General Drawings and Cutaway of the Balao Class SS
29 Thursday Jan 2009
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29 Thursday Jan 2009
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29 Thursday Jan 2009
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The Sudeten Crisis in the summer of 1938 may to some extent have been accountable for the inconsistencies in the handling of the Lake Khasan incident, and the threat of war in Europe it raised undoubtedly precipitated a hasty Soviet withdrawal from direct engagement in the Spanish Civil War. The ‘volunteers’ were all brought home by summer’s end, even though the war itself was not moving rapidly toward a conclusion. Some returned to discover that the Spanish experience and the effects of the purge combined to boost their careers beyond all normal expectations. Others learned that service abroad could be equated with treason. While not as large as those of Italy or Germany, the Soviet participation had been substantial. Some 3,000 Red Army ‘volunteers’ had served with the Republican forces; and the Republic had received (allegedly in exchange for the Spanish gold reserve) in excess of 800 aircraft, 450 tanks and other armored vehicles, 1,500 artillery pieces, 500,000 rifles, 15,000 machine guns, and ammunition and aerial bombs.
Although the intervention in Spain failed, it was taken to have generated a priceless fund of experience. As Isserson put it, the war in Spain ‘opened the curtain somewhat on the battlefield of the future’, an intensely significant concern to all armies and above all to the Red Army. Moreover, to military analysts from many nations, peering over each other’s shoulders, so to speak, it offered a completely consistent picture from start to finish. At no other time during the century had armies possessed so apparently reliable a model from which to work.
In articles published in 1938 in the General Staff ’s new journal, Military Thought, Kombrig S. Lyubarskiy drew a single overarching lesson from the Spanish experience: ‘History repeats itself.’ The defensive superiority that had dominated the World War had reasserted itself more strongly in Spain. Advanced technology had benefited it more than it had the offensive. Deep operations had showed even less promise than in the World War. While the deep operation might well be the only effective offensive form, it would demand ‘enormous strength and the most advanced technological means’; and the war would still ‘assume a prolonged character’.
Lyubarskiy concluded that technology would figure more heavily in battles than ever before, but the infantry mass would ultimately decide wars. Artillery would indisputably retain its place as the most important support weapon, and improvised and permanent fortifications would be essential. The airplane had matured into a powerful offensive and defensive weapon, and the contest for air supremacy over the battlefield would henceforth be a permanent characteristic of warfare.
The tank, in Lyubarskiy’s estimation as also in those of most non-Soviet analysts, had given a distinctly mixed performance. On the offensive, it had provided indispensable moral support for the infantry. In fact, infantry attacks had seldom succeeded without it. On the other had, it had not achieved either ‘large or small successes’ independently of the infantry. The visions of tank formations breaking through prepared positions or even advancing across the open field had not materialized. Moreover, the tanks had frequently experienced ‘great difficulties’ without artillery support; and they had been vulnerable to antitank guns as light as 20mm, which indicated that infantry platoons could probably be armed to defend themselves against tanks.
Kombrig A. N. Lapchinskiy, who held the air tactics chair in the Frunze Academy, completed a book, The Air Army, in 1938, shortly before he was caught up in the purge. As most other commentators on air doctrine also did in the 1930s, he identified three primary air missions: long-range (strategic) bombing to destroy the enemy civilian population’s morale; interdiction bombing directed against the enemy’s communications lines; and close battlefield support. The war in Spain, he concluded, had proved the last to be by far the most significant, because it had demonstrated that ‘only destruction of the enemy armed mass’s will to fight secures victories’. Bombing attacks on cities, such as those on Madrid and Guernica, had neither damaged civilian morale nor impaired the armed mass’s will to fight; hence, bombing civilian targets would not be worthwhile as long as the enemy was holding his own on the battlefront. Interdiction strikes against an adversary’s communications lines would be profitable only if they could be executed without detracting from the effort on the battlefield.
29 Thursday Jan 2009
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The original unit was formed in 1941 with anti British agitators from Iraq, Syria and other Arab counties smuggled in through turkey as well as Arab students in Germany were recruited, the place of deployment was Cape Sounion in southern Greece.
The only combat they saw was in the Caucasus apparently deployed there in August 1942 in the hope that they could be used in a breakthrough into the middle east, I don’t know much about their combat performance but apparently they did take causalities, also they were withdrawn by January 1943 to North Africa
On January of 1943, was formed in Tunisia the denominated unit “Kommando Deutsch-Arabische Truppen or KODAT”. By the middle of February of 1943 the KODAT had two battalions of Arab volunteers of Tunisia, an Algerian battalion and a Moroccan battalion that count a total of 3000 men; with German cadre. The KODAT was part of the Sonderverband 287 denominated “Deutsch-Arabische Lehr Abteilung” or also called “Deutsch-Arabische Truppen.”
In some photos the soldiers are wearing a white armband apparently it says Im Dienst der Deutschen Wehrmacht” (To the Service of the German Army), used by the KODAT recruits.
