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Jefferson County,

September 12–15, 1862

By Dennis E. Frye

CS General Robert E. Lee marched north after his victory at Second Manassas for several reasons. War-weary Virginia could not sustain Lee’s army much longer, the rich farms of Maryland and Pennsylvania could feed both soldiers and horses, and Virginia farmers required time to reap the fall harvest. In addition, the U.S. congressional elections were approaching in November, and Lee hoped to embarrass President Abraham Lincoln as well as encourage European recognition of the Confederacy.

Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River at White’s Ford on September 4–7. When the army reached Frederick, and before continuing the invasion, Lee had to open a lifeline back into Virginia through the Shenandoah Valley. This line of communication and supply was threatened, however, by the continuing presence of Federal troops guarding the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in the Valley. Lee had expected the advance of his army to force the withdrawal of the 14,000 Union troops garrisoning Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, but instead the Federal high command instructed US Colonel Dixon S. Miles “to hold Harpers Ferry to the last extremity.”

Lee’s solution was to divide his army into four parts and send three to Harpers Ferry to eliminate the problem. The fourth column would march to Boonsboro, fifteen miles north of Harpers Ferry, and await the return of the campaigners at South Mountain. Lee put CS Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, a native of Clarksburg, in command because Jackson had been commander of the Confederate units at Harpers Ferry in the spring of 1861 and knew the topography of the region. Jackson responded favorably to the task, observing that he had lately neglected his “friends” in the Valley.

At sunrise on September 10 three converging columns of Confederates methodically began driving toward Harpers Ferry. CS Major General John G. Walker’s Division of 2,000 swung south across the Potomac River and then east toward Loudoun Heights. The 8,000 men of CS Major General Lafayette McLaws veered west and south toward Maryland Heights.

Jackson, with three divisions—14,000 veterans—raced west toward Martinsburg and then east toward Bolivar Heights. Miles knew the Confederates were coming. Outnumbered almost two to one and further handicapped by his inexperienced troops—more than two thirds of them had been in the army for less than three weeks—he weakened his overall defense by dividing his forces to cover Maryland and Bolivar Heights.

On September 13 the Confederates took up their positions near his garrison. Loudoun Heights fell quickly to Walker’s men, and after a six-hour battle McLaws seized Maryland Heights. Jackson then drove in from the west, deploying his forces along School House Ridge, one half mile west of Bolivar Heights. Later that night Confederate cannoneers dragged artillery to the ridgetops. At about 2:00 p.m. on September 14 the hills erupted in smoke and flame, and the bombardment continued until dark. Jackson’s gunners zeroed in on Bolivar Heights, the main position of the trapped Federals. One Union lieutenant recalled the horror of the bombardment: “The infernal screech owls came hissing and singing, then bursting, plowing great holes in the earth, filling our eyes with dust, and tearing many giant trees to atoms.” Darkness finally ended the firestorm, with the Stars and Stripes still flying over Harpers Ferry.

Jackson was becoming impatient. Word had arrived from Lee that the situation in Maryland had deteriorated. The Union army had advanced unexpectedly, aided by the discovery of Lee’s original orders, and the Confederates had been forced to abandon South Mountain. Lee informed Jackson that he would have to cancel the invasion of the North if Harpers Ferry did not fall in the morning.

To ensure success Jackson ordered CS Major General Ambrose Powell Hill to take his 5,000 men from the south end of School House Ridge and flank the Union left on Bolivar Heights. Jackson felt certain that this move, in conjunction with additional artillery on Loudoun Heights, would end the Union resistance. During the night of September 14 Hill’s Confederates quietly snaked along the banks of the Shenandoah River until they discovered ravines leading up to the Chambers farm. In the darkness Hill deployed his men and artillery in open pastures behind the Union left. The fate of Harpers Ferry was sealed.

A thick fog blanketed the valley on the morning of September 15. As the rising sun burned away the mist, Confederate shells from the mountains again filled the sky. One Vermont soldier declared, “We [were] as helpless as rats in a cage.” At about 8:00 a.m., with his artillery ammunition exhausted and his troops surrounded, Miles ordered white flags raised. Jackson received the formal Union surrender on School House Ridge, where he had coordinated the siege. He captured 73 pieces of artillery, 11,000 small arms, and 200 wagons, with a loss of only 286 men. In addition to the 219 Union men killed and wounded, 12,500 Federals were taken prisoner—the largest surrender of U.S. troops during the Civil War.

Lee greeted the news with enthusiasm. The fall of Harpers Ferry allowed him to make a stand in Maryland. However, the resulting battle of Antietam— America’s bloodiest single-day battle— changed the course of the war in favor of the Union.

Estimated Casualties: 12,719 US, 286 CS