During the early months of 1944, the US Army Am Force’s bombing offensive against Germany entered a new and more devastating phase. Formations of several hundred heavy bombers, now protected by large numbers of Mustang, Thunderbolt and Lightning fighters, were able to reach any part of the Reich from them bases in England and Italy Quite apart from the severe damage they caused to targets, these raids, carried out in broad daylight, demonstrated clearly to the German population that the Luftwaffe was unable to defeat such incursions.

The introduction of the American long‑range escort fighters posed an almost insoluble problem for the Luftwaffe, for it was not long before the escorts outnumbered the defending fighters by a wide margin During the hard‑fought battle on the occasion of the first all‑out American attack on Berlin on 6 March 1944 for example 814 Fortresses and Liberators were sent against the capital, supported by 644 escorting fighters which flew a total of 943 sorties. In reply, the Luftwaffe flew 528 fighter sorties, but of these, only about 370 made contact with the enemy.

For the German fighter force, being heavily outnumbered was not the only problem. Its heavy fighters ‑ the twin‑engined Messerschmidt Bf 110s and Me 410s, which had the firepower necessary to knock down the bombers‑ were extremely vulnerable to attacks from the American fighters. On the other hand, its single‑engined Messerschmidt Bf 109s and Focke‑Wulf Fw 190s, which had the performance to dog‑fight with the American escorts, were short on firepower with which to engage the heavy bombers.

By the beginning of 1944, the standard German procedure when engaging American daylight attacks was to assemble formations of up to 100 fighters which were then directed by ground control into position for a head‑on attack on part of the American bomber force Such head‑on attacks were made at a combined closing speed of about 500mph, however, which meant that a German pilot had time only for a single half‑second burst before he had to pull up to avoid colliding with the bomber he was engaging. To be successful, these tactics required considerable skill, and they were beyond all but a few ace Luftwaffe pilots.

Generalmajor (Major‑General) Adolf Galland, at the time General der Jagdflieger (Inspecting General for Fighters), received many suggestions of ways to destroy greater numbers of American bombers and thus halt their debilitating attacks. One such proposal came from Major Ganther von Kornatzki, who asked to be allowed to lead a special fighter unit, manned by volunteer pilots who would be willing to ram the American bombers and then hope to escape from their wrecked fighters by parachute. Galland later commented to the author:

‘I did not think it a good idea. To get into position to ram, pilots had first to break through the screen of escorts and then close with the bombers. But if they could get that close a short burst with ordinary cannon would be lethal anyway and the fighter pilot would have a much greater chance of escaping with his life.’

Although it was not taken up in its original form, Kornatzki’s idea spawned one that did find favour: to use volunteer pilots to fly an especially heavily armed and armoured version of the Focke‑Wulf Fw 190 fighter in the close‑in fighting or ‘Sturm’ (shock) role. This fighter, nicknamed the ‘Sturmbock’ (battering ram), was to engage the American formations not from the front, but from the rear where, although the bombers’ defensive fire would be at its most powerful, the German pilot could engage with greatest effect. The ramming option was retained as a last resort, in cases where the bomber being engaged survived the attack with cannon.

Early in 1944 Sturmstaffel (shock squadron) 1 was formed to test the feasibility of the new tactics. Its fighters were not to fly in pairs to engage enemy bombers as other units did; instead they were to engage as a Staffel of about a dozen aircraft flying wing‑tip to wing‑tip m a broad arrow formation, concentrating their attack on one part of the enemy bomber force to achieve the greatest possible shock effect. Operational trials of the new tactics showed considerable promise and, thus encouraged, Generalmajor Galland introduced the concept of using Sturmbock fighters in Gruppe strength (three Staffeln, about 36 aircraft) accompanied by Messerschmidt Bf 109 fighters to protect them from the American escorts. Three of the Jagdgeschwader engaged to Reich Air Defence operations, JG 3, JG 4 and JG 300, were reorganised, each with one Gruppe of Fw 190 Sturmbock aircraft, and three other Gruppen equipped with Bf 109s with reduced armament and special uprated engines to make them more effective against American fighters Galland’s plan was to assemble mighty Gefechtsverbande (battle formations), each comprising one Gruppe of Sturmbock aircraft and two or three Gruppen of escorting fighters ‑ a total of 100 or more aircraft ‑ and send these in to make a concentrated attack against a single formation of American bombers.

The hazardous nature of Sturmgruppe operations decreed that only volunteers would be suitable; and before a pilot was accepted he had to sign an affidavit which stated:

‘I . . . do solemnly undertake that on each occasion on which I make contact with an enemy four-engined bomber I shall press home my attack to the shortest range and will, if my firing pass is not successful, destroy the enemy aircraft by ramming.’

