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Fighters were mobilized to intercept the V-1, but most fighter aircraft were too slow to catch a V-1 unless they had a height advantage, allowing them to gain speed by diving (a late version of the Republic Aviation’s P-47 Thunderbolt was stripped of all excess weight and given a more powerful engine, to fill this role). Solid machine gun bullets had little effect on the V-1′s sheet steel structure, and if an explosive cannon shell detonated the warhead, the explosion could destroy the attacking fighter. The first interception of a V-1, by F/L JG Musgrave of No. 605 Squadron RAF, took place on the night of 14/15 June 1944.
The V-1 also lacked the primary points of vulnerability of conventional aircraft: pilot, life-support, and a complex engine. Hits to the pilot, oxygen system, or complex reciprocating engines of a piloted aircraft by a bullet or small shell fragment can destroy its fighting capability, but the V-1′s Argus pulsejet provided sufficient thrust for flight even if damaged. The only vulnerable point of the Argus was the valve array at the front of the engine. The V-1′s only one-shot stop points were the two bomb detonators and the line from the fuel tank–three very small targets buried inside the fuselage. A direct hit on the warhead by an explosive shell from a fighter’s cannon, or a very close anti-aircraft shell explosion, were the most effective forms of gunfire.
When V-1 attacks began in mid-June of 1944, there were fewer than 30 Tempests, the only aircraft with the low-altitude speed needed to be effective against the V-1. They were assigned to No. 150 Wing RAF. Early attempts to intercept and destroy V-1s often failed, but improved techniques soon emerged. These included using the airflow over an interceptor’s wing to raise one wing of the V-1, by sliding the wingtip to within six inches (15 cm) of the lower surface of the V-1′s wing. If properly executed, this manoeuvre would tip the V-1′s wing up, overriding the gyros and sending the V-1 into an out-of-control dive. At least three V-1s were destroyed this way.
The Tempest wing was built up to over 100 aircraft by September; P-51 Mustangs and Griffon-engined Spitfire XIVs were tuned to make them almost fast enough, and during the short summer nights the Tempests shared defensive duty with de Havilland Mosquitoes. There was no need for radar — at night the V-1′s engine could be heard from 16 km (10 miles) or more away, and the exhaust plume was visible from a long distance. Wing Commander Roland Beamont had the 20 mm cannons on his Tempest harmonised (regulated) at 300 yards (275 m) (i.e. set to fire at the same spot 300 yards ahead). This was so successful that all other aircraft in 150 Wing were thus modified.
In daylight, V-1 chases were chaotic and often unsuccessful until a special defence zone was declared between London and the coast, in which only the fastest fighters were permitted. Between June and 5 September 1944, the handful of 150 Wing Tempests shot down 638 flying bombs, with No. 3 Squadron RAF alone claiming 305. One Tempest pilot, Squadron Leader Joseph Berry of No. 501 (Tempest) Squadron, shot down 59 V-1s, and Wing Commander Roland Beamont destroyed 31.
Next most successful were the Mosquito (428), Spitfire XIV (303), and Mustang (232). All other types combined added 158. Even though it was not fully operational, the jet-powered Gloster Meteor was rushed into service with No. 616 Squadron RAF to fight the V-1s. It had ample speed but its cannons were prone to jamming, and it shot down only 13 V-1s.
In mid-1944 the V-1 threat was drastically reduced by the arrival of two electronic aids for anti-aircraft guns requested by AA Command, both developed in the USA by the MIT Rad Lab after the British John Randall and Harry Boot had invented the cavity magnetron and provided it to them free of charge: radar-based automatic gunlaying (using the SCR-584 and other radars), and the proximity fuze.
These electronic aids arrived in quantity from June 1944, just as the guns reached their firing positions on the coast. Seventeen percent of all flying bombs entering the coastal ‘gun belt’ were destroyed by guns in their first week on the coast. This rose to 60% by 23 August and 74% in the last week of the month, when on one day 82% were shot down. The rate improved from one V-1 destroyed for every 2,500 shells fired initially, to one for every 100. This still did not stem the problem, however, and the threat was not properly contained until the launch sites could be captured by infantry.
