Warfare continues to be a major influence in world history and perhaps one of the most studied topics as well. Unfortunately, most studies focus on modern and Western warfare. However, a new approach has emerged to analyze warfare. The comparative approach, transferred from the field of anthropology, is yielding insights into the nature and role of warfare in world history. When we compare multiple, similar episodes of warfare in world history, patterns emerge to aid in our understanding of the “how” and even the “why” of modern warfare.

 

The comparative approach is yielding insights into the role of culture in determining the outcome of conflicts between First World and Third World countries; refutation of technological and cultural determinism (single explanations of complex phenomenon) in warfare; and the process of First World development of arms technology that becomes obsolete in conventional battles, only to be adopted by Third World forces and turned against its developers. It also yields insights into why overwhelmingly superior technology, military forces, and professional leadership do not guarantee victory today unless economic, social, and cultural factors are addressed in peacetime occupations and how sea and air power differ from conventional battlegrounds to guerrilla and insurgent environments.

 

Standard beliefs and axioms about warfare can be examined and strengthened or challenged using the comparative approach. Gaps in our understanding of the past can also be shaded in.

 

Professional versus Unprofessional Forces

The assumption that professional forces with advanced training and military technology will defeat unprofessional and lesser-armed forces has been shown to be inaccurate in world history. Small forces of guerrillas and terrorists have defeated the most advanced technological armies and states repeatedly in world history.

 

For instance, during World War II the German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler commanded the German Wehrmacht (army) and Luftwaffe (air force) to invade Yugoslavia in 1941. The German forces had just scored stunning victories over France and Western Europe using the Blitzkrieg (lightning war). They were the best-trained, best-equipped, and most successful military force in Europe when they took on the Yugoslav partisans. Yet, by the end of the war, all Yugoslav territory had yet to be conquered. High-quality German tanks, troops, command, and weapons proved inadequate in the environment of Yugoslavia.

 

The experience of United Nations (U.N.) forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, in Africa during the 1990s is another classic example. The inability of rebel forces to stop fighting among each other in parts of East Africa seemed to provide the perfect opportunity for the U.N. forces to enter Africa and utilize special troops and weapons to disarm local warlords and bring peace to the region. Instead, U.N. forces appeared improperly armed and directed for the type of guerrilla combat they encountered. Rebel forces often united against the U.N., whereas the U.N. seemed to splinter at the most inopportune of moments.

 

In both examples the best professional forces and the best military technology of the time performed poorly in nonconventional environments. Guerrilla and rebel forces, well adapted to their environments, utilized appropriate weapons in such settings. Motivations and goals of the forces on all sides also likely played a role.

 

Great Leaders, Invincible Forces, and Decisive Battles

The image of the heroic, genius leader who can direct invincible forces toward decisive victories that alter the course of history is still with us today. Yet, comparative historical evidence does not support this image.

 

German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was considered one of the greatest tank commanders of all time. His record was impressive from 1939 to 1943, with great victories during German invasions of France and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) to start the war and further victories with the Afrika Corps of panzer tanks in North Africa. Yet, he and his invincible Panzer Corps failed to take the Suez Canal in Egypt and eventually lost control of North Africa entirely. Later his “Fortress Europe” fortifications would fall to the Allied invasions on D-Day, 6 June 1944. Eventually he was forced to take poison after being implicated in a plot to kill Hitler.

 

The French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte was a classic megalomaniac. Genius and defender of the French Revolution, he scored a series of brilliant victories, such as at Austerlitz, with a mixed peasant and professional army. His attempts to establish sea power against the English proved fruitless in his 1798 invasion of Egypt and at Trafalgar, Spain. The sale of the Louisiana Territory to the United States in 1803 and later attempts to reacquire it were followed by larger catastrophes. French revolutionary fervor favored Napoleon throughout Europe, yet he alienated all by placing his own relatives on thrones and enforcing Napoleonic codes and trade across Europe. His invasion of Russia is one of the great military catastrophes of all time, with most of the 500,000-man Grand Armee being killed without losing a major battle. He then lost the Battle of Waterloo in 1814 and died in exile on Elba, off the coast of Italy.

 

Many famous commanders have had military records that are not so impressive: Hannibal of Carthage, Quetzalcoatl of the Toltecs, Viracocha of the Incas, Pyrrhus of the Greeks, Julius Caesar of Rome, Harsha of India, Ramses II (the Great) of Egypt.

 

The infantry legions of the Roman republic and empire are perhaps the best example of supposedly invincible forces that won decisive battles. Certainly they won important victories, but they had more impact as engineers and Latinizers of the provinces. Roman sea power and siege warfare were much more impressive than the performance of the legions on the battlefield. Republican Rome’s forces suffered defeats to the Italic Celts who sacked Rome in 390 BCE and to the Carthaginian general Hannibal for ten years in the Punic Wars. The battle at Cannae in Italy is a classic example, with more than thirty thousand Romans killed. Rome was far more successful at sea, converting the Carthaginian navy into a Roman navy by force and buying the Numidian cavalry of Hannibal for the battle at Zama in 202 BCE. Later Roman empire legions were ambushed by German barbarian tribes at Teutonburg Wald in 9 CE. The Parthian cavalry used the “Parthian shot,” whereby the Parthian cavalry would break Roman ranks by feigning retreat only to let loose with a volley of long-distance arrows on the disorganized legions. This tactic was used repeatedly to break the legions, once killing the Roman emperor and more than forty thousand of Rome’s finest in one afternoon. By the end of Roman power, during the fourth century CE, Roman military forces were struggling to integrate cavalry and legions to hold up the crumbling empire.