Leutnant (Second Lieutenant) Walther Hagenah was one of the volunteers who signed the affidavit on joining IV (Sturm) Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 3 when it formed in July 1944. He explained its terms: ‘It was made clear to us that, having signed the affidavit, failure to carry out its conditions would render us liable to trial by court martial on a charge of cowardice in the face of the enemy. No man was forced to sign, however, and there were no recriminations against those who did not wish to do so; they simply did not join the ranks of the Sturmgruppen.’

The first large‑scale use of the new Gefechtsverband tactics was on 7 July 1944, when a force of 1129 Fortresses and Liberators of the US Eighth Army Air Force set out from England to bomb aircraft factories and synthetic oil plants near Leipzig. As the bombers headed deep into Germany, the Luftwaffe fighter controller for the area was passing intercept vectors to Major Walther Dahl leading a formation comprising IV.(Sturm) Gruppe of JG 3 escorted by two Gruppen of Bf 109s from JG 300 ‑a total of about 100 aircraft. Just west of the target, Dahl caught sight of his quarry: box after box of bombers streaming eastwards. Dahl swung his force in behind a formation of Liberators of the 492nd Bombardment Group which, as luck would have it, was temporarily without fighter cover. The attack fell on the group’s Low Squadron. Led by Hauptmann (Captain) Wilhelm Moritz, the Sturmgruppe closed to short range then opened a withering fire on its victims: bomber after bomber tumbled out of the formation until none was left The 11‑aircraft squadron was wiped out. Those Sturmbock aircraft with ammunition remaining attacked another part of the American force, then broke away and dived for home. The US 2nd Air Division lost 28 Liberators from all causes that day, the majority to Moritz’s fighters. Walther Hagenah was credited with the destruction of one of them. The Sturmgruppe lost nine fighters shot down and three more were forced to crash‑land, five of the unit’s pilots were killed. By the standards of the time, it had been a highly successful operation for the Luftwaffe.

During the months that followed, Gefechtsverband tactics were frequently employed and there were occasions when they inflicted severe losses on bomber formations. On 2 November, for example, two Sturmgruppen were able to obtain firing positions behind separate American bomber formations attacking targets in the Leipzig area. During the first such engagement, IV. (Sturm) JG 3 attacked the 91st Bomb Group and knocked down 13 Fortresses, including two by ramming; then IL(Sturm) JG 4 attacked the 457th Bomb Group and destroyed nine Fortresses. The losses were not all on one side, however, and on the arrival of a strong force of Mustangs the slaughter of the heavy bombers ended and it was the Sturmgruppen that suffered heavily.

Altogether the day’s fighting cost JG 3 15 out of 39 Sturmbock aircraft committed, while JG 4 lost 16 out of 22 During these actions the two Sturmgruppen suffered heavy losses in pilots killed and wounded. Walther Hagenah described the tactics employed during a typical Storm attack. As the gruppe approached an American bomber formation from behind it would split into its three Staffeln, each of which would go after a different squadron within the enemy formation:

‘Once a Sturmstaffel was in position about 1000yds behind “its” squadron of bombers, the Staffel leader would order his aircraft into line abreast and, still in close formation, they would advance on the bombers, At this stage our tactics were governed by the performance of our wing mounted 30mm cannon. Although the hexogen high‑explosive ammunition fired by this weapon was devastatingly, effective, the gun’s relatively low muzzle velocity meant that its accuracy fell off rapidly with range. And since we carried only 55 rounds per gun, sufficient for about five seconds’ firing, we could not afford to waste ammunition m wild shooting from long range. To be sure of bringing down a bomber it was essential we held our fire until we were right up close against the bombers. We were to advance like Frederick the Great’s infantrymen, holding our fire until we could see “the whites of the enemy’s eyes”.’

During the advance, each man picked a bomber and closed in on it. As our formation moved forward the American bombers would, of course, let fly at us with everything they had. I can remember the sky becoming almost alive with tracer. With strict orders to withhold our fire until the leader gave the order, we could only grit our teeth and press ahead. In fact, however, with the extra armour, surprisingly few of our aircraft were knocked down by the return fire; like the armoured knights in the middle ages: we were well protected. A Staffel might lose one or two aircraft during the advance, but the rest con­tinued relentlessly on. In my Gruppe we posi­tioned ourselves about 100 yds behind the bombers before opening fire. Then our chance came and we made the most of it. From such a range we could hardly miss and as the 30mm explosive rounds struck home we could see the structure of the enemy bombers literally falling apart in front of us. On average three hits with 30mm ammunition would be sufficient to knock down a four-engined bomber and the shorter burst was usually sufficient to achieve that.

As a mark of pride, to recognition of the shoat‑range engagements which characterised their operations, pilots flying with Storm units had a ‘whites of the eyes insignia painted on their leather flying jackets.

