The Making of Mafeking

The Perry brothers help a programme about Baden-Powell’s book Scouting for Boys which was to be shown as part of BBC4′s forthcoming Edwardian Season (this edition is to be shown on 14th May BBC 4 at 9 o’clock ). Specifically they needed was an accurate and detailed model of the Siege of Mafeking during the Boer War to show how Baden-Powell’s small force and cunning weezes could hold at bay 7,700 Boers (odds of six to one) for 217 days and how the siege gave birth to the Scout movement.

To the west on the railway line to Rhodesia at Mafeking, Colonel Baden-Powell’s force of some 1,200 men was besieged by 5,000 Boers under Piet Cronje and J. H. De la Rey. There were substantial stores in the town as a trader, Mr Ben Weil, who had his wholesale business headquarters there, had accepted an assurance from the British Prime Minister’s son and Baden-Powell’s second-in-command, Lord Edward Cecil, that they would be paid for. Down line to the south of Mafeking, on the border of the Cape and the Orange Free State, the route for relief from Cape Town was blocked on 14 October when Kimberley was besieged by about 7,000 men. Here Lieutenant-colonel R. G. Kekewich had 600 Regular soldiers, including his own regiment, the 1st Loyal North Lancashire, and some 2,000 police and volunteers. By happy or unhappy chance, depending on whose side you were on, Cecil Rhodes was in town at the time and had to remain there, making strident demands of his political friends to be rescued and behaving to Kekewich as if the military was a subsidiary of his business. North of Mafeking only a small force under Plumer was available, unable to move to the relief as it was vulnerable on the long flank with Transvaal territory. On the western front the situation stayed static. In Natal Joubert was on the move south, soon to be joined from the Orange Free State by Prinsloo. Meanwhile Buller was isolated and out of touch on the high seas.

MAFEKING

The little town of Mafeking on the border of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, of which it was the administrative capital although it was in Cape Colony, had a population of about 1,700 whites and 5,000 black Africans, most of them Barolong in the adjoining settlement of Mafikeng. In September 1899 it had been discounted as a defensible position by the authorities in Cape Town and its only hope lay in the forces in the north. There Colonel R. S. S. Baden- Powell had organised the Protectorate Regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel C. O. Hore, based north of Mafeking in the Protectorate, and the Rhodesia Regiment under Colonel Herbert Plumer, the latter based in Bulawayo. The recruiting was carried out in secret.

In terms of inflicting damage on the British, besieging Mafeking appears a rather mistaken gambit on the part of the Boers, but it was hoped that it would lead to an uprising of Dutchmen in Cape Colony and, possibly even more important, it had symbolic significance as it was the starting point for the Jameson Raid.

By the end of August it was clear that the supplies accumulating in Mafeking were in need of a guard as the Boer forces in the area were reported variously as being between 5,000 and 20,000 men. On 19 September Baden-Powell moved the Protectorate Regiment into Mafeking with Colonel C. B. Vyvyan as Base Commandant; he had the men where he wanted them in a well-victualled and defensible place. His guns were not up to much, he had received two muzzle-loading 7-pdrs. instead of the howitzers he asked for, and he had far too few men, a mere 20 officers and 680 men, including police. To this were added the Town Guards, somewhat reluctant citizens numbering, perhaps, 300 who complained that they had to do all the work. With this force Baden-Powell succeeded in holding the town. Delicacy, tact and diplomacy were irrelevant; an iron determination and a strong streak of stubbornness were needed, as well as a large portion of luck. Plus a willingness to make use of the loyal and courageous Baralong, a feature of the siege not admitted afterwards even by Baden-Powell himself – some 750 of them were armed (Baden- Powell admitted to 300) and known as the ‘Black Watch’.

In the circumstances deception was to prove a key contributor to success. The building of fortifications was undertaken with great energy, two defensive areas being defined, the Exterior embracing the native stadt, Mafikeng, to the south-west on the other side of the railway tracks from the European town, with the southernmost point at Cannon Kopje and a series of forts covering the western approaches astride the Malopo River. The Interior area was the European town itself, protected on the west by the British South Africa Police fort and on the north by the armoured train on its siding. Major Alick Godley, Adjutant of the Protectorates, commanded the western defences and Colonel Vyvyan the Interior.

