Burnt-out Russian tanks on the streets of the South Ossetian capital. Photo: AP

The war in the Caucasus: looking underneath the propaganda blanket

By Alexey D Muraviev

On 12 August, President Dmitry Medvedev declared the end to Russian military operations in Georgia on the basis that they have accomplished set tasks: Georgian forces were pushed back from Southern Ossetia and their fighting capability was seriously curtailed. However, the end of the Russian counter-offensive will not halt the information war that carries on.

In his highly emotional article on the ongoing conflict in Southern Ossetia, Mr Grigol Ubiria was quick to identify Russia as the root cause of the problems in the south-eastern Caucasus and the world in general. The conflict over Southern Ossetia is a complex multi-layered phenomenon that requires a balanced analytical approach. To be able to get a comprehensive picture, apart from the viewpoints of the United States and Georgia, Russia’s motives and strategic intentions have to be examined also.

Russia’s claims about its traditional role in the area are based on the history of its engagement in regional affairs. The nation’s influence over the Caucasus was established in the 18th century as a result of the nation’s prolonged struggle with the Ottoman Empire. After yet another war with the Ottomans (1768-74), Russia secured the Crimean Peninsula, the Sea of Azov and further south along the Black Sea coast. In 1783, the Russian Empress Catherine II (the Great) and the ruler of two Georgian provinces (Kartly and Kakhetiya) Irakliy II signed the so-called Georgian Treaty, according to which Russia offered Eastern Georgia a status of a protectorate and guaranteed the safety of the local Orthodox Christian population against the neighbouring Ottoman Empire. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-91, the Russian protectorate was extended to the rest of Georgia.

However, Russia’s current hard-line actions in Southern Ossetia are driven not just by the understanding of its historical role in regional politics but primarily by the following considerations.

Immediate response

Russian officials claim that the use of force against Georgia is legitimate and refer to Article 51 (the right of self-defence) of the United Nations charter. These arguments are based on accusations that Georgian military forces attacked Russian peacekeepers (stationed in the area since 1992) as well as Russian citizens living in Southern Ossetia.

Antagonistic relations with the government of Mikhail Saakashvili

Throughout the 1990s the relations between Russia and Georgia remained problematic. Georgian officials (Gamsarkhurdiya and Shevarnadze) continuously accused Russia of intervening in its domestic affairs, while the Russians blamed official Tbilisi in playing the ‘Russian neo-imperial’ card in an attempt to secure financial and political backing of Western nations. Georgia was accused of harbouring Chechen separatists and Al Qaeda terrorists, particularly in Pankissi Gorge (the deployment of US military forces into Georgia in 2002 was formally motivated by counter-terrorism agenda).

However, after Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in November 2003, bilateral relations seriously deteriorated. By prioritising above all relations with the United States (before the 2005 visit of US President George W Bush to Tbilisi one of the main streets was named after him, an example that says it all) Mr Saakashvili continuously undertook steps that intimidated Moscow, including:

• Active role in forming the pro-US regional security structure GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), formed in 1997 and aimed at cutting off Russia from south-western Europe, the Caucasus, and Caspian Sea region.
• Persistence in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and an offer to the United States to deploy elements of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (ABM) on its territory, both moves viewed by the Russians as threatening their national security.
• Massive defence modernisation program with the fastest growing military budget in Europe (risen by 30 times over the past seven years reaching a figure of $US1 billion in 2007). US active involvement in forces training and upgrades (the total contribution of the United States towards Georgia’s rearmament reached $US40 million).
• Non-diplomatic and often offensive anti-Russian rhetoric as part of the regular lexicon of Georgian politicians (on one occasion Mr Saakashvili said that he wanted to learn judo to beat up then Russian president Vladimir Putin).

Growing geopolitical rivalry with the United States

When Mr Bush visited Georgia in May 2005 he described the country as a regional ‘beacon of democracy’. However, the US’s overwhelming support for Georgia is driven not so much by the global approach of ‘exporting democracies’ and by particular concerns about the nation’s form of governance but by rather clear geopolitical and military-strategic considerations. Continuing to view Russia as one of its principal rivals, the United States uses Georgia to reduce Russia’s influence in the Caucasus and to drive it away from the Black Sea region (effectively dismantling the 18th century gains). A friendly Georgia could also be used to put extra political-military pressure on Russia in times of international crisis. The Russians view this in the context of the transforming strategic environment (expanding NATO, deployment of ABM in Europe and the Pacific, US penetration of the former Soviet space).

Another major consideration is the geopolitics of pipelines. Georgia plays a key role as a transit state in the US-led transnational Ceyhan energy project aimed at offering a transport route for Caspian and Central Asia oil that would bypass Russia. Adding to that, Georgian ports are also used for the transit of energy resources. This represents an economic challenge to the Russians who strive to become the energy superpower, by becoming the principal deliverer of energy resources.

