Battle of Lake George 1755. The image illustrates the British fortified camp on the right. Lake George is to the British rear. The French are attacking from the left side of the image.
(1701–September 8, 1767)
French Army Officer
Dieskau was the capable French second in command during initial phases of the French and Indian War. However, by violating strict instructions not to divide his army, he was beaten by the British at the Battle of Lake George and captured.
Baron Jean-Armand Dieskau was born in the German state of Saxony in 1701 and joined the military at an early age. Like many German mercenaries he journeyed to France in 1720; he was appointed aide-de-camp to Maurice de Saxe, the great French marshal. For the next two and a half decades, Dieskau accompanied de Saxe in his numerous campaigns and was present at the victory of Fontenoy in 1745 as a cavalry colonel. Dieskau was apparently a thoroughly competent professional soldier, and in 1747 he made major general and gained appointment as military governor of Brest, an important French naval base. Prior to the onset of the French and Indian War in 1755, he was dispatched to Canada as second in command under Governor-General Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil. He arrived at Quebec that March, being in control of French regular forces, but completely subordinate to Vaudreuil in matters of military strategy.
The defeat of British Gen. Edward Braddock at Monongahela in July 1755 resulted in the capture of his official papers. Through them, the French were alerted to forthcoming British offensives and drew up plans of their own to counter them. Vaudreuil considered an anticipated British assault upon Fort St. Frederic (Crown Point, New York), particularly menacing to New France, so he instructed Dieskau to preempt enemy plans by reducing British forts at Oswego. While assembling an army of 4,000 regulars, militia, and Indians at Fort Frontenac (present-day Kingston, Ontario), Dieskau learned of an impending British attack against Fort St. Frederic conducted by Col. William Johnson. Vaudreuil promptly recalled Dieskau to Montreal in August 1755 and dispatched French forces down the Richelieu River to intercept the Americans near Lake George. Prior to departing, Dieskau was specifically advised by the governor-general to keep his force united to ensure maximum military effectiveness.
En route, Dieskau paused briefly to erect a new fort at Carillon (Ticonderoga) before proceeding with 1,500 regulars, 1,000 militia, and 600 Indians. Johnson approached from the south at the head of 3,000 militia and 300 Mohawk Indians. Once informed of Dieskau’s activities, Johnson fortified the head of Lake George by erecting a primitive work that later evolved into Fort William Henry. Dieskau watched British movements carefully, and he anticipated that the bulk of Johnson’s forces were divided. Intelligence was received that only 500 regulars protected his main base at Fort Edward, 14 miles below the lake. Seeking to capture the fort’s garrison while possibly isolating Johnson at Lake George, Dieskau thereupon ordered an immediate advance. It was an audacious move, yet he divided his army against orders, advancing with only 200 regulars, 600 militia, and 700 Indians. The bulk of his forces, 1,300 regulars and 400 militia, remained behind at Ticonderoga to protect it from attack. The French commander was acutely aware that regular soldiers were a precious commodity and could not be easily replaced, so he sought to preserve them. Historians today attribute this fatal parceling to Dieskau’s disdain for the colonial troops opposing him.
Approaching Fort Edward, the French Indians grew skittish and stated that they would not attack there owing to the presence of many large cannons. Dieskau had little recourse other than to suggest hitting Johnson’s main force at Lake George, which was then only partially entrenched. When the Indians agreed, the French march resumed, and on September 8, 1755, Dieskau’s forces took up ambush positions along the wagon road. Johnson, meanwhile, had dispatched 1,000 militia and Indians, under Col. Ephraim Williams and Mohawk Chief Theyanoguin, back to Fort Edward for additional security. The Americans had nearly walked into the French trap before the Indians sprang it prematurely. A confused but deadly firefight then erupted, and Dieskau’s force routed its opponent, killing both Williams and Theyanoguin. The French and Indian force hotly pursued the fleeing colonials right up to their camp, which Johnson hastily fortified with overturned wagons, boats, and anything else that provided cover. A decisive French victory seemed looming.
The error of Dieskau’s earlier mistake now became clear. With his militia and Indians dispersed and fatigued, he had only 200 regulars available to attack Johnson’s entire camp. Badly outnumbered, these professional soldiers marched in perfect formation to within musket range, then traded volleys with more numerous defenders for several hours. Both sides sustained heavy losses, and Dieskau, directing the action under fire, sustained three leg wounds. He nonetheless continued directing the battle while propped up against a tree. Unable to sustain the stalemate further, he finally ordered a complete withdrawal. Dieskau himself, however, refused to fall back, preferring death or capture to defeat. After being shot one more time by a French renegade, the Baron was taken and the action concluded.
