PRE-WAR HISTORY

It’s hard to believe that a little more than five years prior to the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the Luftwaffe didn’t even exist. Disarmed by the conditions of surrender of the First World War, Germany was banned from having a standing air force. While organizationally it prevented the Luftwaffe of WWII from being formed early, the ban was widely ignored in spirit. Numerous state-sponsored “flying clubs” blossomed all over the country, many air officers from WWI were placed high in the German Army structure, and the German aircraft industry, banned from building warplanes for Germany, moved some operations oversees and produced aircraft under contract for other nations.

 

The fact that the Germans saw the potential of airpower in a CAS role is important for understanding the success of the airpower component of what western observers called Blitzkrieg. Unlike most other countries in the inter-war years, Germany saw a close connection between its air force and army, not just on paper, but in tactics. As the Luftwaffe came into its own in 1934, most of the higher officers in the Luftwaffe were formerly of the German Army. Even new recruits to the Luftwaffe officer corps were given valuable training in army tactics and concepts. The two branches frequently held officer exchanges during annual exercises, and to a degree unlike any other nation, the Luftwaffe was seen as a supporting peer to the Army, as well as the other way around. As Germany’s enemies would find once they were on the receiving end of the Blitzkrieg, this coordination, from the highest echelons down to combat units, greatly enhanced their military effectiveness. Despite some early, and even some lingering, feeling of distrust of their new airborne counterparts (incidentally, many of those same German military leaders also distrusted the armor corps), the German Army not only expected, but demanded, that the Luftwaffe support them in war. While the Luftwaffe was not instantly wed to the actions that we would consider close air support today (preferring instead to initially focus on actions in the enemy’s rear…what we would consider interdiction today), several of the Luftwaffe’s most progressive military minds had their own theories.

 

To make these theories work, the Germans needed a practical testing ground for testing air / ground coordination. They got it, in the form of the Spanish Civil War.

 

SPANISH CIVIL WAR

The baptism of fire for the Luftwaffe and their new concepts of air / ground cooperation came in Spain. In November 1936, Germany had 40 aircraft and more than 4,000 “voluntary” personnel in the theater, fighting on the Nationalist side as the Legion Condor. This number would eventually move upwards of 10,000 men.

 

The leaders of the fledgling Luftwaffe used Spain as the testing ground for doctrine, and for the most part came away with correct theory that would prove instrumental over Poland and France in the years to come.

 

One leader in particular, Oberst Wolfram von Richthofen (the cousin of WWI’s “Red Baron”) played a crucial role not only in developing the tactics of close air support, but also the tools to make it all work. Originally the Chief of Staff of General Hugo Sperrle, von Richthofen took over as commander of the Legion Condor in 1938. Prior to that, Richthofen cut his teeth turning years of theory of “peacetime” army/air force cooperation into practice.

 

Richthofen’s fame came largely later in France and Poland, and ironically, while he is often credited with the development of dive bombing tactics for the Ju87 Stuka, he was not an early proponent of the aircraft. While there was never a doubt of whether the Luftwaffe would support the army or not, Richthofen’s original preference was on the status quo theory of effective strikes, low-level strafing and bombing using He51 and Hs123 fighters and coordinated by liaison teams in the German Army.

 

Special Luftwaffe radio teams, attached to army commanders, could accurately direct ground support where it was needed. This by itself was revolutionary; with the added force of some new German weapons, the first large-scale lesson in close air support was about to begin.

 

In September 1937, the Junkers Ju87A Stuka was introduced to the Spanish Civil War as part of the aircraft’s operational trials. Three Ju87s from I/St.G 163 were sent to Spain, and aircrews quickly grew to appreciate the dive bomber’s abilities. It was rugged, stable, and easy to fly. Luftwaffe aircrews were rotated through the Stuka unit to give them combat experience in the airframe and provide a pool of skilled operators for when the type went into widespread use. The Germans prized the Ju87s so much that not even their Nationalist allies were allowed to examine them, and it became a great fear that one of these “wonder weapons” would fall into the hands of the enemy.

 

Approaching its target at a near vertical dive, the Stuka was capable of placing its 1,000 lb. payload with then-pinpoint accuracy. A pair of machine guns rounded out the armament. After its first combat use in March 1938, aircrews bragged of being able to deliver bombs within five meters of the target, more than close enough for the bomb to cause significant damage. Aviation historian Walter Boyne has called the Stuka “the first smart bomb” for its ability to strike at pinpoint targets, far more accurately than conventional low-level bombing.

 

The initial success of the Stuka was not lost on von Richthofen, who began to strongly push for more coordination between Stuka crews and the army forces below. This was a marked change from earlier in the conflict, when he was reluctant to use the new aircraft.

 

In one instance, the Germans launched a bombing raid on a road bridge near Guernica. More than 40 level bombers and fighters were tasked to take out the target. A 1948 British study of the action came to this conclusion:

 

“He had at his disposal a weapons far more suited to the task than the cumbersome Junkers (Ju52 level bomber). Each of his Stuka dive bombers was capable of carrying a single bomb weighing 1,000 pounds. Equipped the latest bombsight, able to nose-dive onto a target, and any of the four Stuka available that day would have had a high chance of taking out the bridge with one direct hit.”

 

Von Richthofen apparently never considered employing the brand new Stukas for the attack. As their worth and accuracy became more evident, they were used much more, which also strengthened army / air force cooperation.

 

By the end of the civil war, Luftwaffe troops served at or near the front line, coordinating strikes on targets between the aircrew overhead and the commanders of both the Luftwaffe and the army further back. As the war came to an end, the Germans walked away from their victory with a solid appreciation for the power of air / ground coordination, although coordination between Luftwaffe units and ground troops still was mostly limited to the Army’s Divisional level.

 

Interestingly, the military observers in Britain came to opposite conclusions. When the Minister of the Army suggested that the value of close air support had been proven by the Germans, the idea was squashed by senior officials as inefficient and ineffective. Official memos strongly discouraged the mere talk of coordinating air power with the army below.  It became so dogmatic that in 1938, any RAF unit practicing strafing in cooperation with the army got a letter of rebuke from the Air Ministry.

 

British and French soldiers and airmen would pay for their leader’s stubbornness in the years to come. Germany was going to take the lessons learned in Spain and focus their attention next on Poland. The West would sit back and watch. The fuse to WWII had been lit.

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The lack of an effective ground-attack aircraft = close-support aircraft was a handicap to German ground troops. The lack of this capability was not anticipated when the Ju-87 entered service. The Hs-123 was taken out of production, despite the excellent record the type had in Spain, and the Henschels were sent to flying schools. Wolfram Von Richtofen, commander of the Legion Condor at the end of the Spanish Civil War, had seen the effectiveness of close-support in aiding ground troops, and pressed hard to retain some close-support capability in the Luftwaffe. When he was made commander of Fliegerkorps VIII, the Luftwaffe “tactical air force” as it were, he pressed that much harder and to appease him he was allowed to retain one Gruppe of Hs-123s. This was II/LG 2, which used the Henschel very effectively in Poland and France, and later in Russia. So effective were they, that the flying schools were obliged to surrender their Hs-123s to make up attrition within this Gruppe, which was later formed the nucleus of new, dedicated Schlachtgeschwadern. The Hs-129 was devised as a dedicated ground-attack aircraft to fill this gap, although the aircraft was not a success and was soon withdrawn. The Hs-123 served until 1944, when the last ones were worn out. By then, the Ju-87 had all but disappeared, as had the Hs-129, replaced by the Fw-109G. Rudel’s cannon-armed Ju-87Gs were the last Stuka units left in Russia.