Jamel Ostwald, Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of Spanish Succession, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007. xiii + 390. Maps, figures, tables, appendices and index. $159.00 (cl). ISBN 10-90-04-15489-2.

Review by Michael Wolfe, St. John’s University.

Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban looms as an almost iconic figure behind the advent of new, more rational and scientific forms of modern warfare in the West. Yet after reading Jamel Ostwald’s brilliant new book, based on his original doctoral dissertation, historians will perforce need to fundamentally revise this longstanding thesis and reassess central aspects of the much vaunted Military Revolution. For years, there has been much talk about the “new military history”, and while certainly the scope for the study of war has been widened to include cultural and social vantage points, few scholars have proposed such a thorough rethinking of basic military theories and practices as Ostwald does, all of which he explains in a series of fascinating appendices on his dataset methodology. Unlike previous historians, Ostwald resists the temptation to buy into the mythos of Vauban propagated in the marshal’s memoirs, the celebrated Oisivetés, and by his eighteenth-century acolytes. Instead, he digs deeply and broadly into the archives in France, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands to examine the actual practices of war during the purported heyday of Vauban’s influence, the War of Spanish Succession, only to discover—as Vauban himself wistfully complained about more than once—that few generals ever actually implemented what he so fervently advocated when it came to siege warfare.

Ostwald situates his study in the vast historiography on the Military Revolution and the rise of the fiscal-military state in chapter one. He builds principally on the revisionary work of his mentor, John Lynn, under whom he studied at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Lynn has stressed the importance of the Bourbon state’s growing administrative capacity to mobilize and deploy resources, primarily in the form of ever larger armies, during Louis XIV’s reign.[1] Ostwald juxtaposes two competing models of warfare vying for dominance under Louis XIV. The first emerged from the world of the engineers, reaching its apex in the work of Vauban. It predicated the pursuit of war on achieving maximal efficiency in terms of resource use to achieve the state’s objectives. It set a premium on planning and prudence. The second approach to war was the way of the generals. It emphasized what Ostwald terms “martial vigor”, which sought to bring maximal force to bear to achieve results in as little time as possible. It emphasized speed and mobility. His analysis examines the ensuing dialectic between the two approaches.

While much of Ostwald’s analysis concerns the tactics of siege warfare, at root the crux of his argument turns on logistics and the growing capacity of fiscal-military states to wage longer, more destructive wars. The history of warfare has oscillated in the relative balance between not only offense and defense, but also methodical versus headlong approaches to war. The advent of gunpowder weaponry in the late Middle Ages prompted a shift in fortification design with the rise and subsequent development of the bastioned trace italienne. Its success ushered in a period of defensive predominance that lasted into the seventeenth century. Conventional explanations attribute the decline of siege warfare to Vauban’s vaunted systems of attack, which in theory rendered all fortified places ultimately indefensible. Yet as Ostwald demonstrates, it was not Vauban’s new efficient methods of attack that gave a decided advantage to besiegers, but rather the brute growth in artillery production and its increased mobility which enabled military commanders to blast their way into just about any redoubt. This latter approach became associated with Menno van Coehoorn, a much understudied contemporary of Vauban. One of the many virtues of Ostwald’s book is to reclaim the significance of this highly influential Dutch military engineer.

The next two chapters establish the Vauban paradigm of efficiency and the “perfect” siege. Chapter two offers a detailed analysis of the 1697 siege of Ath, which Ostwald convincingly argues best exemplified the main principles of a Vauban-style siege with its reliance on trench parallels and the new technique of ricochet fire. Chapter three sets the broader context of the engineers’ pursuit of efficiency, focusing more deeply on the developing rationales behind Vauban’s systematic approach to siege warfare. Avoiding unnecessary costs and reducing casualties drove Vauban’s thinking on the ideal planning and prosecution of a siege, a subject which he elaborated upon in memoranda to the king and, eventually, published guidebooks. Vauban aspired not for a cookie-cutter system of siege warfare, but rather a systematic, rationally-based mode of determining how best to resolve the particular defensive or offensive challenges posed by each fortified place. Experience combined with proper training formed the key to effective, efficient military engineering. In reviewing treatises and manuals, Ostwald shows that Vauban represented the culmination of, not a departure from prior military engineering practices and metrics that stretched back to the Renaissance. What set Vauban apart from earlier military engineers were not his ideas so much as the unprecedented power and resources put at his disposal—for a time—by Louis XIV.