Baron de Dieskau: Letter to Count D’Argenson (September 14, 1755).
M. De Contrecoeur, Captain of Infantry, Commandant of Fort Duquesne, on the Ohio, having been informed that the English were taking up arms in Virginia for the purpose of coming to attack him, was advised, shortly afterwards, that they were on the march. He dispatched scouts, who reported to him faithfully their progress. On the 17th instant he was advised that their army, consisting of 3000 regulars from Old England, were within six leagues of this fort. That officer employed the next day in making his arrangements; and on the ninth detached M. de Beaujeu, seconded by Messrs Dumas and de Lignery, all three Captains, together with four Lieutenants, 6 Ensigns, 20 Cadets, 100 Soldiers, 100 Canadians and 600 Indians, with orders to lie in ambush at a favorable spot, which he had reconnoitred the previous evening. The detachment, before it could reach its place of destination, found itself in presence of the enemy within three leagues of that fort. Mr de Beaujeu, finding his ambush had failed, decided on an attack. This he made with so much vigor as to astonish the enemy, who were waiting for us in the best possible order; but their artillery, loaded with grade (a cartouche), having opened its fire, our men gave way in turn. The Indians, also, frightened by the report of the cannon rather than by any damage it could inflict, began to yield, when M. de Beaujeu was killed. M. Dumas began to encourage his detachment. He ordered the officers in command of the Indians to spread themselves along the wings so as to take the enemy in flank, whilst he, M. de Lignery and the other officers who led the French, were attacking them in front. This order was executed so promptly that the enemy, who were already shouting their “Long live the King,” thought now only of defending themselves. The fight was obstinate on both sides and success long doubtful; but the enemy at last gave way. Efforts were made, in vain, to introduce some sort of order in their retreat. The whoop of the Indians, which echoed through the forest, struck terror into the hearts of the entire enemy. The rout was complete. We remained in possession of the field with six brass twelves and sixes, four howitz-carriages of 50, 11 small royal grenade mortars, all their ammunition, and, generally, their entire baggage. Some deserters, who have come in since, have told us that we had been engaged with only 2000 men, the remainder of the army being four leagues further off. These same deserters have informed us that the enemy were retreating to Virginia, and some scouts, sent as far as the height of land, have confirmed this by reporting that the thousand men who were not engaged, had been equally panic-stricken and abandoned both provisions and ammunition on the way. On this intelligence, a detachment was dispatched after them, which destroyed and burnt everything that could be found. The enemy have left more than 1000 men on the field of battle. They have lost a great portion of the artillery and ammunition, provisions, as also their General, whose name was Mr Braddock, and almost all their officers. We have had 3 officers killed; 2 officers and 2 cadets wounded. Such a victory, so entirely unexpected, seeing the inequality of the forces, is the fruit of Mr Dumas’ experience, and of the activity and valor of the officers under his command.
The British claimed a great victory at Lake George, and William Johnson was knighted as a consequence. They had bested the French in a stand-up fight and, more important, captured the second-highest-ranking French officer in Canada. However, Lake George proved itself a hollow victory, for Johnson’s offensive was permanently derailed while French forces remained strongly entrenched at Ticonderoga. Furthermore, within a year they would advance down the Champlain Valley again and capture Fort William Henry under the aegis of a new general, Louis-Joseph Montcalm, Dieskau’s successor. Dieskau survived his injuries and was eventually transferred to London. He was finally repatriated to France in 1763 and died near Paris on September 8, 1767.
Bibliography
Chartrand, Rene. Canadian Military Heritage. 2 vols. Montreal: Art Global, 1994–2000; Coolidge, Guy O. The French Occupation of the Champlain Valley from 1609 to 1759. Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 1999; Kemmer, Brenton. Redcoats, Yankees, and Allies: A History of the Uniforms, Clothing, and Gear of the British Army in the Lake George–Lake Champlain Corridor, 1755–1760. Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1998; Krueger, John W. A Most Memorable Day: The Battle of Lake George. Saranac, NY: Center for Adriondack Studies, North County Community College, 1980; Nicolai, Martin L. “Subjects and Citizens: French Officers and the North American Experience, 1755–1783.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen’s University, 1992; Starbuck, David R. The Great Warpath: British Military Sites from Albany to Crown Point. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999; Steele, Ian K. Guerrillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969; Williams, Noel S. Redcoats Along the Hudson: The Struggle For North America, 1754–63. Hendon, VA: Brassey’s, 1998.
