H-NET BOOK REVIEW

Published by H-German@h-net.msu.edu (July 2008)

Burghard Ciesla. _Als der Osten durch den Westen fuhr_. Cologne: Böhlau, 2006. 356 pp. Appendices, index, bibliography, illustrations. EUR 47.90 (cloth), ISBN 3-412-30505-7.

Reviewed for H-German by Alfred C. Mierzejewski, Department of History, University of North Texas

Cold War Railroad History

During the Cold War, Berlin occupied an unusual position. Deep within the GDR, it was generally seen as an island of democracy and capitalism in the socialist East. Paradoxically, East Germany’s state railway, the Deutsche Reichsbahn, operated in West Berlin as well, offering a further illuminating contrast. In his new book, Burghard Ciesla chronicles the history of the Reichsbahn in West Berlin. The book provides a wealth of detail, but suffers from the lack of an interpretive framework. Ciesla takes a historicist approach to his topic; he denies that his story falls into any familiar theoretical framework. This approach, which characterizes much contemporary writing in the field of transportation history, detracts from his analysis and is not justified. Indeed, the history of the Deutsche Reichsbahn in West Berlin offers a unique opportunity to compare the West German corporatist market economy with the GDR’s socialist command economy and to test ideas about the viability of socialist economies in general.[1]

The author used a wide range of sources related specifically to the Reichsbahn, although virtually all of are them located in Berlin itself.[2] In addition, Ciesla also consulted the files of the Auswärtiges Amt and the Deutsche Bahn, both also in Berlin. Given the importance of the Allied occupation authorities for the formulation of transportation policy relating to West Berlin, one would have expected that the author would have consulted the files of the Allied powers in College Park, Maryland, London, Paris and Colmar. Use of these western archives would have provided the author with much useful information concerning Allied policy concerning Berlin and its railways. Outside of the author’s control was the fact that the Reichsbahn intentionally kept no written records of its relations with western authorities concerning the S-Bahn. Further complicating matters is the fact that surviving data concerning operations, finances and employment are incomplete, hampering analysis using time series. The resulting documentary foundation is, therefore, surprisingly narrow, leading the author to write what amounts to a highly detailed local history.

One of Ciesla’s basic contentions is that economic considerations overrode political factors in shaping the history of the Reichsbahn in West Berlin. His own narrative undermines this thesis, however. At the outset, political considerations exerted a decisive influence on the Reichsbahn’s operations in the West. The East German regime could not arrive at an agreement with the western Allies concerning the status of the Reichsbahn in the western sector. The Allies granted the Reichsbahn operating rights in the West while the East German government claimed that the rail facilities in the West were an integral part of Reichsbahn property. Consequently, the old name, Reichsbahn, was retained, although the East German government had hoped to replace it with a name more appropriate to the new socialist state. The property rights issue also influenced the Reichsbahn’s readiness to invest in facilities in the West and made coordination with western political authorities difficult, all to the disadvantage of travelers and shippers. The ownership issue was only resolved with the collapse of the GDR and the merger of the East German Reichsbahn with the West German Bundesbahn.

Ciesla provides detailed discussions of the resolution of the property rights issue, labor relations, investment policies, the GDR’s attempt to create a mock market during the 1960s, and the Reichsbahn’s involvement in the regime’s efforts to obtain foreign exchange during the 1980s.

Taken together, these discussions amount to a set of cameos that do not add up to a comprehensive analysis. Far more effective would have been a discussion of how the Reichsbahn’s situation in West Berlin reflected its overall condition. Undoubtedly, labor conditions on the Reichsbahn in West Berlin were troubled, but they were not satisfactory anywhere in East Germany. Investment in the Reichsbahn’s facilities in West Berlin was inadequate, but it was that way everywhere in East Germany as well.

The finances of the Reichsbahn’s operating division in West Berlin were poor, but they were in East Germany, too. Ciesla points to policies of “So viel wie nötig, so wenig wie möglich” and “Devisen gehen vor,” which prioritized the accumulation of foreign currency and the husbanding of resources beyond the absolute minimum for other projects as causes of the misery in West Berlin. But the Reichsbahn suffered from these policies throughout its territory. The causes were deeper. The need to provide massive reparations to the Soviet Union imposed heavy burdens on the Reichsbahn early in its history, a disadvantage that it never fully overcame. The obligatory integration in the economic system of the eastern bloc required the Reichsbahn to serve traffics for which its track network was not suited at prices that frequently did not cover costs. At an even deeper level, the policies of the East German socialist regime caused the Reichsbahn to charge prices for its services that reflected social needs, but were insufficient to sustain its operations and physical plant. The lack of economic incentives caused an otherwise well-trained and loyal work force to function well below its potential. Politically motivated investment policy led to the allocation of badly needed resources away from the railway, the misallocation of resources within the railway, and the failure to maintain those structures and vehicles that were acquired. The absence of economic incentives lead to inadequate performance by the railway’s employees, the misallocation of physical assets,and the provision of unnecessary services while other, desirable services, were not provided. At a superficial level, economic considerations may have seemed to have prevailed. However, at a deeper level, the primacy of political and social considerations prevented the rational allocation of resources.

The overriding political stance of the government, intended to serve social ends, created the context for the Reichsbahn’s short-term economic policies as Ciesla describes them. Use of mainstream economic theory would have laid bare this seeming paradox and made this volume much more illuminating.

Burghard Ciesla provides an account of the Deutsche Reichsbahn in West Berlin that is both rich in detail and analytically disappointing. It will be most valuable to those seeking to reconstruct the day-to-day evolution of Reichsbahn operations and the life of its employees in West Berlin. For those seeking insights into the general development of German railways and the relative performance of economic systems, however, it offers only hints at what might be possible.

Notes

[1]. For a discussion of the term “corporatist market economy,” see Werner Abelshauser, _Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945_ (Munich:

C.H. Beck, 2004). For an overview of the history of the GDR economy see André Steiner, _Von Plan zu Plan_ (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 166-174.

[2]. Most important were the files of the DDR Ministerium für Verkehrswesen located at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, the Reichsbahndirektion Berlin in the Landesarchiv Berlin, the Bundesarchiv’s Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO-DDR) and the Stasi-Akten, also in Berlin.