Here is some information on foreign military assistance to both sides in the Spanish Civil War, taken from Michael Clodfelter, _Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference_, Volume II (Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland&Co., 1992), pp. 606-608:
To Nationalists:
Germany: 14,000 troops (6,500 Legion Condor), c. 600 aircraft, 200 Pz. Mark I. Italy: 72,827 troops, 150 tanks, 763 aircraft, 1,930 guns, 10,135 vehicles, 240,747 small arms. Portugal: 20,000 troops (Legion de Viriato).
To Republicans:
Soviet Union: 2,000 to 3,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft, 900 tanks, 1,550 guns, 15,000 machine guns, 30,000 automatic weapons, 500,000 rifles, 8,000 trucks. Other: 300 aircraft (France), 40,000 troops (International Brigades).
It seems that with the exception of tanks and small arms, Germany and Italy supplied more military hardware to the Nationalists than Stalin sent to the Republicans. More important, Franco’s foreign allies deployed far more troops in Spain than the Soviet Union (the International Brigades included).
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Obviously the aid of Italy and Germany was critical to the victory of the Nationalist forces in the Civil War. The all-important air lift of the African army to the mainland and the equally important lack of Republican naval response to the convoys from Africa were crucial to allowing the Nationalists to launch their “cleansing” operations in the summer of 1936 through Andalusia, along the Spanish border with Portugal, and begin the drive on Madrid.
The Italian forces sent to Spain and the Condor Legion were especially critical in the victory of Franco. All these factors are well known and copiously repeated in the histories of the Spanish Civil War (with different emphasis depending on the politics of the writer).
The point that was raised by the Franco as incompetent line bears repeating. All too often the SPANISH side of the Civil War gets lost in the shuffle, The coalition that Franco forged and ultimately dominated was formed of different political forces, from the Carlists to the Falange. They were all not in tandem, but clearly by the winter of 1936 and early 1937 Franco had forged through his political machinations a unity of command that the Republic did not have that helped him lead his side to victory.
Having been involved with giving and organizing presentations of the Spanish Civil War every once in a while I know how troubling any attempt to “balance” can be for audiences in New York City. First, the veterans of the ALB fought and died for a cause they believed in as young men. They are lionized by the Left throughout the U.S. and especially in NYC, where they are given pride of place as if they were Grenadier Guards at any demonstration.
I recall when Al Nofi and I did a program on the Battle of Jarama over a decade ago, in 1987, the ALB sent several minders to check us out and make sure we did not engage in any besmirching of their involvement. We did not pay any attention to that, and anyway we were happy to let the Jarama veteran have his say. He also felt we did a decent job, since anyone familiar with this first battle of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion knows it was as typical a disaster that befell any Spanish militia unit of either side in the early phases of the Civil War. They had little to no marksmanship training, had just been given their rifles literally hours before they went into battle and everything that followed was what happens to ANY hastily and ill-trained military unit attacking veteran troops- a sharp rebuff and large numbers of casualties.
But, absolutely the use of Hitler of the revolt as a means to present the French with another front on the Pyrenees and break up the fragile alliance diplomatically on the continent was a major factor in his vital support of Franco.
Again, the problem with those historians who tend to focus on external German and Italian aid to the exclusion of equally critical factors as to who militarily was better able to get their act together and why (an issue that is beclouded with political emotion) is why a glib explanation of Franco as a military incompetent has to be critically scrutinized.
On Albert A. Nofi wrote: There is enough evidence available now to demonstrate that Italian and German assistance to the Nationalists was less than Soviet and other assistance to the Loyalists. Stalin sent more aircraft, more — and better — tanks, as more troops (in the form of the International Brigades) than did Hitler and Mussolini combined, not that many of the latter were all that valuable.
