General Gordon’s Last Stand, Khartoum 26th January 1885 by G.W. Joy.
By Robert N. Rossi
Under British pressure, and nearly bereft of manpower the Khedive of Egypt had agreed to evacuate the Sudan after the defeat of the Hicks and Baker relief expeditions. The British agreed to help carry out the evacuation. London suggested General Charles Gordon of England. Gordon quickly left England and arrived in Cairo on 26 January 1884. He spent only two days in the Egyptian capitol before leaving for the Sudan, meeting with the British ministers and the Khedive before his departure. His destination was Khartoum, some 2,000 miles up the Nile. His mission was limited: evacuate the remaining Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan and turn over the government of the Sudan to the local Sudanese.
Gordon wanted to turn the Sudan over to Zebehr Pasha, the Khedive’s original choice for Gordon’s job. Zebehr was a native Sudanese who had conquered Darfur province and added it to Egyptian colonial rule as part of the Sudan. He was in Egypt under detention as a result of slave trading and political activities in the Sudan prior to the appearance of the Mahdi. However, the British government had blocked Zebehr’s appointment; fearing public opinion would turn against them if they backed the nomination of a famous slave trader.’ Because the Khedive, at British insistence, had retained Zebehr in Egypt, Gordon was faced with conducting the evacuation while searching for a suitable candidate to assume the reins of government.
Gordon arrived in Khartoum on 18 February 1884, after a 21 day journey from Cairo. The senior officer in Khartoum upon Gordon’s arrival was Colonel Coetlogan. He had come to Khartoum with Hicks and had replaced Hicks as commandant of Khartoum. Colonel Coetlogan had already begun to prepare Khartoum for a siege. With the destruction of the Hicks’ column the previous November, Khartoum’s vulnerability to the Mahdi had become obvious. The Sennar province area immediately to the south of Khartoum was already in revolt and by now largely controlled by Mahdist forces, although the Mahdi himself had not yet moved out of Kordofan province against Khartoum.
By this time the Mahdi had expanded his activities beyond the command of a revolutionary army. He had also formed a revolutionary government. The Mahdi set up his government in accordance with Islamic tradition. He ran a treasury, a judicial system, and held audiences for his followers. He was also consolidating support for his cause and organizing his efforts for what lay ahead. Although he controlled a large military force and a good deal of territory with its attendant population, he was still personally isolated in Kordofan province from major events. Although his base of operations in Kordofan was now secure from Egyptian reprisals, he had no way of knowing that from now on he clearly held the initiative. His victory over Hicks and the spread of the revolt to other parts of the Sudan had convinced the British to pressure the Khedive to cut his losses and withdraw from the Sudan. The Mahdi did not yet know this, but his efforts at exporting his religious views and spreading the Jihad were beginning to achieve substantial results.
His appointment of local notables such as Osman Digna as regional commander was not an isolated event. The Mahdi’s use of subordinates to organize and lead the people in his revolt was extensive. He had long realized that he could not be everywhere and do everything himself. He delegated responsibilities effectively in his Jihad: to overthrow the colonial Egyptian administration. More importantly, he established the basis for Sudanese nationalism by appointing subordinates from local tribes and providing them with political and military responsibilities.
Knowledge of local conditions and the use of local personages in the highly diverse Sudan were critical to the success of the Mahdist revolution. Osman Digna, like other Mahdist leaders, not only knew the people of the local area, he knew the people of influence. He was also a person of some repute in the area prior to the Mahdist revolution. The Mahdi’s other appointees to lead the Jihad were from similar backgrounds and would achieve similar successes.
To the west, in Darfur province, the Mahdi appointed Sayed Mohammed Khaled. He was a native of the area and a local notable. 2 Sayed Mohammed Khaled successfully completed the overthrow of the colonial administration in Darfur on 15 January 1884 with the surrender of Darfur’s provincial governor Rudolf Slatin. To the south, the Mahdi appointed the Emir Karamella. He too was a well known man and a native-born member of the local community. 3 He succeeded in obtaining the surrender of Bahr El Ghazal province by the provincial governor Lupton Bey on 28 April 1884. To the north, the Mahdi appointed Mohammed el Kheirt to conquer Berber province. A local emir,’ he captured Berber province on 9 May 1884.
The Mahdi’a only key subordinate commander who failed to capture a Sudanese province was Sayed’Mahmud Ali. His efforts in Dongola were cut short by his death at the battle of Korti on 9 September 1884.5 The failure of his forces in Dongola was probably due to its geographic proximity to Egypt, which enabled its governor, Mustapha Bey Yower, to maintain open supply lines.
