by

HOWARD R. CHRISTIE,

Field Marshal Graziani after being ordered to advance into Egypt stated Green and Massignani “For whatever evil may occur, I before God and my soldiers, am not responsible” (Green and Massignani 1994).

The British anticipated an Italian invasion of Egypt soon after the declaration of war between the Italian Empire and the British Commonwealth. The British assumption for planning their defense of Egypt was centered around an Italian thrust into Egypt along the coast which would have as its first objective the town and port of Mersa Matruh. Mersa Matruh was one hundred and sixty-five miles from the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. The village contained the British forward logistical base for the British forces operating along the Egyptian-Libyan frontier. This base was also located at the end of the transportation network from the Nile Delta, and contained a railhead and the end of the hard surface road.

The territory between Mersa Matruh and the border was open desert bordered by an escarpment ten miles inland from the sea. Between the coast and the escarpment was one coastal trail formed by the natural geography of the territory. To the south was the desert, which had a number of trails. The desert west, east, and south of Mersa Martuh was ideal for mechanized maneuver and attack. Only at one small point between the frontier and Mersa Martuh there was a natural obstacle to mechanized warfare. This was where the escarpment meets the coast at a small town called Sollum. Here was a narrow passageway from the desert plains that ran down the escarpment into Sollum. It could be bypassed by traveling south of the escarpment but was a strategic location due to the bottleneck that it formed along the coastal road. Even so this location could be outflanked to the south by mechanized forces moving wide through Sidi Omar. Mersa Martuh also could be attacked on a number of axes of advance and was the logical choice to be the first objective of an Italian invasion.

In this undeveloped and waterless land, the radius of action of a force operating away from the coastal cities and the network of surfaced roads depended largely upon how much mechanized transport was placed at its disposal. This mechanized transport allowed for the logistics support an Army needed to survive in a desert environment. These critical logistical supplies consisted of food, fuel, repair parts and, of fundamental importance, water. An army that was not motorized or mechanized depended solely on the network of roads to support itself logistically in the Desert. Only one major hard surfaced road ran the length of Libya (known as the Via Balbia), and stopped at the border with Egypt. In Egypt one surfaced road ran from the Nile Delta to Mersa Martuh and stopped. Between Mersa Martuh and the Libyan border lay one desert trail forming a natural obstacle between the two armies. An army whose troops marched on their feet could only maneuver as fast as their feet would allow them. This same army would be tied to the road network to survive logistically on the battlefield. Soldiers and their armies who maneuvered on their feet were at a tactical disadvantage once they moved any distance from their lines of communication. These troops would become exhausted within a matter of hours by the heat and conditions of the environment.

The Italian Army’s plan for the opening stages of the war in North Africa were to concentrate their main strength against a possible French invasion directed at Tripoli and to hold the border area between Tobruk and Bardia from any limited British offensive action. At some point in the future, and when they built sufficient strength, the Italian armies would go over to the offensive. Strategically they faced two enemies on each side of Libya, which placed them in a defensive posture. At the beginning of the war they were in no condition to advance into Egypt from the outset, and so, by default allowed the British the initiative.

The Italian 10th Army’s war in North Africa opened with the British launching several small motorized raids across the border into Libya from Egypt. These raids were performed with older Rolls Royce armored cars, which equipped all the squadrons of the 11th Hussars. On the night of 11 June 1940 all three squadrons from the 11th Hussars crossed the frontier wire and attacked Italian outposts, Italian patrols, and set up ambushes along the entire frontier with Egypt. Not all of these attacks were successful but they did show that the Italians were not initially prepared for the first mechanized stages of the war in the western desert. Some of the Italian officers and men captured did not even know that war had been declared; others protested the British attacks from neutral Egyptian territory. These outposts were designed to defend strategic locations and support the patrols along the frontier with Egypt. The British would continue these raids across the frontier and soon would include A.9 medium tanks from the 7th Armored Division.

These initial raids represented the British taking the war to the Italians on their own terms. In adopting a mechanized warfare they were best able to capitalize on the use of their available forces and disrupt the Italian forces along the frontier. The armored cars of the 11th Hussars, advance guard of the British 7th Armored division, harassed the isolated Italian garrisons along the entire border. These raids were designed to disrupt the Italian line of communications and not allow the Italians to know where the British might strike next. Air Marshal Balbo had intended to forestall British raids by seizing at the outset of war the Egyptian border settlement of Sollum, where the Limestone plateau of the interior descended precipitously to the sea and formed an easily defended position (Knox 1982, 129). The Italian high command led by Marshal Badoglio, vetoed any offensive action from the outset and thus transferred the initiative to the British forces in the Western Desert. Initially the Italian military forces lost the initiative in the opening stages of the campaign because of this prevalent defensive attitude and the lack of use of their own mechanized doctrine with the forces at their disposal.

The Italian Armies in Libya did have mechanized forces consisting of 324 L.3 light tanks, 7 armored cars, 8 armed trucks, and 8,039 trucks but had no medium tanks at their disposal when war was declared in June of 1940 (Montana 1990, 463). The armored cars were old Fiat and Lancia World War I models, not the new and reliable AB40/41. Their new doctrine called for the use of medium and heavy tanks not the light tanks, which equipped the independent tank battalions and separate companies that were located in the two Italian armies in Libya. All the available Italian medium tanks were equipping the Ariete Armored Division, which was then in Italy. The three existing Italian armored divisions were located two in Northern Italy and one in Albania. The Italian military considered this to be their main area of operation in which their doctrine was designed to fight the war. There was also one separate medium tank battalion consisting of 24 M.11 tanks, which were sent to Italian East Africa in support of that colony just prior to the outbreak of war. The Italian high command suddenly found itself involved in a war in North Africa, not Northern Italy. This is confirmed by the fact that the Italian Military, beginning with Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Chief of the General Staff, were bound to the war of infantry measured in numbers of soldiers, or the advance in mass as denominated on the Northern front in Ethiopia. This was based on over-inflated reports from the military intelligence community that estimated wrongly, hundreds of thousands of soldiers available to the British in Egypt and to the French in Tunisia. This lack of medium tanks would prove crucial in the opening stages of the war in the western desert against the British.

