Sir John Keegan wrote that the LRDG was “an extraordinary organization that [...] contributed greatly to the victory of the British Army in the epic struggle against the Axis in the Western Desert” ! (See the Introduction to D. Lloyd Owen, “Providence Their Guide – The Long Range Desert Group 1940-1945″, Pen & Sword Books, 2001.)
Formed in July 1940 (some sources say June) by Major Ralph (R.A.) Bagnold, a noted desert traveller of the interwar years, as a deep penetration reconnaissance force capable of operating in the outer reaches of the Western Desert. The LRDG employed selective recruiting, was all-volunteer and many men were New Zealanders and the group was subdivided into patrols, which normally operated in two halves, each five to six vehicles (per vehicle of truck about a half dozen men). Its training included driving and recovery techniques in all sorts of terrain, desert navigation of the highest standard, long- range radio communication and survival. In March 1942 it reached its full establishment of 25 officers and 324 other ranks, manning 110 vehicles. Operating from oases far to the south of the main battle area, the LRDG carried out reconnaissance of specific objectives, intelligence- gathering missions which included surveillance of enemy traffic on the coast road, the insertion and extraction of agents and SPECIAL AIR SERVICE teams, and occasionally direct action such as harassing attacks, ambushes and mine laying. In March 1943 the Group was withdrawn to Cairo to re-equip for subsequent operations in Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia. It was disbanded in August 1945.
Life in the LRDG was extremely tough and lonely, but rewarding. The reports on the movements on the coastal road were very impressive. The traffic counts were kept up for weeks on an end from a hiding place nearby. The information, sent back immediately by wireless if necessary, was invaluable to the British Eight Army right through March 1943, when the group discovered that the right of the Mareth Line in Tunisia could be turned. The tactics and administration of the Group were fluid and successful. Over 50 of its members were decorated for gallantry, and only 16 were killed. Considering its size, it exercised a wholly disproportionate influence on the desert war.
‘Elite Forces’ run into diminishing returns pretty quickly.
The problem with Special Forces is that you get diminishing returns as you expand the size of the operations. A small group of saboteurs can do a large amount of damage and divert a disproportionate amount of the enemy’s forces in guarding against them. And if they are unsuccessful or get destroyed, you haven’t lost much. Increasing the size of the force diverts a larger part of your strength, but without a proportionate increase in effectiveness. In fact larger groups increase your chance of detection, so are less effective.
The SAS in Libya is an excellent example of this. When David Stirling started with a handful of men sneaking onto airfields and planting bombs on aircraft, they achieved high results for little risk. However, when they attempted larger operations like the coordinated attacks on Benghazi, Tobruk and Kufra they met with disaster. Essentially these units were now too big to hide, but still too weak to fight. This was compounded by the fact that so many people were involved that security at base was nonexistent, and the Axis knew they were coming. In addition, there were so many vehicles involved that it proved impossible to hide from air reconnaissance on the retreat from Benghazi, and they lost most of their transport to air attack. If the Axis forces had followed up with a ground column, the SAS would have ended right there. Significantly, the only part of the operation that succeeded was the raid on Barce conducted by an LRDG patrol.
The SAS and the LRDG were not the same, the LRDG’s role was intelligence although it could and did fight when necessary. Essentially it was a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol function similar to the Australian SAS or US LRRPs. The LRDG operated in smaller patrols as time went on, whereas the SAS’s operations grew in size. Also the operations of the SAS and LRDG were fundamentally opposed – the more trouble the SAS stirred up, the harder it became for the LRDG to do its job undetected. (The same conflict between intelligence and sabotage occurred in SOE activities in Europe and Australian coast watchers in SWPA) Arguably the LRDG was more significant for the Allied cause.
