Georgia, Bartow County,

October 5, 1864

By William R. Scaife

After the fall of Atlanta in early September 1864, the Confederates changed their strategy against US Major General William Tecumseh Sherman in Georgia. Instead of continuing to confront Sherman in open battle, they would attack his lines of supply and communications. Their new strategy called for CS General John Bell Hood to march his army northward, staying well to the west of the Western & Atlantic Railroad, Sherman’s single-track supply line back to Chattanooga, and to launch a series of “hit-and-run” attacks against key bridges, passes, and other installations along the railroad.

Before the Atlanta campaign, Sherman’s quartermaster and commissary officers had estimated that it would take 130 railroad cars containing 1,300 tons of material per day to supply his “army group” as it advanced into Georgia. The Confederates intended to disrupt this vital flow of supplies and force Sherman either to withdraw to Chattanooga or to pursue Hood over terrain the Federals had taken months before from CS General Joseph E. Johnston. If Sherman pursued Hood in force, Hood would withdraw before Sherman into the mountains of northern Alabama. If Sherman cut loose from Atlanta and headed for a seaport such as Charleston, Savannah, or Mobile, Hood would pursue and attack him from the rear.

It was not a bad plan, but it was doomed after President Jefferson Davis divulged it in speeches at Palmetto and Augusta, Georgia, and at Columbia, South Carolina, providing Sherman ample warning. Hood decided when he reached the mountains of north Georgia west of Dalton to embark instead on a campaign across Alabama to Franklin and Nashville, Tennessee.

On September 29 Hood crossed the Chattahoochee River at Phillips Ferry northwest of Atlanta and marched northward. He sent CS Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart’s Corps on the first “hit-and-run” attack against the railroad. Stewart overran small garrisons at Big Shanty, Moon’s Station, and Acworth, north of Marietta, and by the evening of October 4 had destroyed about eight miles of track and taken about 600 prisoners. Hood next ordered Stewart to send one division six miles northward to Allatoona Pass, an important Federal supply base where the railroad ran through the Allatoona Mountain range in a cut 180 feet deep. This division was to fill the cut with earth and debris, then march northward about five miles to the railroad bridge over the Etowah River and burn it.

The dubious honor of leading this ambitious expedition was given, at Hood’s suggestion, to CS Major General Samuel G. French. French’s Division consisted of 3,276 men in three brigades under CS Brigadier Generals Claudius Sears, Francis M. Cockrell, and William Hugh Young. The force appeared adequate since Confederate intelligence reported only a few hundred Federal troops garrisoned at Allatoona.

Thanks to President Davis’s forewarning, Sherman had ordered US Brigadier General John M. Corse to hurry his division from Rome, Georgia, to reinforce the small garrison at Allatoona. Corse and one brigade arrived there before French could begin his attack and swelled the defending garrison to 2,025 men. Although outnumbered three to two, Corse held a heavily fortified position anchored by large earthen forts on each side of the cut. Many of his men, including the entire 7th Illinois Regiment, were armed with sixteen-shot Henry repeating rifles, giving them equal, if not superior, firepower.

On the morning of October 5 French mounted a fierce attack against a tenacious Federal defense. By noon most of the Federal troops had been driven back and pinned down in their main fort, Star Fort, and their surrender seemed imminent. Then, a false report from his cavalry led French to believe that a strong enemy force was approaching up the railroad from Acworth in his rear and threatening to cut him off from the army. French reluctantly withdrew, leaving Allatoona to the Federals. He later reported, “I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender by night.”

Federal casualties were 706 out of 2,025 present, and Confederate casualties were 897 out of 3,276 in a fiercely contested engagement.

After the war, the evangelist Philip P. Bliss of Chicago wrote a hymn entitled “Hold the Fort,” and its resounding chorus, “Hold the fort; for we are coming, Union men be strong,” did much to perpetuate the myth that Sherman signaled the garrison to hold out during the battle while a relief column rushed to assist them. However, Sherman later denied having sent such a message, and it was two days after the battle before a relief force arrived at Allatoona, under US Major General Jacob D. Cox.

On the day following the battle General Corse sent a rather dramatic message to Sherman: “I am short a cheekbone and one ear, but am able to lick all hell yet.” When Sherman saw Corse a few days later, he expected to see a man with half his face shot away. Observing only a small bandage on Corse’s cheek and no apparent damage to the ear he had claimed to have lost, the commanding general chided his subordinate, “Corse, they came damn near missing you, didn’t they?”

Estimated Casualties: 706 US, 897 CS