A French army under the Prince de Soubise marched through Franconia to join with an Imperial army under General Joseph Saxe-Hilburghausen in the Saxon duchies. Frederick thought the close proximity of the Franco-Imperial army gave him a chance to strike. On 4 November he camped at Rossbach, opposite Soubise and Hilburghausen’s army, inviting battle. The next morning the two generals decided to attempt a flanking manoeuvre around the Prussian left. Screening their positions with battalions, the Franco-Bavarian army began its circuitous march. A mile to the front of the allied columns rode their vanguard. Frederick’s outposts warned the king who quickly redeployed his entire army and sent his battalions forwards in an enfilade attack. To head off the Allied cavalry, Frederick dispatched General Seydlitz with the Prussian cavalry. Seydlitz scattered the enemy squadrons and moved round the Allied right. Frederick’s battalions appeared before the Franco-Bavarian army and blasted them as they tried to adjust their formation. Seydlitz’s appearance on the French flank alarmed Soubise’s army and it was shattered in a short time.
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After their victory at Kolin the Austrians were moving forces into Silesia to retake the province Frederick had stolen a decade earlier. Although he could march to the relief of the meagre Prussian army there, a better opportunity presented itself when a second French army of 24,000 under Charles de Rohan, Prince de Soubise crossed the Rhine. Moving through Hesse-Kassel into Franconia, Soubise was to meet General Joseph von Saxe-Hilburghausen commanding the Reicharmee. The Austrians called for Kreise contingents to be raised against Frederick in 1757. The Imperial army numbered more than 32,000 men by the end of summer and combined with the French outnumbered Frederick’s field army by two to one.
The Allied plan was that Soubise and Hilburghausen were to push into Saxony while the French army in Hanover moved into Brandenburg, the Russians into East Prussia and the Austrians into Silesia. By October the French and Imperial armies had moved into the Saxon Duchies. Frederick benefited from the lack of cooperation between the two generals, reminiscent of Villars and Max Emmanuel in 1703. According to the Austro-French military agreement, Soubise was to act as an auxiliary to Hilburghausen’s army. The prince chafed at the notion. He had little military experience and he owed his rank to his social standing. He was not yet a Marshal of France, and his appointment in 1757 was due to his friendship with Madame de Pompadour, mistress to Louis xv: Frederick had offered Pompadour a bribe to reconsider the French war effort but it failed. He received a warmer response from Richelieu, the new commander of the French army in Hanover.
At the end of October Frederick moved his army west towards Soubise and Hilburghausen, whose army was afflicted with terrible desertion. There was inadequate logistical preparation for the campaign, the soldiers were hungry and had not been paid. Regardless, the disparity in numbers was substantial if only they could coordinate properly. However, Soubise preferred to manoeuvre against Frederick and not offer battle.
The disunity between Soubise and Hilburghausen offered Frederick greater opportunity to catch one of the wings of the French or Imperial army. As the Prussians crossed the Saale River, Soubise and Hilburghausen, whose armies had temporarily separated, rejoined to find safety in numbers. By the evening of 4 November the Prussian army camped near the town of Rossbach, not far from the combined army’s position. Intelligence had correctly informed Frederick that the French and Imperialists were low on supplies. He also found out that his enemies controlled no more than 41,000 men. Only one-third of Hilburghausen’s army, 11,000 strong, was with Soubise, whose own forces included several thousand German allies.
Hilburghausen and Soubise decided that morning to attack the Prussian king. Instead of an advance head-on, they would screen their camp, and move their columns around the Prussian left flank, catching Frederick unawares. It was a sound plan and uncharacteristically bold. Frederick would do the same the following month at Leuthen. There was, however, a difference. It took most of the morning for the French and Imperialists to organize into three march columns. The advanced guards were Austrian and German heavy cavalry. The first two Allied columns comprised the French army, while Hilburgshausen led the third.
Swift Reactions
Prussian reconnaissance indicated that several French battalions were screening the enemy camp, but clearly there was great activity there. By noon there was still no suggestion of the Allied movement. A Prussian captain interrupted Frederick’s lunch. While observing the French battalions screening their camp, he had spotted the Allied columns to the Prussian left. Frederick dismissed the captain’s report, but as others came to the king with similar information he was stirred. Seeing that the Prussian position was already compromised and the advance guard of Austrian cavalry was moving perpendicular to his left and rear, Frederick ordered General von Seydlitz, his cavalry commander, to take all the cavalry and head off the Allied advance. The redeployment of the Prussian army show the critical importance of decisive leadership, and the benefit of having a well-disciplined, professional army that could respond quickly in a crisis.
