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It seems to me that the essential nature of the Vietnam War [after 1959] was one of mostly conquest. Of course this is the key in assessing any conflict, as Clausewitz posited:
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to it nature.” [Howard and Paret trans.] Of course shortly after this Clausewitz tells us “War is more than a true chameleon…”!
I realize characterizing this conflict as one of conquest is not a popular position, but it does have some merit as a framework of analysis. If we look at the Vietnam War as a war undertaken by the Politburo in Hanoi to conquer and replace the regime in the south (use other words such as ‘subjugate’ or even ‘liberate’ if you wish) then we find that three clear phases of the conflict seem to emerge [does not include First Indochina War]:
I. Pre-1965: Hanoi hoped to use NLF and its armed guerillas (the Viet Cong) to accomplish the conquest…in other words cadres and war materiel were used to support an indigenous insurgency/rebellion. This came very close to succeeding and only didn’t because of U.S. intervention and Hanoi’s slow military response to the realities of that intervention.
II. Post 1965 through Tet: Hanoi decided on a multileveled approach, still using political Dau Tranh and the VC/NLF while at the same time inserting fully trained and mostly light infantry military cadres (the NVA) now that the insurgency alone could not displace the Saigon regimes backed by direct American Military intervention. The intensity of the combat increased proportionately until by the time of Tet Hanoi had decided to go for broke and was relying more and more on infantry heavily supported by artillery as well as a people’s war in the strategic rear. The result was the emasculation of critical veteran NVA units and the virtual destruction of the VC as a credible military force.
III. After Tet (1969-ish): Hanoi switched to a Soviet-subsidized model of mechanized warfare: armor and combined arms along with very healthy organic tactical air defense assets. After a successful defense during the operational pause in 1971 against an ARVN offensive (Lam Son 719) the first phase III conquest attempt was defeated–here defeat means that the forceful regime change in Saigon did not occur– on the battlefield in 1972 by mostly ARVN ground forces and U.S. Air and Seapower.
Of course the second attempt at conquest in 1975 succeeded (James Willbanks’ _Abandoning Vietnam_ is useful on this score]. Conquest, and the ends ways and means to achieve it, (given this simplistic and cursory review) seems a useful framework. It’s certainly not the only framework one should use, I might add.
John T. Kuehn, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Military History