The Italian military forces responded to these mechanized raids by forming their own mechanized combined arms teams or raggruppamento. So in an attempt to utilize their doctrine they formed combined arms teams with the resources which were available in Libya or in this case near the frontier. There were sufficient trucks to form motorized infantry battalions, their artillery was already motorized and there were light tank battalions in the area of operations. These combined arms team consisted of battalion and company sized elements task organized into motorized infantry, motorized artillery and light tank raggruppamento. To fight a mechanized force one must create a mechanized force, which they did with the assets on hand.

The first tank action to occur between the Italian armor and British armor was on the 16th of June 1940. This was only six days after the Italian declaration of war and was conducted between an Italian raggruppamento and elements of the British 7th Armored division. The Italians had suffered the loss of two strategic frontier outposts on the fourteenth of June 1940. The outposts were Fort Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena, which were centered on the main roads, and trails, which intersect the border area, known as the wire. The Italian Army responded to these two losses and formed a raggruppamento. This mechanized column was from the Italian XXI Corps mobile element, deployed along the Egyptian border in the Bardia area, and was led by Colonel D’Avanzo, a former cavalry officer, who died during the action. Later, a Gold Medal for military valor was awarded to him posthumously for this action. This mechanized column was to move forward and defeat the enemy penetrations of the frontier wire in the vicinity of Fort Capuzzo. The entire strength of this raggruppamento was one Libyan motorized battalion, elements of one L.3 light tank battalion and one motorized artillery section. The stage was set for the first tank on tank engagement of the western desert campaign.

The raggruppamento’s armored element came from the IX light tank battalion, which was mobilized during November 1939 and sent to Derna Libya. It was composed of three L.3 companies for a total strength of 46 L.3 light tanks. The 3rd company, supported by another platoon from the Battalion headquarters, was task organized as part of the raggruppamento. This would give the raggruppamento a strength of 16 L.3 light tanks. The motorized Libyan infantry element for the raggruppamento came from the 1st Libyan Infantry Division. The artillery section for the raggruppamento came from the Libyan 17th battery, IV Group and was armed with 4 77/28 artillery pieces. This raggruppamento formed itself with the available equipment and personnel in the Bardia area.

When the raggruppamento advanced toward Fort Capuzzo, the British forces thought they spotted two separate columns and decided to withdraw back across the border area. Before the orders could be sent the scouting armored cars that spotted the smaller column attacked it with only two armored cars. This touched off the Battle of Nezuet Ghirba.

The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba would be the first tank on tank engagement of the war. The raggruppamento was sent from Gabr Saleh toward Sidi Omar-Ridotta Capuzzo to clear the area of any raiding British elements. Unfortunately, this action turned out badly. The Italian motorized column was attacked by only two British armored cars initially. This occurred on a large open plain, void of any cover, along the route of march of the smaller Italian column. The Italian commander, Colonel D’Avanzo, instead of utilizing his forces as a combined arms team, instead formed a defensive square. Colonel D’Avanzo placed his four artillery pieces, one each, in each corner of the square. The infantry then formed the four sides of the square. The twelve Italian L.3 light tanks patrolled outside the square. This was clearly a defensive response by the Italian commander and did not conform to any existing Italian doctrine of the period. This was the more traditional Napoleonic defense for infantry against a cavalry attack.

The British reinforced the initial two armored cars with more armored cars and mixed force of light and medium tanks. Only two A.9 medium tanks were involved in the battle. The Italian tanks charged forward unsupported by the infantry or its supporting artillery. They were defeated by the British armor. The light tanks operating independently of the artillery and infantry were no match for the mixed armored forces they faced. Fighting bravely and with courage they charged forward but were all disabled or destroyed.

The British armored vehicles then circled the Italian square and targeted the soft skinned Italian trucks and exposed infantry. It was only after the second trip around the square that the Italian artillery revealed themselves and opened fire on the British armored vehicles. The Italian artillery had only high explosive ammunition and no armored piercing ammunition at their disposal. They were still capable of inflicting damage on the British armored vehicles. There were no antitank guns with the column either. This was a clear violation of the Italian doctrine for combined arms teams operating in conjunction with the infantry and armor. The battle dissolved into four separate fights at each corner of the square with Italian guns and British armor engaging each other. The exposed Italian gunners soon fell and the infantry broke.

There was no lack of courage or skill from the Italian gunners as they engaged the enemy armor, just the lack of armor piercing ammunition. The Italians were severely defeated with the loss of this portion of the mechanized column.

General Luigi Sibille commander of 1st Libyan Division in an after action report written for the XXI Corps HQs, wrote the following:

On 15th June, at around 16.00 hours, at Gabr Saleh a superior officer from 10th Army HQ arrived. He had an order concerning a small column, which was

to begin operations at 20.00 hours the same day. The order contained the route, the composition and the objectives of the column. As the column was supposed to clear the area along its route and to capture some prisoners, it was necessary to give it adequate infantry support.

Colonel D’Avanzo was the only commanding officer available to lead the column. He made adequate provision for water, ammo, food, etc. At 22.00 hours, the column left Gabr Saleh. At Bir Gibni, some men from the local garrison acted as guides for the column. At 05.00 hours the column rested at Sidi Omar. At 06.30 hours the advance resumed. The column was organized thus:

On the right was a tank company. Prior to this, until reaching Sidi Omar the L.3s were transported by trucks. [This was standard Italian practice and doctrine for all their tanks. It saved on maintenance and lubricants of the armored vehicles for traveling long distances. Once enemy contact was thought to be probable they would dismount their armored vehicles.] These trucks had to follow the track, keeping close to the “wire;”

On the left of the tanks, a platoon of four L.3s, with a motorized infantry company, acted as an advance guard; at the rear of the advance guard was the remainder of the column.

[It was these dispositions that led the British to believe that there were two distinct armored columns. From this point on there followed an incredible succession of Italian mistakes.]