To the east of Kordofan lay Khartoum. Here the Mahdi had appointed Mohammed Abu Girga as his subordinate. Although he would need the assistance of the Mahdi with the main army to achieve success, the surrounding area of Khartoum was largely under his control by the end of 1883. The Mahdi also organized his main military force under subordinate leadership. Estimates of its true size vary, but it was probably in the area of 50,000 Ansar.’ The Mahdi organized his army into divisions for the first time during the siege of Khartoum. Each division of the army was recognized by the color of its flags. The Mahdi copied the flag color system of the Prophet Mohamed’s armies: green, black, and red. Again, his actions in this instance demonstrated his constant use of religious symbols to legitimize his actions and inspire his subordinates. The Mahdi appointed Khalifa Abdallahi the overall Commander-in- Chief of the armed forces. He also entrusted him with the command of the Black Flags division. The Black Flags were composed of Ansar drawn from the western tribes of the Sudan. The Mahdi gave Khalifa Ali Wad Helu command of the Green Flags division. These forces were composed of Ansar primarily drawn from the areas south of Khartoum. The Mahdi gave the command of the Red Flags to Khalifa Mohammed Sheriff. These Ansar were drawn from the areas north of Khartoum.
The Mahdi began to review his armed forces in late 1883. The reviews allowed him to see the main body of his troops, and more importantly, allowed the soldiers to see their religiously inspired leader. The Mahdi’s efforts at self-legitimization had been so successful that many of his soldiers believed he was divine. Military leaders have long used reviews as a means of instilling esprit in their men. For the Mahdi, these reviews were key military training events. Mahdist military success depended upon the ability of the Ansar to close with their enemies in fearless human wave assaults. Such assaults required a high level of esprit and dedication in each individual soldier. The Mahdi’s use of reviews was designed to build such esprit.
After the conquest of El Obeid, the Mahdi had standardized the uniform of his followers. They wore the simple white jibbah. The jibbah is a loose fitting, knee length shirt which was the common dress of the poor of the Sudan.7 The Mahdi himself wore this simple garment. His leadership example in this instance was a good indication of how well he knew his followers. Because the vast majority of his Ansar were the poor of the Sudan, his success at identifying with them strengthened their bonds. White is also the color of dress for the Pilgrim to Mecca. Again the Mahdi utilized religious symbology.
The Mahdi’s efforts at organizing his base of power before leaving Kordofan province were interrupted by an offer from the new Governor General of the Sudan. Prior to his arrival in Khartoum, Gordon had written to the Mahdi offering him the position of Governor of Kordofan province. 8 With his correspondence he included a red robe of honor and a fez (a Turkish hat). Gordon’s action was an attempt at peace. The Mahdi had now been at war with the colonial government for almost three years. He had started with nothing when combat was first initiated. He had been a poor man with 300 followers on Abba Island. Now he was faced with an offer of that would end the war, legitimize him in a position of power, and provide him a luxurious living. The Mahdi refused Gordon’s offer. His refusal demonstrates the Mahdi’s personal commitment to his cause.
‘I prayed in the mosque of El Obeid I should also pray in the mosque of Khartum, then in the mosque of Berber, then in the mosque of Mecca, then in the mosque of Jerusalem, then in the mosque of El Irak.’
An upstart or adventurer would probably not have refused such an offer. Although most people would find it hard to refuse a life of luxury, for the Mahdi it was a simple matter. He had refused the honors and spoils heaped upon him by his followers. He wore a simple jibbah, ate frugally, and lived a simple life. He sincerely believed in what he was doing and refused to compromise his principles.
Although negative or detracting references to the Mahdi’s personal conduct exist, the overwhelming majority are remarks by his enemies and are explainable as part of a propaganda war. The most frequent detracting reference is the contention that the Mahdi was somehow corrupted by his appetite for women. None, however, are firsthand accounts by either his European prisoners or his followers. The Mahdi unquestionably had many concubines, but we do not know if he ever had more than the four wives allowed in the Koran. In the traditional life of the Arab world, marriage was often used as a tool to increase the ties of allegiance to one’s followers.”0 The Mahdi’s successor, the Khalifa Abdallahi, used marriage in such a manner. His harem would be the only two-story building in Omdurman during his reign. It is likely that the Mahdi also utilized marriage to increase his stature and to bond his followers more closely to him. The sincerity of his writings, to his friends and his enemies, as well as his simple lifestyle, also support this conclusion. His followers who published accounts of his activities certainly share this view, and their testimony provides vivid evidence of the Mahdi’s tremendous success in developing a loyal, enthusiastic following.