Free Arab Legion in North Africa 1942-1943
Sonderverband 288 was formed from Germans and foreign language specialists from the Brandenburg Division. The unit served in North Africa and worked closely with Arab volunteers, they had ties to the “Deutsche-Arabische Lehr Abteilung”, which was raised on 7th April 1942.
A group of French Arabs were formed into the “Phalange Africaine” from the french colonies of Algeria and Tunisia. Just before the fall of Tunis, a battalion of Sonderverband 287 arrived in North Africa.
Free Arab Legion- 1943-1945
Sonderverband 287 was raised from Arabs living in Europe, and was based in Athens, Greece. They fought in the Caucasus in Russia and later in Yugoslavia in anti-partisan operations.
Other Arab formations were formed from Muslims living in southern France.
By 1943 all Arab volunteers should have been issued with the “Freies Arabien” armshield
29 Thursday Jan 2009
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369th Legion Memorial badge
Croatia – a country that had seen itself as the victim of Serb oppression – was delighted when it was recognised as an independent country. It contributed ground forces to assist the Germans as well as a small naval force operating in the Aegean and air force squadrons that fought on the eastern Front. These squadrons produced a number of aces.
Verstarktes Infanterie Regiment 369 (kroatisches)
The Verstarktes Infanterie Regiment 369 (kroatisches) also known as the Croatian Legion (Hrvatska Legija) was formed soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. It was made up of two companies of Croatian and one company of Bosnian volunteers and was posted to Dollersheim, Austria, for training.
It was attached to the 100 Jager Division and was sent to Army Group South on the Eastern front. The regiment fought at Valki, Kharkov, Kalatch and at the Don before being trapped and destroyed in Stalingrad.
1. Light Infantry Parachute Battalion
1. Light Infantry Parachute Battalion (1. Padobranska Lovacka Bonja) was formed in 1942 as 1. Light Infantry Parachute Company (1. Padobranska Lovacka Sat). The volunteers were trained at the Air Force school at Petrovaradin before moving to the new training area at Koprivnica. The base was attacked by the partisans in October 1943 and the paratroopers were forced out after days of heavy fighting, where they suffered 20 killed or captured.
Following the attack the unit was disbanded. It was, however, soon reformed again and expanded to battalion size. It was sent to the area of Resnik and Obrovo in January 1945 to fight the partisans. The unit later fought the partisans at Sisak and Petrinja, this time attached to the Kampfgruppe Schlacher (Borbena Skupina Schlacher) together with the Motorised Brigade (Brzi Zdrug).
At the end of the war the men of this unit marched to Austria and surrendered to the Allies but were immediately transferred back to the partisans and most of them were killed. – see Hrvatski Orlovi: Paratroopers of the Independent State of Croatia 1942-1945; Novak-Spencer
29 Thursday Jan 2009
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By 911, the Vikings, or Northmen, had established themselves so powerfully in a large area round the lower Seine that the territory was formally granted to them as the duchy of the Northmen – later to be called Normandy. They achieved a reputation as warriors in their disputes with their neighbours, and in 1016 were invited to southern Italy as mercenaries. By 1030 they had created a principality of their own at Aversa; in 1059 Pope Nicholas II granted them Sicily, Calabria and Apulia. In 1066, William, Duke of Normandy, with only 5,000 men, took the crown of England by force; by 1167, when Dermot MacMurrough, in need of allies to restore him to his kingdom, outlined to Henry II and his barons the profits to be gained from involving themselves in Irish affairs, the Normans had established a strong kingdom in England and were firmly rooted in Scotland and Wales.
On 1 May 1169, Robert FitzStephen, Meiler FitzHenry and Robert de Barry, with thirty knights, sixty other horsemen and 300 archers, ‘the flower of the youth of Wales’, landed at Bannow Bay, in three ships. A contemporary chronicler, Robert Wace, described typical Norman landing tactics. First ashore were the archers, with bow bent and quiver ready, taking up a position on the beach ready for immediate action. Not until a reconnaissance had been completed and the all-clear given would the men-at-arms, all in full equipment, be allowed to disembark with their horses; the cavalry would then ride inland through the screen of archers. Such tactics were typical of the military sophistication of the Normans, which was to bring them to military victory in Ireland despite their inferior numerical strength.
On 2 May arrived Maurice de Prendergast, with ten men-at-arms and about 200 archers in two ships. Figure 12 shows the landing places of the main invading armies and traces the more important invasion routes. It should be emphasized that only an indication of direction can be given, not precise itineraries.
The two Norman armies were joined by Dermot MacMurrough, with 500 men, and together they took Wexford. After resting at Ferns, the invading force, now with the addition of a number of Leinstermen and Norse from Wexford – about 3,000 strong – launched an attack on Ossory that met with success despite a spirited defence. Successful expeditions were launched against Offelan and Omurethy. Another expedition into Ossory resulted in the defeat of MacGillapatrick at Achadh-ur. At this stage Prendergast seems to have lost enthusiasm for the enterprise and he attempted to return to Wales with his men. When prevented from doing so by MacMurrough, he allied himself with the king of Ossory and caused a great deal of trouble to his erstwhile allies before finally leaving the country.
