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Desert Snapshots 1941-42 V
23 Thursday Apr 2009
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23 Thursday Apr 2009
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23 Thursday Apr 2009
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In the Prussian army, cuirassier units were the senior cavalry and generally held in highest regard. At the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), the Prussian army list had two guard and eight line regiments, and these were probably the best equipped, mounted and trained heavy cavalry regiments in Europe. Except for the Garde du Corps and Guard Cuirassiers, the regiments were named after their place of recruiting, following the tradition of the Napoleonic Wars: 1st Silesian, 2nd Pomeranian, 3rd East Prussian, 4th Westphalian, 5th West Prussian, 6th Brandenburg, 7th Magdeburg and 8th Rhenish. Each consisted of four squadrons of 150 men, and a 200-man depot squadron.
According to Prussian cavalry rules of 1860, the requisite height for service in the cuirassiers was at least 170 cm/5 ft 7 in for men and 157.5 cm/62 in for horses. For Guard Cuirassiers, they were 175 cm and 162 cm/5 ft 9 in and 64 in respectively. For comparison, the minimum heights of men and mount for dragoon and uhlan units were 167 cm/5 ft 6 in and 155.5 cm/61 in, and for hussars and their horses 162 cm/5 ft 4 in and 152.5 cm/60 in. For light guard horsemen, the line was set at 172 cm/5 ft 8 in for men and 156 cm/61 in for their steeds. Cuirassier and dragoon regiments were mounted on Holstein, Hanover and Magdeburg breed horses.
The height of horses is measured from the withers in centimetres/inches or hands, a hand being equal to 10.16 cm/4 in. In horses of similar proportions a difference in height of 1 cm (less than ½ in), though seemingly negligible, could mean a difference in weight of 10-20 kg/22-44 lb. A Guard Cuirassier horse 162 cm/64 in tall could weigh up to 600 kg/330 lb while a hussar horse 152.5 cm/60 in tall would be about 450 kg/990 lb.
In the initial phase of the Battle of Mars-la-Tour, on 16 August 1870, a Prussian cavalry brigade made up of the 7th Magdeburg Cuirassiers and the 16th Uhlans executed a charge against the French infantry and artillery which became known as the todesritt (death ride). The French infantry threatened to attack the weak Prussian left wing near Vionville, jeopardizing further Prussian advances. As reinforcements failed to materialize, General Alvensleben ordered General von Bredow to charge with his brigade, consciously sacrificing them to halt the enemy until his own troops arrived. Von Bredow led his men into the charge spread out in a line, with the cuirassiers under Major Count von Schmetow on the left and the uhlans on the right, in all about 700 men. Under fire from cannon and machine-guns, the Prussians pierced the French defensive lines and cut down the artillery crews and the infantry around them. Carried away by their success, they attacked the French troops behind the first line, but were surprised by a division of enemy cavalry and routed. Less than half the brigade returned – 104 cuirassiers and 90 uhlans. The charge held the French back until the end of the day, and removed the danger to the Prussians’ left wing.
Fearing new attacks, the French brought in another cavalry division, while the Prussians used their cavalry to secure the arrival of reinforcements. At Mars-la-Tour, 5,000 French and Prussian cuirassiers clashed in the greatest cavalry battle of the war.
23 Thursday Apr 2009
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An interesting employment of experimental units to develop new approaches to war during the conduct of campaigns in World War I was the British Army’s creation of a tank force, which was to play a major role in the Allied victory in late summer and fall 1918. The tank did not exist as a weapon or even as a concept-at least in the minds of military men-before the outbreak of the conflict. It received its initial impetus for development from Winston Churchill in 1914, when Churchill was still First Lord of the Admiralty. [1]
The first tanks were developed by desperate innovation in the United Kingdom. The greatest difficulties the British confronted in employing were the harsh realities that
· no organization existed to employ or maintain such vehicles,
· no tactical conceptions yet existed for their employment in combat, and
· no means yet existed for tanks to cooperate with infantry, much less artillery.