The remainder of the book shifts attention to the changing ways of war during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Ostwald sees this vast, complex conflict as a time of transition, as he explains in chapter four. While sieges took place in abundance, they did not proceed according to Vauban’s system. Vauban’s greatest influence was in the area of defense, in the concentric rings of fortresses that composed the celebrated pré carré. This defense-in-depth stopped the Allied advances when France’s field armies could not. Territorial gains on both sides, in fact, depended much on the condition of the fortifications in a given area of the Low Countries, the principal theater of operations. Military engineers, including the aged Vauban, played a decidedly declining role in military affairs on both sides as the generals, led by figures such as the Duke of Marlborough, opted for “vigor” over “efficiency.”

Chapter five, “Implementing the Paradigm Siege,” chronicles the yawning divide between Vauban’s theoretical propositions as expressed on paper and their actual implementation in siege warfare. Time and again as sieges occurred, efficiency gave way to expediency, the careful advice and calculations of engineers assiduously ignored by commanders. In part, this disjunction between theory and reality stemmed from the army’s organization into discrete service branches, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and—finally and most marginalized of all—engineers. The ensuing controversies saw general officers and engineers trading charges of incompetence and inefficiency against each other with rising frequency as the war went on, with the general officers steadily gaining the day, especially following Vauban’s death in 1707. Chapter six, “Contesting the Paradigm Siege,” details how commanders disregarded and criticized the engineers. While engineers provided convenient scapegoats to account for military failures, Ostwald makes a good case that the overall professional caliber of engineers declined as experienced ones died or became disabled.

The rejection of Vauban’s own principles and practices paved the way for a speedier, but also decidedly bloodier way to conduct sieges through the use of massive artillery bombardments and infantry assaults. This forms the subject of the last chapters of the book on “vigor”, which provided an alternative paradigm for the conduct of war by the more robust fiscal-military states of the early eighteenth century. General officers saw unacceptable risks in the engineers’ obsession with cautious, time-consuming efficiency. From their perspective, as Ostwald clearly explains in chapter seven, speed was of the essence becauseof the inherent, multiple difficulties of bringing together and sustaining over time a larger fighting force. Seasonal and logistical factors, in particular, loomed large in their calculation to accept the higher casualties entailed in efforts to quickly overwhelm the enemy. Time mattered more than lives. This shift in thinking also explains why pitched field battles became so attractive as alternatives to grinding sieges, especially among Allied commanders. And, as Ostwald demonstrates in chapter eight, the use of brute force, primarily in the form of massed artillery, brought frequent success to those who initiated the attack. Indeed, as he explain in the concluding chapter, the roots of the modern premium placed on mobility and firepower, seen later in the carnage of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the ensuing rise of total war, go back to the War of Spanish Succession.[2] The dialectic driving the shape of modern war was decidedly not Vaubanian.

Jamel Ostwald has set a new standard for the writing of military history. He proposes revisionist readings of time-worn truisms about the directions and development of early modern warfare, all based upon a thorough and intelligent analysis of pertinent archival sources. While not denying the predominance of an offensive mentality in modern warfare, the days of resolving conflicts by overwhelming force in terms of personnel and technology—the vaunted “shock and awe” of recent American campaigns in the Middle East—may be coming to an end in what specialists now call the new modalities of “asymmetrical” war, itself a practice addressed as far back as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.[3] The planning and prudence so touted by Vauban, so brazenly ignored by most politicians and generals alike since his day, may yet find new advocates in light of recent failures of “martial vigor.”

NOTES

[1] John Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[2] See, in particular, the new book by David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007).

[3] Sun Tzu lived in the state of Wu from 544 to 496 BCE. On the subject of modern asymmetrical war, consult the almost prophetic work of Martin Van Creveld, including his recent The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq, (New York: Presidio Press, 2006).

Michael Wolfe

St. John’s University

wolfem1@stjohns.edu

(originally Waldstein; 1583–1634),

‘Torn by the hatred and favour of each faction, his name merges unsteadily with the past.’ (‘Von der Parteien Gunst und Hassverwirrt, schwankt sein Charakterbild in der Geschichte.’)- Friedrich Schiller’s lines on Wallenstein

Bohemian noble, soldier, and statesman who played an important role in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Wallenstein was born in Bohemia (today the Czech Republic). Given a Protestant upbringing, he converted to Catholicism in 1606. In 1609, his Jesuit confessor arranged his marriage to a wealthy widow who may have been some ten years his senior. When she died in 1614, he inherited all her estates. During the Bohemian rebellion that began in 1618, he remained loyal to the ruler, the Holy Roman emperor Ferdinand II (ruled 1619–1637), and profited enormously from the latter’s victory over the rebels. He was appointed governor of the kingdom of Bohemia and bought up a large number of confiscated estates so that he came to possess most of northeastern Bohemia. These estates were consolidated into Friedland, of which he became duke in 1623.