Gordon also understood the importance of bonds between a leader and his followers and directed his efforts in this area. Together, they were a formidable opponent and very tough for the Mahdi to overcome. Upon his arrival at Khartoum, Gordon quickly took steps to publicize his attempts to alleviate the injustices that he believed were at the root of the Mahdi’s support. He repealed-the prohibition against slavery, cut the tax rate in half, freed political prisoners, and paid off government debts.”1 Despite military failures in attempting to destroy the Mahdi, these activities had finally begun to address the political reasons for the Mahdist revolt.
The Mahdi did not remain idle on the political or the propaganda front as he entered into his greatest campaign. He wrote Gordon explaining his religious philosophy and asking Gordon to join him.12 The Mahdi reciprocated Gordon’s gift of clothing. He sent Gordon a jibbah and returned the clothing Gordon had sent to him. Gordon also refused his gifts, and in March 1884 informed the Mahdi that correspondence between them was no longer necessary. Gordon had written the Mahdi a second time while at Khartoum asking the Mahdi for a ten-month truce. The Mahdi refused. He held the initiative and had no intention of losing it. The Mahdi, as he had done during the siege at El Obied, also wrote a proclamation to the inhabitants of Khartoum. His proclamation urged the inhabitants to perform a hegira (flight), as he had done from Abba Island, and as the Prophet Mohammed had done, and come over to his side.13 Again the Mahdi framed his argument in the religious symbology of the Prophet which he knew was acceptable to the Islamic peoples of the Sudan.
Although both sides had some successes in their political strategies, the Egyptian side made the mistake of announcing its intention of withdrawing from the Sudan.”‘ For the native Sudanese, continued support for the colonial government, which had clearly been losing the military campaign against the Mahdist uprising, and was on the verge of evacuating the country, was becoming more illogical and risky. Relatively few would stand firm.
The majority of the population in the Sennar province area, the immediate vicinity of Khartoum, would choose to join the Mahdi’s side. The people of Sennar were already in revolt by the time Gordon reached Khartoum. The Mahdist forces did not directly threaten Khartoum itself but controlled the countryside. Sheik El Obied and Sheik El Mudawwi were leading the revolt in Sennar and had already achieved many local successes. They were sufficiently strong to approach the defenses of Khartoum and put it under direct pressure in March 1884.
Inside Khartoum Gordon had roughly 10,000 men available.15 His artillery consisted of 21 guns and up to six Nordenfelt and Gatling machine-guns. He also possessed seven steamers which gave him the ability to use the Nile for offensive sorties. He was able to produce small arms ammunition and repair and even build more boats in the arsenal and shipyards of Khartoum. His principal disadvantage was the requirement to feed Khartoum’s population of 40,000 people, under siege conditions.
Gordon’s background made him a very capable commander of a besieged force. Originally commissioned in the British army as an engineer, Gordon was very knowledgeable in the techniques of siege warfare. He was also a very energetic man and spared no efforts to improve his position and withstand the siege until relief arrived. Gordon directed the planting of crops on the land he controlled to improve his food supply. He began improving existing defensive works and greatly strengthened the landward side of the Khartoum defenses. The land defenses eventually consisted of a rampart and ditch stretching from the White to the Blue Nile. Incorporated into the rampart were four strongpoints where he placed most of his artillery. Gordon utilized improvised mines made out of artillery shells to further strengthen his defenses. Across the Nile, Fort Omdurman and North Fort protected the garrison against an attack by boat.
The local Ansar were not strong enough to mount a direct assault on Khartoum and did not make the attempt. Instead, they utilized the indirect approach. On 13 March they seized the town of al-Halfaya north of Khartoum and cut the government telegraph line. With the capture of al- Halfaya Mahdist forces encircled Khartoum. Gordon’s counterattack with 4,000 men initially failed to retake al- Halfaya.
In March the Mahdi delivered his answer to Gordon. He dispatched Mohammed Abu Girga from El Obied with reinforcements to take charge of operations in Sennar and capture Khartoum. Initially, Abu Girga did not change the policy of the indirect approach, and he made no major effort to assault the city. The Mahdist forces focused on strengthening their positions while maintaining the siege.