The advance guard (formed by the Infantry Company and the tank platoon) signaled the presence of some British armored cars, but Colonel D’Avanzo at first thought they were the tanks of the L.3 Company on the right.

Soon it was clear they were really enemy armored cars. Two infantry platoons (under the command of Lt. Perinea and Lt. Vitally) of the advance guard left their trucks. The armored cars went after the trucks, now empty and moving away. The drivers, thinking their role was finished, retired westward, to evade the armored cars.

The remainder of the advance guard and part of the main column, now confused, started to follow the empty trucks. Colonel D’Avanzo, worried from what he was seeing, ordered Captain Andolfato, commander of the Libyan infantry Battalion, to stop their movement.

Captain Andolfato reached the trucks carrying the with the artillery section first. This was due to their load that they were carrying and were slower than the others trucks in the column. Immediately, the guns were unloaded and began firing at the armored cars. The L.3s tried to intercept the Rolls-Royces Armored Cars, which being faster, ignored them and surrounded the main column.

In a few minutes it was chaos: the main part of the column (the artillery battery, the infantrymen and some light tanks) was immobile and surrounded by the armored cars, another part was retiring, subdivided into three groups, followed by other armored cars.

Before Captain Andolfato could reach the three groups, more than 20 minutes had passed and some trucks were already at Sidi Azeiz, about 15 Kms from the area of first contact

with the enemy.” [It is interesting to note that the Rolls-Royces, considered very fast, weren't able to catch the Lancia 3RO trucks, capable of a max road speed of 45 Km/h.]

The three groups were reunited and reorganized by Andolfato. They included some trucks still transporting food, water, ammo and about 70 men.

At this point, Andolfato tried to reach Colonel D’Avanzo and the main body near Ghirba, but the actions of the armored cars obliged him to give this up and to go North, toward Amseat. Before starting the movement, he informed 1st Libyan division HQ of the situation of the column.

Near the airfield of Amseat he found further enemy armored cars and changed direction, following the Trigh Capuzzo. At Gambut he reached the coastal road and, after a few Kms towards Bardia, again found enemy units. They were from “C” Squadron 11th Hussars and had just destroyed 27 empty Italian trucks and captured General Lastrucci, 10th Army’s commander of the Engineers.

Changing direction again, Andolfato decided to return at to Gabr Saleh, via El Adem. Along the way he was ordered to go to 10th Army HQ at Tobruk. At Tobruk Captain Andolfato reported to the HQ and, the following day, at last returned to Bir Saleh.

Returning to the immobilized part of the column, it fought with honor: the artillerymen had fallen beside their pieces, all the tanks were destroyed in action and many infantrymen died fighting. (Pignato 1988, 32-34)

General Sibille closed his report with following considerations reflecting on Italian doctrine:

“With his aggressive posture, D’Avanzo’s column tested the enemy’s mettle. Considering the superiority of the enemy and the inadequacy of the L.3 for deep penetrations, the defeat was inevitable, regardless of the officer in charge.” (Pignato 1988, 34)

This engagement was examined in great detail by many superior officers, determined to find a responsible party for the poor showing of the raggruppamento but they failed to see the violation of existing Italian doctrine. The fate of the D’Avanzo column was inevitable because of the use of L.3 light tanks in the role assigned to the medium tanks, and the impossibility of coordinating the action of light tanks with a column composed of motorized infantry.

The Italian tactical lessons extracted from General Luigi Sibille’s report of the action were:

- our light tanks aren’t suited to be employed in a way different from doctrine;

- our light tanks aren’t suited to move for more than 5 Kms in desert terrain: they tend to develop mechanical problems and to break down;

- our light tanks lack radio links with the lorried part of the columns with which they are called upon to operate;

- the machine guns of our light tanks aren’t able to penetrate the armor of the armored cars, which, on the contrary, are able to penetrate our armor [it is interesting to note that D'Avanzo didn't order the L.3light tanks to be equipped with AP ammo];

- our artillery should be operated from on board, not transported on, the trucks so as to be faster in deploying and changing position;

- the truck sections should be commanded by trained officers, so as to avoid problems when emptied by the transported infantry.” (Pignato 1988, 34)

General Sibille’s considerations, written to ease the responsibilities for the failure of the engagement do not stand up to closer examination. First, Colonel D’Avanzo did not employ the L.3 light tank according to doctrine. Second the statement that the L.3 could not move for more than five kilometers in desert terrain before breaking down was false. This had been proven first during the Ethiopian war with the L.3 tanks being employed on the Somalia front in 1936. It had been proven again during the Libyan training exercises that were conducted in May 1938.

The third point is that the Italian artillery pieces were carried on the trucks instead of being towed behind them. The primary reason the artillery was loaded on the trucks was due to the fact that they were older World War I Austrian pieces. These Austrian weapons’ wheel construction did not permit them to be towed by trucks, thus they were being carried in-portee. Italian practice in the Libyan divisions, and other motorized divisions was to mount their artillery on fast trucks (the Dovunque), capable of 45-50 Km/h on road, faster than the ones used by the Regular Italian infantry divisions.

The failure to properly task organize the combined arms teams for success by insuring that the L.3 light tanks had armor piecing ammunition and sufficient antitank guns is clearly a responsibility of the commander. The Libyan divisions were equipped with an excellent 20-millimeters AA/AT piece mounted on the Dovunque truck. It is not clear why D’Avanzo did not add two to four of these pieces to his column, knowing that an encounter with British armored cars was very likely. Surely, they could have exacted heavy toll from the attacking armored cars.

General Sibille’s report does bring up excellent points in his report in reference to communications and leader training and to standard battle drills. The L.3 tanks had the means to communicate by radio but were unable to communicate with the motorized infantry forces. This failure of a standard communications link for all elements of the raggruppamento resulted in inadequate command control for the entire force. Communications is necessary to be able to operate as one combined arms team. Standard battle drills for the trucks carrying the motorized infantry caused the trucks to leave the battle area once the infantry was dismounted. This one event in itself caused the entire force to become disorganized and separated. The commander was forced to go to ground in a defensive posture to reconsolidate his position.

