Professor Minoru Nomura, Military History Department, National Defense College, Tokyo, Japan.

Introduction

There are no universally accepted opinions on the origin of the Japanese people, but it can be considered that they are probably a complicated mixture of northern peoples who migrated from Manchuria and Korea, and of southern peoples from the South Seas. Naturally the Indonesians are also included in these southern peoples. The enthusiastic welcome that the Indonesians gave to the Japanese Army, when it advanced into the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War 1, is not unconnected with this close racial relationship.

There are considerable disagreements over exactly when Holland began her colonial policy in Indonesia, but one can probably suggest the appointment of a Governor-General for Java and the building of Batavia in 1619. However, the final formation of the Dutch East Indies was only in 1904. Before that, from the end of the 16th century, Japan’s trading with the South Seas area, including Indonesia, had been fairly active, but with the Tokugawa Bakufu’s complete introduction of the sakoku (closed country) policy in 1639, Japan’s connections with Indonesia were severed.

In the 19th century Japan avoided being colonised by the Western powers, and by victories in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, became herself one of the world’s great powers. Japan’s growth as a world power was watched with astonishment by the Indonesians, who had been colonised by the Dutch, and it has been widely recognised that this had an influence in restoring the self-confidence that the Indonesians had lost.2

The Dutch East Indies was an area in which, since the Meiji Restoration, Japan had hoped for peaceful economic development. After the Russo-Japanese War the Emperor approved the ‘Imperial National Defense Policy’ on 4 April 1907. This was the state’s basic policy, decided in order to unify the policies of the government and the supreme command, in a situation whereby the Japanese government and the supreme command had come to function separately and in parallel. It stated that Japan had to protect, firstly, her rights and interests in Manchuria and Korea, and secondly, the development of emigration and commercial influence in South Asia and on the American Pacific Coast.3 It was Japan’s desire to make inroads into the Dutch East Indies, but obviously this conflicted with Holland’s colonial policies and could not progress smoothly.

The Japanese Armed Forces first gave close attention to the Dutch East Indies in the second half of the 1930s. This paper will present an outline of the thinking and policies of the Japanese Armed Forces towards the Dutch East In-dies from tint period until 1945, and will attempt to discuss the essential themes. The majority of the materials used in this paper are to be found amongst the official documents in the Military History Department of National Defense College, and the remaining materials are the records of interviews given by Japanese Army and Navy high-ranking officers.

Growth of Interest

On 7 August 1936 the Japanese Five Ministers’ Conference (consisting of Prime Minister Hirota, Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister Terauchi, Navy Minister Nagano and Finance Minister Baba) adopted the ‘Fundamentals of National Policy’. This stated that “we plan to develop nationally and economically vis-à-vis the Southern areas, especially the outer Southern area… We plan to expand our power by gradual peaceful means”. The phrase “outer Southern area” meant the islands to the south of Japan’s existing mandated islands, with the Dutch East Indies as the essential focus-point. Much importance was attached to the ‘Fundamentals of National Policy’ in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which saw it as showing Japan’s aggressive intentions, and it was one of the reasons for Prime Minister Hirota being the only civilian sentenced to death, but, actually, at that point of time, there was no great difference between this policy and Meiji era policies. 4

With the change of warships’ fuel from coal to oil and the development of aircraft, the guarantee of oil supplies became an important problem for the Japanese Armed Forces, and this factor became the major reason for the Japanese Armed Forces to start paying attention to the Dutch East Indies. After the 1920s tie majority of Japan’s oil imports came from America, and, secondly, from the Dutch East Indies. However, as Japan advanced on the Chinese mainland the antagonism between America and Japan gradually increased, and, in inverse proportion, Japan’s interest in the Dutch East Indies deepened. America’s announcement on 26 July 1939 of her intention to abrogate the United States – Japanese Commerce and Navigation Treaty marked the turning-point for the Japanese Armed Forces to direct their attention closely to the Dutch East Indies. Namely, in the event of America prohibiting the export of oil to Japan, nowhere except the Dutch East Indies could be considered as a possible source of oil for Japan.