At this stage the High King, Rory O’Connor, showed unexpected strength in marching into Leinster and forcing MacMurrough to submit to him. He contented himself with taking hostages and exacting from MacMurrough a promise to bring no more foreigners into Ireland and to expel his Norman allies once Leinster was finally subdued. This was a promise that MacMurrough had neither the inclination nor the power to keep.
Late in 1169, two more ships arrived in Wexford, bearing Maurice FitzGerald, FitzStephen’s half-brother, with ten knights, thirty mounted retainers and 100 archers. Shortly after this MacMurrough marched towards Dublin and secured the submission of the citizens. Meanwhile FitzStephen led an army to Limerick to attempt an attack on the high king, but was forced back to Leinster.
In May 1170, Raymond FitzGerald (le Gros) arrived with ten knights and seventy archers. Landing at Dundonnell he there defeated the men of Waterford in battle and awaited Strongbow, who arrived in August with 200 knights and 1,000 other troops, accompanied by Maurice de Prendergast, who had been persuaded to return. Until Strongbow’s arrival, the invasion had been only partially successful; his intervention was to lead the Norman forces to military triumph. Richard FitzGilbert de Clare, called earl of Striguil and popularly known as Strongbow, was a leading Welsh baron. It had been his original agreement with MacMurrough in 1168 to lend military support in exchange for the succession to the kingship of Leinster that laid the foundations for the Norman invasion and gave it its Welsh character. Landing at Crook, Strongbow joined forces with le Gros to attack and take Waterford. They then joined MacMurrough, who confirmed the alliance by giving his daughter to Strongbow in marriage. Together, they captured Dublin in September and launched attacks on Meath and on O’Rourke’s territory, as far as Slieve Gory. MacMurrough then retired to his palace at Ferns, where he died the following year, and Strongbow spent the next year consolidating his military position. After MacMurrough’s death the High King besieged Dublin, but was defeated in a surprise attack in September and forced to retire.
By the autumn of 1171 Strongbow was master of Dublin, Waterford and Wexford. He was, however, uncomfortably aware that Henry II was intending to intervene to curb his power. Strongbow had already defied an order from Henry to return from Ireland, and had hoped to stave off his wrath by sending a message of loyalty. When Henry arrived in October at Crook with about 4,000 troops in 400 ships, he had two objectives: first to secure the submission of the Irish leaders and second to impose his authority on his own barons. He was successful in both his aims, securing the submission of many of the Irish kings, including MacCarthy, O’Brien and O’Rourke. Although O’Connor and many of the northern kings refused to submit, the High King’s resistance was to prove temporary. At a council of Irish bishops in Cashel, fealty was sworn to Henry, and the Irish church was pledged to conform to the practices of the English church. Henry restricted Strongbow’s power in two ways. Although he granted him Leinster, he removed the towns of Dublin, Wexford and Waterford from his jurisdiction and his pretensions to power were controlled by the appointment as justiciar of Hugh de Lacy, to whom the king granted Meath.
With these grants the conquest became a political reality. Although the military struggle was to continue for centuries, by 1172 the Normans were so strongly entrenched in the east and south-east of the country that there could no longer be any hope of their eventual expulsion. The next century was to prove to be a time of consolidation.
28 Wednesday Jan 2009
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The Russian BARS CLASS of 1915, the Kuguar, was fitted with a telescoping tube to supply air to operate the diesels while submerged, a forerunner of the snorkel. Gepard is in front of Kuguar.
USS Torsk – last ship to sink enemy vessel in World War II: One of several Tench Class submarines still located inside the United States. Nicknamed the “Galloping Ghost of the Japanese Coast,” the vessel is the only ship of the United States Navy to be named for the torsk fish. Torsk received two battle stars for World War II service and the Navy Commendation Medal for her service during the Cuban Missile Crisis. She set the all-time record of career dives, at 11,884. She is also the only submarine converted in the Fleet Snorkel program that has the original snorkel.
To reduce the unbearable losses inflicted by radar equipped escorts and aircraft, U-boat designers resuscitated an idea they had found in captured Dutch submarines in 1940. The Schnorchel (nostril) was an air mast, originally intended to ventilate the interior of the boat, but in 1943 it promised a way to allow a U-boat to recharge its batteries without surfacing. The diesel-generators could be run at full power, while a masthead float valve prevented water from flooding the boat (small amounts of water were vented outboard). Used in rough weather it caused extreme discomfort to the crew by causing rapid changes in air pressure, but the alternative was destruction.
In practice the Schnorchel (later Americanised to ‘snorkel’) did some damage to morale, and some of the inexperienced U-boat commanders were reluctant to use it for long periods. Radar warning receivers were used to detect hostile transmissions, but the performance of Allied radars outpaced the German scientists’ efforts to counter them. Rubber coatings were used to absorb sonar energy and the pillenwerfer bubble decoy was introduced. It functioned like a giant Alka Seltzer, producing flat bubbles in the water, but experienced asdic operators rarely mistook them for genuine targets.