Gordon knew that he could not sit passively awaiting outside reinforcements. He undertook offensive operations to keep the besieging forces off balance and to obtain food supplies. Throughout the summer months Gordon launched limited attacks against the Mahdists. By utilizing the steamers to travel the Nile and outflank his opponents, lie met with some success. The Mahdists were unable to defeat the steamers with their limited firepower. Gordon armed the steamers with cannon and machineguns for his operations. The Mahdists had captured cannons from previous battles but were untrained in their use and were at a severe disadvantage when engaged in artillery duels. To make up for their lack of training, the Mahdists’ used captured government artillerymen by offering them their freedom if they would man the Mahdi’s artillery.16 Nevertheless, the Mahdists never gained superiority in the artillery duels that occurred in the siege.
Gordon’s offensive operations were generally successful when confined to the banks of the Nile where the government forces enjoyed vastly superior firepower. They recaptured Al-Halfaya in June and pushed back the Mahdists from the Nile. In August, Muhammad Ali Pasha Husayn led several successful sorties against the Mahdist forces along the Nile’s banks. In September, attempting to exploit a victory along the river, he advanced inland. The Mahdists ambushed and routed his force, capturing 1,000 rifles at al Aylafuh on 4 September.
Gordon had planned to continue attacking to the north, hoping to break the siege and eventually to retake the province of Berber. The defeat of Muhammad Ali Pasha Husayn (referred to in several British accounts as The Fighting Pasha) convinced Gordon to cancel his plans. The initiative passed to the Ansar at exactly the time they were being heavily reinforced. They quickly retook al- Halfaya in late September. The Mahdi’s main army arrived in the Khartoum area in early September. On 23 October the Mahdi himself arrived in the Khartoum area and established his headquarters at Abu Sad, south of Omdurman. As he approached Khartoum he opened communications with Gordon but Gordon refused the Mahdi’s offers to surrender. The Mahdi continued to build on the strategy of the indirect approach. He directed the building of fortifications at al-Halfaya, and intensified the bombardment of Khartoum using captured artillery and captured enemy gunners.
The Mahdi directed his main effort against Fort Omdurman across the river from Khartoum. The Mahdist forces besieging the fort were primarily composed of ex-regulars. 17 These were the best trained men the Mahdi had in the use of the Remington rifle. The fort stood on high ground and could deliver effective artillery fire against attacking forces in support of the main defensive works. It also dominated the Nile, and its possession was key to control of steamer traffic on the Nile.
Prior to the Mahdi’s arrival at Khartoum Gordon could freely move men to and from the fort. On 12 November, the Ansar isolated the fort from Khartoum’s main defensive positions by attacking and seizing the narrow area between the fort and the river. Direct communications with Khartoum were now by signal flags only.
The Mahdi’s tactics were to employ the divide and conquer approach to his siege operations. At El Obeid he had suffered a severe setback when he first attempted to assault the town. Khartoum was a much stronger position than El Obeid and its garrison was much more formidable in both manpower and firepower. The Mahdi did not repeat the mistake of El Obeid by ordering an early all-out assault on Khartoum. He utilized his forces effectively to isolate the main garrison and strengthen his siege lines so that no reinforcement of men, food, or material could reach the defenders. He knew that time was on his side and that starvation would eventually bring about the fall of Khartoum. His campaign strategy on siege warfare had effectively incorporated the lessons learned from his earlier battles.
Fort Omdurman was the first position to succumb. The Ansar successfully blocked all attempts at resupplying the garrison with food and ammunition. The commander of the fort communicated his plight to Gordon on a regular basis. Gordon was clearly anxious over the fate of the fort. He knew the fort was key to the successful defense of Khartoum, and he was determined to hold the fort as long as possible. Finally, however, on the fifth of January 1885 Gordon allowed Fort Omdurman to surrender. He had been unable to clear the Ansar from the fort’s supply lines and saw no benefit in forcing the fort’s garrison to die at their posts due to starvation.
The Mahdi was content to await the surrender of the main garrison which he knew starvation would bring about. He had based his campaign for Khartoum on isolating and starving the defenders from the very outset. But now other factors intervened. The British had dispatched a relief expedition to save Gordon.
The British government had convinced the Khedive to send Gordon to the Sudan to evacuate the remaining garrisons and establish indigenous Sudanese rule as a counter to the Mahdi. Gordon tried to comply with his orders. Prior to being cut off in Khartoum he evacuated 2,000 civilians and 600 soldiers from the Khartoum area. He failed to convince the Mahdi to agree to a truce or to find a suitable Sudanese to counter the Mahdi’s influence. The Mahdi’s success at isolating Gordon in Khartoum forced the British to choose between abandoning Gordon to the Mahdi or attempting to rescue him.