Given the lack of reliability of a new technology and weapons system, just getting tanks to the battlefront in France from the factories and training facilities in the United Kingdom represented a considerable challenge.
Recent research has shown that the post-war view propagated by British armoured war advocates J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart-namely that Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig and the British High Command displayed little interest in tanks-was not true. In fact, Haig, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force in France, was quite supportive of the development of the tank, along with a number of other weapons systems. [2] As Fuller grudgingly admitted after the war, Haig’s use of the first experimental tank unit at the Somme in September 1916 was an absolute necessity in order to examine the tactical utility of the armoured fighting vehicle as well as its mechanical limitations. [3]
Discovering the best way to employ such a radically new weapons system demanded the creation of an experimental unit. The establishment of the experimental tank unit in Britain received the initial title of “the Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps”-the title undoubtedly an effort to provide security about the development of a new weapon. In July 1917, with the tank now having received considerable publicity in the British press, and undoubtedly known to the Germans by its use in battle, the experimental unit received a Royal Warrant constituting it as the “Tank Corps.” [4] The new title came at a time when the fortunes of the tank hardly appeared bright. Armoured fighting vehicles had proven of some use on the Somme, but in the Messines attack of June 7, 1917, out of sixty-nine tanks used, only nineteen proved of any use to the attacking infantry, while forty-eight of the tanks ditched (i.e., stuck in trenches) and seventeen broke down entirely. [5]
A number of factors contributed to the initial difficulties the British encountered in utilizing the new weapon:
· First, there was little commonality of experience between the tank crews and the front-line infantry, as there had been between the Stormtroops and the front-line German infantry.
· Equally important, the initial commitment involved the tanks in terrain that had been thoroughly chewed up by artillery bombardments, straining vehicles that were already mechanically unreliable.
Nevertheless, initial setbacks were not sufficient to end the British Expeditionary Force’s support for continued development of the weapons system. [6] Moreover, the experimental Tank Corps attracted and then nurtured a number of imaginative and innovative advocates for the further development and employment of the tank. Foremost among these was J. F. C. Fuller.
In November 1917, Haig supported a major blow by the Tank Corps against German positions at Cambrai. Here there was no long preliminary bombardment to alert the Germans and wreck the landscape. Rather after a short, sharp bombardment, over three hundred tanks struck out across no-man’s land, with fifty-four held in reserve. The attack succeeded in entirely rupturing the German front lines. The success must be seen as a sign of the emergence of combined-arms warfare rather than a singular success for the Tank Corps. [7] By now the crews in the Royal Tank Corps were learning how to work with the infantry, while the artillery bombardment, predicated on new techniques of indirect fire and off-the-map shooting, was able to make major contributions. Finally, the Royal Air Force rolled in with the first true use of massed close air support in the war.
The Cambrai success was such that the Tank Corps would have an even more important role in 1918. But it still remained very much an experimental unit. Above all, it still was not a regiment, the key mark of permanence in the British Army’s scheme of organization. Moreover, in the defensive fighting that marked the first half of 1918 on the Allied side, it remained of limited utility because of its lack of speed and mechanical reliability. Nevertheless, by 1918 the experimental force had reached quite respectable proportions. Reorganized after the Battle of Cambrai, the Tank Corps was to have two heavy groups and one light group, each heavy with two brigades, each with 288 tanks. The light group was to consist of 410 of a new, more mobile armoured fighting vehicle. In the first major British offensive of 1918, the Amiens attack beginning on August 8, 1918, the Tank Corps was able to make a substantial-if not decisive-contribution to a victory that Ludendorff later described as the “blackest” day of the German Army in the war. A sudden, massive artillery barrage, the skilful use of gas, and 430 tanks, working with infantry with whom they had carefully trained, destroyed six German divisions in a day. [8]
Succeeding British attacks over the course of the next three months were not able to utilize the tanks quite so effectively, due in part to losses suffered in the Amiens attack and in part to the speed with which conventional attacks now moved against a collapsing and defeated German Army. Nevertheless, the experimental Tank Corps made a substantial contribution to the successive British victories. It paid for its success in blood: of the 7,200 fully trained officers and men on the rolls of the Tank Corps on August 8, with a further 500 men in training, 561 officers and 2,627 Other Corps Ranks became casualties in three months of fighting. [9]
In the long term, the experimental tank unit was responsible for creating an entirely new weapons system and opening one of the avenues through which modern combined arms, mechanized warfare would emerge in the 1940s. From the beginning, British innovators confronted enormous difficulties:
· They first had to develop a new weapons system on a weak technological base;
· they had to figure out how to integrate that weapons system into an emerging and complex system of war; and
· they had to build up a support and training and logistics base to support the continued employment of a weapons system, the technology of which was also undergoing rapid change.
