The English have followed a centuries-old foreign policy of supporting the weaker European country in any conflict to maintain a balance of power that would ensure belligerent forces were unable to contemplate an invasion of the British Isles. Equally, continental powers from Spain to Sweden have sought to limit this interference by supporting Irish and Scottish rebellions. The auld alliance between Scotland and France forms part of this pattern, though France supported the pact less wholeheartedly than the Scots. Nevertheless French policy has been successful at different periods, tying down men and materials in England as well as requiring troops on the continent to be hurried back to defend the English homeland. The Allies battle plan echoed that used at Agincourt, with the cavalry attempting to sweep round and attack the flanks of the vulnerable infantry. As it turned out, the awesome power of the English longbowmen turned the battle decisively.

The French suffered massively at the hands of English archers during the early years of the Hundred Years’ War. From French sources we know they deliberately tried to outflank the English longbowmen at Agincourt in 1415, and Verneuil in 1424. When they couldn’t get that to work they resorted to sieges and roving bands of men-at-arms to try to pick off the English escorts of supply trains and foraging parties as at Patay (1429), Valmont (1416) and Clermont-en-Beauvoisis (1430).

Against the largely static massed spearmen of the Low Countries the French again tried to outflank them and then bring superior numbers of missilemen, including catapults, to the field to break up the enemy formations. The Burgundian armies of Charles the Bold failed to ever find a solution to the problem of massed Swiss pike, halberd and handgun-armed infantry. His losses against the Swiss at the three battles Grandson (1476), Morat (1476) and Nancy (1477) amounted to well over 20,000 men plus much expensive equipment.

During the Hundred Years’ War, which lasted for 120 years, both sides called in friends and allies to help. The English enlisted the Bretons, Burgundians, Gascons and Flemish, and the Welsh were also obliged to fight for them. The French also recruited Bretons, Bohemians, Flemish, Gascons, Genoese, German and Scots contingents. Some were obliged by their feudal oaths to fight, some fought for money, some through formal alliance. Much of the war involved fairly small-scale battles, raids really, designed simply for plunder or to capture a town or castle.

In 1423 the French secured Ivry on the banks of the River Eure as a base to raid into English territory. The following year the English under the Earl of Suffolk assembled a force to eliminate this base. The town fell but the garrison retired to the castle and were there besieged. As was customary in this period, the garrison agreed to surrender if not relieved by 15 August. The arrangement saved a great deal of effort and loss of life on both sides. Such was the importance to the French of this base that they mounted a huge operation to bring the required relief. Also part of the relief force was a large Scottish contingent supplied as part of the auld alliance. The commander of this force was the Scottish Earl Douglas.

Douglas’ army arrived at Nonancourt southwest of Ivry. They were too late. On 14 August the English duke of Bedford accepted the surrender of the Ivry garrison and then retired with his army to Evereux, north-west of Ivry. The French held a council of war. The French commanders were wary, having received several hard defeats at the hands of the English, and were reluctant to force a battle over a town already lost. This made perfect sense. The English tended to win the major battles, so the French strategy was to wear them down through small actions. The Franco-Scottish [my insertion] alliance had not had a battle since Bauge three years earlier, which they had won, and the Scots were eager to repeat that success.

The plan was to occupy the town of Verneuil further upriver and southwards from their present position. This had the triple advantages of appearing to do something positive while taking them away from the main English army and providing some plunder for the troops and perhaps ransom money for the lords. Two of these objectives were met. There was no loot or ransom because the town opened its gates without a fight, (it was actually a fief of the duke of Alencon who was with the allied army).This move was followed by Suffolk with 1600 men. After all he didn’t want to lose track of 14,000 enemy soldiers wandering around his borders.

Bedford set out to bring the French and Scots (here referred to as ‘the allies’) to account. Just to make sure, he politely invited Douglas to ‘share a drink’. Douglas replied he had ‘come to France to seek him’. The allied plan echoed that used at Agincourt. Mounted troops on the flanks of the army would attempt to sweep around onto the flanks or rear of the English archers. At Agincourt the English had their flanks secured on difficult terrain. In front of Verneuil there was no such terrain. It was a good position. The allied army drew up in front of the moated and walled town. The Scottish contingent formed on the left of the allied line, each end of which was tipped with 600 cavalry, Lombards on the right, French on the left. They also had a significant but unknown number of archers. The other half of the army was mainly Spanish and Lombard mercenaries with a scattering of French soldiers.

To the rear of the English army was a large wood. If things went wrong the infantry could withdraw into the wood and it would hinder any mounted pursuit. The land between the wood and the town was clear, open and flat, a good position too for the English archers. The English army straddled the road from Damville with their baggage wagons in a rough circle and the horses tethered nose to tail three deep around the outside of the wagons.

About 2000 archers formed a reserve behind the right wing. The rest of the army consisted of approximately 6000 more archers and 2000 men-at-arms. These were formed into two divisions, men-at-arms in the centre, archers on the wings. The latter were also equipped with stakes to be emplaced when they got within range of the enemy.

The French advanced to attack, their archers and crossbowmen losing out to the more numerous English. The French cavalry charge caught the English archers before they got their stakes in place and routed about 500 of them. The Lombards on the other flank swept around the flank and pillaged the English baggage. Back in the centre the English men-at-arms countercharged the French, who were then forced to fight within range of the awesome English bowmen. This support fire made the end inevitable and the French were routed back towards the town moat, pursued by the English. Bedford was able to rally his men and lead them back into the fray and the rear of the still battling Scots. They withstood this fresh onslaught, but when the English reserve archers, who had by then routed both the French and Lombard cavalry attacks, joined in against their right flank they too broke and fled. Over 7000 men from the allied army died with a further 200 prisoners captured for ransom. The English lost over 1000, which was a high figure. At Agincourt deaths were between 100 and 500.

We have to admire Bedford’s power of command. The pursuing troops knew they had the chance of a fortune in ransom just in front of them, yet they turned to fight the still-potent Scots to whom due credit must also be given. Facing the English men-at-arms with close archery support was hard enough. To then contend with another enemy to their rear without succumbing amply demonstrates their tenacious fighting spirit.