In “Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale” vol. I, “Sidi el Barrani,” published in 1984 by the Italian Army historical office and written by General M. Montanari, is found the official Italian operational level lesson learned from the engagement:

Command and Control of the column exerted by higher headquarters was poor. As the only mobile element of XXI Corps, the raggruppamento was transferred from the direct command and control of the XXI Corps HQ to 10th Army HQ. The XXI Corps was only informed of this transfer of authority after the raggruppamento was on their route of march. A few hours later, when General Dalamazzo at 10th Army was informed that the column was under heavy attack and virtually surrounded by British armored units, the Raggruppamento was returned to the command of XXI Corps, which now became responsible for its rescue.

Unfortunately immediate action was impossible, for the only real help available was from the Regia Aeronautica, but this was under the direct control of Comando Superiore HQ.” [This last point, concerning the RA is debatable for between 8:00 and 11:00 it should have been possible to arrange for air support from Tobruk's many airfields.]

The decision to form “square” in the open, knowing the ability, mobility, co-ordination and aggressiveness of the British armored units was a great mistake by the Italian commander, especially considering how these aspects of how the British operated were regularly emphasised by the Italian commands during this period. (Montanari 1990, 65-66)

Although the first engagement was fought by relatively large forces on both sides the Italians were severely defeated. However, Colonel D’Avanzo’s failure was not without some positive consequences for the Italian army in Libya. Marshal Balbo ordered the XXII Corps to the Egyptian border and asked Mussolini for Italian medium tanks, or German tanks and armored cars. The British raids continued, but without the same degree of freedom and success as before. These continued operations by the British did not prevent the Italian 10th Army from concentrating their forces between Tobruk and Bardia and further westward along the border (Playfair 1954, 119).

The Italian’s first battle utilizing mechanized doctrine was a failure at the tactical and operational levels of war. This raggruppamento which had been formed with L.3 light tanks, motorized infantry and motorized artillery was defeated by a British a armored patrol, formed by light Mk. VIBs, medium A9s tanks and Rolls-Royce M24s armored cars. The Italian raggruppamento was defeated by a combination of superior British equipment and tactics in this new form of warfare and the lack of utilizing their own mechanized doctrine efficiently to counter them.

Former Lt. Ponce de Leon, then commander of a tank platoon in LXI Light Tank Bn, writes:

The Vickers tanks (Mk. VIBs) were more or less in the same category with the Cv.35s, but when the first A9 medium tanks arrived things started to become difficult for us.

The first unit to experience problems was the IX Light Tank Bn. It had fought well during the fighting for Ridotta Capuzzo, which was taken and lost many times. During a reconnaissance mission South of the Trigh Capuzzo, at Gabr Gaerfi, IX light tank Battalion, under Colonel D’Avanzo, was surrounded by superior motorized forces (armored cars, A9s, 88mm guns actually 2 pdr-).

The Bn formed a circle, with the Cv.35s facing outwards. The enemy started to circle around firing against the Italians. The Bn fought hard until the end, refusing to surrender, until the last Cv.35 was destroyed and the Colonel D’Avanzo was killed. ” Colonel D’Avanzo improvised, under enemy fire, a defense of infantry and artillery, counterattacking with the last light tanks under his command.

I commanded a little recon party in the area and I took some pictures of L.3 destroyed, still positioned in a circle and with some crew bodies still in the tanks.” (Pignato 1988, 35)

The main failures of these initial combined arms columns or raggruppamento were in training, equipment, and their doctrinal use. The lack of training as a cohesive force was critical. These formations were ad hoc formations with no standard battle drills. They were organized based on the current conditions and lacked the necessary training in combined arms warfare as called upon in Italian doctrine. The new doctrine called for medium tanks working in cooperation with motorized infantry and artillery that had trained together to perform their specific mission. No prior training or cooperation existed with these units. Complete command and control relationships were not developed and poor communications nets supported them. Antitank guns were in short supply in North Africa at the beginning of the war. The main antitank gun was the 47/32 piece, which was on par with the British two pounder. However, at the start of the war, the Italian military had a very low stockpile of armor piercing (AP) rounds for both the 47/32 and the 65/17 pieces. The new doctrine called for antitank guns to cooperate with the infantry and armor to help defeat enemy armor threats. The lack of a medium tank to fight the British on equal terms and the reliance on the L.3 light tanks to perform a role they were not designed to do led to Italian failures at applying their doctrine to the newly formed raggruppamento. This would change with the arrival of the first medium tank battalions in North Africa.

The first 72 M.11 medium tanks arrived in North Africa on the 6th of July 1940 and were all that were available to send. These M.11 medium tanks came from the Ariete Armored Division and were sent over as two separate battalions. These M.11 tank battalions were the I and II Medium Tank battalions. They represented the first true Italian armor that was trained and could replicate their doctrine. After the initial small unit actions and encounters with the different mobile and mechanized columns it was recognized that medium tanks were desperately needed in North Africa to bolster the present Italian forces. Air Marshal Balbo had first requested these reinforcements at the outset of the war, but after his untimely death, Marshal Graziani continued to request for medium tank reinforcements. These assets allowed the Italian 10th Army to have a medium tank, which could fight on par with the present British armored forces in Egypt and actually utilize the doctrine designed for their use. These assets would form the raggruppamento Maletti.

Maletti’s Raggruppamento was formed on 8 July 1940 in the city of Derna in Libya (S.I.A. 1955, 122). This was just two days after the arrival of the two M.11 medium tank battalions. This was the primary motorized formation available to the Italian 10th Army in Libya. It had motorized infantry battalions and an armor element when initially formed. The motorized infantry battalions consisted of seven Libyan battalions. The armor element consisted of one medium tank company, M.11 tanks, and one light tank, L.3, company. The supporting services consisted of motorized artillery and logistics. The armored element would later be raised to a medium armored battalion, solely comprising M.11 tanks. This in the sense was the first true combined arms formation among the Italian forces in North Africa.