In late 1944 a radar-equipped Vickers Wellington bomber was modified for use by the RAF’s Fighter Interception Unit as what would now be described as an Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. It operated at an altitude of some 4,000 feet over the North Sea to control Mosquito fighters intercepting He 111s flying from Dutch airbases and carrying out airborne launches of the V-1.
By September 1944, the V-1 threat to England ended when all launch sites were overrun by the advancing Allied Armies. 4,261 V-1s had been destroyed by fighters, anti-aircraft fire and barrage balloons.
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A USMC F4U Corsair armed Air Group was trained to take out V-1 launching sites, but as it was about to ship out to the ETO the mission was cancelled at the last minute and the group deployed to the Pacific.
The unit was trained to launch the Tiny Tim rockets and this required special training. There was a Marine unit already undertaking the training on the East Coast as it was to be deployed to the Pacific in an anti-ship role. Because of its advanced state of training it would be quicker to deploy it than train a USAAF unit.
PROJECT CROSSBOW (PROJECT DANNY TO THE MARINES)
“Project Danny involved the four fighter squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 51 (MAG-51) in the fall of 1944 to conduct an attack against the V-1 rocket launching sites in Europe. VMF-511, – 512, -513, and -514 were equipped with an assortment of F4U-1, FG-1A, and F3A-1 aircraft. These were all basically F4U-1s but manufactured by different companies.
The V-1 rockets being employed by the Germans lacked any controls to hit a specific target and had been wrecking havoc in England with their indiscriminate attacks. Washington wanted the launching sites destroyed and the task was assigned to the NavAirLant Staff. Working with the Marine Corps staff at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina, the plan was developed to arm Marine Corps Corsairs with the 11.75 inch (29.8 centimeter) Tiny Tim aircraft rocket, load them aboard escort aircraft carriers (CVEs) and transport them to the North Sea where they would be launched against the targets. At this time there were no Marine Corps squadrons aboard carriers, nor were any contemplated to be carrier based. The Tiny Tim was the largest aircraft rocket with a warhead developed from a 500-pound (227 kilogram) semi-armor-piercing bomb. The four newly formed squadrons commenced the special training for the mission at several of the outlying fields.
Commander Moorer (later Admiral Thomas H. Moorer) was the Naval Air Force Atlantic (NacAirLant) staff officer for the project who was sent to Washington to brief the top civilian and military authorities including General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff U.S. Army. The briefing commenced without the General who was quickly brought up to date, by one of his staff generals, upon his arrival. General Marshall listened, but on hearing that Marine aviators would make the planned attacks, raised his hand. Rising to his feet he moved towards the door and said something to the effect “that’s the end of this briefing. As long as I’m in charge of our Armed Forces, there’ll never be a Marine in Europe.” It can only be assumed that the Army did not want a repetition of the Marine publicity of World War I.
The project was cancelled and the first three squadrons went on to become the first Marine Corps fighter squadrons to be assigned to carriers during WWII.”
Also, according to Robert Sherrod, one of the foremost historians of WWII USMC aviation (if not THE foremost historian), there was fifth squadron involved — it was a VMO squadron that was previously trained on the rockets and was assigned to join the 4 squadrons of MAG-51. Also, according to Sherrod, the MAG was loaded up and ready to go and the cancellation came about at the last minute becaus the V-1 sites were captured by ground forces or destroyed.
The incident is discussed in HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION IN WWII by Robert Sherrod.
“The operation was part of Operation Crossbow — the USMC portion of the op was operation Danny. It involved Marine Air Group 51 with five squadrons flying “Tiny Tim” armed F4U corsairs. “Tiny Tim’s” were 11.75 inch rockets developed by Cal Tech. The unit was alerted on July 11, 1944 to prepare for overseas movement to the ETO to begin six days later, and begin loading its equipment and waited. The mission was postponed and then cancelled on July 30, 1944. The CO of MAG-51 said on the day after the mission was scrubbed, “This group in performance of its mission completed rocket training and was prepared for movement overseas.”
The Marine V-1 operation, according to Sherrod, was that the unit could only train primarily on dummies and 5 inch rockets because the Tiny Tim’s were having problems and were not yet in mass production.
Technicians at Caltech were working feverishly to work out the kinks right up until the mission was scrubbed.