In 1625, when the emperor decided to raise an army of his own to counter the threat from Christian IV of Denmark (ruled 1596–1648), Wallenstein was the obvious choice to be commander in chief; he was appointed on 7 April. It is often said that he raised and paid for this army at his own expense, and there is certainly some truth to it: he was able to put together a force of over 24,000 without recourse to the imperial treasury. His great personal wealth and his ability to obtain loans were important factors, but Wallenstein’s primary aim was to sustain his forces with requisitions from any territory they occupied. He also used his duchy of Friedland as a source of supplies.

During the Danish phase of the war (1625– 1629), Wallenstein enjoyed considerable military success. He defeated the Protestant commander, Count Ernst of Mansfeld, at Dessau in 1626, and early in 1627 he marched into Holstein and Jutland (the Danish mainland) before turning east into Mecklenburg and Pomerania. The dukes of Mecklenburg had supported Christian IV, so the emperor deprived them of their titles, transferred their confiscated estates to Wallenstein (February 1627), and the following year made him the sole duke of Mecklenburg (January 1628). This arbitrary move caused some disquiet among all hereditary rulers.

The campaign of 1628 was anticlimactic. The complete defeat of Denmark turned out to be an impossibility: although the emperor appointed Wallenstein ‘‘General of the Oceanic and Baltic Seas’’ in February 1628, without a fleet the Danish islands were beyond his reach. He attempted to capture the port of Stralsund in the summer of 1628 (May– July), but without success. Although he defeated Christian again at Wolgast in September, Wallenstein warned the emperor that if peace were not made, Sweden might undertake a full intervention. He also warned that the cost of maintaining his 100,000-strong army was placing an intolerable burden on the north German states. Peace was made at Lubeck (July 1629).

Wallenstein’s success and his financial exactions from friend and foe alike created enormous resentment and, with the coming of what was thought to be peace, the princes turned on him at the Electoral Diet in Regensburg and made a formal request for his dismissal on 16 July 1630. Surprisingly, Ferdinand agreed to comply; the general was dismissed on 13 August. Equally surprising was the fact that Wallenstein also complied. Indeed, it would appear that he had come to feel that the maintenance of such a large army was unsustainable and greeted the end of his responsibility with relief. Although there are some indications that Ferdinand had come to distrust his general, his dismissal deprived the emperor of military power just as he faced invasion from the Swedish king, Gustavus II Adolphus.

The success of Gustavus II Adolphus in 1631 forced the emperor to recall Wallenstein, and he was appointed commander in chief (with considerable powers) once again in April 1632. Although he was not victorious at the Battle of Lutzen in November, the death of the Swedish king in that battle created a new political situation. Surprisingly, Wallenstein did not go on the offensive, but sought to conduct negotiations with all concerned parties in an effort to bring peace (and probably to obtain territory and titles for himself). However, his independence, his alleged double-dealing, his reliance on astrological predictions, and his bizarre behavior (it was asserted that on arrival in any town he ordered all dogs and cats to be killed because he did not like the noise they made) undermined his credibility with everyone. By now he had become a liability to the emperor, who saw him as a traitorous conspirator (and dispensable now that Spanish aid was imminent). Accordingly, in January 1634 he ordered Wallenstein’s capture (or liquidation), and the following month he was assassinated—by an Englishman, an Irishman, and a Scotsman.

Wallenstein was the most important military entrepreneur in the Thirty Years’ War, and his alleged treason and murder have overshadowed the considerable success he had in his first imperial generalship (1625–1630), when he raised the emperor to the zenith of his power. An enigmatic figure, his life became the subject of a dramatic trilogy by the German poet, Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Asch, Ronald G. The Thirty Years’ War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–1648. New York and London, 1997. An up-to-date survey of the war of manageable length that keeps the focus on Germany. Wallenstein is not neglected.

Benecke, Gerhard, ed. Germany in the Thirty Years’ War. London, 1978. A collection of documents; for Wallenstein’s reappointment in 1632 and his assassination in 1634, see pp. 89–92.

Darby, Graham. The Thirty Years’ War. London, 2001. A concise introduction to the conflict; a good place to start.

Mann, Golo. Wallenstein: His Life Narrated. New York, 1976. Translated from the German edition of 1971 by Charles Kessler, this runs to over 900 pages, without the notes and bibliography of the original.

Parker, Geoffrey, ed. The Thirty Years’ War. 2nd ed. London and New York, 1997. Currently the definitive work on the war, with a full set of notes and a comprehensive bibliography that lists all the essential works in German. For Wallenstein, see especially pp. 262–263 of the bibliographical essay.