The Italian 10th army formed the Comando carri della Libia or Libyan Tank Command on the 29th of August 1940, under the command of Colonel Valentini. This command consisted of three separate raggruppamenti. The first was that of Colonel Aresca with the I medium Tank battalion (M.11), 31st, 61st and 62nd light tank battalions. The second commanded by Colonel Antonio Trivioli, consisted of the II medium tank battalion (M.11), less one company, 9th, 20th, and 61st light tank battalions. The third was the mixed Colonel Maletti tank battalion with the 60th light tank battalion and the remaining M.11 company from the II medium tank battalion (Ceva amd Curami, 1989. 306-307). These elements consisted of most of the available armor formations in Libya.

The first engagement in which the Italians employed their M.11 tanks against British armor occurred on the 5 August 1940. A small Raggruppamento, composed of one platoon of motorcycle Bersaglieri, artillery, a company of L.3 tanks and a company of M11/39 tanks engaged a British column formed by armored cars, tanks and artillery. The Italians won the engagement capturing two British tanks and destroying two other British tanks. The tanks captured were of the cruiser A.9 type which the Italians placed into their own service, helping to supplement their medium tank forces. The Italians had three M11/39s damaged by artillery fire during the engagement. These M11 medium tanks were later recovered and repaired at the workshops in Bardia.

There is only one English history account of this action. None of the British or Commonwealth official histories mention this engagement, which did occur and was considered an Italian tactical victory. Kenneth Macsey takes the following account from “Beda Fomm.”

The Italians were getting stronger and stronger and toward the end of July, and felt able to start the ball rolling themselves, sending up two infantry divisions supported by a few tanks – Medium M11/39s.

This force presented the British Tanks for the first time with something they could not easily overcome, particularly since the Italian artillery was handled with both aggression and skill. Keeping the British at long range they posed a tactical problem which was clearly stated in the history of the 7th Hussars, who had two tank squadrons engaged on the 29th of June: “if the tanks halt so as to engage the guns accurately, they in turn become targets for the guns. If they do not halt, they are still quite good targets and at the same time nothing but a fluke shot from the moving tank would hit an enemy gun.

So the 7th Hussars were persuaded to pull back while the tanks of the 6^th Royal tank regiment, 7th Armored Division, sent forward to support them, were ordered to refrain from rushing the three Italian batteries which were putting up a truly formidable display, Never less, as dusk began to fall, it was decided to attempt a night attack.

. . . and rush at speed against the enemy batteries using Vickers machine guns continuously during such an advance,” to quote orders from the 7th Hussars. At once the there came a dazzling blaze of fire from the Italian guns, tracer flying all over the place and, out of the gloom, three Italian M11s advancing, one of which rammed a British Tank. Again the British backed off after one of their cruisers had deflected a 37mm shot at point blank range, and still the Italian gunners stuck it out, through now being fired at by British 25 pounder artillery from long range. (Macksey 1971, 19)

The Italian mechanized doctrine proved to be successful when used with the right equipment in a combined arms role. The M.11 medium tank proved capable of the task to be accomplished, even though it had some shortcomings. In this battle the tanks cooperated with the artillery, infantry and Italian medium tanks. The M.11 tank could stand up to the British armor then fielded in the Western Desert. Still after its first engagement Colonel Aresca, commander of the armor regiment, assigned to the Babini armored brigade, published a number of lessons learned.

In “La Meccanizzazione dell’esercito” fino al 1943 volume II, is found the lessons learned written by Colonel Aresca in reference to this engagement. The report drew attention on the shortcomings of the new medium M.11 tank. This report centered on them being sent to North Africa in such haste. A list of these shortcomings that needed improvement related to the armored vehicle itself and the logistical support for the medium tanks. These shortcomings were: (1) the lack of a sufficient telescope, (2) the lack of radios in each tank, (3) inadequate maintenance workshops for repair,

(4) inadequate trained mechanical support personnel, and (5) the lack of sufficient recovery tractors (Ceva and Curami 1989, 211-215).

At the design level of the new medium tank we seen again the need for radio communications between tanks for synchronized maneuver. At this point in the war and in Italian doctrine all maneuver was to be accomplished with signal flags. As with the L.3, the M.11 did not have radios for each armored vehicle, only the Commander tanks had radios. The telescopic sights for the commander were not of sufficient power to aid in the long distance target acquisition for the main tank gun. The other shortcomings were mainly due to the fact they sent the medium tank battalions without the proper logistical support primarily in maintenance to support the battalions.

The tactical lessons learned were: (1) the need of air reconnaissance and ground cooperation, (2) the need for an English-speaking officer in order to interrogate POWs to help decision of the Commander, and (3) the need for anti tank guns to accompany the mechanized forces (Ceva and Curami 1989, 211-215).

At the tactical level we see again the need again for the cooperation between air and ground elements. As called for in Italian doctrine close cooperation was to exist between the mechanized elements and the air elements, in this case to aid in reconnaissance. The glaring lack of an antitank guns is reported again. As noted in Spain, and advocated as part of their doctrine it was necessary for the infantry and armor to have antitank guns to help deal with the enemy threat of armor vehicles. Also was the first inclusion of military intelligence to assist the tactical ground commander on the ground. The Italians had employed their new M.11 medium tanks in combat, utilized their doctrine and were now at a point to make refinements for their use.

The Italian 10th Army was primarily built around non motorized infantry divisions. It had received additional armored medium tanks, which formed combined arms teams in raggruppamento and in an armored brigade. The 10th Army finally had a medium tank to match or at least fight the British armored and mechanized columns utilizing their current Italian doctrine. Marshal Graziani, for his part could call on a large force of nonmotorized infantry, which was little use in this theatre. He did have artillery in overwhelming numbers and during the summer and early fall, at a time when the British Cruiser tanks were inferior in numbers (though superior in quality) to the Italian M.11 medium tank he had the advantage (Gooch 1990, 86-87). The Italian artillery was well served by its skilled crews, but it was outranged by their British counterparts. With these forces Marshal Graziani had the forces necessary to follow Italian mechanized doctrine, a doctrine which he had used on the Southern Front of the Ethiopian campaign with great success and boldness. Graziani needed to tailor his available forces and develop a plan for the invasion of Egypt to secure the strategic objective of the Nile delta and the Suez Canal.