In this context, the conflict over Southern Ossetia is not a war between Russia and Georgia (de jure, it cannot be classified as a war as neither side declared war on its opponent). De facto, it is a proxy conflict between Russia and the United States over the strategically important area.

Where from here

The declared ceasefire does not mean the end of hostilities. Russia has shown an intent to keep its military presence in the area and indicated support for backing South Ossetian and Abkhazian claims for independence (on par with other reasons such as pragmatic desire to have friendly buffer zones and weaken hostile Georgia, the Russians will use the Kosovo precedent to justify such an action).

Another difficulty arises from Russia’s refusal to deal with Mr Saakashvili. Effectively, Russian officials are incriminating Georgian authorities in state-sanctioned terrorism. Georgia was accused of ethnic cleansing against Ossetians. Adding to that, on August 11, the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (counter-intelligence) Aleksandr Bortnikov accused Georgian secret services of planning terrorist attacks in Russia. It is likely that the Russians will continue to insist on Mr Saakashvili’s resignation.

While large-scale military operations may be coming to an end, the political war over Georgia is likely to escalate, particularly in the context of the upcoming US presidential elections.

It is clear that Russia has won a military campaign and Mr Saakashvili has suffered a humiliating military and political defeat. After all, if you continuously tease and hurt the bear, he will retreat first, roar loud but eventually counter attack. However, so far it is not winning the information war. Over the past four years the Russians did amazingly well in restoring their national might and international reputation and prestige. Now, they have to engage in aggressive damage control over what seems clear to them was a just war.

Dr Alexey D Muraviev is a strategic affairs analyst and an award-winning lecturer in International Relations and National Security at Curtin University of Technology. He is one of Australia’s leading experts on Russia’s strategic and defence policy.

American Troops Help Defend Georgia

August 13, 2008: As Russian troops invade, from bases in southern Russia, 127 American military trainers remain in Georgia (the one in the Caucasus). They weren’t the only foreign troops around, as at the end of July, a thousand Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and U.S. troops departed after holding joint training exercises with their Georgian counterparts.

For the past three years, several hundred American military trainers have run the GSSOP (Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program), which has trained over 5,000 Georgian troops, many for eventual service in Iraq. The trainers were American soldiers and marines, who imparted their combat experience to the Georgians. This was much appreciated, as Georgia aspires to membership in NATO. That requires the Georgian being able to achieve NATO standards in training and equipment. Georgia hoped to get into NATO by next year.

The U.S. trainers, usually a team of 70 Americans taking a 600 man Georgian infantry battalion through a 17 week training program, concentrate on combat subjects. Other training programs instructed support and staff troops.

Georgia has been an active participant in peacekeeping operations since 1999, when they sent 200 troops to Kosovo, and kept troops there until the present. In 2003, 70 peacekeepers were sent to Iraq. The following year, 50 troops were sent to Afghanistan. In 2004, the Iraq contingent was increased to 300. That was increased to 850 in 2005. Last year, the Iraq force was increased to 2,000. The Georgians were highly regarded by troops they worked with on these peacekeeping missions.

Georgia has a population of about 4.6 million, and an active duty military of about 28,000 troops. Russia has a population of 142 million, and an active duty military of about a million personnel. The U.S. has been helping Georgia train and equip an army reserve force of about 100,000. Only about a fifth of that force has been organized so far. Georgia was hoping to develop a sufficient qualitative advantage to discourage the Russians.

Why Georgia Lost The War

August 10, 2008: To no one’s surprise, the Russians drove back a Georgian attempt to regain control of South Ossetia. There were several hundred military and civilian casualties. The fighting apparently began when some South Ossetia militiamen fired across the border at Georgian troops. This escalated to a Georgian invasion, and a Russian reinforcement of its peacekeepers, and the expulsion of the Georgian troops. All in the space of a week. The fighting continues, with Russian warplanes bombing civilians and military targets in Georgia and moving more troops into another breakaway Georgian region, Abkhazia. Georgia has asked for a ceasefire, but the Russians have not responded.

Since the early 1990s, Russia and Georgia have argued over who should control South Ossetia, a Georgian province on the Russian border. Just to the north of South Ossetia, is the Russian territory of North Ossetia. The Soviets often split ethnic groups between two provinces (or “Autonomous Republics”) to make it more difficult for the people to unite in opposition to the Soviet Union. This, among many similar measures, worked. Since the Russians moved in their peacekeepers in the early 1990s, they have issued Russian passports to the South Ossetians and, in effect, annexed the region.

