Monterrey as it appeared to General Taylor in 1846. He had been beset by logistical troubles, culminating in a shortage of wagons for the final approach to Monterrey. This limited his force to 6,000 against 7,000–9,000 Mexican defenders.

The war with Mexico began, as previous wars had, with little or no preparation. However, this time, the American economy was able to support a war. A second industrial base was emerging, and America had control of the seas. Seapower enabled the United States to transport troops and supplies despite the great distances involved. Overall, the Armed Forces were better equipped and trained than those of Mexico. This is not to say that hardships did not exist. Otis Singletary explained:

Though few Americans were willing to face them, the problems of waging offensive war against Mexico were staggering. The great distances involved, the rugged and forbidding mountain ranges, the problems of sustaining an army on arid desert terrain and the ever present danger of attack by the most deadly and dependable of Mexican allies, yellow fever, presented difficulties of no small dimensions (9:23).

More than 10,790 men died from disease and exposure while only 1,548 were killed in action out of a total force of some 100,182 troops (4:110).

Although war with Mexico had been expected since Texas had gained its independence in 1836, no real plans had been made for war. Even when Texas joined the Union in 1845, little preparation was made, yet there was every indication that war was imminent. Little thought was given to the condition of roads, the availability of water, transportation, and supplies (9:25). In their study of military mobilization from the Revolution to World War II, Kreidberg and Henry point out that, although a general staff was in existence:

. . . there does not seem to have been a single directive to any of the War Department Staff bureaus calling for procurement or logistics planning of any other kind, nor is there any indication that any of the bureaus prepared mobilization plans on their own initiative (7:66).

Yet a limited mobilization had in fact commenced. Secretary of War William Marcy, under President James Polk, had directed General Zachary Taylor to move his army to Corpus Christi, Texas. By 15 October 1845, General Taylor had 3,860 troops, about half of the Regular Army’s strength, at Corpus Christi (1:67). Then, on 24 April 1846, Mexican troops crossed the Rio Grande and attacked an American patrol, initiating war with Mexico (4:70).

The Mexican War consisted primarily of five major drives— four into Mexico and one into California. The most important campaigns were those of General Taylor and General Scott. However, the other three were also noteworthy because of the great distances over which the soldiers marched. In 1846, General Kearny’s Army of the West marched in 6 months from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to San Diego, California. Colonel Doniphas also departed from Fort Leavenworth and traveled some 3,500 miles before reaching Reynosa, Mexico, in 1847. In 1846, General Wool moved his forces from San Antonio, Texas, some 900 miles, to Saltillo, Mexico, in 1846. These marches contributed greatly to the successful outcome of the war and in claiming the southwest as American territory (6:146- 147).

Industrial Base

Following the War of 1812, the industrial base continued to grow. More arsenals and armories were added to the National Armory System, and innovations continued.

After Whitney and North’s introduction of mass production for firearms, a technical breakthrough was achieved with Hancock Hall’s patent of a breech-loading flintlock. Hall, working at the Harper’s Ferry Armory, also created the machine tools to mass-produce his rifles. Hall’s firearm was designated the M1819 and was the first mass-produced firearm manufactured entirely by machine (12:46).

Other innovations were also evident: Asa Walter’s patented trip hammer, used to forge 16 to 18 gun barrels daily, Thomas Blanchard’s stock-making machine, and James Green’s improved barrel-boring mill. The mass production of firearms with interchangeable parts improved precision, increased productivity, and greatly enhanced the US machine tool industry. The military concept of interchangeability was introduced in the sewing machine industry in 1846 and in clock-making in 1848. Even the textile industry borrowed liberally from the arms industry. The firearms industry drove the technological revolution as it encouraged inventions, innovations, and improvisations along with precision and increased productivity (12:46-47).

With the machinery then available for manufacturing weapons, the Springfield Armory produced 14,200 muskets, and the Harper’s Ferry Armory produced 12,000 muskets from 1 July 1846 to 30 June 1847 (6:130-131). Private contractors provided artillery, ammunition, and gunpowder in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the war. Even the textile industry was able to meet clothing requirements. At this point, a gradual shift began from an agricultural to a manufacturing society. This change would play an even more significant part in the Civil War.

Requirements

Requirements, as in the past, were left to the last as planning for the Army’s needs was still not done on a timely basis. At the onset of the war, initial strength requirements were estimated at 50,000 men (7:70). This figure grew to more than 100,000 before the war concluded. In addition to combat casualties, about 11,000 soldiers died from disease and exposure. The United States was simply not prepared to employ troops in a semitropical climate:

Officials in Washington supplied tents that were inadequate for the different types of climate encountered, clothing that was designed for cooler temperatures; and those officials made little effort to educate the raw recruits to what they had to face (4:110).

As General Scott moved toward Mexico City, he reported to the Secretary of War on 4 June, “one thousand men were bedridden in Vera Cruz, one thousand were reported sick and wounded in Jalapa, and 1,014 of his immediate forces were on sick report at Puebla” (4:114). Scott believed the various diseases were brought on by the extreme climate, inadequate clothing, and lack of salt meat (4:115).

Logistics support was generally erratic due to the general staff’s lack of adequate planning. An aspect of logistical planning first emerging in the Mexican War was the requirement for a variety of ammunition. In previous wars, the musket was generally used; however, with the Mexican War, a variety of personal weapons began to enter the inventory. Flintlock muskets were still used by the Regular Army; the volunteers brought with them Hall’s breech-loading firearm, the Colt revolving pistol and rifle, and the carbine. This greatly compounded supply requirements for both ammunition and spare parts (6:129). The different types of ordnance, along with the different terrain and climate, also compounded acquisition problems.