As Seydlitz led his cavalry away, the Prussian infantry marched. Frederick benefited from the local geography. To his immediate rear and oblique to the Allied columns was Janus Hill. He ordered his heavy guns to the crest and proceeded to bombard the French more than a mile off. His battalions wheeled left with meticulous precision and marched to their new position on the hill. Fewer than 90 minutes passed between Frederick’s interrupted lunch and the redeployment of his entire army. Prussian artillery opened up at 3: 15 PM and Seydlitz’s cavalry emerged from around Janus Hill soon after. Ahead was the Allied cavalry still in column. Seydlitz unleashed his 38 squadrons. Surprised, only some of the Austrian cavalry were able to meet the charge. The fighting was sharp, but the Prussian cavalry succeeded in scattering the Allied squadrons. With the enemy in flight, Seydlitz recalled his regiments, illustrating the superb training of these troops and the skill of their general. As the Prussian infantry moved down the slope towards the French, Seydlitz re-formed his regiments and sent them on their own wide flanking march to the French right beyond the towns of Posendorf and Tagewerden.
After the Prussian battalions descended from Janus Hill the Allies were unable to observe their progress due to a dip between their position and the Prussian army. The first sight of Prussian infantry was to their front, when the left-most battalions wheeled right facing the French front. The centre and right of Frederick’s army appeared not long afterwards. Only seven French battalions could deploy before the Prussian infantry attacked. Disciplined volleys poured into the head of the Allied columns. The French battalions faltered.
Timing is everything. As the infantry attack developed, Seydlitz’s cavalry emerged on the French right. The charge of Prussian heavy squadrons took apart the already shaken army. Whatever control Soubise had disappeared in moments. Hilburghausen was luckier as the Imperialists were in the rear. He had more time to bring his battalions into line and resigned himself to covering the French rout. Prussian infantry fire and artillery salvoes tore holes in Hilburghausen’s line. The battalions from Hesse-Darmstadt stood under withering fire while covering the retreat. Seydlitz ordered his cavalry to charge again, completely unnerving the Imperialists who fled.
By 5 PM the field was cleared of French. Hilburghausen moved off with the remnants of his small force. Frederick had not only won the day, but the victory transformed the strategic situation that had depressed the Prussian king through the summer. The battle cost Frederick 500 men. For the French and Imperialists it was much more expensive: 5,000 killed and wounded and another 5,000 captured. Instead of moving into winter quarters, Frederick decided to move rapidly eastwards against the Austrians in Silesia. A month later he was able to shatter the Austrian army at Leuthen. Frederick could now consider 1757 a good year for Prussia. Oddly, it proved to be not too bad of a year for Soubise either, who blamed the defeat on Hilburghausen. The prince was granted a marshal’s baton the following year and was given another command. In the age of Louis XIV he might have been disgraced, as was Tallard after Blenheim, but this was the age of Louis XV and Madame de Pompadour’s friendship counted for more than a mere lost battle.
Concerning the Quality of Mid-18TH century French Generals
One of my sources said that there were a whole bunch of court functionaries present in the French Army of this period and that His Majesty King Louis even forbade the Comte de Eu and Comte de Clermont from giving orders to the units they commanded!
French generals were of poor quality (even worse during the SEVEN YEARS WAR). The problem was even worse for the colonel and officers of the regiments. During the SEVEN YEARS WAR, the situation was clearly abnormal and scandalous, too many officers were totally incompetent, cutoff from their men and unable to properly conduct their platoon/company /battalion/regiment.
One of the main problems in the French command was; among a large number of other problems, that the number of generals on the field very often created huge confusion (Some brigadiers appointed to a Maréchal de Camp, were sometimes accompanied as volunteer by one or two Lieutenants-généraux, brigadiers and so on, in this respect it was very difficult for the commander in title to command his brigade). Fontenoy is a good example of the role of generals not specifically appointed to units but who take part in the action, some with success, Richelieu for example.
I would say that except the Maréchal de Saxe and de Broglie in the SEVEN YEARS WAR, the main obstacle for the French générals was that they were unable to command a large army on the field. Contades at Minden (Contades was a good general but unable to impose his will on his subordinate generals and unable to react during the battle), Soubise (not that bad, but definitely humiliated by Rossbach), Clermont (certainly the worst, a member of the royal family, personally courageous, but not a commander in chief, even besides the terrible problems he had with is major-général M. de Mortaigne) and so on, are some of the numerous example of this situation.
However, for small engagements or battles, French often fought gallantly, even during the SEVEN YEARS WAR and with success, but history keeps only in mind the major battles, and the battles lost by the French during the SEVEN YEARS WAR, which always had major consequences.
When the French were lead by good Commander in Chief like Saxe and de Broglie, they had success; like Fontenoy, Raucoux and Lawfeld (WAR OF AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION) and Bergen (SEVEN YEARS WAR) and many others.
One thing for which French remained good during both wars were in sieges both besieging and defending against a siege.
The conduct of the French army during the SEVEN YEARS WAR was such a disgrace in general concerning the lack of the competence in the command structure, that it lead to the major reforms which made the army (and navy) of Louis XVI and afterwards that of the Revolution and Empire so improved in performance.