THE GUPPY PROGRAMME
In 1946, the US Navy began its Greater Underwater Propulsive Power (GUPPY) programme, upgrading the large number of ‘Gato’, ‘Balao’ and ‘Tench’ class boats built during the war.
The basic elements of the GUPPY conversion included streamlining the hull and augmenting underwater power. The prototypes Odox and Pomodon were originally intended to act as fast targets for training surface anti-submarine forces, and to cope with an expected improvement of performance in Soviet submarines. The conning tower was replaced by a streamlined ‘sail’, which enclosed periscopes and snorkel mast. The characteristic buoyant bow (intended to improve surface performance) was replaced by a round bow, and every possible piece of equipment likely to cause resistance was either removed or made retractable. It was not easy to find space internally for more battery cells because the wartime fleet boats were by no means spacious. The solution was to remove the auxiliary diesel-generator from the after-engine room and reposition it in the space formerly occupied by the magazine for the redundant deck-gun.
Much work had to be done on battery technology to achieve higher output. By accepting a shorter life (18 months) and designing a smaller battery-cell, it was possible to provide four main batteries of 126 cells each (the original boats had only two). This brought new problems, for the high-capacity batteries generated more hydrogen and heat, increasing the risk of fire and explosion. After experimenting with a closed-cell system the US Navy reverted to a water-cooled opencell system, and the air-conditioning equipment was boosted by nearly 300 percent to handle the extra load. Apart from minor teething troubles the GUPPY I conversion proved successful. A simultaneous programme to improve the snorkel was running at Portsmouth Navy Yard in New Hampshire. The basic problem was that exhausting gases underwater created more back-pressure than the diesels could handle. The American two-cycle diesels suffered pressure fluctuations when the float valve closed, whereas the wartime German four-cycle diesels were not badly affected. Some components of the Fairbanks Morse and General Motors diesels were redesigned to cope with the stresses, but the ultimate solution was to replace the simple float valve with an air-actuated head valve designed to act rapidly and positively. The opening and closing was now controlled by three electrodes located near the snorkel head. When a wave broke over the head it completed a circuit, directing air to shut the valve.
The exhaust mast was designed to be raised with the induction mast, and to ride about 1.21-2.4m (4-8ft) below the surface. The exhaust port was fitted with baffles to reduce the amount of smoke and haze reaching the surface. A mast similar to that in the Type XXI boats was tried in the USS hex in 1947, but it threw up a highly visible plume of spray. The US Navy boats, being much larger than the U-boats, needed a much bigger snorkel head and mast to draw in sufficient air, and a major redesign of the head was needed to reduce the plume. Three types of snorkel were developed: the original GUPPYI type; a simpler type for the unmodernised fleet boats, and a sophisticated type for fast attack boats. Even nuclear submarines need snorkels; they are needed if the boat is running on the auxiliary diesel-electric system, and it is still the quickest way to rid the interior of the boat of the various contaminants which cannot be absorbed by the air-purification system.
28 Wednesday Jan 2009
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British captain Herbert Buck had been taken prisoner by General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps while fighting was raging in the vast desert of North Africa in mid-1941. He escaped and set off eastward across the trackless wasteland in the hope of reaching friendly forces. It seemed like an impossible task. One Briton wandering around in the desert would be easily detected.
However, Buck found an Afrika Korps cap and he put it on, mainly to deflect the rays of the torrid sun. Soon he discovered to his amazement—and relief—that he was able to walk freely through German positions and bivouacs. In the desert, the British, the Germans, and the Italians all wore khaki uniforms with short-sleeved shirts and trousers that hit just above the knees. Moreover, Buck spoke fluent German, and he often received directions from men of the Afrika Korps.
When Buck finally reached elements of the British Eighth Army—the Desert Rats, the soldiers called themselves—he approached the brass with an idea. They bought it. He would form and train a new unit that was given a totally meaningless designation—Special Intelligence Group (SIG)—to mask the perilous nature of its task.
The SIG was composed mainly of German Jews from Palestine whose job was to sneak behind German lines masquerading as Afrika Korps soldiers. It virtually would be a suicide outfit. Each Jew knew that capture would mean dying an excruciating death. [1]
Captain Buck was a strict instructor and commander. He knew that a slight slipup could doom an infiltrator. Only German was spoken when the men were training. Each received necessary documents, all of them forged: a phony name, identification tags, and letters from “home.”
To reinforce the cover story assigned to each Jew, he carried a photograph of himself with his “girlfriend” in Berlin. Actually, she was a member of the Eighth Army’s women’s auxiliary who was usually blonde; that is, her features were suitably Aryan. A Berlin background was added in the darkrooms of Eighth Army photographers in Cairo.
Knowing that the slang of all armies often changes, British intelligence officers kept SIG current with the latest words being used by the men of the Afrika Korps.
When Captain Buck felt that his men were ready for desperate missions, he looked around for some action in which they could be involved. That chance came in late May 1942, when twenty-six-year-old Captain David Stirling was ordered to report to Cairo for a meeting with the director of military operations.