As Graziani received supplies, equipment and his much needed medium tanks the pressure arrived from Rome for an Italian army to advance into Egypt. This invasion was scheduled to commence at three different times, and only on the fourth planned date did it begin. The first invasion was to coincide with the German invasion of England scheduled on the 15th of July 1940. When this invasion did not develop it was then planned for 22 August 1940. Due to the summer heat in August, which would have affected the primarily nonmotorized Italian formations, it was postponed for the second time. The third time was scheduled for the 9th of September 1940. Due to delays in positioning and marshalling the forces the invasion would actually begin on the 13th of October 1940. Four separate plans were developed for this grand invasion.

Marshal Graziani was extremely hesitant in his actions from the moment of taking command to the actual invasion of Egypt. Immediately after taking command he requested additional troops, supplies, tanks, equipment, and aircraft. Some of these additional requests were justified in the area of medium tanks, antitank guns, and antiaircraft guns. He also requested on many different occasions additional trucks, which numbered in the hundreds. These were items he needed to be able to fulfill the Italian mechanized doctrine. The high command in Rome sent all the available supplies and equipment that they could after realizing the situation in Libya. Still, as supplies and equipment were brought forward he would ask for more. He and his intelligence community overestimated the British capabilities in Egypt, always thinking that they possessed far superior numbers then the British actually did have at their disposal. The combination of the initial Italian engagements and the defensive attitude that prevailed left him almost paralyzed when it came to going on the offensive. He had not fought a European enemy since World War I. There was always a reason why he should not move forward. The invasion did not take place until Mussolini threatened him with removal.

The first operational plan developed by Marshal Granziani and his staff was for the planned invasion of 15 July 1940. The first invasion plan was to coincide with the German invasion of England. Planning was conducted and called for the stripping of all the trucks from the Italian 5th Army and using the just arriving Italian M.11 medium tanks. It had very limited objectives and called for crossing the wire and occupying Sollum only. This was the initial plan Air Marshal Balbo wanted to conduct immediately after the declaration of war but was refused by Rome. Once the enemy counterattacked and the Italian armies were replenished they would then continue the advance. This plan was limited in nature with no clearly defined endstate for the operation, and only could be considered a limited tactical operation. This invasion did not materialize due to the fact the Germans did not invade Great Britain even though it made good tactical sense based on the current conditions and strength of the opposing armies in July 1940.

Another course of action that was explored by Marshal Graziani staff was forming a mechanized force to invade Egypt only, followed by garrison troops to maintain the lines of communication. Based on the amount of transport available in Libya his staff estimated they could have fully motorized two divisions and a brigade of Libyan troops (Knox 1982, 156). Combine this with the available armor and motorized artillery forces, and he would have had a potential mechanized force to invade Egypt in August of 1940. Marshal Graziani turned down this course of action. If he had adopted this course of action it would have meant that the rest of the Italian Army would be without the necessary transportation for logistical resupply. The only realistic motorized formation that could have been formed was with the Comando carri della Libia, possibly three or four artillery Regiments and one motorized infantry division. Even modest attempts to create a 10th Army mobile force built around a medium tank battalion met with his disapproval (Knox 1982, 156). This went against the new Italian doctrine of mechanized war, but did agree with the Italian’s Army’s most cherished dogma: that strength lay in numbers.

The second operational level plan developed by Marshal Granziani and his staff was for the planned invasion of 22 August 1940. This plan called for a limited advance and its objective would be the city of Sollum. This plan had the Italian limit of advance to east of Sollum, with a point north of Shawni el Aujerin (Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel 1995, 271). This would have three primary forces advancing on three separate axis of advance. Only after securing his initial objectives would he advance to Sidi Barrani, if warranted by success. This plan was limited in nature and only could be considered a limited operation, which followed the advance-in-mass theory as seen on the northern front of the Ethiopian War. The Italian binary nonmotorized infantry divisions were assigned the only road network available to them. Due to the summer heat in August, which would have affected the primarily nonmotorized Italian formations, it was postponed for the second time.

The third operational level plan developed by Marshal Graziani and his staff was for the planned invasion of 9 September 1940. Graziani had defined his new objective of Sidi Barrani and only informed his staff six days prior to the date Benito Mussolini ordered him to finally invade Egypt. This did not allow much time for his staff to prepare the new plan and get it to the field commanders. Two separate forces attacking on two separate axis of advance would make this attack. The Metropolitan Italian nonmotorized divisions would advance along the coast and attack through Halfaya Pass and occupy Sollum and continue forward to Sidi Barrani. The southern column consisting of the Libyan Divisions and Maletti’s raggruppamento were to advance on the Dayr al-Hamra – Bir ar Rabiyah – Bir Enba track to flank the escarpment and the enemy. This plan was an example of Italian mechanized doctrine. The combination of the advance of forces advancing along the coast pinning the enemy and the Italian mechanized forces operating to turn the enemy’s flank followed Italian mechanized doctrine.

According to this plan, Maletti’s raggruppamento was intended to make a long flanking movement through the desert, this being ideally suited for the role of mechanized forces according to Italian doctrine. However Marshal Granziani’s staff failed to provide the proper maps and navigation equipment needed to work deep in the desert. Moving to its assembly point for the invasion, the Maletti raggruppamento got lost and the XXIII Corps Headquarters had to send aircraft out to their location and help lead his units into their positions. Additionally the Libyan divisions, which were to accompany him, took an unconscionable time to rendezvous near Fort Capuzzo (Pitt 1989, 50). These developments and the fact that Marshal Granziani believed that the material prerequisites underlying his operational plan were still lacking sufficient trucks, and transport aircraft, as well as command of the space changed the plan again. (Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel 1995, 271).

