HBMS* St. Lawrence
(October 7, 1782–August 21, 1818)
British Naval Officer
Commodore Yeo was the supreme British naval authority in Canada during the War of 1812. For nearly two years he stalemated superior American naval resources on Lake Ontario and prevented the fall of Upper Canada. At that time he also constructed several of the world’s largest warships.
James Lucas Yeo was born in Southampton, England, on October 7, 1782, and he went to sea at 10 as a volunteer. An astute learner, Yeo was commissioned a lieutenant in February 1797 and soon acquired a reputation as a daring naval officer, well versed in unconventional naval warfare. He first garnered notice on August 26, 1800, during the siege of Genoa, Italy, by leading a cutting-out expedition against Cesanatico Harbor that sank 13 enemy vessels. Yeo then reported for duty aboard the frigate HMS Loire in 1805 for service off the coast of Spain. On June 4 of that year he gallantly stormed a fort at Mura Harbor with only 50 men, capturing the garrison of 250 soldiers and spiking their cannons. This feat enabled the Loire to capture a 22-gun privateer schooner in the harbor, which was renamed HMS Confiance and awarded to Yeo as his first command. In 1807, Yeo sailed the Confiance to Brazil in concert with Adm. Sir Sydney Smith to assist the Portuguese prince regent. He was then entrusted with the storming of Cayenne, French Guiana, with only 400 men. On January 7, 1809, the daring lieutenant did precisely that, capturing nearly 1,000 prisoners and 200 cannons. This victory completely eliminated the French presence in Latin America. Yeo was consequently received into the quasi-religious military order of St. Benedict of Aviz, reputedly the first Protestant so honored. The following year he was also knighted by King George III for gallant service to the Crown. For both reasons, Americans came to deride him as the “Knight.”
Following the onset of the War of 1812 with the United States, Yeo assumed command of the frigate HMS Southampton at Jamaica.
In this capacity he captured the 14-gun sloop USS Vixen in November 1812, only to lose both vessels on a reef. Cleared by a court of inquiry for this accident, Yeo was taken aback in March 1813, when his appointment as naval commander of His Majesty’s naval forces on the Great Lakes in Canada suddenly arrived. This assignment carried a rank of commodore, but the conditions and strategic prerogatives encountered there were unlike anything a seasoned naval officer like himself could have imagined.
The War of 1812 was essentially a frontier conflict in which armies marched, lived, and fought on the periphery of civilization. The primitive conditions encountered made utilization of various lakes and waterways a prerequisite for success. On land, critical routes of communication and supply were seldom more than paths hewn through dense forests. Extended winter thaws and spring rains choked them with mud and rendered overland transportation impractical. Waterborne transit obviated many of these problems, however. The Great Lakes constituted an elaborate communications network over which men and supplies could be shuttled year-round at a fraction of the money and time. Furthermore, naval control of the Great Lakes not only facilitated one’s own movements but also forced an enemy to move and feed his troops by land—a distinct liability. Throughout the War of 1812, therefore, the lakes remained vital conduits for the defense of Canada and forays against it. This strategic expedient was never lost on the United States or Great Britain, for both initiated impressive shipbuilding campaigns to acquire and maintain naval supremacy. Considering the scope of these endeavors, and the magnitude of supplies and personnel required, the lake campaigns literally constitute a war within a war.
Yeo reached Kingston, Ontario, the principal British naval base on Lake Ontario, in early May 1813. There he conferred with Governor-General George Prevost over strategy and agreed to a preemptive strike against Sackets Harbor, New York, home of the American lake squadron. At that time, Commodore Isaac Chauncey and his ships were absent at the Niagara frontier supporting army operations, so his base remained weakly defended. Yeo and Prevost aspired to capture a new vessel, the 28-gun brig General Pike, and burn it at the stocks. Such a strike would also force Chauncey’s immediate recall from Niagara, thereby relieving pressure upon Gen. John Vincent’s forces. On May 28, 1813, Yeo’s squadron hove to off his objective, but adverse winds prevented a British landing until the following day. Prevost was then put ashore and defeated the militia of Gen. Jacob Brown, but he proved unable to storm a last line of fortifications and summarily withdrew. Thus, the British suffered galling losses without achieving anything. Yeo, for his part, came ashore like a captain of marines instead of supervising his fleet, and naval support of the operation proved less than effective. Furthermore, the entire affair only served to sour relations between him and his superior.
Control of the Great Lakes remained essential to Upper Canada’s fate, so Yeo and Chauncey enacted elaborate building programs to acquire new ships. However, Yeo suffered from shortages of manpower as well as supplies, so he declined to forward much of his scarce resources to British naval forces on Lake Erie. Consequently, Lt. Robert Heriot Barclay’s small squadron was severely disadvantaged and decisively defeated when it encountered Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry on September 10, 1813. Yeo himself was also bested in a series of running engagements at the far end of Lake Ontario, the so-called Burlington Races. Chauncey, fortunately for the British, was reluctant and unwilling to jeopardize his ships by sailing close to shore. Yeo escaped to Kingston, battered but intact. His opponent’s caution played directly into British hands, for as long as Yeo’s ships survived, he could contest American control of the lake. Survival of the British fleet had became tantamount to the survival of Upper Canada.