There was still hope of acquiring more guns, but this was dashed when, on 12 October, De la Rey cut the railway line at Kraaipan, 35 miles (55km) south of Mafeking, and attacked the train transporting the weapons – the first action of the war. Not only were the guns lost, but also the armoured train, one of two he had, that Baden-Powell had sent to fetch them. The next day Boers were seen from Cannon Kopje and the other train was sent out to prevent them settling in too close. On 14 October Lord Charles Cavendish- Bentinck was sent out with A Squadron of the Protectorates to investigate what was happening to the north, and very nearly got caught in a trap as the canny Boers retreated to ensnare him. Baden-Powell had to send out a reserve squadron under Captain Charles FitzClarence only to learn that he too was yielding to the temptation to pursue the Boers too closely. Out went the mighty train and an order to FitzClarence to withdraw to prevent disaster, but a benefit was the impression of British strength and confidence given to the Boers.

General Piet Cronje brought up his Creusot on 24 October. The shelling from the 75mm guns had been going on for some days, unpleasant but relatively harmless in a spread-out township. Now serious damage would be done. The next day a Boer attack on the stadt was thrown back, mainly by the armed Baralong, and Baden-Powell decided a counter offensive was necessary. On the night of 26 October FitzClarence led an attack on the trenches closest to the town, to the north-east. The result was unsatisfactory, surprise was not achieved and a decision to use only the bayonet reduced Boer casualties to, perhaps, three killed and some wounded while the British lost six dead and nine wounded as well as two missing. On 31 October a determined attack was launched against Cannon Kopje which was defended by 45 British South Africa Police commanded by Colonel J. A. Walford. Some 700 Boers came from the south and a second group from the south-west. The shell-fire on the fort continued unrelentingly as the Boers came on and it seemed certain that they must succeed. It was the gunnery of Lieutenant K. Murchison that turned the tide. With two puny 7-pdrs. and remarkable accuracy the attackers were put to flight.

As the days passed Cronje came to the conclusion that his energies were better spent elsewhere. The shelling continued, but the British seemed to be set solid and able to resist direct attacks. A force of 2,000 men under J. P. Snyman was left to continue the siege. Inside the town life was boring and unpleasant. Drunkenness became a serious problem, and one officer had to be relieved of his duties because of his habitual inebriation. The daily bombardment did not kill many, but in a population of 1,700 white civilians and 700 soldiers, the eventual loss of 115 killed was considerable, and almost everyone would know nearly all of the slain. Amongst the Africans the causes of death are not categorised, so the total of about 700 includes those who died of disease or starvation.

Baden-Powell stands accused of deliberate withholding of food from the Africans, but this is hard to sustain in the light of recent research. In the latter stages of the siege disease became a serious problem, particularly of the very young and very old, and thus had a greater impact on the black population. Even so the figures speak for themselves; the death rate amongst the Europeans was half of that of the Africans.

The physical destruction accumulated until, as Filson Young of the Manchester Guardian reported when at last he was able to enter the town,

‘As one passed house after house, one with a gaping hole in its side, another with the chimneys overthrown, and another with a whole wall stove in, none with its windows completely glazed, all bearing some mark of war – as this panorama of destruction unfolded itself one marvelled that anyone should have lived through the siege.’

There was little Baden-Powell could do about it. He had no artillery that could hurt the Boer emplacements. Careful sniping scored modest victories and a ship’s gun a century old was found being used as a gatepost and pressed into service. Although it had ‘B.P. & Co.’ marked on it, it was dubbed Lord Nelson and fired solid shot at the enemy. Good for morale, but little else. It was frustration that led the defenders into a foray with fatal consequences. North of the town the Boers had dug trenches known to the British as Game Tree Fort. They were assumed to be open trenches, no one recalling that, as Baden-Powell himself had noted on 17 November, they had been roofed with corrugated iron and covered with earth.

Just before daybreak on 26 December 150 men attacked this stronghold. The armoured train was out in support together with three 7-pdrs. and two Maxims and a further 100 men were in reserve with another gun. It was costly and unsuccessful, with 26 killed and as many again wounded or captured. The Boers suffered 13 casualties, three fatal. Three Victoria Crosses were won that morning, one awarded to FitzClarence. Nothing like it was tried again. From then until the relief in May 1900 survival was the objective and survival alone.

THE RELIEF OF MAFEKING

As the advance on the Transvaal began in the centre, two forces were on the move away to the west, striking for Mafeking. From the north Colonel Herbert Plumer with his Rhodesians and from the south Colonel Bryan Mahon with a flying column of about 1,000 men from the Imperial Light Horse, the Kimberley Mounted Corps with a small number of infantrymen and four guns of M Battery, Royal Horse Artillery and some machine-guns crossed the Vaal on 4 May. Plumer was trying for a second time; he had been badly mauled at the end of March. As a result Baden-Powell seriously contemplated withdrawing from the town in secret and surrendering it to the Boers. Now he daily awaited news of the progress of the relieving forces.