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Arkansas: March 1862 Pea Ridge, Arkansas

Benton County, March 6–8, 1862

By William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess

The battle of Pea Ridge resulted from Federal efforts to secure control of the border state of Missouri. US Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon had seized control of St. Louis and the Missouri River but was killed at Wilson’s Creek in his unsuccessful effort to eliminate Major General Sterling Price’s pro-Confederate State Guard. In September 1861 Price pushed north, captured Lexington on the Missouri River, and then retired in the face of converging Union forces. He took refuge in the southwestern corner of the state, where he menaced Federal control of Missouri and threatened to disrupt the logistical support for a planned Federal invasion of the Confederacy down the Mississippi River.

In late December US Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis was appointed commander of the Army of the Southwest and was instructed to drive Price out of Missouri. Curtis launched his campaign on February 11, chasing Price down Telegraph Road into northwestern Arkansas. Price joined Confederate troops under CS Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch in the rugged Boston Mountains. Curtis halted near Pea Ridge, forty miles north of these mountains, and assumed a defensive position to shield Missouri.

On March 2 CS Major General Earl Van Dorn, newly appointed commander of Confederate troops west of the Mississippi, joined Price and McCulloch. He named their combined force the Army of the West and immediately began preparations for an invasion of Missouri. His offensive began on March 4 in the midst of a blizzard.

Learning of Van Dorn’s approach, Curtis consolidated his 10,250 troops where the Telegraph Road crossed Little Sugar Creek, three miles south of Pea Ridge and the nearby hostelry called Elkhorn Tavern. The Federals fortified their naturally strong position along the creek. On March 6 Van Dorn managed to move fast enough to catch a small rear guard led by Curtis’s second-in- command, US Brigadier General Franz Sigel, as it retreated from Bentonville toward the creek position. Sigel escaped from the pursuing Confederates with minor casualties.

That evening Van Dorn’s army of 16,500 men, divided into two divisions led by Price and Mc- Culloch, reached Little Sugar Creek. Rather than attack Curtis in his fortifications, Van Dorn decided to envelop the Federals by moving his army around to their rear. During the night of March 6–7, the weary Confederates marched along the Bentonville Detour, a local road that passed around the right flank of the Federal position. Price’s Division reached the Telegraph Road by midmorning on March 7 and turned south toward Elkhorn Tavern, but McCulloch’s Division fell so far behind that Van Dorn ordered it to leave the detour and move by a shorter route to rejoin Price’s Division at Elkhorn Tavern. This decision divided the Confederate army and meant that the battle of Pea Ridge actually involved two separate engagements, at Leetown and at Elkhorn Tavern.

Curtis, who learned of the Confederate maneuver on the morning of March 7, was ready. He turned much of his army to the rear, so that his troops were facing north instead of south—one of the most extraordinary changes of front in the Civil War. He then launched sharp attacks against both Confederate divisions. McCulloch’s Division was intercepted a mile north of the hamlet of Leetown by the First and Third Divisions, commanded by US Colonels Peter J. Osterhaus and Jefferson C. Davis. Price’s troops were blocked by Colonel Eugene A. Carr’s Fourth Division. Curtis held the remaining troops in reserve.

The fighting at Leetown was divided into three sectors by the vegetation, cultivated fields, and the road system. The first sector was the Foster farm, where McCulloch first encountered the enemy. The farm was a partially cleared swale from which a Federal battery, supported by a small cavalry force, fired on his division. McCulloch’s cavalry, supported by two regiments of Cherokee Indians, easily captured the battery and scattered the cavalry.

The second sector was the cornfields of the Oberson and Mayfield farms. Osterhaus and Davis established a solid line of infantry and artillery in these fields, which were separated from the Foster farm by a belt of timber. As McCulloch led the advance, he was killed by a volley from two companies of Federal skirmishers posted in the woods. His successor, CS Brigadier General James McIntosh, ordered a general infantry attack. He personally led one regiment through the timber, and he too was killed by the Federal skirmishers. McIntosh’s death ended the fighting in the Oberson and Mayfield fields as fighting began in the third sector.

This was an area of thick scrub timber and densely tangled brush east of the cornfields, separated from them by the road that ran north from Leetown. CS Colonel Louis Hébert led 2,000 infantry troops through this thicket. They were opposed by half as many Federals in two regiments of Davis’s Third Division in an hour-long fight during which the brush reduced visibility to seventy-five yards. Hébert’s men pushed these regiments back toward Leetown and captured two Federal cannons in the southeast corner of the cornfield.