After much debate, the British government decided to mount a relief expedition. The Mahdist had cut the telegraph from Khartoum in March, and England knew little of the current situation. On 5 August 1884 Parliament approved 300,000 pounds to finance the expedition. 18 On 9 September, Lord Wolseley, the commander of the relief expedition, arrived in Cairo.
Because of Osman Digna’s control of the Suakin-Berber area, and his own preference for riverine operations, Wolseley chose to reach Gordon and Khartoum via the Nile route. 19 The expeditionary force entrusted to Wolseley consisted of 6,000 men, including eight infantry battalions, a cavalry regiment, and a field artillery battery. Wolseley also formed a Camel Corps to proceed along the Nile and cross the Bayuda Steppe via Jakdul Wells. He formed the force from volunteers of British regiments in England not assigned to operations in the Sudan.
In order to transport the force down the Nile, the British built 800 boats, and gathered boatmen from Canada, West Africa, and Aden. The force’s starting point was Sarass, the southern end of the rail line from Egypt. Sarass is located just south of Wadi Halfa along the Sudan frontier and is approximately 830 miles upriver from Khartoum.
On 6 November 1884, the first boat load of British soldiers began the advance down the Nile to Khartoum. On 12 November, the Camel Corps began its march along the Nile’s banks to Khartoum.
The denial of the Suakin-Berber route to the British by Osman Digna’s Mahdist forces gave the Mahdi additional time to carry on the siege of Khartoum. The British debated long and hard on the choice of routes to relieve Gordon. Without Osman Digna’s firm possession of the Suakin area, a faster option would have been available to British planners.
The Camel Corps arrived in Korti on 14 December 1884. The lead element of the waterborne contingent arrived in Korti on 17 December. Thus far the advance had been unopposed. Korti was at the southern limit of the Egyptian government’s effective control. From Korti, Wolseley sent the Camel Corps across the desert via Jakdul Wells to Metemmeh on the Nile. However, the Camel Corps carried insufficient supplies to make the advance straight to Metemmeh and had to delay its advance in order to establish a supply base at Jakdul Wells. Accomplishing this, the column advanced from Jakdul Wells on 12 January 1885.
The Mahdi knew of the British attempt to relieve Khartoum and reinforced his forces in the northern region to delay the British relief expedition. 20 The Mahdi did not want to break off operations against Khartoum and realized the British advance represented a direct threat to his siege operations.
The first major action between the Mahdists and the relief expedition occurred on 17 January 1885. The Mahdists contested the Camel Corps’ advance from Jakdul Wells at Abu Klea.
The Mahdist commander, Abu Saleh, led 11,500 men against the Camel Corps’ 2,000. Abu Saleh failed in his attempt to ambush the British column. He gave away his position with poor fire discipline. Forewarned, the British advanced in square against the Mahdists. The Ansar attempted to rush the square but were mowed down by the disciplined British volleys. Abu Saleh was killed along with several of his key subordinates and approximately 1,100 of his men. The British lost 81 men killed, including their second in command in the battle. The Mahdists were able to withdraw unpursued from the battlefield.
The British continued their advance after the battle. They paused shortly at Abu Klea to draw water from the wells and care for their 100 wounded. On 19 January they reached Abu Kru, four miles from the Nile.
The Mahdists had retreated to Metemmeh after their first battle with the Camel Corps. They advanced against the British at Abu Kru, but did not attempt an assault. Instead, they harassed the British with rifle fire and sustained this action as the British advanced the four miles to the Nile’s banks at the town of Gubat. These actions inflicted British casualties of 22 men killed and 92 wounded, including the British commander, General Sir Herbert Stewart, who was mortally wounded. 21
Sir Charles Wilson, the column’s intelligence officer, now took command of the Camel Corps.. On 21 January, he attacked the Mahdists in Metemmeh. The Mahdists held their position strongly, and Wilson called off his attack shortly after it had begun and withdrew to Gubat.
Gordon had dispatched four steamers from Khartoum to meet the relief forces he knew to be coming. They found the Camel Corps at Gubat on 21 January (five days prior to the fall of Khartoum). Sir Charles Wilson decided to attempt to rescue Gordon utilizing two of the steamers. He sailed upriver for Khartoum on 24 January with 20 British soldiers on board. One steamer struck a rock in the Nile at the sixth cataract and sank. On 28 January, Wilson, in the remaining steamer, came within sight of Khartoum and realized the city had fallen. He had arrived two days too late to save Gordon. He turned back to Gubat.