Stirling, who stood six feet six, was the founder and leader of a group of desert raiders code-named Special Air Service (SAS). That designation had been invented to make German intelligence believe that a large contingent of British paratroopers had arrived in Egypt.
Stirling was told that a convoy of twenty ships would sail through the Mediterranean bottleneck at Gibraltar in June and try to reach the beleaguered island of Malta, a British crown colony fifty-eight miles south of Sicily. Although it contained only 120 square miles, Malta was crucial to the Allied war effort. It controlled the vital sea lanes between Italy and Africa, and fighter planes based on the island defended convoys of Allied ships.
Because of its geographic importance, Malta was bombed relentlessly during the war, and its survival depended on getting supplies. Now Captain Stirling was asked to be part of a widespread British effort to thwart or diminish Luftwaffe attacks on the convoy scheduled to reach Malta in three weeks.
Responding with typical alacrity, Stirling produced a plan within twenty-four hours. It called for simultaneous raids on eight Luftwaffe airfields five hundred miles west of Cairo in Libya on the night of June 13. Stirling felt that five of the targets were lightly guarded and would present no real obstacle to the mission. The remaining three airfields, however, were in a region heavily patrolled by motorized units of the Afrika Korps. No one had ever doubted Stirling’s courage, so when he mentioned that it might be difficult, or impossible, to penetrate the roving patrols, brass at Eighth Army suggested that a unit about which he had never heard—the Special Intelligence Group—might be able to help.
When Stirling asked Captain Herbert Buck if the SIG could carry out the raiding parties to the three airfields, Buck eagerly replied that he himself would lead his men on the mission far behind German lines.
On the evening of June 12, a convoy of three captured German trucks and a large British truck marked as being property of the Afrika Korps headed for the three airfields in the Derna-Martuba region along the Mediterranean coast of Libya. In the cabs were Buck and his Palestine Jews, all wearing Afrika Korps uniforms and armed with German weapons. In the back of the vehicles hidden under tarpaulins, were Stirling’s Special Air Service men.
On the road to Derna, the little convoy came upon a German bivouac. The trucks stopped, the SIG men clambered down from the cabs with their mess kits and casually joined the line at the field kitchen which was serving the evening meal.
Around nine o’clock the next night, about five miles from Derna, the convoy halted and began preparing for the action against the three airports. Only two trucks would be used. One vehicle would head for the lone airfield at Martuba, the other truck for Derna, with its two airports. Each of the three raiding parties would consist of five SAS men who had been recruited by Stirling from the Free French Army that had been created after France had fallen in 1940. Three SIG men would go with each truck. Reluctantly, Captain Buck remained at the rendezvous point to coordinate the recovery of the trucks and raiders.
At about midnight, an SAS lieutenant who had been on the raid stumbled back to where Buck was waiting and told a tale that stunned the SIG leader. The truck going to Derna had developed engine trouble, and the driver stopped only two hundred yards from one of the airfields and climbed out.
From their hiding place under the tarpaulins, the ten Frenchmen heard the alarming sound of many running boots. German soldiers surrounded the truck and one shouted: “All Frenchmen come out!”
The response from the SAS men was a burst of automatic weapons fire and pitched grenades. In the mass confusion, the lieutenant, who would tell Captain Buck the story, leaped out and ran for his life. Moments later, the truck, which had been packed with explosives, erupted into a gigantic ball of fire.
Buck waited at the rendezvous point for a week in the long-shot hope that men from the Martuba missions would return. None did. They had met the same fate as the Derna raiders: all were killed or captured.
British intelligence was convinced that the raiders had been betrayed. Later it was learned that the driver of the Derna truck had been a German prisoner of war recruited by Buck to help SIG perfect its German identity. On the way to Derna, he had invented mechanical problems to turn his SIG comrades and the French raiders over to his own countrymen, the Germans.
Elsewhere, the SAS raids on the five other airfields were resounding successes. Sixteen Luftwaffe planes were blown up, as were hundreds of tons of ammunition and fuel. At an airfield near Benghazi, Captain Stirling and two corporals planted sixty bombs on airplanes, ammunition dumps, and hangars. On their way out, Stirling opened the door to a room in a barracks and saw a German seated at a desk. The Briton pitched a grenade and said, “Here, catch!” By reflex action, the German caught it, and in a voice tinged with terror, he called out, “Nein, nein!”
Stirling slammed the door shut and ran. Moments later, an explosion ripped the room into shreds.
Despite the heroics by the men of SIG and SAS, German air and sea attacks devastated the supply convoy bound for Malta. Only two ships made it to port.
[1] In March 1942 the Special Interrogation Group came under L Detachment’s control. The S.I.G were formed by Captain Herbert Buck M.C and consisted of 12 German Jewish émigrés to Palestine who had volunteered to operate in German uniform, despite the expected consequences if caught. Two Afrika Korps prisoners were recruited to teach current German military procedure.
28 Wednesday Jan 2009
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28 Wednesday Jan 2009
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Many of the partisan groups in the Mediterranean lacked the punch of heavy weapons. That was where the Raiding Support Regiment came in.