This Confederate advance was repulsed as two Indiana regiments of Davis’s other brigade outflanked Hébert’s left and Osterhaus’s division struck his right. Exhausted and unsupported, the remnants of Hébert’s command retreated to the Bentonville Detour in mid-afternoon, along with the rest of McCulloch’s Division. Hébert was captured by the Federals. Just then Sigel arrived at Leetown with heavy reinforcements, helped to secure the battlefield, and marched toward the ongoing fight at Elkhorn Tavern.

Price’s Division, with Van Dorn at its head, had encountered Carr’s Fourth Division at the tavern. The Confederates were at the bottom of a deep canyon known as Cross Timber Hollow; the Federals occupied a superb defensive position on top of the Pea Ridge plateau. For several hours Van Dorn engaged the Federals with artillery before ordering Price to attack. The Confederates ascended the steep hill, pushed back both of Carr’s flanks, and gained a foothold on the plateau. The most intense fighting of the entire battle of Pea Ridge occurred around Elkhorn Tavern and just to the east at the Clemon farm. Carr’s men were forced back nearly a mile before reinforcements arrived. Darkness halted the fighting.

During the night of March 7–8 Curtis concentrated his remaining 9,500 troops on the Telegraph Road in order to drive the Confederates away from Elkhorn Tavern in the morning. Van Dorn ordered the remnants of McCulloch’s Division to the tavern. With only about half of his troops in any condition to fight because of exhaustion and lack of food, Van Dorn formed his men into a V-shaped defensive line running along the edge of the woods south and west of the tavern.

At dawn on March 8 Curtis deployed the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions in numerical order from left to right, facing north. It was one of the few times in the war that an entire army from flank to flank was out in the open for all to see. Sigel directed the First and Second Divisions west of the Telegraph Road, while Curtis directed the Third and Fourth Divisions east of the road and retained overall command. During the next two hours Sigel gradually advanced and wheeled his troops around until they faced northeast. In this fashion the Federal line soon roughly corresponded to the V-shaped Confederate line.

To cover this movement the Federals hammered the Confederates with twenty-one cannons, most of them directed personally by Sigel. This unusually well-coordinated fire compelled the Confederates to fall back to safer positions. Van Dorn’s ordnance trains had been separated from the army as a result of negligent staff work, so the Confederates did not have enough ammunition for their artillery. The Federal army then advanced. After a brief fight the Confederate rear guard disengaged, and the rout began. Van Dorn retreated southeast, leading the main body of his battered army entirely around the enemy army, a maneuver unique in the Civil War. Other Confederate units scattered north and west via their approach route, rejoining Van Dorn several days later in Van Buren. However, hundreds of Confederate soldiers left the colors to return home. Curtis did not know until the next day which route Van Dorn and the main column had taken, and by that time pursuit was futile.

The Confederates began the campaign with approximately 16,500 soldiers, including 800 Cherokees, but because the advance was so rapid, only about 14,000 were present at Pea Ridge and even fewer were actually engaged. About 2,000 Confederates were lost in the battle. The Federals had 10,250 soldiers at Pea Ridge and suffered 1,384 casualties. Half of the Federal losses were incurred by Carr’s Fourth Division during the fighting at Elkhorn Tavern on March 7.

Despite being outnumbered three to two, the Federals achieved a decisive tactical and strategic victory at Pea Ridge. The outcome of the battle ended any serious Confederate threat to Missouri and led to the conquest of Arkansas. Van Dorn’s impulsiveness, his obsession with speed and surprise, and his unconcern for logistics and staff work gravely weakened the Confederate effort. Conversely, Curtis’s coolness and tactical boldness were major factors in the Federal victory.

Estimated Casualties: 1,384 US, 2,000 CS

On paper there were two companies of French paratroopers in 1940, but they were not at full strength. They were nevertheless considered “ready for action”, and their deployment was planned as part of the Allied entry in the Netherlands, but eventually they were not dropped. Their “standard” plane was the Potez 650.

The corps franc is a special infiltration and deep reconnaissance unit. It is the equivalent of the German Stosstruppen. Concerning WW2, these corps francs were created in September 1939 with specially selected volunteers at the battalion, regimental and/or divisional level. These elite troops had the mission to infiltrate behind the enemy lines, to collect information, to organize ambushes or raids and to take prisoners.