Acquisition

One area that had improved since the last war concerned the issue of long-term contracts for acquisition of arms. Secretary of War Calhoun recognized the benefits of renewing contracts with vendors who had performed satisfactorily. This arrangement led to the establishment of an arms manufacturing industry and to what was seen as healthy competition between armories and contracted production of arms. However, at the beginning of the Mexican War, procurement was again done on a catchup basis.

With the demise of the Purchasing Department in 1842, the various bureau chiefs were left to procure their individual needs. They did this without any plans as to how supplies would be used or even how to determine what was really needed (6:125; 1:77). Supplies were often bought at outrageous prices as the Quartermaster General ordered officers to procure wagons, boats, and camp equipment at any price. Oddly, civilian standards of living were often applied. “The troops in the field were provided with dancing girls, bars, theaters, newspapers, ice, liquor, vaudeville, gambling houses, fancy tobacco, fancy groceries, camp followers, and so forth.” (7:79- 80).

Clothing, however, was another matter. Although the regular forces were provided uniforms, volunteers received a clothing allowance and were required to provide their own uniforms. Unfortunately, volunteers either did not use the money for that purpose, or they bought cheap clothing that did not meet their needs. Soon after the war was over, Congress passed an act that would provide clothing to both the volunteer and regular forces. The lack of adequate clothing contributed to unnecessary suffering. Most unfortunate was the fact clothing was often actually available, but the field commanders were not authorized to issue it (4:118).

Overall, acquisition was handled by contract as it had been in the past. Contracts were used to procure arms, wagons, boats, clothing, food, and camp equipment. Generally, the troops were fairly well supplied. The costs, however, were significantly higher than expected. The initial allocation of funds appropriated by Congress was $10 million (7:70). Total expenditures for the war exceeded $39 million per year. Within the Quartermaster General’s Department in fiscal year 1846- 1847, some $3.96 million was spent to transport the troops. Expenditures for subsistence amounted to $1.754 million and for ordnance another $924,600 (6:136). Fortunately, the availability of money was not a major problem in the Mexican War.

Distribution

Distribution problems were greatly reduced during the conflict with Mexico. In the past, transportation of troops and supplies had proven to be a major obstacle and had a tremendous impact on strategy and tactics. Distribution problems were present in this war, but they were due more to inadequate planning than anything else.

The distance from Washington to Mexico, of course, presented endless challenges in communications. There were no major roads leading to Mexico, and there were no railroads. The first railroad had opened in 1830, but it was located in the Northeast (11:329). In order to move troops and supplies, the steamship and sailing ship provided the primary means of transportation. Difficulties were not so much in getting the troops and supplies to Mexico but in handling problems that arose after they arrived.

During the first engagements, at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma on 8 and 9 May 1846, respectively, General Taylor was prevented from pursuing the enemy due to a lack of pontoon bridge equipment needed to cross the Rio Grande. Although Taylor had requested this equipment, there were no funds in the Corps of Engineers to pay for it. Also, it must be pointed out that Taylor seems to have made no effort prior to these engagements. (6:133-139).

These two initial battles were fought with about 3,000 regular soldiers. General Taylor had previously put out a call for militia, and by June, he had 12,601 militiamen but no transportation to support them. As a result, all 12,601 had to be demobilized without ever being employed (7:75). Again, little preplanning had been made for these troops, and in reality, Taylor ended up troop poor.

General Taylor’s next objective was to march to Monterrey, a trip that was delayed at least twice due to lack of transportation. The first leg of the journey concerned setting up a supply base at Camargo about 130 miles upriver on the Rio Grande. For this effort, he needed shallow draft steamboats, and these were not available until July. Once he reached Camargo, wagons and teams were needed to travel over land to Monterrey. Since there was not a sufficient quantity, Taylor had to requisition some 1,500 Mexican pack mules and oxcarts to move his supplies (1:168-169). Again, part of the distribution problem was Taylor’s failure to requisition the things he needed when needed.

In contrast was General Scott’s march to Mexico City. General Scott’s landing at Vera Cruz was classified as the first major amphibious landing. With a force of 12,600 men, Scott was able to put more than 10,000 on shore in less than 4 hours with some 65 surf boats, which had been towed there for that purpose. On 27 March 1847, Scott set up a supply base at Vera Cruz for his move to Mexico City (1:174).

In both Taylor’s and Scott’s campaigns, we saw the first real effort for providing supplies by steamboat—from New Orleans and Pensacola to Vera Cruz and up the Rio Grande. Overall, the system worked fairly well.

Maintenance

The use of a variety of weapons and the interchangeability of parts produced the necessity for maintenance. Spare parts were required, and weapons had to be maintained with greater care than was required for the musket.

The national armories continued to meet ordnance needs. In addition to manufacturing arms, they also had to manufacture parts. The Harper’s Ferry Armory manufactured some 1,530 components for 1822 and 1840 model muskets. These components were issued to the arsenals and the armies for repairing and maintaining arms (6:131).

With the peace treaty in 1848, the United States had greatly expanded its territory. The Rio Grande was recognized as the boundary of Texas; and Mexico ceded the current states of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, California, and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. However, once again, the Army reverted to a peacetime force of less than the 10,000 authorized in 1815 (1:179-180).

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