With Germany’s attack on Poland the Second World War began, and the Japanese Armed Forces watched for the fate of the Netherlands proper. Although the Dutch Government adopted a policy of neutrality, it was thought that there was a strong possibility that this neutrality would be violated either by Britain and France or by Germany. The Japanese Armed Forces were concerned about the fate of the Dutch East Indies if Holland were to be invaded. This concern increased considerably as, with Germany’s invasion of Norway and Denmark on 9 April 1940, the spreading of the flames of war into Holland became nearer to being realised. Therefore the Naval General Staff (Gunrei-bu), headed by Admiral Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, on 20 April 1940 formulated the ‘Policy towards the Dutch East Indies in the Event of a Violation of the Neutrality of the Nether-lands Proper’. It was considered that sooner or later Holland’s neutrality would be violated by Britain, France and Germany, in which case a vacuum would be created, both politically and militarily, in the Dutch East Indies, and moreover that only three countries, Japan, Britain and America, could possibly fill that vacuum. It is known that, therefore, fearing that Japan’s economic relations with the Dutch East Indies would come under pressure if Britain or America were to fill that vacuum, the question of despatching naval squadrons, if necessary, under the pretext of ‘the protection of residents’ was examined. 5

Descent into War

The success of the German Western offensive after 10 May 1940 had an impact on the Japanese Armed Forces, as on the rest of the world. They started to think that Germany might win quick victories in the war in Western Europe, and they were apprehensive that, in the event of a consequent peace conference, Germany might extend her influence into the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and Japan’s mandated territories in the South Pacific (former German territories). Some of the young officers urged that Japan should make use of this golden opportunity to occupy the Dutch East Indies and secure her position of self-sufficiency. However, these arguments were rejected, as an occupation of the Indies would at some stage lead to a Japanese – American war for which no preparations had been made and moreover in which the prospects for victory were poor. The initial motive for the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany was the desire to make Germany recognise Japan’s sphere of influence in East Asia, including the Dutch East Indies. Germany wanted by means of the Tripartite Pact to deter America from joining the war against her, but Japan signed the Pact because of a misjudgment over the result of the war in Western Europe.

Any army anywhere makes strategic plans for use in the case of emergencies, and the Japanese Armed Forces were no exception. The first time that the Annual Operation Plans of the Japanese Armed Forces contained plans for the occupation of the Dutch East Indies was in 1941. It was decided that Army divisions would occupy Java and southern Sumatra, an important area for natural resources, while the Navy would occupy Dutch Borneo and the Celebes. Further, the Annual Operation Plans for 1941 included provisions for war against America, Britain and Holland, in which event, it was planned to deploy strategic troops in advance in bases in the southern part of French Indo-China and Thai-land.6 It must not be overlooked that this plan was the background to the stationing of Japanese troops in southern French Indo-China (the Saigon area).

After the occupation of Holland by the German Army and the exile of the Dutch Government to London, Japan wanted to increase her power of influence in the Dutch East Indies and to obtain the necessary strategic materials, oil, rub-ber and tin, by earnest negotiation with the Governor of the Dutch East Indies. The negotiations from September 1940 to June 1941 were conducted by first-rate individuals, firstly, Minister of Commerce and Industry Kobayashi Ichizo, and, secondly, former Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who were sent to Batavia as the Japanese representatives. The Japanese Armed Forces enthusiastically supported the Japanese Government. However, the Dutch East Indies Government, in secret contact with both America and Britain, did not accept readily Japan’s demands. This Government, taking the delivery of strategic materials to Japan to mean in effect, with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, handing over the rubber and other materials to Germany, adopted a tough line.7 The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, which incorporated Japan’s desire to preserve the East Indies within her sphere of influence, in fact had the opposite effect, for it pulled the Dutch East Indies away from Japan.

Disappointed with the Dutch East Indies Government’s firm attitude, on 17 June 1941 the Japanese Government broke off the negotiations, and on 28 July sent the Japanese Army into the southern part of French Indo-China. There were various motives for this occupation, 8 but the main reason was the Japanese Armed Forces’ assessment that there was a likelihood that the East Indies Government would be cowed by the Japanese Army’s occupation and would consequently relax their tough attitude towards Japan. A document prepared by the Imperial Headquarters on 23 June 1941, entitled ‘Reasons for the Absolute Necessity, Militarily, Economically and Politically, to Station without delay the Required Troop Strength in Southern French Indo-China in the same way as in Northern French Indo-China’, stated that ‘there is the prospect that the Imperial advance into southern French Indo-China will contribute to the reopening of the Japanese-Dutch negotiations’.9 One high-ranking member of the Naval General Staff has testified that ‘we thought that Holland, ruled by only a Queen, would bow before military pressure.’10 It is clear that the Japanese Armed Forces in their thinking miscalculated the determination of the Europeans in the Dutch East Indies Government to try to resist, as one with America and Britain, Japanese pressure.