The main body of the Relief Expedition, the Nile Column, commanded by Major-General W. Earle, made considerably slower progress in its boats than did the Camel Corps. Major-General Earle led the advance from Korti on 28 December 1884. They were unopposed until they reached Kirbekan on 10 February.
The 2,000 Mahdists opposed the advance force of 1,100 British of the Nile column. The Mahdists occupied a ridge and made no attempt at an attack. The British advanced and drove the Ansar from the field inflicting numerous casualties. The British lost only 12 men killed; however, Major-General Earle was among those slain.
Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had obeyed his orders to remain headquartered at Korti, allowed the Nile column to continue to advance until 24 February. On that day the Nile Column began its retreat to Korti. With Gordon dead, the British government no longer had any desire to continue military operations in the Sudan. The Nile column arrived in Korti on 16 March. Sir Charles Wilson, after returning from his attempt to save Gordon at Khartoum, began the retreat of the Camel Corps on 6 February. The Camel Corps arrived back in Korti in early March.
The Mahdi had successfully delayed the relief expedition and could now complete the siege of Khartoum. Although he dispatched reinforcements north to help delay the relief column, he did not give up his siege operations. His forces correctly determined that the much faster Camel Corps was the greatest threat and major focus for their efforts, and did not contest the advance of the Nile Column until after the Camel Corps had begun its retreat.
The Mahdi was aware that the relief expedition could ruin his plans. He had excellent reconnaissance information on the progress of the British relief column, and knew that he could not maintain the siege indefinitely.
After the fall of Fort Omdurman, he wrote to Gordon on 12 January 1885 calling on him to surrender Khartoum.
The Mahdi’s final offer to Gordon to surrender illustrates the Mahdi’s preferred use of the diplomatic option. He offered Gordon the option of safe passage to the Relief Expedition. The Mahdi made the offer to Gordon because he wished to save him from the destruction that the Prophet had shown him would shortly overtake Khartoum. He was prepared to send Gordon to the British without claiming the 20,000-pound reward offered by the British for his safe return. He would not even accept five pieces of silver. 22
With Gordon’s refusal to surrender the city and the approach of the British Relief Expedition, the Mahdi decided to assault the garrison. In order to achieve surprise and simultaneously limit the defenders’ superiority in firepower, the assault took place at night. The Ansars’ major attack was directed at the weakest section of the defensive works. The seasonal receding of the Nile had exposed flat ground and weakened the effectiveness of the ditch and rampart fortification system along the water’s edge. Shortly before dawn on 26 January 1885, the Ansar assaulted Khartoum along the banks of the White Nile. They quickly overran the defenses and captured the city. Despite the Mahdi’s orders to take Gordon alive, the Ansar killed Gordon and brought his head to the Mahdi.
The conquest of Khartoum eliminated nearly all Egyptian military opposition to the Mahdi’s rule outside of Berber and Suakin. The 40,000 strong Egyptian military force which had garrisoned the Sudan at the time of the outbreak of the revolt had been destroyed. In the absence of further British military intervention, the Mahdi was effectively the ruler of the Sudan.
On 30 January 1885 the Mahdi entered-Khartoum. He came to the city to lead the prayers in the mosque. After the completion of prayers he addressed his followers. He asked them for forgiveness because the Ashraf (members of his family, again copied from the term utilized by the Prophet to refer to his family) had been tempted by the riches captured at Khartoum. He asked that all the faithful pray three times, so that the Ashraf might learn the fallacy of their ways.23 There was no victory speech to the crowd. The Mahdi was more concerned with moral issues than he was of boasting of his accomplishments.
The Mahdi abandoned Khartoum. He directed his army and all the people in the vicinity to build a new capital across the White Nile just south of Fort Omdurman. The Mahdi occupied a newly constructed simple house in his new capital. He did not have much time to rule the Sudan.
Six months later, on 22 June 1885, the Mahdi died. The cause of his death is believed to be typhus. 24 Little is written or known of his activities between the capture of Khartoum and his death. The Khalifa Abdallahi succeeded the Mahdi as the ruler of the Sudan.
The Khalifa engaged in war with Egypt and Abyssinia during his reign. He instigated both wars by embarking on an invasion of both countries. The Khalifa’s struggle to establish a perfect Islamic community was unsuccessful. He was defeated in both wars. The Khalifa ruled the Sudan until his defeat by an Anglo-Egyptian force at the battle of Omdurman in 1898. The Anglo-Egyptians then reinstituted a colonial government in the Sudan that lasted until 1954.
