The Luftwaffe, having just concluded its 1942 Malta offensive, was redistributed amongst other theatres, and could no longer attack in strength. With the new summer offensive in Russia needing every available machine, KG 77 was sent there on Hitler’s personal orders. I/KG 54 was posted to Greece, while II/StG 3, II/ZG 26 and I/NJG’s night-fighters were all sent to support Rommel in Africa. The same applied to the fighters: II/JG 3 and I/JG 53 went to Russia, III/JG 53 to Africa—just at the time when squadron after squadron of new Spitfires were flying into Malta. By the end of May Loerzer’s II Air Corps, which in April had all but beaten Malta to its knees, was scattered to the winds.

Once more the German high command repeated its crucial mistake of embarking on a new enterprise before the current one had been concluded, thus dissipating its own strength. While Kesselring wanted to capture Malta by combined air and sea landings directly after the bomber offensive (”It would have been easy,” he wrote in his memoirs) the Italians disagreed. They considered the preparations were being over-hastened, and the forces inadequate. As we have seen, Mussolini had asked for a delay of three months, and though Hitler no doubt could have insisted on an earlier date, he viewed the Italians’ competence to conduct the operation successfully with deep misgiving, and gave way.

The consequence was that events in the Mediterranean theatre failed to mature as had been hoped. In both the German and Italian camps every-one had been agreed that Malta must be eliminated before any new offensive in Africa began. But now the commander of the Afrika Korps, Colonel-General Erwin Rommel, pointed to feverish offensive preparations opposite him on the Gazala front by the British 8th Army under General Ritchie. By starting an offensive themselves the British saw their chance of rescuing Malta. For the Luftwaffe was not strong enough to support both fronts simultaneously.