By SEPTEMBER 1943 the land war in the Mediterranean theatre had moved from North Africa to Italy and Sicily. This left only about 800 suitably trained men available to GHQ Middle East when it was given the task of harassing the Germans still occupying the Balkans and Greece. These 800 men mostly belonged to small units such as the Special Boat Squadron and the Long Range Desert Group, so the decision was made to gather them into a new formation called the Middle East Raiding Forces. To this organisation was soon added a new unit: its role was to support commando raids and underpin partisan activities with heavy weapons.
The name of the new unit, the Raiding Support Regiment (RSR), described its role exactly and a call went out from Middle East Command for volunteers for duties of a hazardous nature’. Over 3000 men from 60 different regiments applied and one of the first tasks of the newly appointed commanding officer, Lieutenant‑Colonel Sir Thomas Devitt, was to interview and select suitable officers. Being an international rugger player, he not unnaturally chose those who were keen on that game. One Jack gage, was an Irish international, while others had played for clubs in Britain and South Africa. A training camp at Azzib in Palestine was established, a programme of strenuous physical training, including 24‑hour mountain marches with heavy loads, was instituted, and all were given parachute training. By the end of the year a motley collection of men had become a disciplined and energetic unit that was raring for action.
The regiment was organised into a headquarters commanding five batteries, and it is safe to say that never before in the history of the British Army had a regiment of this nature been formed with such a mixed complement of weapons. A Battery consisted of 12 Vickers and MG‑42 medium machine guns, B Battery contained 18 Sin mortars; C was a light anti‑aircraft battery with 18 0.5m Browning machine guns; D was an anti‑tank battery with four Italian 47/32mm anti‑tank guns; and E was a mountain battery equipped with four 75mm pack howitzers. This, at least, was the theoretical establishment, but weapons and equipment were m desperately short supply and when C Battery, in February 1944, was sent to support No. 2 Commando on the island of Vis, off the Yugoslavian coast, it was still untrained m the use of its weapons as none, up to that point, had ever issued to it! Later, this battery was joined by a Troop from E Battery. Both supported numerous commando raids on the Dalmatian Islands, to such good effect, that three RSR officers were decorated with the Military Cross (MC).
On 11 April the regiment was moved to Bari, situated on the southeastern coast of Italy. From there it helped support a number of raids into occupied territory, under the aegis both of Land Forces Adriatic and Force 266, the cover name given to SOE (Special Operations Executive) operating in the area. Raids were carried out on the Albanian mainland and the Dalmatian Islands
All these commando raids landed from the sea. But while they were taking place, some members of the RSR became involved in what originally had been considered one of its main roles ‑ that of dropping behind enemy lines in support of partisans who were engaged in harassing the Germans. In April 1944, six men of the unit were parachuted into Greece to contact both the Military Mission officers from Force 133 (the cover name for SOE controlled from Cairo) and the partisans; after that they were to make preparations for the arrival of the rest of the force. This last was to include both Troops of A Battery, the two remaining Troops of B Battery and the one remaining Troop of D Battery, all of whom were to be divided in mixed proportions over three different areas. Eventually, nearly 200 RSR personnel were infiltrated from the sea to support the partisans.
The officers chosen to parachute into these three areas were Major Douglas Unsworth, Major Norman Astell and Captain Jack Gage, each one to be accompanied by an NCO. Astell dropped into the northern area, north of Salonica; Unsworth into the central area in the vicinity of Mount Olympus, and Gage further south into countryside around Lamia Devitt told them:
`Your orders are to reconnoitre the main roads and railways in your area To ascertain the strength and morale of the enemy to build a is food supplies for your men when they arrive; and finally to check for suitability certain targets which have been chosen by British liaison officers who are already in Greece, for a final assault on the Germans when they withdraw.’
The small party was given 10 days of intense briefing in Cairo They were to live off the land, and their diet was to consist mainly of beans and black bread although on rare occasions, they might be supplied from the air. Medical supplies were very limited. They would be given gold sovereigns and some drachma, with which mules and food could be bought. To travel around they were only to walk or ride their animals The liaison officers from the Allied Military Mission already established in the areas would do everything they could to help, but the six men had to be entirely self‑sufficient and could expect to be completely cut off for at least six months They were also beefed on the complicated situation in Greece where the Military Mission of around 100 officers was attempting to conciliate between the two largest guerrilla organisations. These were the communist‑inspired ELAS, led by General Serafis, and the pro‑British EDES, commanded by General Zervas, and they were already fighting each other rather than the Germans. Additionally, the relationship between the villagers and the partisans was not always a cordial one.
Unsworth and Astell were dropped in April and were soon followed by their detachments. One bombardier later described how each man’s kit was carefully compiled.
‘One quarter‑pound tin of tobacco, one toilet roll, one book, thin, which would give a Troop library of 25 volumes. The book was a very good idea. My copy was a wartime edition on very flimsy paper and I was able to use the leaves to roll cigarettes with when our proper fag‑paper became exhausted. My idea of the perfect reading for a lonely mountain residence was “The Life and Impressions of Ethel Mannin”, so that my cigarettes were practically self‑igniting … We even had an escape kit, complete with everything that the well‑dressed escaper could desire. In it were compasses, gold sovereigns, a map and files.’ The compass was in two parts and as each could pass for a button it was sewn onto the flies of the men’s trousers.