As is well-known, the American response to Japanese troops entering southern French Indo-China was to break off economic relations with Japan; the Dutch East Indies Government, together with Britain, followed suit. Over a long period of time Japan, particularly the military, had endeavoured to store oil, but it was estimated that, if imports of oil could not be obtained from America and the Dutch East Indies, oil supplies would be exhausted in two years even in peace time, and the mechanised branches of the military would stop moving. Being an island people with plentiful energy, it was a weak point of the Japanese that they could not patiently await the passing of time, trusting the State to the hands of fate. The Japanese Government and the Imperial Headquarters thought that if Japan could occupy the South Pacific area of natural resources centred on the Dutch East Indies and could obtain these materials, particularly oil, then, relying on German victories as well, they should be able to prosecute a war with America, Britain and Holland which they would not necessarily lose.

The statistical details of Japanese war planning for oil supplies can be obtained by reference to my article entitled ‘Japan’s War Plans for World War II’ included in the Institute of Military History in Japan’s edition of ‘The International Review of Military History, 1978′.

Occupation and Independence

In the Second World War the Japanese war leadership was invested in a consultative organ of the Government and the Imperial Headquarters, the Joint Liaison Conference, which decided and implemented the policies. Because the most important reason for Japan’s venture into war was the supply and demand relationship over strategic materials, especially oil, Japan’s basic planning for conducting the war was set on maintaining these material supplies. On 12 November 1941 the Liaison Conference decided on a ‘Basic Plan for a Wartime Economy’, which stated foremost the need ‘to secure resources and materials for national defense in the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and to be pre-pared for a rapid expansive development of our country’s strength to prosecute war’.11 Following this, on 20 November, the Liaison Conference decided to establish a military administration in the occupied areas in the Southern area,12 and subsequently on 26 November the Army and Navy Divisions of the Imperial Headquarters decided that under the military administration of the Dutch East Indies, which was the core for securing materials, the Army would take charge of Sumatra and Java, and the Navy would take charge of Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccan islands and the Lesser Sunda archipelago.13 In addition, immediately after the start of the war, the Liaison Conference on 12 December decided on the detailed essentials of the economic policies for the Southern areas occupation; the first objective was the procurement of resources, with the highest priority being given to the exploitation of the oil resources.14

As argued above, the majority of the leaders who decided to undertake the war considered that this war was unavoidable in order for Japan’s continued existence as a state, and called the war one of ‘self-preservation and self-defence’. However, some of the leaders held to the doctrine that Japan should lead and organise the Asians colonised by the Western Europeans, and called this ‘the establishment of the New Order in Greater East Asia’. The Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami, in despatching the Imperial orders to Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, on 5 November 1941, telegraphed that ‘for the sake of the self-preservation and self-defense of the Empire, the opening of hostilities with America, Britain and Holland is anticipated within the first ten days of December, and it has been decided to complete all strategic preparations’.15 According to the Imperial orders sent by Sugiyama Hajime, the Army Chief of Staff, to General Terauchi Hisaichi, the Commander of the Southern Army, on 15 November 1941, “the Imperial Head-quarters plan an advance into the Southern areas in order to accomplish the self-preservation and self-defense of the Empire and the establishment of the New Order in Greater East Asia”.16 However, since the basis of this doctrine of a ‘New Order in Greater East Asia’ was a Japanese conception centred on Japan, from the beginning it was difficult to obtain support from other peoples.

After the occupation of the Dutch East Indies, it was not until midway through the War that the Japanese Army’s line of thinking evolved towards giving independence to the Indonesians. Following a decision by the Liaison Conference, on 31 May 1943 the Imperial Conference agreed on the ‘Fundamental Principles of the Political Leadership of Great East Asia’, in which it was written that “Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and the Celebes are determined as Imperial territory, and every possible effort will be made to bring popular feelings under our control and to develop this source of supply of essential resources”. Namely, Japan tried to preserve the Dutch East Indies as a Japanese colony, but, after considering carefully its effect on the Indonesians, this decision was not made public at the time.l7

Japan made Burma independent on 1 August 1943 and the Philippines on 14 October the same year. It was a natural course of events that, with the independence of these two countries having an inevitable effect on the Indonesians, and also with the military situation becoming unfavourable to Japan, it became necessary to sanction independence in order to ensure the co-operation of the Indonesian people. After the fall of the Tojo Cabinet and the establishment of the Koiso Cabinet, the Liaison Conference which had been in charge of directing the war was reorganised as the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. This Supreme Council decided on 19 August 1944 to grant Indonesian independence “in the future”,18 and Prime Minister Koiso made a statement to that effect in his administrative policy speech to both Houses of the Diet on 7 September.19 How-ever, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War sanctioned Indonesian independence only “as far in the future as possible”, and the decision to facilitate these preparations without delay was made only on 17 July 1945, immediately before Japan’s defeat.20 Even after the declaration of independence of the Indonesian Republic on 17 August by the Indonesians themselves, they still had to undertake a war of independence against the Dutch Army before gaining full independence.