The smallest element of a corps franc is a team of 6 men called “l’équipe” (= the team) or “sizaine”. All the members of the team have a combat knife, a handgun (revolver or pistol) and many grenades for close combat. These men are usually armed with the mousqueton (carbine) Berthier Mle1892 M16 and in each team there are usually 1-2 SMGs (typically Erma-Vollmer but also MAS38 SMGs, Suomi M31 from which 150 had been sent on the north-eastern front in 1939 and even German captured SMGs and even German captured SMGs) and 1 FM 24/29 LMG to increase the firepower (some captured MG34s are also used). Some shotguns were also used during the patrols. They carried also satchel charges if the mission required explosives. Several teams could be grouped together, for example a squad of 12 men will include 2 FM 24/29 LMGs and 2-4 SMGs and has therefore more automatic weapons than a regular infantry squad. The bigger unit including several teams is called the “groupe franc” (or “trentaine”) with 5 teams (30 men), it corresponds roughly to a platoon. The “groupe franc” is generally commanded by a lieutenant and is completely independent. Several “groupes francs” can be grouped for a specific mission into a “groupement franc”. Such a “groupement franc” includes usually a maximum of 6 “groupes francs” (180 men), roughly a company.

The “SES” = “Section d’Eclaireurs Skieurs” (ski-scouts platoons) are elite deep reconnaissance troops. They play the same role than the corps francs but they are specialized in mountain warfare and winter conditions. They are included in the mountain infantry units.

———–

The first French airborne troops were e.g. used as groupes francs in 1939.

Fred Geille was born on 19 November 1896. In November 1914, at 18 years old he enlisted in the infantry and fought bravely on different fronts. He is wounded during an assault in April 1915. In 1917, his platoon leader is killed; he takes the command of the unit and pulls the Germans back. He is then promoted 2nd lieutenant and is awarded a citation by the division.
But Geille had a passion for aviation and in 1917 he is formed as aerial observer and enlisted in the BR 7 squadron. He behaved with the same bravery as in the infantry during various missions over the enemy lines. On 15 November 1918, he is awarded a second citation. In July 1919, he is sent in Poland in general Haller’s “blue division”, which was fully armed and equipped in French gear. He earns in Poland a third citation as excellent observer. On 25 May 1919, he flew during a reconnaissance over Tarnopol, 150km behind the enemy lines. The aircrafts was damaged by enemy fire at low altitude but he managed to bring back precious intelligence. Note that he married a Polish wife and had 3 girls with her: Danouta, Maryla and Héléna.

Back in France, he earned is pilot wings on 7 October 1920 and served successively in France, in North Africa and in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon), where he is promoted captain at Christmas 1927. Back in France, he will be in 1935-1937 at the origin of the first French airborne troops.

In 1935 an airborne training center is created by capitaine Geille at Avignon-Pujaut. The first French airborne troops were called “infanterie de l’air” and officially created on 1 April 1937, after a decision taken on 20 October 1936. Two “Groupes de l’Infanterie de l’Air” (GIA.) were formed (601st in Reims and 602nd in Baraki in Algeria).

Each group is composed of:
• one HQ
• one transport aircraft squadron
• one airborne infantry company (= CIA = Compagnie d’Infanterie de l’Air) : 175 men organized in 3 platoons + 1 support platoon (with 2 37mm TR infantry guns and 2 Hotchkiss Mle1914 HMGs).

Groupe de l’infanterie de l’air 601 (1937)
• commander : commandant Mayet (after commandant Arsac)
• commander of the infantry company: capitaine Sauvagnac assisted by lieutenant Glaizot (the lieutenants in the squads are Le Bourhis, Mayer, Audebert, Lespina, Fournier and Foucault)

Groupe de l’infanterie de l’air 602 (1937)
• commander : commandant Michel
• commander of the infantry company: capitaine Loizeau assisted by lieutenant Dupouts (the lieutenants in the squads are Fleury, Morel, Chevalier, Lemaître, Lemire and Bastouil)

Each 12-men squad is armed with Mousqueton Berthier Mle1892 M16, 2 FM 24/29 LMGs per squad, one VB launcher and hand grenades (36 carbines and 6 LMGs in one platoon). The MAS36 CR39, a MAS 36 with foldable stock specially designed for airborne troops was never put into service before the armistice. Seven Boys anti-tank rifles were also already used in the Corps Francs in 1939. The 37mm infantry guns and HMGs are launched in separate containers in the bomb bay of the planes but the small arms are attached to the men during the drop.
The doctrine and formation are inspired from the big Russian training observed in Kiev in 1935. Many specific equipment, girdles for the fixation of various equipments, the leg bag etc. are specially studied and realized by the French Air Force. This equipment were presented to the British forces in 1939 and adopted by the British SAS. The parachutes are at first American Irvin sport models imported by the SGP (Société Générale des Parachutes) from the factory in England and Russian copies of the Irvin model and later with French models: the Aviorex 120 and 130 models.

Concerning the transport aircrafts squadrons:
• GIA 601 started with Potez 650 and received Farman 224 in September 1939
• GIA 602 started with LeO 213 and was equipped with Potez 650 in March 1938

On 7 October 1937, capitaine Sauvagnac beats the world record of free fall without inhalator with 74 seconds.