The Ossertians are a different ethnic group from the ethnic Georgians, as are the Abkhazians. This sort of ethnic mélange is common throughout the Caucasus. During the last years of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), ethnic tensions increased throughout the Soviet Union, as long dormant (and suppressed by a brutal police state) aspirations stirred once more. While the Soviet politicians pulled off an astonishing feat by dissolving the empire without bloodshed (and creating fourteen new countries from portions of the empire that decided not to stay with the new Russia), there were lots of smaller groups that still had separatist grievances. Two of these groups were in Georgia, and occupied the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The populations rebelled against the Georgian government and drove out Georgian officials, troops and ethnic Georgians. Thousands of ethnic Abkhazians and Ossetians fled to the new statelets. Since both of these areas were on the Russian border, Russia saw an opportunity to quiet things down (they did not want an ethnic based guerilla war going on along their border). So Russia offered its services as mediator and peacekeeper in the early 1990s, and peace was restored. The UN agreed all this, and a reluctant Georgia went along. But after that, the Russians refused to leave, or encourage the Abkhazians and Ossetians to work out a deal to become part of Georgia once more. Abkhazians and Ossetians wanted to be independent, and declared themselves so. No one else recognized this. In 2004, Georgia began cracking down on the smuggling and other criminal activity that was keeping the economy in South Ossetia going. This led to more and more gunfire along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia.

Two years ago, Georgia began a major expansion of its armed forces. Officially, the active forces were then about 26,000 troops, already up from about 12,000-14,000 just a couple few years before that. Unofficially, the government has raised strength to about 28,000. This was done by adding more professional troops and increasing the order-of-battle by two battalions of conscripts. The government goal is to increase the active force to about 35,000. In addition, Georgia began building a reserve force.

Until a few years ago the “reserves” constituted the entire body of conscripts discharged over the past 15 years. But this pool, of about 250,000 men, was just that, a pool. The “reservists” were not subject to periodic refresher training, and so no more than perhaps 10 percent of them could be considered useful in the event of activation. Beginning four years ago, Georgia instituted a more rigorous reserve training program. An active reserve has been created, which apparently numbers over 10,000 men, and is expected to grow to as many as 100,000 over the next few years, as conscripts (drafted at 18 to 18-24 months) leave active service, and enter 5-10 years of reserve duty.

While Georgia doesn’t have the money for modern equipment (it’s stuff is mostly Russian Cold War vintage), it does have enough professional soldiers from the old Red Army, and a military tradition going back centuries. Much to the discomfort of Russia, the United States has been supplying Georgia with military trainers and some equipment. Partly, this is in response to Georgian help in Iraq. Georgia first sent 800 peacekeepers to Iraq, and began increasing that force. Currently there are 2,000 Georgian troops in Iraq, where they obtain useful operational experience.

The principal reason for the military build-up is the secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgians wanted the option of trying for a military solution. There are also some Russian troops, leftovers from Soviet Union era garrisons, still in the country. Georgia has been trying get all the Russian soldiers out since the Soviet Union collapsed (and Georgia became independent once more) in 1991. But the Russians have come up with a long string of excuses for delaying a final pullout. To make matters worse, several thousand of those troops are “peacekeepers” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To most Georgians, the Russian peacekeepers are there mainly to keep the rebel regions free of Georgian control.

It’s not yet clear what the Georgian government was thinking when they allowed the border skirmishing to escalate to a military effort to restore government control over South Ossetia. It didn’t work, as the Russians promptly counterattacked and drove the Georgian troops out of South Ossetia. The Georgians can try a guerilla war, and hope that their new relationship with the United States and the European Union will add some measure of protection. That’s a false hope. The Russians have made it clear during the last few years that any real, or imagined, Western influence or interference in nations that border Russia (what the Russians call the “near-abroad”) will be opposed with lots of noise, followed by some firepower. The recent events in Georgia are an example of that, an example the Russians hope the West takes seriously, even if the Georgians don’t.

Russian politicians have been playing the nationalism card, catering to widespread feelings that the Soviet Union should be restored. Most Russians never cared for the communist dictatorship, but they did like being a superpower. The Russians also feel that those fourteen nations that split off when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, left Russia surrounded by a lot of unstable and vulnerable nations. This sounds paternalistic and paranoid to Westerners, but not to Russians. And the Russians are willing to use force to back up these attitudes, as the Georgians just discovered. Russia still has nukes, and some Cold War attitudes that make for a potentially very dangerous situation.

War With Georgia

August 8, 2007: A week of fighting in Georgia (on Russians southern border in the Caucasus) was apparently a Georgian attempt to finally defeat ethnic separatists in the breakaway area of South Ossetia (population 50,000). Georgia announced that it had liberated the separatist area. Russia has not yet announced if it will go to war to support the, apparently, defeated South Ossetian separatists.

