 2000, and others in bibliography below). The land action was very bloody. Carlos Franqui wrote:
“We lost a lot of men. This frontal attack of men against machines (the enemy tanks) had nothing to do with guerrilla war; in fact it was a Russian tactic, probably the idea of the two Soviet generals, both of Spanish origin (they fought for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War and fled to the Soviet Union to later fight in World War II. One of them was a veteran, a fox named Ciutah (sic). He (Ciutah) was sent by the Red Army and the Party as an adviser and was the father of the new Cuban army. He was the only person who could have taken charge of the Girón campaign. The other Hispano-Russian general was an expert in antiguerrilla war who ran the Escambray cleanup. But the real factor in our favor at Girón was the militias: Almejeira’s column embarked on a suicide mission, they were massacred but they reached the beach.”
Sea Action
Naval action during the Bay of Pigs extended beyond the attacks on the invaders supply vessels. The Cuban Government lost at least one vessel, the P.C. Baire with extensive, but apparently not specifically reported, loss of life. The invader command ship Blagar successfully fought off attacking aircraft.
Aftermath
From the air battle, there were 10 Cuban exiles, 4 U.S. pilots, and 6 Cuban Air Force pilots killed in action.
By the time fighting ended on April 21, 68 exiles were dead and the rest were captured. Estimates of Cuban forces killed vary with the source, but were generally far higher.
The 1,209 captured exiles were quickly put on trial. A few were executed and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison for treason. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.
Cuba’s losses during the Bay of Pigs Invasion are unknown, but most sources’ estimates are high. Triay mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch states about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting.
In one air attack alone, Cuban forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by napalm.
The government initially reported their army losses as 87 dead with many more wounded. The number of those killed in action in Cuba’s army during the battle eventually ran to 140, and then finally to 161. Thus in the most accepted calculations, a total of around 2,000 (perhaps as many as 5,000, see above) Cuban militia fighting for the Republic of Cuba may have been killed, wounded or missing in action.
The total casualties for the brigade were 104 members killed, and a few hundred more were wounded.
In 1979 the body of Alabama National Guard Captain Thomas Willard Ray, who was shot down flying a B-26, was returned to his family from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted to his links to the agency and awarded him their highest award, the Intelligence Star.
Prisoners
In May 1961 Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for five hundred bulldozers. The trade rose to US$28 million. Negotiations were non-productive until after the Cuban missile crisis. On December 21, 1962, Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and medicine; the money was raised by private donations. On December 29, 1962, Kennedy met with the returning brigade at Palm Beach, Florida.
Political Aftermath
For Kennedy the fiasco was a massive humiliation, made worse when Castro sold back the captured exiles for food and medical supplies. He was denounced in America and internationally for the operation. He was condemned by anti-communists for allowing the operation to fail. Others condemned him for an unjustified and reckless gamble that might have provoked a Soviet response leading to nuclear war. One thing was clear, America would never forgive Castro for this humiliation; he had made a permanent enemy.