All three parties were soon to be harassed by big sweeps carried out by crack German troops. One group was hunted by over 12,000 of them moving into the mountains of central Greece from nine different directions. The search went on for 11 days, forcing the Allied detachments to march by night and hide by day, covering in all nearly 130 miles to escape capture. But the Germans did not have it all their own way, one large group was surrounded m a mountain village and plastered with RSR mortar bombs and machine‑gun fire.
Because of the intense pressure on them, the two northern groups were not able to be as active as the RSR group fighting with the guerrillas m the mountains around Lamia, even though Gage’s group was the last to parachute in. Adverse weather conditions had delayed his drop until the beginning of May, but the subsequent actions of his group well illustrate the kind of war in which all those fighting behind the lines in Greece had to engage.
During the weeks following his arrival accompanied by his faithful interpreter Dimitri, Gage reconnoitred his area and prepared rim way for the men who were later to loin him. In mid‑June he crossed to the west coast to meet a small force of Americans and RSR personnel who needed to be guided to their destinations The following month his own troops arrived and it was quite a task to move a convoy of 200 mules, 200 muleteers and 50 British personnel across a half‑starving and devastated enemy‑occupied country. But somehow, with the aid of both ELAS and EDES ‑ and the £5000 in gold sovereigns that the whole undertaking cost ‑ he managed it without being detected by the Germans.
After being involved in a few skirmishes with the enemy including an ambush of a German armoured train. Gage received from Cairo the codeword ‘Noah s Ark. This was the signal to set up his small force in ambush positions by the main Salonika ‑Athens road. Where the maximum damage would be done to the retreating Germans.
The withdrawal started on 9 September, and with the help of the partisans Gage and his men shot up any German convoys that teed to negotiate the road that wound through their pass. This went on for some time, the Germans trying first one tactic and then another, but on the whole being thwarted in them attempt to withdraw northwards m any numbers.
The actions of this long‑running ambush are well described in Gage’s report for 16 September:
‘MG sections have fired about 7000 rounds and mortars about 750 bombs. Still cold and wet. Convoy of 50 trucks delayed all day by sections It is difficult to say what damage we are a inflicting on the Hun. We must be causing more than we realize as he takes all sorts of precautions before attempting to get past our ambushes. Puts out 88mm guns, mortars and MGs and plasters the hills. Then always waits for whole convoy to get through each ambush before moving on. The whole operation takes him seven or eight hours for a normal half an hour. Also he has wasted a couple of days trying to spot us. Mines and demolitions are also doing considerable damage. ‘
Those that did escape still lead the other RSR detachment to cope with as they drove towards Yugoslavia. But after 10 days, despite constantly blows holes in the road and shooting up anything that moved on it, Gage’s group was obliged to withdraw for the Germans had built up an overwhelming superiority in numbers in order to remove them. However, the men continued to harass the eves with lightning strikes on their convoys.
One of Gage’s officers, Lieutenant Hoey, was especially audacious during this time. On 22 September he took his section of heavy machine-guns forward to an exposed position north of the town of Dhomokos. From this vantage point, he shot up a German convoy of battalion strength, preventing from moving for 12 hours and inflicting many casualties. In the following days his section penetrated the German positions guarding the road no less than three times, again inflicting heavy casualties. For these actions, and for entering Lamia while it was still occupied and firing a Bren gun into two truck‑loads of troops, he won the MC.
The following month Gage received orders to move into Lamia immediately it had been evacuated. Accordingly, on 19 October he and his men moved down out of the mountains and took over a hotel for the night. The next day they were joined by British paratroopers and the SBS, who were moving up from Athens. It was later reckoned that Gage’s men had held up a complete division for a week, and Gage himself calculated that during the seven months he was in Greece he had walked over 2000 miles) For hits leadership he was later awarded the MC.
The record of the RSR in Greece is an outstanding one. Its casualties had been light ‑ four killed, four wounded and six taken prisoner ‑ but it had managed to wreak havoc among the enemy. Seventeen vital bridges had been destroyed, as had a mine, a dam, and five petrol and ammunition depots, while hundreds of yards of railway line had been torn up on 18 separate occasions. Five trains had been shot up and 150 vehicles knocked out. The total enemy killed amounted to 300, with many more being wounded. Most of the personnel from the original RSR groups in Greece were withdrawn at the end of November, though some were moved to Athens in anticipation of the trouble that was to come. On 4 December civil was erupted, with the ELAS and EDES forces fighting each other in the streets of the Greek capital. Now British troops were also regarded by ELAS as the enemy and it is a tragic fact that more members of the RSR, including Major Astell were killed by Greeks than by Germans.