The fourth plan developed by Graziani and his staff was for the planned invasion of 13 September 1940. Graziani still defined as his objective Sidi Barrani and points south. The Italian 10th Army consisting of five divisions and the armored elements would advance in mass down the coast road. They would occupy Sollum and advance to Sidi Barrani through Buq Buq. Due to what he thought were his Army’s failings to adequately implement the third plan he decided on an advance in mass. He intended to advance to Sidi Barrani, consolidate his holdings, resupply his army, destroy any British counter attacks and then resume the advance to Mersa Matruh. The Italian binary nonmotorized infantry divisions were forced to utilize the only road network available to them. If he was going to use these forces in an advance he would have to utilize the coastal road, because they would be ineffective anywhere else. This was clearly the model shown on the northern front in Ethiopia. It did not comply with existing Italian mechanized doctrine, which he had ample forces to execute. He believed the only way to defeat the British would be by sheer numbers and weight, because he overestimated the strength of the enemy, which was something he had not feared in Ethiopia.

On the morning of the thirteenth of September, 1940 the great Italian invasion of Egypt began. The Italian 10th Army had three Corps, XXI, XXII, and XXIII consisting of most of the Italian strength in Libya. The XXI Corps was in Tobruk. The XXII Corps was in reserve. The XXI Corps was the 10th Army Reserve. It contained the nonmotorized 61st Sirte infantry division, the nonmotorized 28 Ottobre CCNN division and one light tank battalion. The nonmotorized 61st Catanzaro infantry division, and the nonmotorized 3 Gennaio CCNN division were attached to the XXII Corps in Tobruk.

The XXIII Corps spearheaded the Italian 10th Army’s attack into Egypt. General Annibale Bergonzoli, commander of XXIII Corps, advanced to Sidi Barrani along the coastal road with his nonmotorized and motorized formations. The XXIII corps was given enough trucks to partially motorize three infantry divisions for the advance but could only fully motorize one infantry division. General Bergonzoli wanted to advanced with the 1st raggruppamento carri as the advance guard, two motorized infantry divisions on line, one motorized infantry division in reserve, two Libyan nonmotorized infantry divisions on foot, and the Maletti raggruppamento in the rear. The motorized formations were, the partially motorized 62nd Cirene infantry division, the partially motorized 63rd Marmarica infantry division, the fully motorized 23 Marzo CCNN division, the motorized the Maletti raggruppamento and the 1st raggruppamento carri. The partially motorized infantry divisions would move in shuttle fashion. The nonmotorized infantry had to march the sixty miles to the objective.

During the advance into Egypt, the 1st Raggruppamento carri was kept in reserve, except for the LXII L.3 light tank battalion assigned to the 63rd Marmarica Infantry division and LXIII L.3 light tank battalion assigned to 62nd Cirene infantry division. The 2nd raggruppamento carri was located at Bardia, except for the IX L.3 light tank battalion assigned to 2nd Libyan infantry division. The II M.11 medium tank battalion was with Raggruppamento Maletti but the Maletti raggruppamento only had three Libyan infantry battalions for the attack, but these were fully motorized to carry its infantry.

The invasion started with an artillery barrage followed by an advance behind a rolling barrage. The Italians took and occupied their first objective, which was Sollum. Then over the next four days the Italian Army advanced along the coast with two divisions leading, behind a screen of motorcyclist, tanks, and motorized infantry and artillery. On 14 September, what remained of the 1st raggruppamento carri, in reserve under 10th Army HQ was following the advancing 1st and 2nd Libyan divisions toward Bir Thidan el-Khadim. At Alam el Dab right before Sidi Barrani, Italian mechanized forces attempted to outflank the British forces. At this point about 50 Italian tanks supported by motorized infantry and artillery attempted to outflank and surround the British rear guard. This flanking maneuver forced the British forces to retreat.

On the evening of the sixteenth, the 1st raggruppamento carri was east-southeast of Sidi Barrani, along with the 23 Marzo division and all the artillery of XXIII Corps. Raggruppamento Maletti was still west of the objective. Raggruppamento Maletti was not able to fully participate in the offensive because of various logistical and organizational problems it was dealing with during the advance. The 1st raggruppamento carri was used only in a prudent infantry support role. The Italian army was only able to advance twelve miles each day based on the nonmotorized elements it contained. Once reaching Sidi Barrani, its primary objective, it halted and began to develop a series of well-fortified camps. There were no bold mechanized strokes or flanking movements. These mechanized elements, the best in the Italian 10th Army and the XXIII Corps, were the advance guard of an army in mass advancing up the coastal road at the pace of the slowest foot soldier.

During the advance the Italian forces lost 120 dead and 410 wounded with a number of tanks and trucks lost to mechanical failure. The Regia Aeronautica lost a total six planes, two of them due to accidents. The only three truly motorized elements of 10th Army raggruppamento Maletti, 1st raggruppamento carri and the 23 Marzo CCNN infantry division failed to act following the mechanized doctrine. This was for a lack of preparation, training and organization on the Italian army. Other fragment problems included the problems with assembling and directing the raggruppamento Maletti, the timid use of the remaining tank battalions of 1st raggruppamento carri, the totally improvised motorization of the 23 Marzo, which caused a lack of synchronization between truck drivers and the infantry. The division was not trained to act like a motorized infantry division. In the end the advance reached its objectives with modest costs, but failed to wear down the British forces which would then be employed in their subsequent offensive.

The British had expected the Italians to make a flanking movement well south of the coast and had concentrated most of their small forces south of the escarpment. Only one Coldstream motorized infantry battalion and some artillery were on the coast to oppose the main weight of the Italian invasion. This force fought a delaying action against the advancing Italians. The main armor strength of 7th Armored division was located at Mersa Matruh. The British strength in Cruiser tanks was only eighty five, of which fifteen were out of action undergoing repair (Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel 1995, 276). Mersa Matruh is where the British thought the Italians were going to advance and they planned to defend there, and utilize their mechanized forces against the Italian flanks and long lines of communication, which the Italians would have to maintain. But the Italians stopped at Sidi Barrani and established a series of fortified positions.

