An American View

Seizing and Holding the German Bridges at Arnhem, September 1944

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Ramsey III

On 8 August 1944, the Allies created the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), with lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton as its commander. The FAAA was an unprecedented combined organization consisting of airmen and soldiers from Britain, Poland, and the United States. Brereton commanded over 50,000 soldiers in the British I Airborne Corps (the 1st Airborne, 6th Airborne, and 52d [Lowland] Divisions and 1st Polish Independent Airborne Brigade [commanded by his deputy, Lieutenant General F. A. M. Browning]) and in Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway’s U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps (the 17th Airborne, 82d Airborne, and 101st Airborne Divisions). In addition, Brereton had the U.S. IX Troop Carrier Command with over 1,300 C-47 transport aircraft under Major General Paul L. Williams (along with the RAF’s 38th and 46th Groups-old bombers used as tugs for gliders-under Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst). With a portion of these forces, Brereton conducted the largest airborne operation of World War II, Operation Market-Garden.

As the Allies raced across France, the FAAA found itself under tremendous pressure to participate in the destruction of German forces, which appeared imminent. Since the FAAA was a pet project of both General George C. Marshall and Lieutenant General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, General Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged his subordinates, as well as Brereton, to develop an imaginative and daring concept for the use of the FAAA. Accordingly, in its first forty days, the FAAA considered eighteen separate airborne operations: five were developed into detailed plans, and three reached the point of execution. The last, Operation Comet, a reinforced division drop to secure the bridges at Arnhem, was canceled on 10 September. In fact, Browning threatened to resign over this risky operation. As the Allies approached the German border, the opportunities to use the FAAA from its bases in Britain were steadily diminished.

On 10 September, Brereton received instructions to support Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in its attempt to flank German defenses by moving north into Holland to cross the Rhine River. Montgomery proposed that Brereton secure key bridges along his axis of advance by dropping three and one-half airborne divisions while Montgomery attacked along that axis with the British XXX Corps. Market was the airborne operation, Garden the XXX Corps’ advance. That evening, Brereton stated to his commanders and key staff officers his intention to seize the bridges with “thunderclap surprise” by using the U.S. 101st Airborne Division in the south from Eindhoven to Veghel; the U.S. 82d Airborne Division in the center from Grave to Nijmegen; and the British 1st Airborne Division, with the Polish Brigade, for the bridges over the Rhine at Arnhem. The plan called for the XXX Corps to advance the sixty-four miles to Arnhem in forty-eight hours. Although an operation of this magnitude was unprecedented in its boldness and complexity, the new, enthusiastic FAAA staff worked diligently and quickly to execute Market in less than a week.

With little available time, Brereton made some fundamental decisions. First, he decided that this operation, unlike all others in the war, would occur during daylight since moonlight would be nonexistent during the operation and Brereton’s aircrews were not well trained for night navigation. In addition, weak German air and ground forces in the area could be better attacked during daylight. Second, Brereton decided to make only one airlift on D-day, carrying 16,500 of the 35,000 soldiers behind German lines. To facilitate XXX Corps’ advance, priority went to the U.S. 101st Airborne Division, then the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, and finally the British 1st Airborne Division. After receiving contradictory advice from his air commanders, Brereton agreed with Williams that the expected loss rate, estimated at 30 percent, and a shortage of ground crews to perform maintenance made the use of the initial lift force for a second lift impossible. In addition, Williams, the airlift commander, argued that it was important to start each lift with fresh, fit crews. Williams was naturally concerned with airlift problems, not the ground commanders’ plight. These decisions, along with optimistic intelligence reports, affected operations at Arnhem.

Major General Roy E. Urquhart, a combat veteran of Sicily and Italy, was new to the British 1st Airborne Division. His Market-Garden mission was the most difficult and the most important: to seize and hold the bridges at Arnhem for forty-eight hours. Allied headquarters expected German resistance to be disorganized and no larger than brigade size, with a few armored vehicles. Urquhart’s initial concept was to land his four brigades-two parachute, one airlanding, and the Polish parachute-close to both ends of the bridges simultaneously, achieving Brereton’s “thunderclap surprise.” Unfortunately, intelligence indicated that enemy flak, as well as terrain unsuitable for drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs), made that impossible. After a long discussion with his RAF advisers, Urquhart was forced to choose DZs and LZs north of the Rhine and eight miles west of Arnhem.

