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germain-s

(January 26, 1716–August 26, 1785)

English Secretary of State for the Colonies

The abrasive Lord Germain capably oversaw the raising, transport, and deployment of the largest British army ever sent overseas to that time. It was a Herculean effort, well-handled, and merits recognition as such. However, he underestimated the difficulties of trying to win the American Revolution at such a great distance from England. His refusal to adapt strategy to the political and military realities of the New World factored largely in Britain’s defeat.

George Sackville was born in London on January 26, 1716, the youngest son of the First Duke of Dorset. Like many aristocratic youths, he received an excellent education at the Westminster School and later obtained a degree from Trinity College, Dublin. Sackville then joined the army in 1737 as a captain in the Seventh Irish Horse (his father at that time being Lord Lieutenant of Ireland), and he later rose to serve as colonel of the 28th Regiment of Foot. He also was elected to Parliament in 1741. Sackville commanded his regiment throughout the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and particularly distinguished himself at the Battle of Fontenoy on May 11, 1745. He charged so impetuously that his regiment careened right into the French army’s headquarters! His wounds were subsequently treated in the personal tent of King Louis XIV. In light of his good service, Sackville transferred as colonel to the 20th Foot and 12th Dragoons in succession, and he rejoined the Irish establishment. During his father’s second tenure as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, he also functioned as a personal secretary.

Sackville’s star seemed on the ascent in 1755 when he was elevated to major general in time for the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). He fought well during the abortive expeditions against Saint Malo and Cancale on the French coast before transferring to the staff of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. His military merits notwithstanding, Sackville had by this time also acquired a well-deserved reputation as a sarcastic and acerbic individual. King George II disliked him intensely but accorded him high rank on account of his family ties. For these reasons Sackville functioned poorly with Prince Ferdinand, and their dispute came to a head during the famous Battle of Minden on August 1, 1759. After several hard charges, the allies had penetrated the French center and the prince ordered his cavalry forward to clinch the victory. Sackville, commanding the reserves, refused to advance on the grounds that his orders were too vague, and the French withdrew intact. This single act of defiance forever stained Sackville as militarily incompetent, and he was removed from command and publicly humiliated. In 1760, he demanded and received a court-martial, which pronounced him guilty of disobedience and “unfit to serve His Majesty in any military capacity whatsoever.” Sackville was then cashiered; to underscore his displeasure, George II summarily ordered the verdict written into every orderly book in the English army! Stung by the king’s vindictiveness, Sackville worked the next 15 years trying to erase this blot from his personal reputation.

By 1770, Sackville had made major gains in rehabilitating his public standing when he inherited property from Lady Betty Germain—on the grounds that he change his name accordingly. Thereafter, he was formally known as Lord Germain. He also gained a political respite following the accession of King George III to the throne, and the two men became close friends. The British Empire at this time was being wracked by political dissent arising over the issue of taxation, and the American colonies were brewing with resentment. The conservative Tories could not fathom the depth of opposition to imperial policies in America, and many statesmen insisted upon coercive measures to enforce them. Germain was among the most outspoken and eloquent proponents of the hard line. He allied himself with the faction supporting Frederick, Lord North, another strong supporter of imperial policies, and George III. Germain finally achieved his dramatic vindication in November 1775. Previously despised as a coward, he now succeeded Lord Dartmouth as secretary of state for the colonies, then in revolt against the Crown. Thus Germain, still reviled in some quarters for his behavior at Minden, now conducted military affairs intended to bring America back into the English fold.

Germain has long been vilified for his role in directing the war against America and—because England lost—was commonly regarded as incompetent. In truth, despite profound shortcomings in terms of tact and personal diplomacy, Germain functioned efficiently in his appointed role. He certainly displayed more tenacity and conviction in his opinions than did Lord North, another vilified figure, who displayed caution and indecision when confronting major decisions in the war. Over the next six years Germain, more than any other individual, bore responsibility for raising 65,000 soldiers, shipping them to the New World, and overseeing their logistics. This would have taxed the abilities of any minister operating in Europe, but in this instance British forces were operating at the end of a 3,000-mile supply line. The system Germain worked out was by no means perfect, and there were occasional lapses, but overall Crown forces in America were well supplied and adequately manned. Major problems arose, unfortunately, in exactly how to employ them.

Germain’s shortcomings as a war leader were legion. His principal failure was in strategic conception, a trait shared by virtually all senior British commanders assigned to America. To the very end he refused to accept that the colonists were unfaithful to England. In fact, he believed that the majority of American’s citizens were Loyalists by nature and only cowed by the lack of a visible British military presence. Neither was Germain above personal politics. He openly despised several senior leaders, among them William Howe, Guy Carleton, and Henry Clinton, either from their previous service in Germany or because of disagreements over strategy. For this reason, Germain appointed the tractable but inexperienced John Burgoyne to command the decisive 1777 campaign (which came to grief at Saratoga, New York) over the more experienced Carleton. More important, his instructions to other commanders were vague instead of explicit, hence Burgoyne received almost no support from the armies of Howe and Clinton. This, it turns out, would have proved essential to British success.

Three years later, Germain helped conceive the excellent southern strategy, which came close to detaching that part of the colonies from the United States. But again, personal politics undercut his own success. Disliking Clinton, Germain favored the aggressive Charles Cornwallis as a senior commander, encouraged insubordination toward Clinton, and provided political cover for Cornwallis when he was insubordinate. For this reason Germain bears great responsibility for disasters like Saratoga and Yorktown, outcomes that precluded any chance for British victory.

By 1782, the loss of America was impending, and public sentiment demanded that Germain step down. The haughty minister again found himself a despised figure and the butt of public humor. He secured the peerage of Viscount Sackville from George III, which enabled him to sit in the House of Lords. Germain remained an unhappy, unpopular figure, living in relative obscurity thereafter. He died at Withyham, England, on August 26, 1785, roundly remembered as the man who lost America.

Bibliography

Black, Jeremy. War for America: The Fight for Independence, 1775–1783. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991; Brown, Gerald S. The American Secretary: The Colonial Policy of Lord George Germain, 1775–1778. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963; Burt, Alfred L. “The Quarrel Between Germain and Carleton: An Invented Story.” Canadian Historical Association 11 (1970): 202–222; Cook, Don. The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760–1785. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995; Edgar, Gregory T. Reluctant Break with Britain: From Stamp Act to Bunker Hill. Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1997; Gruber, Ira D. “Lord Howe and Lord George Germain: British Politics and the Winning of American Independence.” William and Mary Quarterly 22 (1965): 225–243; Macksey, Piers. The Coward of Minden: The Affair of Lord George Sackville. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979; Seymour, William. The Price of Folly: British Blunders in the War of American Independence. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995; Syrett, David. Shipping and the American War, 1775–1783: A Study in British Transport Organization. London: University of London, Athone Press, 1970; Valentine, Alan C. Lord George Germain. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1962.

The Battle of Minden