The Italian Army of mass established itself in five fortified camps. Here they built and maintained their logistics lines of communication and awaited the British counterattack. The British waited for the Italians to resume their offensive. This was not going to happen until the Italians had time recover from the advance, reorganize their units, build a hard surface road and a water pipeline forward to Sidi Barrani. In essence the Italians were building up their logistical supply base and waiting for the enemy counterattack. This pattern followed closely what had occurred on the northern front in Ethiopia. The British waited for the Italians to advance to their next objective and prepared their defenses. Since it did not happen immediately they would again make raids on the Italian forces and their lines of communications.

The Italian medium armor strength was relatively intact after the advance to Sidi Barrani. On 21 September there were still 68 M.11 tanks out of the original 72 shipped to North Africa. From these 68 M.11 tanks 31 were unserviceable due to maintenance and 37 serviceable between the two tank battalions. 1st medium tank battalion had 9 serviceable and 23 unserviceable. The 2nd medium tank battalion had 28 serviceable and 8 unserviceable (Ceva and Curami 1989, 307). Their medium tank strength would increase because the next generation Italian tank would soon be arriving in North Africa. This tank was the M.13 tank, which was much better in quality and performance than the M.11 and was equal to the British Cruiser tanks. The medium M.13 tank had a hard-hitting 47-millimeter gun in a rotating turret with two 8-millimeter machine guns in the hull and had the same chassis as the M.11 medium tank. The II medium tank battalion with 37 M.13 tanks arrived in Libya during the first days of October, followed by the V Medium Tank battalion equipped with 46 M.13 tanks on 12 December 1940. These armored forces gave the Italians an increasing advantage until mid November of 1940 with 417 medium and light tanks in Libya and Egypt. At this point massive British reinforcements in cruiser tanks and the Matilda Heavy tank and additional infantry divisions from the commonwealth would erode the advantages the Italians may have possessed and passed the initiative back to the British.

After the conquest of Sollum, the Comando carri della Libia transformed into the Brigata Corazzata and added some artillery elements. This grouping of units was united west of Bardia, near Mersa Lucch. These elements formed the Babini Armored Brigade. The Babini Armored Brigade was formed on the 18th of November 1940 utilizing the I medium tank battalion (M.11) and the II medium Tank battalion (M.13) initially (Ceva and Curami 1989, 308). These medium tank battalions were the medium tank battalion assigned to this newly formed organization and the center of its combat power. The elements assigned to this organization were I medium tank battalion, M.11 tanks, II medium tank battalion M.13 tanks, one motorized bersaglieri regiment, 1 motorcycle battalion, 2 antitank companies, 47/32 antitanks guns mounted on trucks, and 1 artillery regiment, 1 battalion of 75/27 guns, 1 battalion of 100/17 guns, 1 battery of 75 CK anti-aircraft guns, and 2 batteries of 20-millimeter anti-aircraft guns (Ceva and Curami 1989, 217). The armor brigade was to become the armored component of the 1st Libyan Armored Division.

The Italian Army began to makes plans for the next phase of the operation. This would be an advance to Mersa Matruh, planned for December 16th 1940. At the start of British counteroffensive only the IX L.3 light tank battalion, still with 2nd Libyan infantry division, II M.11 medium tank battalion, still with raggruppamento Maletti and LXIII and XX L.3 light tank battalions, with XXI Corps HQ, were east of the “wire” in Egypt. Before the Italian Army could execute this plan the British counterattacked their fortified camps in what was to be a five-day raid called “Operation Compass”. These camps were well defended but they did not have overlapping fields of fire. In these areas of dead space they relied on ground and air patrols to monitor British actives. The lack of Italian air to ground cooperation allowed the British to attack one camp from the rear, and then in detail defeat the other camps and force the Italians to withdraw back to Libya. The Italian Medium tanks consisting of M.11 and M.13s would be destroyed while warming up their engines before breakfast during the initial British attack.

The Italians faced a new mechanized enemy, one in which they were not equipped to defeat in 1940. This mechanized enemy was the Matilda heavy tank. The Italian soldiers fought bravely but technology and British use of doctrine defeated them. This was the counterattack that the army of mass was to destroy, but by consolidating their position and not resuming the advance the Italians had allowed the British time to build their strength to defeat them.

From the start of the Italian advance in Egypt to the battle of Beda Fomm, the inadequate operational flexibility of the Italians formations was made worse by micro-management at the tactical level from the higher echelons of command. The invasion of Egypt was under command of the 10th Army, but Marshal Graziani, overall commander in Libya, micro-managed the operations down to regimental level, often without even informing the10th Army and Corps commanders. This often caused confusion and, during the British counter-offensive, helped to freeze many Italians units, awaiting orders or receiving hopelessly outdated ones. This was another violation of the doctrine, where the mobile formation commanders were to be given large tactical freedom of maneuver.

This was the beginning of the end of the Italian 10th Army in Egypt and in Libya. The five day British raid known as Operation Compass extended into a campaign that destroyed the Italian 10th Army and pushed the Italians almost back to Tripoli by February of 1941. The Italian 10th Army would at last be destroyed and surrender at the battle of Beda Fomm, a mere ghost of its former self. Thus the Italian invasion of Egypt failed to meet the strategic military goals and national political objectives of the government. The Italian 10th Army equipped with their newly developed doctrine, and commanded by Marshal Graziani, was severely defeated by a smaller British Commonwealth Army of only 35,000 soldiers.

The Italian 10th Army was primarily built around non motorized infantry divisions, which was of little use in this theatre, but it had received additional armored medium tanks, which formed combined arms teams into raggruppamento. The Italian medium tank could match or at least fight the British armored and mechanized columns utilizing their current Italian doctrine. Graziani also had artillery in overwhelming numbers and during the summer and early fall, at a time when the British Cruiser tanks were inferior in numbers (though superior in quality) to the Italian M.11 medium tank he had the advantage (Gooch 1990, 86-87). With these forces Marshal Graziani had the forces necessary to follow Italian mechanized doctrine. All Marshal Graziani needed to do was tailor his available forces and develop a plan for the invasion of Egypt to secure the strategic objective of the Nile delta and the Suez Canal. Instead of utilizing his forces according to Italian mechanized doctrine he chose the doctrine of mass, allowing the British to react and seize the initiative in the western desert.