Unlike the two U.S. divisions-which put maximum infantry strength, nine battalions, on the ground with the first lift-Urquhart believed that it was more important to get artillery and division troops on the ground early. Consequently, his D-day lift of 145 C-47s and 358 gliders put the 1st Parachute Brigade and most of the 1st Airlanding Brigade on the ground-less than six battalions, with division troops and two 75-mm artillery batteries. When the RAF refused to support a predawn glider coup de main on the bridges, Urquhart decided to use the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, his reconnaissance unit, for that purpose.

Given limited lift assets, Urquhart was forced to plan both for the immediate seizure of the bridges and for the buildup of his four brigades. On D-day, the 1st Airlanding Brigade-minus part of a battalion and other divisional units-would land to secure the DZ and LZ for the D+1 arrivals. The 1st Parachute Brigade would jump and then advance with three battalions to Arnhem to seize the bridges. On D+1, the 4th Parachute Brigade, with the remainder of the divisional units, would arrive. Then, both the 4th Parachute Brigade and 1st Airlanding Brigade would advance into Arnhem. On D+2, the 1st Polish Airborne Brigade would jump south of the Rhine, completing the arrival of the four brigades deemed necessary to take and to hold Arnhem. However, on D+2, the XXX Corps was scheduled to arrive. The piecemeal arrival of units over several days at distant DZs, and LZs, shaped Urquhart’s plan.

Sunday, 17 September, was D-day. From 22 airfields throughout Britain, 1,534 aircraft with 491 gliders carried the 16,500 men of the FAAA’s first lift (see map 1). An intensive flak suppression bombardment was conducted the night before, as well as prior to, the arrival of the C-47s. The placement of the troops was almost flawless. Moreover, aircraft losses were less than 3 percent-well below the projected 30 percent. Urquhart was particularly fortunate. The Germans failed to hit a single 1st Airborne Division plane or glider. Furthermore, only twenty-three gliders had aborted. The air force had done an excellent job getting the men to the proper LZs and DZs, west of Arnhem. Brereton’s decision to make the unprecedented daylight airborne assault made this the most successful airborne drop of the war.

At 1300, exactly as the XXX Corps advanced, the gliders of the 1st Airlanding Brigade landed with divisional troops. An hour later, the 1st Parachute Brigade jumped without difficulty. By 1530, the 1st Airlanding Brigade had secured the DZ for the D+1 drop. The 1st Parachute Brigade, with the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron leading, began moving toward Arnhem. As the 1st Parachute Brigade advanced with three battalions abreast-the 1st Parachute Battalion in the north, 3d Parachute Battalion in the center, and 2d Parachute Battalion along the river road-the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, with its gun jeeps, raced ahead on the direct route toward Arnhem.

Unknown to Urquhart, German forces in the Arnhem area were more numerous and better equipped than expected. The hasty preparations for the operations, together with the general chaos of the German retreat, made it almost impossible for the Allies to determine the German strength at Arnhem. Aerial photographs, reports from the Dutch Resistance, and signals intelligence from Ultra provided contradictory clues. Not only did ad hoc German combat groups exist, but the remnants of the II SS Panzer Corps were refitting east of Arnhem. The German reaction to the Allies was swift. By 1700, German armored reconnaissance vehicles moved toward the DZs. Elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division-brigade size and with armor-focused on Arnhem, while elements of the 10th SS Panzer Division moved on Nijmegen to the south.

A meeting engagement occurred west of Arnhem. The 1st Parachute Brigade began its fight, not at the bridges as hoped, but en route to them. With limited mobility and few antiarmor weapons, the 1st and 3d Parachute Battalions, along with the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, were halted before dark. Communications problems led Urquhart to move forward with the 1st Parachute Brigade during its advance. When his vehicle was destroyed by indirect fire, he was unable to return to his headquarters. Attempts by the 1st Parachute Brigade to fight through the German forces in the dark increased British losses, some from friendly fire. The chaotic nonlinear fighting, combined with the aggressive enthusiasm of 1st Parachute Brigade troopers-attacking without adequate fire support-created heavy casualties, particularly among leaders. Fortunately, the 2d Parachute Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Frost, met no resistance. By 2030, the 2d Parachute Battalion occupied the north end of the main highway bridge in Arnhem with about 500 men. Two attempts to take the bridge during the night failed. By dawn of D+1, Frost occupied a strong defensive position. His only source of help, the remnants of the 1st and 3d Parachute Battalions, each down to about 100 men, was halted by German hasty defenses west of Arnhem. In less than twenty-four hours, the 1st Parachute Brigade lost its offensive capability. To continue the advance required fresh troops.

