Aichi D3A2 ‘Val’ shurikens strike at the heart of the Pacific Fleet

By ALVIN D. COOX

Debate has raged for decades concerning Nagumo’s decision to leave the Hawaiian waters in the early afternoon of December 7 after only two air strikes. Critics have always argued that despite Japan’s obvious successes, the Pearl Harbor attack could not be termed decisive. As Fuchida told Nagumo at the time, many worthwhile targets remained: the American battleships mired in shallow water, dozens of other vessels, untouched hangars, shops, and oil tanks. A new air assault, launched even closer to Oahu, might conceivably have lured the U.S. carriers and heavy cruisers to their doom. Commander Genda and others have contended that the Japanese, beset by “medal fever,” lost sight of unglamorous but important targets such as machine shops needed to repair the mauled American fleet and fuel storage facilities containing 4.5 million barrels of oil.

No one argues seriously that the Japanese should have landed an army on Oahu. Yamamoto knew that the Southeast Asia campaign took priority in amphibious and sealift resources and that a huge convoy of troop transports, moving for a month at eight knots, would have ruined the vital element of surprise. As Fuchida said, the Japanese had been thinking of little more than “pulling the eagle’s tail feathers.”

Apart from the fact that Nagumo, a battleship admiral, was unenthusiastic at best and timid at worst, he had good reasons for leaving the scene promptly: As many as five U.S. aircraft carriers might be lurking in the region, and the whereabouts of enemy heavy cruisers and submarines was unknown. Because the initial strikes had succeeded beyond expectations, little more could be anticipated from additional assaults against the same area. U.S. antiaircraft fire had been surprisingly strong, and Japanese losses could be expected to increase geometrically once the element of surprise was gone.

In addition, Japanese intelligence reported at least fifty large planes (presumably B-17s) still available to the defenders. It was dangerous for the Japanese attack force to hover within range of land-based enemy aircraft. The six aircraft carriers had to be brought home safely, for they represented the entire such force available to the Japanese navy. Meanwhile, the weather north of Hawaii had deteriorated, and the carriers were rolling at fifteen degrees. Attacks against ground targets would require refitting the ordnance loads, and any new strike would involve night flights and dangerous night landings. Illuminating the flight decks would invite retaliation, especially if the missing American carriers showed up. As for a follow-up air strike, some have argued that the turbid oil fires would only have obscured the bombers’ aim.

Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, while deploring the insufficient Japanese reconnaissance efforts, suggested that Nagumo be credited with a wise decision to terminate the attacks. At the time, the naval general staff was not unhappy with Nagumo’s safe and skillful disengagement. If the operation had turned out badly, Yamamoto would have been criticized for recklessness and Nagumo praised for caution.

The Pearl Harbor operation was no battle in the ordinary sense; it was a massacre. The overall evaluations may be grouped into three categories. Many commentators have called the raid a short-term masterpiece but a long-range blunder, which jolted the dozing American giant into revenge. As Admiral Hara Chuichi, a carrier division commander, put it, “President Roosevelt should have pinned medals on us.”

A second school argues that the Japanese naval high command was foolish to think only of checking the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it proceeded with a campaign to seize control of the rich, invulnerable southern area, which would be developed during a protracted war. Certainly Yamamoto himself had wanted to shatter, not merely neutralize, the U.S. battle fleet at the onset of hostilities and to achieve decisive strategic results by retaining the initiative while the bloodied American Navy was in confusion.

The third school, represented by Fukudome, is convinced that the Pearl Harbor raid achieved superb results, nullifying the Rainbow Plan and preventing the Americans from retaking control of the sea until 1944. In the meantime, the Japanese were able to attain all of their initial strategic objectives without interruption. Fukudome argued that if Oahu had not been attacked and the Japanese had engaged the Americans in a conventional surface battle near the Marshalls and the western Carolines, “it would have been impossible for the Japanese to have inflicted greater damage than they did in the Pearl Harbor attack, however favorable our estimate.”