The real key to German success was Auftragstaktic. Today this is usually translated as ‘mission oriented command’ or something on these lines, there’s no universal agreement on how to capture the concept in English. Interestingly Patton said that American commanders found the concept difficult to understand, which suggests that US intelligence manuals also missed the point, so studying them is fairly meaningless.

Van Creveld quotes a Bundeswehr General’s explanation (who also states it originated with the Hessian troops who fought in America for George III):

1. The mission must express the will of the commander in an unmistakable way.
2. The objective, course of action, and mission constraints, such as time, must be clear and definite without restricting freedom of action more than necessary in order to make use of the initiative of individuals charged with the tasks to be accomplished.
3. Limits as to the method of execution within the framework of the higher commander’s will are imposed where essential for coordination with other commands.

In essence this means that tactics are whatever works against the enemy of the moment. It also explains the very quick reactions and exploitation of opportunity that was the real hallmark of the Wehrmacht. In essence their tactical success was based on getting inside their enemies’ decision cycle. This, of course, is the heart of the maneuverist approach to war because it maintains tempo.

This is in marked contrast to the US and UK approach in WW2 that tended to emphasis detailed planning, for UK this in essence started with Montgomery because he knew the weaknesses of the citizen forces he was working with. This ‘war by work breakdown structure’ approach got there in the end but was an anathema to the German concept of war as set out in key doctrinal publications such as Truppenfuhrung 1936. Eg ‘Thus decisive action remains the first prerequisite for success in war. Everybody, from the highest commander to the youngest soldier, must be conscious of the fact that inactivity and lost opportunities weigh heavier than do errors in the choice of means’.

It may also be relevant that the War Academy closed in 1939 and did not reopen until 1942 (I think), this probably slowed the spread of new ‘means’ within the Wehrmacht.

That said Auftragstaktic clearly depends of a high level of training at the team and sub-unit level, and since you need something to train to it probably means that what the Brits call ‘minor tactics’ is vitally important.

Of course the alternative to Auftragstaktic to ensure tempo is the Soviet/Russian use of drills up to regimental level. It may be a second rate plan but it happens very fast.

I’m going to go off on a tangent here. One of THE central tenets of German Panzertaktik was the close cooperation with the Panzergrenadier element within the Panzer Divisions. What is sometimes misunderstood is the tactics employed by the Panzergrenadiere, they were NOT supposed to fight from a dismounted position, but from their armored SPWs:

”…Generally the Panzergrenadiere do not carry the burden of combat on their own. Instead they are the most important auxiliary arm of the tanks. Their employment has to be strictly tied to the actual objective of the commitment of the tanks. It is vital that the commitment of the Panzergrenadiere does not put a brake on the fluidity of the movement and the dynamic of the maneuver-oriented operations of the tanks. In contrast to infantry, the Panzergrenadiere are capable of both mounted and dismounted combat. The infantry performs its missions only in a dismounted role. It is important to keep in mind that dismounted combat is very time-consuming and incurs the danger of leaving the tanks stationary, which increases their vulnerability. If the operation is delayed, the enemy who is under attack may also be able to take advantage of the time he gains by reorganizing in the depth of his sector. A delayed resumption of operations is costly.

The tactical commander must therefore carefully consider how he effectively commits his Panzergrenadiere and what missions he assigns to them. There is a fundamental difference between combined and separate commitment. The latter, however must always be focused on the overall mission, as stated in the maxim: Move separately, strike together! (Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen!).

It then follows that the Panzergrenadiere;

- Fight as mounted troops for as long as possible.
- Complete their dismounted tasks as rapidly as possible and
- Are only committed to fulfill “armor appropriate” missions.

How should that final item be understood? The interests of an armor and infantry commander differ fundamentally. If the one thinks of leading wide-ranging maneuvers and delivering massive blows, the other, in contrast, has to control the terrain that is assigned to him and clean out the enemy that is there. Taking and holding terrain, is therefore, the primary objective of infantry operations. In armor operations, that is only a means to an end. Armor operations were early seen in terms of combat at sea. The tank hunts down the enemy and delivers a destructive blow to him. It does not concern itself with elements that are incapable of combat nor with local pockets of resistance.