Command and control continued to be a problem on 18 September. Radios failed to work, both within the division and to higher headquarters. Only the artillery nets worked with any reliability. What is more, Urquhart remained cut off from his units on D+1. Crucial decisions were not made because no one knew the real situation or where Urquhart was. In Urquhart’s absence, the commander of the 1st Airlanding Brigade acted as the 1st Airborne Division’s commander. Bad weather in Britain delayed the arrival of the 4th Parachute Brigade until 1500. By 1700, after discussing a plan to attack toward Arnhem and receiving the 7th King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) Battalion from the 1st Airlanding Brigade, the 4th Parachute Brigade’s commander ordered an advance to the east. Attacking late in the day without surprise, fire support, and knowledge of German intentions, the 4th Parachute Brigade bogged down in the dark, just as the 1st Parachute Brigade had the day before. Aggressiveness and dash again produced high casualties with minimal results. German indirect fire and close air support were devastating. By the end of D+1, Frost doggedly held the bridge at Arnhem against increasingly adverse odds. The 4th Parachute Brigade had blunted its own advance against a reinforced German defensive line.

Urquhart reappeared on the morning of D+2 after his combat elements had been committed. Reinforcement by the 1st Polish Brigade was canceled because of bad weather. In the afternoon, Urquhart decided to establish a bridgehead at Oosterbeek, near a ferry site. The 1st Air landing Brigade (-) and divisional troops occupied the perimeter, joined by the survivors of the 1st Parachute Brigade. The 4th Parachute Brigade now was fighting for its life. Conducting a hasty withdrawal under fire in the daylight, the 7th KOSB lost two-thirds of its strength in less than one hour. Both the 156th Parachute and 10th Parachute Battalions, now at 50 percent strength, had about 250 men each. The fighting was severe. In less than 2 days, the 1st Airborne Division had lost 3,500 out of 5,500 men, the majority of casualties in the infantry battalions. Few officers or noncommissioned officers survived unscathed. Urquhart was disappointed that the XXX Corps had failed to arrive and hoped that its arrival was imminent.

On Wednesday, 20 September, D+3, Urquhart was able to talk directly with Frost for the first time by using the civilian telephone system. Both received a discouraging, candid appraisal of what each could expect from the other-basically nothing. Repeatedly attacked, Frost could hold only for a short time longer. The 2d Parachute Battalion’s gallant fight described by Brigadier General James M. Gavin, commander of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, as “the outstanding independent parachute battalion action of the war,” would be for naught if the XXX Corps failed to arrive soon. The arrival of the 4th Parachute Brigade at Oosterbeek provided Urquhart another shock. It had exhausted itself in less than thirty-six hours; only about 500 of its infantrymen remained. The 156th Parachute Battalion was down to two officers and forty-seven men. Fortunately for the British, the Germans became more cautious as they probed the perimeter. The best the 1st Airborne Division could do was to hold and hope that either the XXX Corps or 1st Polish Brigade would arrive soon.

By dawn on D+4, resistance at the Arnhem bridge ceased. The 2d Parachute Battalion no longer existed. At Oosterbeek, Urquhart reorganized his defenses, consisting of fewer than 3,000 men, mostly divisional troops. To add to his problems, weather continued to hinder resupply, and the division ammunition dump exploded from enemy fire. Just as things were bleakest, two incidents raised the morale of the 1st Airborne Division. First, communication was established with the 64th Medium Field Artillery Regiment at Nijmegen, eleven miles away. For the first time during the entire fight, friendly fire support was provided; it kept the Germans at bay. In the afternoon, despite bad weather and heavy flak, the 1st Polish Brigade jumped south of the Rhine. Only 2 battalions with about 750 men arrived at the jump site. Aircraft turned back without dropping the third battalion. The Poles wanted to cross the river that evening, but no boats arrived. Isolated, Urquhart sent the following message at 2144: “Our casualties heavy. Resources stretched utmost. Relief within 24 hours vital.” The 1st Airborne Division was in danger of destruction.