Yeo spent the entire winter building new ships at Kingston while Chauncey performed identical work at Sackets Harbor. The British were first to emerge on the lake in May 1814, and Yeo, assisted by the newly arrived and highly aggressive Gen. Gordon Drummond, sought to make another attempt at Sackets Harbor—only this time with bigger ships and more men. The governor-general, however, remained wedded to his cautious, defensive policy and refused reinforcements. Therefore, on May 5 Yeo and Drummond selected the smaller American entrepôt at Oswego, New York, as their target. This place, defended by Col. George E. Mitchell, was gallantly carried with some loss. The British also failed to capture the heavy cannons intended for Chauncey’s new vessels, so Yeo imposed a tight blockade on Sackets Harbor to prevent their acquisition. At length, navy Capt. Melancthon T. Woolsey and army Capt. Daniel Appling contrived a scheme whereby the cannons would be shipped to Chauncey at night by small bateaux. When two Royal Navy captains followed the Americans up Sandy Creek on May 29, 1814—against Yeo’s explicit instructions—their entire force was ambushed and captured. This loss forced Yeo to lift his blockade and return to Kingston, where he concentrated upon finishing his trump card, the 112-gun ship-of-the-line HMS St. Lawrence. Because this was the largest warship to ever sail the Great Lakes, its appearance in October ensured British control of Lake Ontario for the rest of the war. He also spent the rest of the summer shuttling men and supplies to General Drummond at Niagara, where his effort proved crucial in containing General Brown’s 1814 Niagara offensive.
In the fall of 1814, Prevost was directed by the British government to attack northern New York with 10,000 veteran troops, newly arrived from Spain. To accomplish this, he required naval control of Lake Champlain to assist his supplies and communications. Yeo subsequently assigned Capt. George Downie to construct and command the fleet, although, as previously, Yeo deflected only minimal amounts of men and supplies from his own building efforts. Downie’s fleet was still under construction when Prevost hurried it into battle at Plattsburgh, New York, and on September 11, 1814, it was totally defeated by Commodore Thomas MacDonough. Yeo was so angered by Prevost’s prodding that he preferred charges against him, and the governor-general was recalled back to England. Back on Lake Ontario, Chauncey had emerged once more on the lake with a bigger fleet, so Yeo slipped back into Kingston. Furthermore, he refused to further supply General Drummond’s army until the St. Lawrence was ready to sail. This reluctance to cooperate strained relations between them, but Yeo refused to sail unless he was ready. When the British squadron finally departed Kingston that October, Chauncey typically withdrew back to Sackets Harbor and commenced building mammoth ships of his own. But Yeo’s gamble finally paid off. The mighty St. Lawrence proved the final arbiter of naval events on Lake Ontario. Moreover, its appearance induced Gen. George Izard, then confronting Drummond at Niagara, to abandon Fort Erie and return to American soil. The war ended shortly after with little fanfare along the border. Consequently, a vast array of giant warships of every description were mothballed at Kingston and Sackets Harbor, never to fight again.
After the war, Yeo received command of the antislavery patrol off the West Africa coast. He spent several weeks in England beforehand testifying on behalf of his surviving officers on Lake Champlain—and against Prevost, who died before his court-martial convened. Yeo remained off Africa until August 21, 1818, when he died of fever at sea. His principal legacy from the lake war was mixed, but ultimately it was a success. On balance, both sides had performed remarkably well in constructing powerful squadrons in the middle of the wilderness. But the British, with smaller crews and less access to supplies, managed to fight Chauncey to a draw. It proved a less than glorious termination for an ambitious officer like Yeo, but his steadfast efforts checked the American conquest of Upper Canada. For this reason he remains a significant British hero of the War of 1812.
Bibliography
Cogar, William B., ed. New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Eighth Naval History Symposium. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989; Irvine, John B. “The Role of Sir James Lucas Yeo in the War of 1812.” Unpublished master’s thesis, Carleton University, 1958; Malcomson, Robert. Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812–1814. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998; Malcomson, Robert. Warships of the Great Lakes, 1754–1834. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001; Skaggs, David C., and Larry Nelson, eds. The Sixty-Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754–1814. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001; Spurr, John C. “Sir James Lucas Yeo: A Hero of the Lakes.” Historic Kingston 30 (March, 1981): 30–45; Townsend, Robert B. The Story of the HMS St. Lawrence: The Canadian-Built Ship That Won the War of 1812. Carrying Place: Odyssey, 1998; Wilder, Patrick. The Battle of Sacket’s Harbor. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation, 1994; Williamson, Robert J. “The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Superiority on Lake Ontario.” Canadian Military History 8, no. 4 (1997): 7–15.
* In formal documents like peace treaties, the English version describes the treaty as being between, for example, “His Britannic Majesty” and “His Catholic Majesty.” Likewise, a captain reporting a capture would write about having encountered “His Most Christian Majesty’s Ship Incroyable.” There were so many kings in Europe that just “His Majesty” would have been highly ambiguous. It would be proper, and more specific, to refer to British warships has HBMS, and I think that if hailed at sea, a British warship at this time would have so identified herself:
“Ahoy, what ship is that?”
“His Britannic Majesty’s Ship Warrior.”
British naval historians and their American toadies have gotten arrogant and lazy and left out the “B.”