At First the doctrine is concerning the use of small saboteurs groups for the destruction of factories or bridges. Much training was organized for the new airborne troops. For example in August 1937 the 601st CIA seized a bridge on the Durance and in September 1937 after a drop of 100m only in a rainy sky they seized by surprise the HQ of a whole division.

In October 1938 the whole 601st CIA is dropped on BA112 airbase by 5 planes and in less than 3 minutes after the beginning of the drop the first 37mm rounds were shot. The German observers invited to this presentation were impressed and unlike the French high command they used these lessons.

In September 1939, the 601st CIA is based in Avignon-Pujaut and the 602nd CIA in Montélimar. In November 1939 they are directed towards Calais where they keep on alert, ready to embark in Farman 224 planes during one week. They were thought to jump over the Flessingue airbase and Arnemuisen isthmus in the Netherlands but the operation was never launched.

The French airborne companies are then used to form 4 “groupes francs” (52 men from the 601st CIA and 91 men from the 602nd CIA commanded by capitaine Glaizot) under the authority of the 28th alpine infantry division in Alsace. These groups are based in the no man’s land, in Lembach (Alsace), 12 km NE of Niederbronn (in the operational area of the 7th and 27th BCA – bataillon de chasseurs alpins -, alpine troops).

On February 14, 1940, the four “Groupes Francs”:
• Lieutenant Chevalier (based in Lembach)
• Lieutenant Le Bourhis (based in Lembach)
• Lieutenant Audebert (based in Obersteinbach, at 15 km west of Lembach)
• Lieutenant Lemaître (based in Obersteinbach, at 15 km west of Lembach)
are commanded by capitaine Henri Glaizot whose HQ is in Lembach.

Usually the work was divided into 3 days of patrol and 1 resting day during which capitaine Glaizot who is also a pilot, uses a recon plane from the observation squadron of Haguenau.

From 14 February to 11 March 1940 they led 28 patrols and 23 ambushes, sometimes more than 3 km behind the German lines. They lost only 2 KIAs (sergent Baratte – 602nd CIA – on 24 February and sergent Solacroup – 601st CIA – on 7 March) and 3 WIAs. They scored about 30 German soldiers KIA.

From 11 to 17 March, they returned in Niederbronn in the French lines and 54 French parachutists were awarded citations and on 22 March the groupes francs are disbanded, the men return to their infanterie de l’air companies.

Origins of the Irish in French Service (The Wild Geese)

The Original Wild Geese so legend has it where formed from what remained of the English Regiment of G Hamilton transferred to French service after the Dutch War of 1672-78). After 1679 the Regiment then led by Colonel Justin Macartie disappears from the French establishment – possibly amalgamated into one of the other French Regiments.

In 1690, James sent following regiments to France in exchange for French Regiments that were sent to Ireland.

Raised Title Colonel
1689   O’Bryan’s Dragoon’s D O’Bryan, Lord Clare
1661 2nd Bn Kings Guards William Dorrington
1689 Mountcashel’s Foot J Macarty, Lord Mountcashel
1689 Tyrone’s Foot R O’Neill, Earl of Tyrone
1689 Kilmallock’s Foot D Sarsfield, Lord Kilmallock
1689 O’Gara’s Foot O O’Gara (Previously O’Farrell’s)
1689 Bagnall’s Foot D Bagnall
1689 D Browne’s Foot D Browne
1689 MacCartie’s Foot O MacCartie
1689 Iveagh’s Foot B Magenris, Lord Iveagh

After Ireland was abandoned in 1691 the Irish Regiments where formed from those regiments in France and the units that had left Ireland. The Irish in French service where as follows:

Roi d’Angleterre – Sheldon’s Horse: formerly Lord Dover’s troop of Lifeguards – fought with James in Ireland and followed him into exile in 1691.
Colonels
1686 Henry, Lord Dover
1689 Patrick Sarsfield
1691 D Sheldon (+1693 Neerwinden)
1698 => Sheldon Irlandais
1701 => La Reine d’Angleterre
(+ 1701 Chiari; 1702 Cremona and Luzzara; 1703 Spires; 1704 Blenheim)
1706 Comte de Nugent (+ 1706 Ramilles; 1708 Oudenarde;
1709 Malpalquet and 1712 Denain)

Roi d’Angleterre Dragoons – raised in 1685 as Dongan’s Dragoons on the Irish Establishment. Entered French Service in 1691 as dismounted dragoons – Colonels
1685 William Dongan, Earl of Limerick
1689 Walter Dongan (son of above, + Boyne)
1690 Walter Nugent (+ 1691 Aughrim)
1691 Richard Bellew => King of England’s Dismounted Dragoons
1691 Thomas Maxwell (+ Marsaglia)
1693 Dominick Sarsfield, 4th Viscount Kilmallock
1698 Amalgamated into the Infantry Regiment Bourke