On the morning of 12 May, before sunrise, gunfire from the north-east woke the people of Mafeking, Baden-Powell amongst them. His first reaction was to telephone Lieutenant H. T. Mackenzie, commander of the ‘Black Watch’, the armed Africans who were in the forts on the south-west, and found them still in place. He then contacted Major Alexander Godley on the west, just as a messenger arrived, and was able to give Godley the news that a Boer force had entered the stadt, Mafikeng, taken it, and pushed on to capture the British South Africa Police Fort on the western edge of the European township, Mafeking. Orders were issued to close up the western defences to prevent reinforcement of the intruders. It soon became clear that Commandant Sarel Eloff, a grandson of Kruger and second in command to Snyman, had led the attack and was now in the BSAP fort with about 150 men, three-fifths of his attacking force. They were quickly surrounded, Baden-Powell thinning the garrison on the east and south to find the men. Colonel Hore, three officers and 23 other ranks were prisoners in Eloff’s hands, as also was Nurse A. M. Craufurd who had been caught up in the original attack.

Godley wasted no time in dealing with the Boers in Mafikeng. Indeed, the Baralong might well have done the job without assistance. Fearing the dangers of shooting his own side, Godley was content to drive the attackers out of the town rather than to kill or capture them. Nonetheless Boer casualties included nine killed or wounded and some 25 prisoners here. At the BSAP fort the captives’ number had been augmented by Angus Hamilton, correspondent of The Times, who had approached thinking the men around the fort were British. He reported Eloff’s courtesy and steadiness as the long day passed and no reinforcements came. Towards evening, having lost a number of men sent vainly to summon help, Eloff suffered the defection of yet more of his force. He went to the storeroom, where his prisoners were held, and asked Hore to accept his surrender and put a stop to the incessant rifle fire from the British. The Boer attempt, unsupported by Snyman, had failed.

Edward Ross, an auctioneer, had been recruited into the Town Guard early on, and complained of his treatment.

‘These [he and his like] are men who hold very high positions in the town, and who are now living in the trenches and doing Tommy Atkins’ work for no pay and less thanks… most of the men in one of the redoubts talk of getting up a petition and working for the removal of their commander.’

The tone was rather different after the events of 12 May.

“I can assure you it was indeed a lesson to all who saw him [Baden-Powell]. I had that luck. He stood there at the corner of his offices, the coolest of cucumbers possible, but his orders rattled out like the rip of a Maxim… [It] shewed us the ideal soldier, and what the British officer can be and is in moments of extreme peril.’

No doubt both passages of Ross’s memoirs have a proportion of truth.

On 13 May Mahon’s column had a brush with Commandant P. J. Liebenberg’s commando some 60 miles (100km) south of Mafeking, losing five killed and 21 wounded, but throwing off the Boers. On 15 May Mahon and Plumer met at Massibi, west of the besieged town, and two days later encountered more serious resistance to their progress. De la Rey had brought another 1,000 men to reinforce Liebenberg and Snyman had detached 200 to assist. They fought on the Molopo River at Israel’s Farm, some 8 miles (13km) north-west of Mafeking. British intelligence was good and Mahon put his trust in it, calculating that De la Rey had spread his forces wide to give the impression of even greater number than he actually had. A month before Major Joseph Hudon had been ordered to take C Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery, to join Plumer, by way of Beira and Bulawayo. Within 20 hours of his arrival he was marching with the Rhodesian Field Force, and now the Canadians were able to make their vital contribution, 180 rounds that, in the course of four hours, overcame four Boer gun positions. The infantry, veterans of the Natal campaign, worked their way forward in rushes supported by rifle and artillery covering fire. In reserve, men of the Queensland Mounted Infantry, chafed at being excluded from the battle. When they saw the English start their final bayonet charge they could stand still no longer and were soon running side by side with the attackers. The Boers broke and the way to Mafeking lay open.

Corporal Ernest Warby, from Sydney, was with the Imperial Light Horse and described the day.

‘At dusk we had the Boers beaten. Then our Major Karri Davies called for volunteers to ride with him into the town … You can bet I was in that lot. We galloped all the way, striking across country… The first challenge we got was an English voice: “Halt who goes there. ” We yelled out: “The Imperial Light Horse. ” ‘… Soon we were met by men galloping out to learn what was up. When we got to headquarters the crowd swarmed around us, everyone wanting to shake hands at once. Then they struck up “Rule Britannia” and the National Anthem.’

The news was greeted in England, Australia and Canada with an enthusiasm far greater than the strategic importance of this little town justified, a reaction that has encouraged myth and myth breaking on an equally exaggerated scale. For morale the relief was excellent, the last of the Boers’ initial objectives was back in British hands.