Conclusion

The progress of the industrial revolution in Western Europe and the growth of capitalism became strong weapons in the European colonisation of the world. The only states in Asia to avoid colonisation were Japan and Thailand.

It can be argued that at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Japan had grown to be a world power after victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, the era of colonialism had already passed; it was the eve of a reaction, the era of nationalism and anti-colonialism. However, the Japanese did not appreciate this change of eras. The Japanese, following the Western Europeans, took the path of a colonial era world power.

The Japanese Government called the Pacific War (including the China Incident) ‘the Greater East Asia War’. In the sense that it was a war for the establishment of the ‘New East Asia Order’, the Japanese Government led the Japanese people and enunciated this doctrine to the world. However, the leaders of a Japan, which had no reserve strength to provide the necessities of life such as food for the inhabitants of the occupied areas, were unable to make allowance for liberating South-East Asia from Western European colonialism. This can be demonstrated by the single fact that the Liaison Conference wanted to keep Indonesia as a Japanese colony.

In posterity historians might say that Japan’s Pacific War made the biggest contribution to ending the world’s colonial era. As has been explained in this paper, it is more correct to say that this was simply a result of the war, rather than the result of any such intention by Japan’s leadership.

References

1. George S. Kanahele’s unpublished thesis, ‘The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence’, 1967, translated into Japanese as ‘Ni-hon Gunsei to Indoneshia Dokuritsu’, Tokyo, 1977, pp. 35-58.

2. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

3. The original of the Imperial National Defence Policy is not extant, but the Military History Department of the National Defense College (Boei Ken-shusho Senshibu – hereafter cited as Senshibu Archives) contains a written copy made by Field-Marshal Yamagata Aritomo.

4. Boei Kenshusho Senshishitsu, ‘Daihonei Kaigunbu, Rengokantai(l): Kaisen Made (Navy Section of the Imperial Headquarters, The Combined Fleet before the Outbreak of the Pacific War),’ Tokyo, 1975, pp. 297-99.

5. Kaigunsho Chosaka Shiryo (Materials of the Navy Ministry Research Section) held by the Institute of Oriental Studies, Daito Bunka University.

6. The Army and Navy’s Annual Operation Plans for 1941 were approved in December 1940. The originals of the Annual Operation Plans of the Army from 1938 to 1941 and of the Navy from 1936 to 1940 are preserved in the Military History Department. The Navy’s 1941 Plan is no longer extant, but part of the 1941 Plan exists in the form of a correction of the 1940 Plan.

7. Boei Kenshusho Senshishitsu, ‘Daihonei Rikugunbu, Dai Toa Senso Kaisen Keii (Army Division of the Imperial Headquarters: Leading to the Outbreak of War)(4)’, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 29-34.

8. Ibid., pp. 118-139. Daihonei Kaigunby, Rengokantai (1), op. cit, pp. 526-8.

9. Senshibu Archives, ‘Nanpo Shisaku Sokushin ni Kansuru Ken (Regarding the Promotion of the Southern Area Policy)’.

10. Information given by Rear Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi (at that time, Head of the First Section of the First Department of the Naval General Staff) to the author, in Tokyo, on 13 February 1962.

11. Senshibu Archives.

12. Senshibu Archives, Document entitled ‘Nanpo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoko (Outlines for Implementing the Administration of the Occupied Southern Areas).’

13. Senshibu Archives, Document entitled ‘Senryochi Gunsei Jisshi ni Kan-suru Rikukaigun Chuo Kyotei (Central Agreement between the Army and Navy Concerning the Implementation of the Military Administration in the Occupied Areas)’.

14. Senshibu Archives, Document entitled ‘Nanpo Keizai Taisaku Yoko (Out-line of Economic Policies for the Southern Areas)’.

15. Senshibu Archives, Daikaimei (Imperial Orders for the Navy) No. 1.

16. Senshibu Archives, Dairikumei (Imperial Orders for the Army) No. 564.

17. Senshibu Archives.

18. Senshibu Archives, ‘Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi Kettei (Decisions of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War)’, No. 2.

19. Proceedings of the Meetings of the Diet.

20. Senshibu Archives, ‘Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi Kettei (Decisions of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War)’, No. 27.