Reine d’Angleterre Dragoons – raised in 1689 in Ireland by Francis O’Carroll for James. Entered French Service in 1691 as dismounted dragoons -
Colonels
1689 Francis O’Carroll (+ Marsaglia 1693)
1693 Charles O’Brien 5th Lord Clare
1696 Oliver O’Gara
1698 Amalgamated into the Infantry Regiment Galmoy

Gardes Irlandaisses
2nd Battalion of the Irish Guards (formerly on the Irish establishment) transferred to France. Amalgamated with the Gardes du Roi Angleterre (or the 1st Battalion of the Irish Guards to form Dorringtons regiment in 1698.

Gardes du Roi Angleterre (See Gardes Irlandaisses)
(+ 1693 Neerwinden)

Mountcashel
Formerly the Duke of Ormonde’s foot on the Irish Establishment.
Colonels
1689 Comte de Mountcashel (C MacCarthy)
1694 A de Lee (+ 1703 Hochstadt, 1704 Blenheim)
1704 N de Lee (+ 1708 Oudenarde, 1709 Malpalquet, 1712
Denain)

Clare
Formed from O’Briens Dragoons and other Irish Exiles in 1690
Colonels
1690 Vicomte Clare (D O’Brien) (+ 1693 Marsaglia)
1693 A de Lee
1694 Richard, Lord Talbot
1696 Comte de Clare (C O’Brien) (+ 1703 Hochstadt, 1704 Blenheim; 1706 Ramillies)
1706 Comte O’Brien (Morgan) (+ 1709 Malpalquet, 1712 Denain)

Dillon
Colonels
1690 A Dillon (+ 1702 Luzzara, 1707 Almanza)

La Reine Irlandais
Colonels
1691 F Wauchop (+ 1693 Marsaglia)
1696 H Luttrell
1698 Incorporated into the Luttrells Regiment

La Marine Irlandais
Colonels
1691 N Fitzgerald
1698   Incorporated into the Albemarle’s Regiment

Dublin
No Colonel given
1698   Incorporated into the Albemarle’s Regiment

Limerick
Colonels
1691 Richard Talbot (+ 1693 Marsaglia)
1698 Incorporated into the Berwick’s Regiment

Athlone
Colonels
1691 N Athlone
1693 Walter, Comte Bourke
1698   Incorporated into the Berwick’s Regiment

Klincarthy
Colonels
1691 N Klincarthy
1698   Incorporated into the Luttrell’s Regiment

Charlemont
Colonels
1691 N Charlemont
1698   Incorporated into the Galmoy’s Regiment

With the Treaty of Ryswick (1698) the following Regiments where formed from the amalgamation of those disbanded.

Dorrington
Formed from the amalgamation the Regiments of the Gardes Irlandaisses and the Gardes du Roi Angleterre.
Colonels Lord William Dorrington (+ 1703 Hochstadt, 1704 Blenheim, 1708 Oudenarde, 1709 Malpalquet, 1712 Denain)

Luttrell
Formed from the amalgamation the Regiments of La Reine Irlandais, and Klincarthy
Colonels
1698 H Luttrell
1699 Walter, Comte Bourke (+ 1701 Chiari, 1702 Cremona, Luzzara,
1705 Cassano, 1706 Turin)
1715 F Wauchop – passed into Spanish service

Albemarle
Formed from the amalgamation the Regiments of La Marine Irlandais and Dublin
Colonels
1698  J Monck, Duke of Albemarle (+1702 Cremona, Luzzara)
1703 N Fitzgerald (+ 1705 Cassano, 1706 Turin, 1708 Oudenarde)
1708 D O’Donnell (+1709 Malpalquet, 1712 Denain)
1715 Disbanded

Berwick
Formed from the amalgamation the Regiments of Limerick and Bourke
Colonels
1698 J Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick (+ 1701 Carpi and Chiari, 1702 Cremona and Luzzara, 1705 Cassano, 1706 Turin, 1707Almanza)

Galmoy
Formed from the amalgamation the Regiments of La Reine Dragoons and Charlemont
Colonels
1698 P Buttler, Vicomte Galmoy (+1701 Carpi and Chiari, 1702 Cremona and Luzzara, 1703 Speyerbach, 1706 Turin)
1715 Disbanded

Berwick Etranger
Raised from deserters from the British Army
Colonels
1702 J Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick
1704 N O’Berghiez
1708 N O’Davan
1713 Incorporated into the other Irish Regiments

Sources
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1836-45)
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