One of those who were involved m the conflict was an RSR captain Peter Street Since the previous April he had been leading his sections of mortars and anti-tank guns in ambushes against the Germans in central Macedonia and was to be awarded the MBE for doing so, but by December he had joined a small detachment of the ESE In Athens The fighting was bitter, but on 4 January 1945 he was able to write:
‘Big attacks with 2 Indep Para Bde RSR again spearhead attack Hard going but objectives reached and captured. Lieut. Keane killed 12 ORs wounded. 16 ELAS killed including two Germans, 31 prisoners. Attack a great success. ELAS finished as fighting force in Athens area.’
The war was now nearly over for the Raiding Support Regiment, but some members still saw action when supporting the commandos at Lake Comacchio and joint SBS/LRDG operations in Istna on the Italian-Yugoslavian border. Another of the RSR’s officers, Captain Newton was awarded the Military Cross for bravery during a the battle for the Argenta Gap.
Within three months of the German surrender the regiment had been disbanded. In the decades that have followed it has become perhaps one of the least known fighting units of the British Army‑ and yet it had more than measured up to its motto, ‘Quit You Like Men.’
28 Wednesday Jan 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Mufti Hdj Amin al-Hussaini inspecting Waffen SS recruits from Bosnia.
Grand Mufti Hdj Amin Al-Hussaini (1895-1974) was a member of one of the most powerful clans in Palestine. Yassir Arafat was one of his distant relatives; other Hussainis (e.g. Faisal Al-Hussaini) still play a role in Palestinian and Jordanian politics. After serving as an Ottoman officer in World War I, he became a scholar in Islamic law and theology. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the abolishment of all old religious authorities made it necessary to establish the institutions to provide religious guidance and legal authorities on Islamic Law (Sharia) in the successor states, colonies, and territories.
The British Colonial Office made Amin Al-Hussaini Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in their Palestine-Jordan Mandate of 1921; his predecessor was also an Al-Hussaini. He struggled for the leadership of the Palestinian Arabs and put himself at the top of the resistance to Jewish immigration and was increasingly opposed to the British as well. He was the driving force behind the rising violence in the 1920’s and 1930’s, slaughtering probably more Arab political opponents than Jews. When he stirred up the big rebellion in 1936-39, the British arrested him, but he escaped and fled to Beirut.
It is a telling example of British-French rivalry in the Middle East that he (by now one of the major political figures in Arab Nationalism) was allowed to continue his activities from French controlled territory. The outbreak of World War II, however, brought the Allies closer together and the Mufti had to flee again—this time to Baghdad. Here he played a central role in the coup d’état of nationalist officers against the British in 1941. When the short war against the British was lost, he fled to Berlin.
The Mufti was well received by Hitler and he supported German efforts to raise SS-Legions from the Islamic populations of the Balkans and USSR. He was instrumental in the anti-British German propaganda aimed at the Arab Middle East. What he did not know was that the Germans had already promised Egypt to the Italians and certainly had no intentions of establishing the Mufti’s dream of an independent pan-Arab Empire. They might have tried to re-install him in Jerusalem—but they probably would not have been stupid enough to empower the most charismatic figure of the contemporary Arab national movement. This would be akin to making Joseph Stalin the governor of a Nazi occupied Russia. One thing, however, is certain: Not one Jew would have escaped the claws of the Mufti.
He escaped the doom of the Third Reich and reached Palestine with French support. He tried to regain the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. The disastrous war of 1948 drove him to exile again and deprived the clans of their traditional political legitimacy. Amin gradually lost all influence except in pan-Islamic circles. He spent the last 15 years of his long life in Beirut—he visited East Jerusalem for the last time a few weeks before the 1967 War.
Units Associated with the Mufti—“Centro A” and “Reparto Wanda”
On 1 May 42, Centro “A” (Arab) was formed as a mixed Italo-Arab commando unit. It originally consisted of 14 men from the Italian Army, 7 from the Italian Carabinieri, and 6 Cadres of mixed Italian and Arab origin coming from Arab counties. By the end of August, 1942, it had 15 officers, 12 NCOs, 80 Italian soldiers and 68 Arab volunteers. Centro “I” (Italian) was the sister unit of the Arab group composed of native Italians.
On 18 August 42, the Grand Mufti visited Centro A. He wanted to choose soldiers from this unit who would accompany him into Egypt and Palestine in the wake of the expected Italo-German victory and form the cadre of an Arab Army.
On 5 September 1942, the Reparto Missione Speciale formed under Captain Tellini. This unit was charged with the task of escorting the Mufti in Egypt. On 23 October 1942, Centro A was renamed Gruppo Formazioni A with 25 officers, 39 NCOs, 271 Italian soldiers and 100 Arab volunteers. It was organized into:
• 1st Reparto “Wanda” (5 platoons of Arabs)
• Reparto Guide—Esploratori (3 platoons of Italians, one of which was actually sent to Africa)
• Reparto Missione Speciale (the Mufti’s escort)
These units deployed to Naples to prepare for the Mufti’s escort mission, but this became impossible after El Alamein. On 15 Aug 1943, Gruppo Formazioni A (less one company) became the Battaglione d’Assalto Motorizzato (Motorized Assault Battalion). This battalion was located near Rome and after 8 September 1943 it joined in the fighting against the Germans.