It therefore follows that Panzergrenadiere execute completely different missions than infantry forces. The training manual – Heeresdienstvorschrift 298/3a concerning command and control and combat operations for Panzergrenadiere (Fuhrung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere) – hits the nail on the head:

“…Mechanized Panzergrenadiere are the armored assault troops (Sturmtruppen) of the Panzerdivision. Their unique, rapidly maneuvering operations form the prerequisite for operational commitment. Together with tanks they form a close combat team. They carry out independent assignments in bold, rapid action.

A high level of maneuverability, all-terrain capability, armored protection, high firepower and an abundant outfitting of the means of command and control enable them to master difficult situations rapidly and successfully.

Mechanized Panzergrenadier formations fight from Schutzenpanzerwagen. Enemy action and terrain can temporarily force them to a rapid change from mounted combat to fighting on foot. Even during dismounted operations, the heavy weapons mounted on the Schutzenpanzerwagen = (anti-tank guns and mortars) in mobile commitment – give them a unique capability.

Combat йlan and boldness, united with lighting fast power of decision and great maneuverability, characterize the Panzergrenadier.”

The following primary tasks of the Panzergrenadiere arise from that:
- Support of the tank attack by eliminating enemy antitank guns that have not been taken out.
- Safeguard the tanks from attack by enemy anti-tank hunter/killer teams.
- Clean, occupy and hold territory gained by the tanks.
- Rapidly exploit success by tanks and
- Provide security for assembly positions, pauses during combat and movements of armor formations.

The Panzergrenadiere often have to create the prerequisites for tank operations:

- Fight for jump off positions (Ausgangstellungen) and attack positions (Bereitstellungen) for a tank attack.
- Attack the enemy in or beyond terrain that prevents or limits passage of tanks.
- Attack obstacles, rivers and terrain sectors that are unsuitable for tanks and
- Fight in towns and woods.

In Summary, it can be said that Panzergrenadiere have three primary missions:

1.- Overcome defiles, obstacles and barriers with speed and surprise.
2,- Rapidly advance through enemy-held areas in which opportunities for observation and fields of fire are limited and, if necessary, claim the battlefield in dismounted combat.
3.- Take and hold terrain sectors that do not have clear fields of observation and/or are difficult to negotiate in advance of other forces.

The tactical commander, therefore, must evaluate the enemy situation and terrain in advance so as not to make excessive demands on the Panzergrenadiere. He must always regain their use as rapidly as possible and avoid slowing down the momentum of the tank movements.

When it comes to assigning missions, consideration is based on the special strengths and weaknesses of the branch (Panzergrenadier vs Panzer). Fields of fire and ranges must be appropriate to the branch, as well as tasks assigned. As a result, the tank always has as a major task in protecting the Panzergrenadiere from the major threat to their existence, the enemy armor. Movements must be coordinated and times at which fire is to be opened must be discussed.

The position of the Panzergrenadiere in the combat formation is, first of all, governed by the terrain and conditions of visibility. Because of their moderate armor protection, SPWs are generally echeloned to the rear so that they do not come into enemy armor engagement range. In the open terrain they follow the tanks, taking advantage of depressions and vegetation for their own movements. Whenever possible, they move on a road network and proceed in line. If they have to negotiate terrain that does not have good fields of observation, the same formations for developing the situation apply to them as for the tank platoons. When performing security and defense for a limited period of time, the dismounted riflemen dig in and fight according to the fundamentals of infantry combat. If they have to withdraw the re-mounting must be carefully planned in advance. When the Panzergrenadiere are dismounted, the SPWs are located under cover and the radio set is manned. The machine guns are dismounted and employed with the riflemen. Those SPWs equipped with cannon take hull-down positions and provide cover.

When working with attached tanks, Heeresdienstvorschrift 298/3a lists the following as necessary components of orders for assigning missions:

1.- Enemy situation (especially anti-tank defenses)
2.- Friendly situation.
3.- Terrain (trafficability, terrain obstacles, cover from observation and enemy fire)
4.- Objective of the attack and phases of the attack.
5.- Intended conduct of the operations (directions of attack, attack formations, fire support)
6.- Move out times for tanks and Panzergrenadiere.
7.- Liaison and coordinating instructions and
8.- Actions following the attack.

All information from Wolfgang Schneider’s “Panzertaktik: German Small-unit Armor Tactics”