As one tank officer suggested with some pride shortly after the war: Taking it all in all, I doubt if there can be anything, even in the exceptional records of the war, to equal in extent and variety the growth of the technical, instructional, and supply branches of the Tank Corps during the last two years [of the war]. [10]
[1] The most thorough and careful reconstruction of the development of the tank in the British Army is J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995).
[2] In February of 1917, Haig placed tanks as his number three priority after the Royal Air Service-soon to become the Royal Air Force-and 188 locomotives to support the light railways behind British lines. With those exceptions Haig noted, “the prompt and continuous delivery of Tanks at the greatest rate at which they can be turned out and shipped to France should be ensured.” Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, p. 73.
[3] After the war Fuller commented on the first use of the tanks on the Somme to Liddell Hart in the following terms: “The use of the tanks on 15 September [1916] was not a mistake. Serious mechanical defects [were] manifested. No peace test can equal a war test.” Quoted in Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, p. 74.
[4] Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, p. 101.
[5] Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, p. 99.
[6] And that support, which placed tanks lower in priority than other weapons systems such as aircraft, must be seen in the light of the tank’s performance to that point in the war rather than in the light of what tanks proved able to do decades in the future.
[7] Which is how Fuller and Liddell Hart would see it throughout the interwar period.
[8] Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, pp. 169-179.
[9] Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, p. 186.
[10] Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks, p. 188
22 Wednesday Apr 2009
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Only Thorncrofts were able to meet the Royal Navy’s tight specification for the CMB. This is the 55-foot version.
The CMB was conceived to attack enemy vessels in their own harbours. This was their finest moment—and their swan song.
The raid on the Russian naval base at Kronstadt on August 18, 1919, was the highlight, and the swan song, of Coastal Motor Boat (CMB) actions in World War 1. It demonstrated that boldly and skilfully handled CMBs could achieve a great deal, but opinion in the Royal Navy regarding their fighting value remained split. In the decade following the end of the war, they gradually disappeared from the navy.
The CMB was conceived in 1915 with the idea of having fast torpedo-carrying motor boats to attack enemy vessels in their own harbours. As they were intended to be carried in a cruiser’s davits to the scene of operations, their total weight was restricted to 41/2 tons. It was a tight specification, and only one firm, Thornycrofts, were able to meet it. They produced a 40-foot boat capable of 34knots, carrying an 18 in. torpedo in a trough at the stern. The torpedo was fired, tail first, by a cordite charge. The boat was aimed at the target, turning away immediately the torpedo was fired. High speed was necessary for the boat to get out of the way of the torpedo.
After some experience with the 40 ft. type, the Admiralty decided that a larger boat would be useful. A 55 ft. CMB carrying one or two torpedoes and four Lewis guns was designed. Too big to be carried in davits, they had to proceed to the scene of operations under their own power, or in tow for big distances.
The CMBs never achieved their main purpose — an attack on the High Seas Fleet anchorage. They did see some action off the Belgian coast and in the Dover Straits against German destroyers and patrol craft.
