Dominic Tierney._FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that Divided America_. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007. ix + 223 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $74.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8223-4055-3; $21.95 (paper), ISBN 978-0-8223-4076-8.

Reviewed for H-Diplo by Wayne H. Bowen, Department of History, Ouachita Baptist University

Roosevelt’s Regret: Abandoning the Spanish Republicans

On July 17, 1936, elements of the Spanish military, especially the colonial army in Morocco and conservative officers, rose up in an attempted coup against the elected, albeit increasingly unstable, Second Republic. This rising failed, but it developed into a bloody civil war, pitting the socialists, communists, anarchists, regional separatists, and liberals against conservatives, Catholics, monarchists, Falangists (fascists). The struggle was primarily internal–Spaniards fighting Spaniards in Spain over the future of their nation–but almost immediately the Great Powers became involved. As the war between the Spanish Republicans (the Left) and the Spanish Nationalists (the Right) accelerated, it threatened not only the survival of Spain as a state, but the peace of Europe and the world, as many feared this civil war would draw other states into open conflict.

In the first chapter, the author examines the issue of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s character and leadership style, relating these to U.S. policy toward Spain during that nation’s civil war. Arguing that Roosevelt was the critical factor in determining American foreign policy, Tierney’s nonetheless demonstrates that the president did not operate outside the contemporary context of domestic politics and the bureaucratic imperatives of the federal government. The case for examining Roosevelt as an individual decision-maker, rather than as an expression of the sum of these pressures, however, is persuasive.

Tierney’s second chapter focused on the international context, one that drove Roosevelt toward support for non-intervention in the Spanish conflict, including enforcing an arms embargo on both belligerent sides.

The United States, under Roosevelt, was initially sympathetic to the Spanish Republicans, but feared that allowing weapons sales, even to the elected Spanish government, could lead inexorably to a broadened conflict or even world war. Although it did not officially sign the Non-Intervention Agreement, an international treaty shepherded through by the United Kingdom and France, the United States did commit to abide by the general outlines of the policy, refusing to sell armaments to the Republicans or Nationalists.

Later chapters document the ways in which this arms embargo in practice favored the Nationalists, as their German and Italian sponsors violated the Non-Intervention Agreement more effectively than did the Soviet Union, which provided arms to the Republicans but at inflated prices and under strict political control through the Spanish Communist Party. Tierney also demonstrates the extent to which American companies, especially in the oil sector, extended credit and favorable terms to the Nationalists, providing the indispensable fuel for General Francisco Franco’s army and militias.

By mid-1938 at the latest, Roosevelt’s perspective on the Spanish Civil War had evolved considerably, leading him to believe he had erred in his initial neutrality. Given pro-neutrality sentiments in the U.S. Congress and general public, however, he was greatly constrained by what he could do to alter government policy. Additionally, American Catholics were supportive of the Spanish Nationalists, viewing with horror the anti-Catholic actions of the Republicans, which included murders of priests and nuns, church burnings, prohibitions of masses, and other persecutions. Given the importance of the Catholic vote to Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition, he could not risk publicly supporting the Republicans.

His greater concern in foreign policy, to nudge the American people toward more engagement in defense of Europe’s democracies, could have been short-circuited by a precipitous endorsement of what was in 1938 already seen by most observers as the losing side in the Spanish Civil War.

Even rumors in early 1938 that Roosevelt was considering lifting the embargo brought a wave a protest by American Catholics and conservatives.

Rather than a public embrace of the Spanish Republicans, Roosevelt instead chose more subtle means, attempting to smooth the way for modest covert aid, as well as facilitating humanitarian assistance. None of these ideas, including using the U.S. Treasury Department to buy Spanish Republican silver, delivered much in the way of tangible aid, but they did allow Roosevelt to claim to leftist supporters that he was doing what he could, without openly breaking with U.S. neutrality laws.

The final defeat of the Spanish Republic in early 1939, announced by Franco on April 1, came as no surprise. Roosevelt’s delay in recognizing the Nationalist regime as the legitimate government of Spain until April 3, well over a month after the British and French did so, was a final reflection of his unhappiness at the final outcome of the Spanish Civil War, and perhaps his regret at his role in preventing the Spanish Republicans from arming themselves.

The author makes clear that the Spanish Civil War, and the failure of non-intervention and neutrality to limit outside involvement in that conflict, was one of the key factors accelerating Roosevelt’s position from one of neutrality to open embrace of war against the Axis powers.

While Roosevelt had long been far more sympathetic to the United Kingdom and France as against Germany and Italy, until 1938-39 he believed that it was in the interests of the United States to remain aloof from the brewing European conflict. His change of heart during the Spanish Civil War convinced him that the United States could not, and should not, stand aside when the issue was the defense of democracy. Tierney’s assertion, however, that Roosevelt’s hostility to Franco, which emerged as a result of the Spanish Civil War, was reflected in later years by his instructions to his ambassadors in Spain, is not entirely supported by the evidence.

U.S. ambassador Carlton Hayes, who served in Madrid from 1942 to 1945, was very accommodating to the Franco regime, pushing for a speedy normalization of relations in 1944-45, even after clear evidence of that government’s collaboration with Nazi Germany. While Roosevelt did not adopt the perspective of Hayes, he did allow him to remain in position for almost three years, despite the ambassador’s relatively positive opinion of Franco and the Spanish government.

This slender book makes a solid contribution to our understanding of the evolution of U.S. policy, and especially the opinions of Roosevelt, during the Spanish Civil War. The book could have been strengthened by more discussion of domestic politics in the United States, especially in terms of other political figures involved in making or attempting make policy toward Spain during this period, but this is a modest suggestion for an otherwise excellent, well-crafted, and interesting text. _FDR and the Spanish Civil War_ will be useful to historians and general readers interested in American foreign policy, the Spanish Civil War, U.S. domestic politics during the late 1930s, and the road to World War II.