There is a second such area; Abkhazia (population 200,000). Georgia has a population of 4.6 million, and a hostile relationship (going back centuries) with Russia. In response to this bad attitude, Russia has backed the rebels of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which are on the Russian border) since the early 1990s. Georgia was part of the Soviet Union (and Russia) for over two centuries. Georgians tolerated this for a long time as the only way to keep the Moslem Turks out of Christian Georgia. But with the end of the Cold War, this was no longer an issue and the Georgians wanted the Russians gone. The Russians considered the Georgians ungrateful and unreliable (for allowing Chechen rebels to hide out in neighboring Georgian mountains.)

The fighting in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had stopped over a decade ago, because Georgia could not muster sufficient military force to regain control of the two breakaway border areas. Then a UN brokered peace deal brought in several thousand Russian peacekeepers. About ten days ago, there were were reports of gunfire and mortar shells exploding in South Ossetia. In the last few days, Georgian Su-25 ground attack aircraft were seen hitting targets in South Ossetia. Artillery shells were reported to have hit a Russian peace keeper barracks. Russia announced that it was sending more peacekeeping troops to South Ossetia. Russian aircraft were reported to have bombed targets just inside Georgia. Russia was unable to get the UN to pass a resolution demanding that Georgia cease efforts to get back control of its territory.

August 7, 2007: The government has been making a lot of noise about rebuilding the navy, with plans to build 5-6 aircraft carriers, and new classes of nuclear submarines. But this is, for the moment, mainly a PR exercise, as the announced plans don’t start building anything for another five years. There’s a practical reason for that, as many of the smaller suppliers of ship and weapons components did not survive the post Cold War collapse of the 1990s. New suppliers, either foreign or domestic, must be found or developed. A new generation of specialists and technicians has to be recruited, for the Cold War era people are now largely gone (either retired, or moved on to more lucrative work.) Moreover, the current Russian economic boom is driven largely by oil and gas exports (which account for 60 percent of all exports, and 20 percent of GDP.) By comparison, the more varied economy of neighboring Poland, with about a quarter of Russia’s population, has 15 percent higher per-capita GDP. Russia still living off its past, especially when it comes to military affairs. A generation of military research and development was lost, along with the research facilities, suppliers and skilled people. The government is having a hard time convincing the new consumer-goods oriented economy to get behind military work. So new state owned weapons corporations are being formed, and these will likely be as inefficient as their Soviet predecessors. Right now, Russian arms exports are seen as a generation behind the West, but cheap and generally reliable. If your neighbors don’t have Western stuff, the Russian weapons will do.

August 3, 2008: Russia is quietly preparing to deliver and install S-300 (similar to the U.S. Patriot) missile systems to Iran. For the past year, Iranian operators and technicians have been training in Russia, and some components of the missile systems have already been delivered. Russia has opposed greater economic sanctions on Iran (for its nuclear weapons program, which it says it doesn’t have). The only other threat to the Iranian nuclear program (for which Russia is a major supplier) is an air raid by Israel. The S-300s are supposed to help prevent that. By the end of the year, or early next year, the S-300s will be in place.

August 1, 2008: It’s been a scary Summer in the Caucasus. Small groups of Islamic terrorists appear to be following through on their threat to terrorize the police into submission. This is done by killing policemen. Sometimes it’s an ambush on a rural road, but a recent attack had a lone gunman walk into a village cafe, shoot three policeman, and leave. Special counter-terror police are tracking down these groups, who are usually more into crime than religious extremism, although that is necessary just to keep the group going. There’s been a reaction to this in many large Russian cities. Young nationalist thugs are attacking anyone who is not an ethnic (Slav) Russian. This is especially true of those from the Caucasus, Middle East, East Asia or Africa. In Moscow alone, there have been 10-20 such assaults (one or two of them murders) a month.

July 31, 2008: Russia pulled about 400 of 2,500 peacekeeping troops out of the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Georgia resents this “peacekeeping” mission as it is see as supporting the rebels, and another Russian effort to punish independent minded Georgia.

July 23, 2008: Negotiations are underway with India to jointly develop a new tank, to replace the T-90 that India is building (under license) to become their main battle tank. India will eventually have 1,600 T-90s, with most of them built in India. At the moment, India has more T-90s than Russia, and unless the Russian army places some large orders, India will continue to be the largest user of the T-90 (which is an upgrade of the thirty year old T-72 design.) The new design is expected to be a major departure from the T-72 design, employing lots of new technology.

July 21, 2008: Russia and China have finally settled decades old disputes along their 4,300 kilometers of border. Some of these disagreements go back nearly a century, and the two countries fought several border skirmishes in the 1970s. A treaty was worked out with North Korea over less serious border issues, along a much shorter border.