 

Other supposedly invincible forces that did not perform so well include the elephant-equipped armies of classical and medieval India. Hundreds of war elephants led armies as large as 500,000 men. Yet, neither the elephants nor great numbers of men deterred waves of invaders, usually on horse, who swept into India periodically, putting the elephants to flight and capturing thousands of soldiers on a regular basis. India’s territory and population sizes proved far more effective than its military forces at slowing and absorbing periodic invasions.

 

The vaunted Aztecs and their last leader, emperor Montezuma, are another example. Although these warriors, professional soldier clans equipped with weapons of Stone Age technology, fought bravely and well against the Spanish invasion, their record in Mesoamerica (the region of southern North America that was occupied during pre-Columbian times by peoples with shared cultural features) is not so good. Before the Spanish conquest the Aztecs and their emperor failed to subdue a hated rival civilization whose homeland was only miles from the Aztec capital at Tenochtitlan. The Tlaxcallans became faithful allies of the Spanish, providing logistics and ten thousand soldiers whose volley-fire arrow tactics were lethal to the Aztecs. The Aztecs and Montezuma also failed to secure their western border against the bronze-wielding Tarascan civilization. Many Aztec soldiers garrisoned on this border would have been far more useful against the Spanish horse and steel. Although the Aztec had a great military record during previous expansions, the inability of Montezuma to attract allies and present a united territorial front against the Spanish conquistadors from 1519 to 1521 was fatal to his empire.

 

Great leaders, battles, and forces do exist in world history. The successes of Alexander of Macedon and his forces and of the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan and his forces are examples. However, numerous great deeds of warfare do not stand up well when compared to others in world history.

 

Gaps in History

Inworld history gaps exist where evidence is not available. The comparative approach can shed light on these gaps when used contextually. Warfare as an ephemeral activity leaves little evidence. Historical records can be supplemented with archaeological evidence to help identify and explain the role of warfare in world history, especially in nonliterate areas. This is the case for pre-Columbian warfare and for warfare in early Eurasia and early Africa.

 

Written records of Minoan chariots on the island of Crete in the Mediterranean are an interesting case. Minoan civilization (2500–1500 CE) was a seafaring culture that controlled sea trade. Warlike neighbors, such as the Mycenaeans in Greece, the Egyptians and Hyksos to the south, and the Hittites and Mitanni to the east, used chariots as an integral part of warfare. Mycenaean cities such as Tiryns were walled, and we can recall the Greek poet Homer’s epics for images of what Bronze Age warfare looked like. Yet, Minoan palatial estates were not walled and had no need of chariots for war on an island protected by Minoan ships. Current thinking suggests that the chariot records were instead representative of elite status (as the number or size of automobiles can be today in industrialized states). This was the case during peacetime for Egyptian nobility. A comparative, contextual approach to warfare in this case yields negative evidence that Minoans used chariots for war.

 

The size of military forces can be deduced by the comparative approach. The Chanca chiefdom opposed the Inca in South America during early Inca expansion during the fifteenth century CE. The size of the Chanca military force is unknown, but the population of the chiefdom can be derived from calculations of arable (fit for growing crops) land. This estimate can be compared to estimates for similar-sized chiefdoms for which historical records exist recording the size of military forces. Finally, comparative warfare studies can reveal the importance of particular traits to developments in warfare. For instance, the lack of the horse in warfare during pre-Columbian times did not deter the interaction and conflict of nomadic and sedentary cultures. The same nomadic-sedentary warfare patterns seen in the Old World (Eurasia, Africa) are seen in the New World (the Americas), regardless of the presence or absence of the horse.

 

The relative lack of metal weapons in the Americas (some copper and bronze weapons, mainly in South America, were developed) provides more interesting comparisons. Armies such as those of the Aztecs, Incas, and Cherokee were using Stone Age technology when European forces arrived. This situation provides an excellent example of what Stone Age warfare really looked like in places such as Eurasia and Africa before the coming of metallurgy, the horse, and complex seafaring. The comparative analysis can be carried even further, with hypotheses about the low level of siegecraft technology in the pre-Columbian Americas despite large-scale fortifications. Siegecraft in the Old World became highly developed and played an integral role in all periods of warfare after the Stone Age.

 

Further Reading

Archer, C., Ferris, J., Herwig, H., & Travers, T. (2002). World history of warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Art, R. & Waltz, K. (2003). The use of force: Military power and international politics. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Baylis, J.,Wirtz, J., Cohen, E., & Gray, C. (2002). Strategy in the contemporary world: Introduction to strategic studies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Brown, M., Coat,O., Lynn-Jones, S.,& Miller, S. (1998). Theories of war and peace. Boston: MIT Press.

Davis, P. (1996). Encyclopedia of invasions and conquests. New York: W. W. Norton.

Ferrill, A. (1985). The origins of war: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. London: Thames & Hudson.

Gray, C. (1999). Modern strategy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Haas, J. (Ed.). (1990). The anthropology of war. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Harkavy, R., & Neuman, S. (2001). Warfare in the Third World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keegan, J. (1993). A history of warfare. London: Hutchison.

Keeley, L. H. (1996). War before civilization. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Lynn, J. (2003). Battle: A history of combat and culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Neiberg, M. S. (2001).Warfare in world history. London: Routledge.

Rafeal, E. B. (1979). Social aspects of guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare. Tel Aviv, Israel: Magnes Press.

Reyna, S., & Downs, R. (1994). Studying war: Anthropological perspectives. New York: Taylor & Francis.