It was, nevertheless, rare for a Sturm pilot to ram a bomber; Walther Hagenah never had to and he never saw anyone else do so.

‘If we held our formation, ran the gauntlet of the bombers’ defensive fire and reached a firing position 100yds behind a bomber, with our powerful cannon it was a relatively simple matter to get a kill. There were a few occasions when people reached a firing position and found for example, that their weapons had jammed. They then opened their throttle pulled up a little, dived down and rammed. By and large, however, our weapons were very reliable and that was rarely necessary.

We received no detailed instructions from our High Command on how best to ram the enemy bombers though the matter was, of course, the subject of several discussions in our crewroom. Of the pilots who made ramming attacks, about half escaped without serious injury.’

Although the Sturmgruppen were able to achieve occasional successes against heavy bombers during the autumn and winter of 1944 the hordes of Amer­ican fighters sweeping ahead and on the flanks of the bombers made such operations increasingly costly and finally, put a stay to them altogether. German fighters were liable to be shot up on the ground at their bases, or attacked during take‑off, or on their way to engage the bombers Once a Gefechtsverband had been broken up it was almost impossible to re‑form it in the presence of the enemy and the operation had to be broken off. It was not that the Sturm tactics were at fault or that the German fighter pilots lacked determination in carrying them out; it was simply that no tactical method could succeed in the face of such overwhelming enemy air superiority. By the end of January 1945, the Sturmgruppen had virtually ceased operations against the American bombers, and during the closing weeks of the war their heavily armoured aircraft were relegated to ground attack operations.

Questioned long after the war about his part in the Sturmgruppe operations, Walther Hagenah was proud of the time he had spent with the elite force.

‘As members of a Sturmgruppe we knew that we were a tough unit, something special, and morale was high. There were no shirkers; people like that did not accept the harsh conditions of membership The enemy was systematically destroying our homeland and we were determined to hit back hard. I am proud to have been numbered amongst the Sturmgruppe pilots. If the conditions were ever repeated, I would do the same thing again.’

THE GEFECHTSVERBAND

Late in 1943, the US Army Air Force began to deploy the North American P‑51 Mustang in the long‑range fighter escort role. Other types, including the Republic Thunderbolt, were modified to increase their range, and by early 1944 US Army Air Force daylight bombing raids were accompanied by large numbers of escort fighters able to engage and destroy the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmidt Bf 109s and Focke-Wulf Fw 190s. In addition to providing close escort, the Mustang squadrons ranged up and down the bomber stream searching for German fighter formations and engaging them. As German losses mounted, the Luftwaffe tacticians sought a better way of deploying their fighters.

The solution they adopted was the ‘Gerfechtsverband’ or battle formation, which consisted of a Sturmgruppe of heavily armed and armoured `Sturmbock’ Fw190s escorted by two ‘Beleitgruppen’ (light groups) of escort fighters ‑ normally Messerschmidt Bf 109s. While the Bf 109s engaged the American Mustangs and Thunderbolts, the Sturmgruppe Fw 190s were free to close on the bombers and hit them at point‑blank range. Although the giant battle formations were difficult to assemble, and could on occasion be broken up by enemy fighters before reaching the bomber stream, the Sturmgruppen were able to inflict devastating losses when they succeeded in getting close to their targets.

THE FOCKE‑WULF BATTERING RAMS

The Focke‑Wulf Fw 190, converted in 1944 for Sturmbock (battering ram) operations, was one of the Luftwaffe’s most feared fighter types. Introduced into combat against the Spitfire Mk V in September 1941, it had proved itself more than a match for its adversary. Powered by the big BMW 801C 14‑cylinder air‑cooled radial engine, its top speed of 388mph enabled it to out‑run the Spitfire, and it could out‑fly its rival on almost every count except the British plane’s superb turning circle. Even the replacement of its original MG 17 wing‑stub machine guns with much heavier 20mm MG FF cannon could not impair its overall performance.

Germany, unlike the Allies, did not introduce significant new types of fighter as the war progressed. Instead, existing successful aircraft such as the Bf 109 and the Fw 190 were subjected to a bewildering array of modifications and improvements as new roles suggested themselves. When, in 1944, the urgent necessity of close‑range attacks on bombers became obvious, the current Fw 190 models were adapted, and only one version, the Fw 190A‑9, was produced specifically for ramming tactics: it featured a 2000hp BMW 801E engine and an armoured wing leading edge.

Most of the Sturmbock aircraft, however, were older Fw 190s with their 20mm cannon replaced by two 30mm Mk 108 cannon supplied with explosive rounds. To improve protection against the bombers’ close‑range defensive fire they were given additional steel plating around the cockpit and ammunition boxes. The 4001b of extra weight imposed by these additions did reduce the performance and maneuverability of the aircraft, but it was now far better equipped for its potentially suicidal missions.