On the eve of World War II the Luftwaffe had inherited ‘little in the way of doctrine from World War I. During World War I two general missions were given to German tactical aircraft. One was to give direct support to attacking infantry by neutralizing enemy trench lines, the other was to suppress enemy aircraft attempting to do the same for their own infantry. Units of the Air Force in squadron size were attached directly to ground units and tasked by the ground commander. It was a basic German precept that “no battle must be fought on the ground without the Air Force making its honorable contribution.” So, as the Luftwaffe began rebuilding after the failure of the policies of the Treaty of Versailles, a basic doctrinal assumption was the legacy of close cooperation with the army. ‘ In actuality, however, the tactics to be used in the Second World War were still in experimental stages.

During the period between the end of World War I and 1936 the Luftwaffe trained its pilots and developed its doctrine outside of Germany. Additionally, continued emphasis was placed on maintaining a viable aircraft industry. Throughout this period there was a growing commitment to the concept of Close Air Support. Once Hitler came to power and the Wehrmacht was brought back into the open, German military power became an instrument of German foreign policy. However, this power was by no means complete. Notably, the Wehrmacht lacked heavy firepower and artillery. Williamson Murray commented on this situation and wrote, “Because of the shortage of heavy artillery, German Army commanders proved almost too enthusiastic on the subject of close air support.” * The first real test of Luftwaffe doctrine was in Spain with the Condor Legion, sent by Hitler to aid General Francisco Franco in his conquest of that country.

Initially, German air forces adopted a strategic bombing campaign against Spanish cities. In November 1936, Franco’s forces surrounded Madrid and requested support from the Condor Legion in reducing the city. German advisers were eager to test the Luftwaffe in such a role and consented. From November 16 until November 19 the Condor Legion bombed the city and its outskirts. In March 1938, Spanish Nationalist forces with support from the Condor Legion began the battle for the Plains of Aragon. The battle was victorious for the Nationalists notably because of air superiority. From these actions the Germans learned a great deal about the use of aircraft in support of infantry. Adolph Galland, later to become an ace in the Luftwaffe, noted that it was from this time on that a distinction was made between air-to-air fighters and ground-attack aircraft. Afterwards, many of the Luftwaffe’s leaders, but especially Wolfram von Richtofen, commander of the Condor Legion, felt the need to expand further the Luftwaffe’s capability to support ground operations. The German General Staff still had not decided upon Luftwaffe doctrine, but it did lean away from the strategic and more toward the tactical aspects of airpower.