In June 1762 the British caught the Spanish off guard by landing at the mouth of the Bacuranao river and moving swiftly to occupy the strategic heights of La Cabana and the village of Guanabacoa. AJbermarle, the British commander, was criticised for his slow but methodical strategy. La Cabana gave the British a commanding position above the Bay of Havana, where they could position artillery before moving to take control of the fortress of Morro. To distract Morro’s defenders the British staged a diversionary attack at Correa to the west of Havana. Unexpectedly Morro, fiercely defended by the Spanish, held out until 22 July and the delay cost the British dearly in numbers of sick and wounded in the unhealthy tropical climate. However, it meant that AJbermarie could finally march with his troops around the south of the Bay and lay siege to the city itself, which eventually capitulated on 14 August 1762.The siege was over and Britain had won a great victory over her colonial rivals.
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Havana was the most powerful fortified city in the Americas in the eighteenth century, and the lynchpin of the Spanish Empire in the New World. The city was not only the capital and main port of Cuba and the centre of Spanish power in the West Indies, but also a vital port where the silver fleets made rendezvous before sailing across the Atlantic to Cadiz. The Spaniards placed their most powerful fleet there to protect the strategic port, naval base and shipyard. The capture of Havana dealt a massive blow to Spain’s imperial prestige, slowly undermining her grip upon her mainland American colonies over the next 60 years, and was comparable in its effects to Japan’s capture of Singapore from the British in 1942.
Early in 1762 the British collected 16,000 troops and a massive transport fleet at Spithead. They set sail on 5 March, arriving off St Domingue’s (Haiti) northern coast on 25 May. To catch the Spaniards off guard the British Fleet braved the narrow and treacherous waters of the Old Bahama Channel, and took the Spaniards completely by surprise when they arrived off Havana on 6 June. This element of surprise was essential, because the British needed to take Havana before the sickly season began in the autumn if they were to avoid the ravages of yellow fever and malaria. But reducing Havana was no simple proposition as the Spaniards viewed the fortress city as impregnable. Guarding the entrance to the harbour and the walled city itself lay the massive fortress of El Morro. The huge land walls of the fort were reinforced by a deep and wide stone ditch. The ground outside the fortress was devoid of soil to dig siege trenches or fill sandbags, furnished no cover for an enemy and had no source of fresh water. The entrance to the harbour was also blocked by the fortress of La Punta on the western side, by a boom and by the ships of the Havana squadron. The city, its outer forts and the harbour were an interlocking defence system of great strength – no mean task for a besieging army to overcome. There was also a garrison of 5000-10,000 including sailors from the squadron to contend with. But the Spanish defences had one fatal weakness that the British could exploit – the commanding heights of La Cabana had not been fortified. British batteries placed here could rake El Morro, Havana and the harbour with deadly fire.
The British, commanded by Lord Albermarle, decided to concentrate their efforts to attack and take El Morro, but this condemned them to a protracted siege that would expose their unseasoned troops to all the horrors of the local climate and diseases. On 7 June the British landed 4000 troops at the mouth of the Bacuranao River and captured a fort there without much resistance. Once the British had created a bridgehead it was clearer than ever that the Spaniards should have fortified La Cabana. On 10 June Colonel Carleton and his light infantry captured this vital height. With speed and determination the British began building a road from the bridgehead to La Cabana,’ and batteries there opposite El Morro.
Once these were complete heavy mortars on La Cabana sank vessels in port and bombarded Morro with single-minded determination. The Spaniards, hoping to prolong the campaign into the hurricane and disease season, changed the garrison of El Morro at regular intervals and the Governor picked a determined commander for the fort, Don Luis de Velasco. The British realized that Don Velasco would hold out at all costs and that Morro needed to be softened up with a massive and prolonged bombardment before a breach could be made.
In the first week of July the British troops were suffering from the intense heat and lack of water. One battery, after two weeks without a drop of rain, self-ignited. Morale, already low, slumped further still. Sailors from Admiral Pocock’s fleet (some 800 men) were recruited to fill sandbags and fascines. Every day fire from 24 and 32 pounders, accompanied by 28- and 33-cm (11- and 13-in) mortars, pounded El Morro so intensely that the batteries were beginning to run out of shot. Nevertheless, British batteries sprayed the inside of El Morro with shell fragments that 208 knocked great hunks of masonry from the stone walls. By 17 July El Morro that was left with only two working guns and the British were able to make an approach. The British built a line running north-west towards the right-hand bastion, next to the sea, but since there was no earth to use this line had to be protected by a continuous line of breastworks. On 20 July the breastwork line was completed, enabling the British to fire with small arms against the top of the walls and set up a battery opposite the bastion. It was here that they hoped to make a breach. But the British changed their plans when they discovered a narrow stone bridge crossing the ditch, and decided to place two mines there. One would be positioned under the wall to make a breach, and they hoped to explode the other so that a barrier of stone and rubble debris would fill the ditch, enabling the columns of assault to cross unhindered.
Mining operations began on 20 July and were completed two days later. On that day (22 July) the Spaniards made desperate efforts to spike the guns of the batteries and destroy the mines with 1300 troops attacking at three separate points including La Cabana. All these attacks failed.
When the mines were set off, the breach was made, but the ditch was not filled as planned. Lt Colonel James Stuart of the 90th Regiment led the assault of 268 infantry and 150 sappers. The British attack came through the breach with such force, speed and numbers that it only took them an hour of savage hand-to-hand fighting to win the fortress of El Morro. The Spaniards lost 130 killed, 37 wounded, 326 prisoners .and another 213 killed or drowned when they tried to swim across the entrance of the harbour to safety in Havana. One of the many killed was the brave, resolute commandant, Don Velasco. The Spanish Governor of the city, Don Juan de Prado, would now probably have been justified in capitulating to Albermarle, but the Spaniards wanted to fight on.
At this moment much needed reinforcements arrived: some 3188 American auxiliaries and British regulars from New York. This enabled the British to expand their bridgehead and erect additional batteries to bombard La Punta and Havana itself. Again Spanish sorties failed to dislodge the British or destroy the batteries. By 31 July Albermarle had completed a siege line running along the entire western (land) front of Havana and had erected batteries along the entire harbour shore from El Morro to La Cabana. By 10 August he had ten mortars, five howitzers and more than 40 guns ready to pound the city’s defences to pieces. He sent an ADC to ask Don Prado to capitulate but the Governor refused.
On 11 August the final British bombardment commenced upon Havana and the remaining Spanish-held outer forts of La Punta and La Fuerza with deadly effect. After several unpleasant hours under the intense fire La Punta was silenced and the Spanish garrison withdrew’ to Havana. By noon most guns on the city’s walls were out of action. It was now only a question of time before the city was stormed and sacked. At 2 PM Prado ran up the white flag and sent an adjutant across the lines to negotiate terms. After fruitless discussions Albemarle and Pocock sent a joint warning to the Governor threatening to level the town unless Prado agreed to British terms immediately. On 14 August the British occupied La Punta and marched into Havana.
The victory at Havana was a triumph of logistics and siege warfare under difficult climatic conditions. Pocock had lost 1200 of his men, mainly to disease, and Albermarle lost more than 5000 troops. In the end the costly and protracted siege of Havana contributed not only to the fall of the Spanish American Empire but also to that of Britain in North America. When the American auxiliaries returned to New York they were racked by disease. The British were unable to stem Native American attacks. This fuelled the American colonists’ discontent with Imperial rule, culminating in the rebellion of 1776.
