Steven Siry. _Greene: Revolutionary General_. Brassey’s Military Profiles Series. Washington, D. C.: Potomac Books, 2006. xiii + 117 pp.

Pictures, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $13.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-57488-912-3.

 

Reviewed for H-NC by Solomon K. Smith, Department of History, Georgia Southern University

A Forgotten Patriot

 

The Revolution holds a special place in the imagination of Americans.

While it has never generated the passionate and sometimes fanatical popularity of the American Civil War, it remains wrapped within the celebratory mythos of the nation’s birth and continues to generate new publications. In the last few years, scholars have published biographies of many individuals, whether great or small, whose lives intersected with the momentous event.

 

Although heroic and courageous, the founding generation often seems far removed from the world of today. Even the battles of the Revolution, which generally involved only a few thousand men, seem paltry compared to the great armies and ghastly casualty figures of wars that have come afterwards. And yet if the dedicated patriots had not persevered, the United States would not exist as we know it.

 

If George Washington was the vital man in America’s revolutionary cause, then, according to historian Steven E. Siry, Nathanael Greene was the essential right-hand man in Washington’s intricate plan for success. Siry and the editors of Brassey’s Military Profiles Series seem dedicated to bringing forgotten heroes to light, and make Greene the subject of their latest biography in what appears to be a much larger series.

 

Born into a Rhode Island Quaker family, Greene had nothing in his background pointing toward a military career. Yet he broke with normal conventions in his search for his own path in the world. While his brothers focused their career aspirations on the family’s shipping interests, Greene worked in his father’s iron foundry. When war came, Greene abandoned Quaker pacifism and organized the local militia company. His total military training before 1775 consisted of serving as a private in the militia for a few hours each week.

 

In May of 1775, the Rhode Island Assembly appointed Greene commander of that state’s Army of Observation for the siege of Boston, no doubt because of family connections rather than his leadership ability. But at Boston, he sufficiently impressed George Washington. In June, at age thirty-two, Greene became the youngest general in the Continental Army.

Washington immediately put him in command of the defenses of New York City. Greene’s record in New York is somewhat difficult to assess. He recognized that the outnumbered patriots were in a precarious situation, which led him to urge a retreat from New York City into New Jersey after torching the noted Tory stronghold. At the same time, Greene staunchly recommended that vulnerable Fort Washington, on upper Manhattan, be defended, a mistake resulting in the fort’s speedy surrender and the capture of 2,900 badly needed patriot soldiers.

 

As the war dragged on, Greene retained Washington’s confidence. Resourceful and courageous, Greene combined common sense, a keen intellect, fine organizational skills, and a remarkable aptitude for using topographical and geographical information. He remained Washington’s most trusted adviser throughout the war, eventually reaching the rank of second in the command of the Continental Army.

Greene’s military prowess deserved the recognition. At Trenton, he ably commanded Washington’s left wing, and his skillful disposition at Brandywine permitted the army to avoid a route and to withdraw in good order. So great was Washington’s confidence in him that he made Greene quartermaster general for two years in order to bring stability to the army’s chaotic supply system. But by 1778, Greene was back in the field helping to drive the British out of Rhode Island.

 

In October 1780, desperate to find a suitable commander for the southern theater, Washington made Greene commander of the Southern Department. With Georgia and South Carolina under British control, and North Carolina and Virginia threatened by invasion, the situation seemed hopeless. Greene reorganized the southern forces, going out of his way to secure the cooperation of local authorities. He combined regulars, militia, and guerrillas into a force capable of using rapid movement to place continuous pressure on the British, outmaneuvering and outguessing them at every step. Whenever he gained ground against the enemy, Greene would withdraw before the British counter-maneuvers and draw the British troops away from their supplies and communications, only to harass them once again on their retreat. The British under Gen. Charles Cornwallis gained costly victories at Guilford Court House and Hobkirk’s Hill, but were outmaneuvered at Camden. Afterwards, Greene captured British posts in the South one by one. By 1782, Greene’s tactics had limited the British occupation to just two southern seaports. With his understanding of unconventional warfare, Greene had unraveled Great Britain’s power in the southern theater and contributed to their final destruction at the Battle of Yorktown.

 

Written in concise prose with a small page count, Siry’s _Greene_ offers a thorough and judicious appraisal of Nathanael Greene, both the man and the general. As a result, he effectively establishes that Greene was motivated by a sincere desire to help the American colonies gain their independence, but also a hunger to secure an enduring fame.

 

The book was written purposely for use in the classroom. But it has some minor problems which may limit its utility. The specificity of the book makes it less useful in lower-level history courses, although it would be a welcome addition to a class on military history or the Revolutionary War. Siry effectively tells the larger military history of the war in his focus on Greene’s contribution, but he does not engage previous historical works on the subject; in fact, the endnotes only provide sources for quotations. All in all, _Greene_ is a very readable book, which offers a good introduction into the life Nathanael Greene and serves as part of a larger composition study of Washington’s able subordinates.

#——————#

I take issue with the term “forgotten” when it comes to General Nathanael Greene.  Those who work in the field of early American military history certainly have not forgotten Greene, and I suggest that the general readers of military history haven’t either.  Greene was featured prominently in McCullough’s “1776,” and a recent popular biography of NG by Terry Golway did well on the market.  Moreover, Greene’s papers have been published in 13 wonderful volumes thanks to the Rhode Island Historical Society.  I doubt any of the founders or patriots who have had that much of their correspondence and other papers published in so many volumes can rightfully be declared forgotten!

Mr. Smith also makes a few factual errors in his review.  Washington did not actually make Greene commander of the Southern Department–Congress did on Washington’s recommendation.  Although Smith states that “the British under Gen. Charles Cornwallis gained costly victories at Guilford Court House and Hobkirk’s Hill,” it is debatable that Hobkirk’s Hill was a British victory.  Lord Rawdon’s retreat immediately afterwards, as well as the number of British casualties suggest otherwise.  Smith also erroneously states that the redcoats were “were outmaneuvered at Camden.”  In fact Camden (16 Aug 1780) was a resounding, clearcut victory for British arms.

Smith’s description of the southern theatre is also somewhat garbled.

He tells us that “Greene captured British posts in the South one by one.

By 1782, Greene’s tactics had limited the British occupation to just two southern seaports.”  This is correct, but when Smith states that “with his understanding of unconventional warfare, Greene had unraveled Great Britain’s power in the southern theater and contributed to their final destruction at the Battle of Yorktown,” he refutes his own previous statement that the war was still going on in 1782, since Yorktown was in

1781 and the British were supposedly destroyed.  They were not, and as students of the Revolutionary War in NC, SC and GA recognize, the war in those states–in which Greene commanded–was far from over at Yorktown.

 

Respectfully,

JM

John R. Maass, Ph.D.

Historian, Contemporary Studies Branch

US Army Center of Military History