The worst weather of the entire operation occurred on 22 September. The XXX Corps’ reconnaissance units linked up with the Poles and provided reliable radio relay for the 1st Airborne Division. For the first time, both Urquhart and the XXX Corps understood each other’s situation. Efforts from 22 to 24 September by the Poles and the Dorsets from the British 43d Division provided reinforcements: 250 Poles and 400 Dorsets. Finally, on 23 September, close air support became available in limited numbers. Besides bad weather and the destruction of the two air control parties’ radios early in the fight, the Second Tactical Air Force (TAF) had been forbidden by the FAAA from flying when lift or resupply missions were in the air. No one coordinated with the Second TAF to interdict German reinforcement of the Arnhem area. As a result, German units moved about with almost complete freedom. While Allied air support missions were more numerous when weather permitted, they were too late to help the 1st Airborne Division.

Finally, on 25 September, D+8, Urquhart received permission to withdraw across the Rhine River while in contact with the enemy-a delicate and complex operation. As Urquhart made his plan, he drew on his prewar preparation for a promotion examination that required him to study the withdrawal from Gallipoli. At 2145, in the midst of a heavy rainfall and covered by the artillery fire of the XXX Corps, the 1st Airborne Division commenced its withdrawal. By 0230 on D+9, the last remnants of the 1st Airborne Division-military policemen who had volunteered to remain behind to ensure that German prisoners of war did not expose the withdrawal-reached the southern bank of the Rhine. Market was over for the 1st Airborne Division.

What were the results? Losses were high. Of 10,003 Allied soldiers and airmen north of the Rhine, only 2,398 were evacuated: 1,741 from the 1st Airborne Division, 422 glider pilots, 160 Poles, and 75 Dorsets. The remainder-1,200 killed in action and 6,642 prisoners of war or missing in action-were lost during the fighting. The 1st Airborne Division ceased to exist as a fighting unit. Despite Montgomery’s claim that the operation was 90 percent successful for the 1st Airborne Division, it was a failure. The 1st had not captured the bridges, and the XXX Corps did not link up in time. Brereton considered the operation a “brilliant success.” Perhaps his focus was on the two U.S. divisions and the daylight landings rather than the reason all the units were delivered. The bold, imaginative plan had failed. Without the bridges over the Rhine, a fifty-mile salient leading nowhere of importance to the Allies had been created.

Why did the 1st Airborne Division fail? First, Montgomery’s plan for Market-Garden was too ambitious. To expect that the XXX Corps could advance sixty-four miles along one road in forty-eight hours assumed almost flawless execution of a complex plan. Friction affects simple plans, but it can act even more disconcertingly on complex ones. Second, time was in too short supply to prepare adequately for an operation of this complexity. Important things were left undone. Intelligence was scanty and inaccurate, especially in regard to German forces, flak density, and DZ and LZ terrain assessments. Liaison with the I Airborne Corps, XXX Corps, and Second TAF was poor. The general euphoria and the intense desire to use the FAAA combined to create this hasty operation. Badly wanted, it was badly executed. Third, while Brereton’s decision to conduct a daylight operation permitted an accuracy unrealized in previous airborne operations, his decision not to attempt a second lift on D-day was disastrous for the 1st Airborne Division. Urquhart was forced to fight one brigade against an objective expected to require four. If no follow-on lifts had been planned, an attack on D-day with six battalions, instead of three in the 1st Airborne Brigade, would have been possible. Urquhart was seriously constrained in his planning options for this operation.

To improve his chances for success, Urquhart could have done some things differently. First, the DZs and LZs were too far from the objectives. Faulty intelligence, along with the emphasis on air considerations rather than ground operations, created this problem. At least the glider coup de main could have been attempted. Second, command and control could have been enhanced by greater emphasis on training before the operation and by Urquhart’s remaining in a position to control this complex operation, particularly through D+I. Regardless of what else Urquhart could have done, the simple fact remains that the best airborne forces, when left alone and unassisted for extended periods of time, do poorly against even remnants of heavy forces.

As Bernard Fall said, “A parachute is merely a means of delivery, but not a way of fighting.”

Bibliography

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MacDonald, Charles Brown. The Siegfried Line Campaign. United States Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963.

Powell, Geoffrey. The Devil’s Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem, 1944. New York: Franklin Watts, 1985.

___. Men at Arnhem. London: Buchan & Enright, 1986.

Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.

Urquhart, Robert Elliott. Arnhem. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1958.