The new Douglas airliner, the DC-4, seemed to fit the ATC’s requirements. Like the B-24, and unlike the “tail draggers” of the day, the DC-4 mounted tricycle landing gear, giving it a horizontal attitude on the flight line. Original specifications for the DC-4 originated with a proposal funded by five separate airlines in the United States. A prototype made test flights in 1938, but only United and American Airlines pushed development that led to the DC-4, which first flew in 1942.

An unpressurized airliner, the C-54 military type appeared in many variants. Early models carried only twenty-six passengers, but the manufacturer quickly introduced stretched versions to carry between forty and eighty people. The C-54B, for example, typically seated fifty medical evacuees or twenty-six stretcher cases. The C-54A represented a heavy lift type, equipped with an oversized cargo door and capable of loading fourteen thousand pounds or more, including vehicles like trucks and road-building equipment. Later versions of the C-54 carried more than twice the payload and could fly missions of more than forty-four hundred miles at a cruising speed of 220 mph; the airplane boasted a top speed of about 285 mph. Wartime production totalled 953 aircraft, the largest transport to be mass-produced during World War II. A number of executive modifications appeared, though none so well known as the “Sacred Cow,” equipped for the personal use of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Like the C-47, dozens of C-54 transports soldiered on into the post-war era at Air Force and allied bases on every continent.

Meanwhile, within the framework of Air Transport Command (ATC) requirements and airborne assault campaigns, a variety of special operations took place. One of these proceeded under the code name, FRANTIC. During the winter of 1943-44, as Germany moved many factories to the east and out of range of Allied bomber strikes, the concept of “shuttle bombing” took hold. The idea rested on bombing missions that could originate in Britain and at Allied bases in Italy, strike German targets at long range, and then proceed to convenient airfields in the Soviet Union. Refuelled and armed, the bombers would hit German targets again on their way home. After several frustrating planning sessions, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin finally agreed to the concept in February 1944.

In haste, the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe set up an Eastern Command to carry out the shuttle-bomb requirements for FRANTIC. Heavy equipment and bulky supplies went by sea to the port of Archangel, north of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg), and then to a quartet of new airfields in the Ukraine. Additional supplies and key personnel would fly in on ATC airplanes from U.S. bases in Iran. Delicate negotiations finally fixed a total of forty-two round-trip ATC missions to make the bases operational for the Army Air Force (AAF), and allowed an additional rate of two weekly support missions to sustain the U.S. contingent. The issue of flight communications eventually ended with a compromise, allowing U.S. crews to carry out navigation and radio duties with a Soviet observer resident at all related communications centres.

Eventually, the ATC in support of FRANTIC delivered some 450 personnel and thirty-six thousand pounds of cargo by June 1944. The same month, Gen. Ira Eaker made the first shuttle bombing mission with 129 B-17 bombers of the Mediterranean Air Force. Operations continued through the middle of August 1944, by which time the original sixteen targets identified for Operation FRANTIC had been taken by the rapidly advancing Soviet offensives. A reluctant Stalin agreed to a winter intermission of operations; U.S. and Soviet advances by the spring of 1945 ended the need for shuttle missions and the ATC flew out the last U.S. contingent in June 1945. Operation FRANTIC demonstrated the flexibility of airlift equipment and personnel. It also demonstrated the political role of airlift logistics in terms of operational support that would have been impossible by conventional ground-based means.