The Armistice of 1918 brought an end to fighting in Western Europe. But in the Baltic area, there was a complicated imbroglio going on. Britain and France were supporting the newly created Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Estonia and Lithuania against the Bolsheviks, as well as assisting the White Russian Army.
Rear Admiral Sir Walter Cowan had been sent to the Baltic early in 1919 to command a force of light cruisers and destroyers holding the Russian Fleet at Kronstadt in check. Against his 6in gun cruisers the Russians could muster the 12in. gun dreadnought Petropavlosk, the 12in. gun pre-dreadnought Andrei Pervosvanni, and the 8in. gun armoured cruiser Oleg. Luckily, they showed little initiative.
There were no CMBs attached initially to the British force. The first boats to arrive in the Baltic were CMBs Nos. 4 and 7. These two 40 ft. boats, under the command of Lieutenant Augustus Aga, R.N., were sent to carry out “courier” duties for the Intelligence Service, and did not come under Cowan’s command. Unarmed, their task was to ferry agents in and out of the Bolshevik-held territory. Their crews wore civilian clothes, but carried uniforms to don if in danger of capture.
Agar established a base at Terrioki, on the north shore of Petrograd Bay. From here the boats ran by night to a point near Petrograd to land or pick up their passengers. Lt. Agar was not a man to accept a passive role easily. Reporting his arrival to Rear Admiral Cowan at Biorko, he requested to be supplied with torpedoes. Cowan reluctantly agreed to supply these, on the understanding that if they were carried the boats would fly the White Ensign and the three-man crews would be in uniform. Two 18in. torpedoes then were sent to Terrioki.
There was some unrest in Kronstadt among the sailors who were generally unsympathetic to the Bolsheviks. At the beginning of June, Fort Krasnaya Gorka on the south shore of the bay revolted against the Bolsheviks. To bring the rebels to heel, the Petropavlosk and the Andrei Pervosvanni bombarded the fort. Anchoring where the forts guns would not bear, they began to leisurely lob in 12in. shells.
Agar felt that if the fort could hold out it might induce the sailors in Kronstadt to rise. But how long could they stand this bombardment? Orders forbade the boats to take aggressive action. A signal to London explaining matters drew a reply to the effect that the boats were to be used for intelligence purposes only. However, a rider was added that no action was to be taken without the consent of the SNO Baltic. Agar pondered this last sentence. The Rear Admiral was too far away at Biorko for immediate consultation. So Agar decided to take his approval for granted. He began to plan an attack on the two battleships.
Early on the morning Friday June 1, White Ensign flying, he set out in No. 7 to reconnoitre the battleships. At 0200 hours, he located the two battleships at anchor, with a destroyer guard. An attempt at attack was prevented by a sudden engine failure. Unable to reach torpedo firing speed, there was nothing to do but return to Terrioki.
On the night of June 16, Agar had another go, taking both boats. Rounding Tolbukhin lighthouse No. 7′s propeller struck some heavy floating object. The impact sheared the propeller shaft. So there was nothing for it but to return to Terrioki with the cripple in tow.
Despite two failures, Agar was determined to carry on. Next night he set out again in No. 4. Sailing from Terrioki at 2230 hours, he set a course west beyond Tolbukhin lighthouse. Proceeding in rather heavy seas, he went about three miles to the west before circling round to approach the fort — to make it appear that the attack had come from Biorko.
Reaching the anchorage where the battleships should be, Agar failed to find them — they had returned to Kronstadt. But he did locate a four-funnelled cruiser anchored with a guard of four destroyers, a sloop and a torpedo boat. This was the Oleg, which had replaced the battleships. No. 4 slipped between the destroyers and prepared to attack. At this critical point Sub. Lt. Hampsheir, in preparing the torpedo, accidentally fired the charge. Luckily, the two clamps were still on and the torpedo did not leave the trough. But it meant a new charge had to be fitted. Working in the dark in the rolling boat only 700 yards from a guard destroyer, it took 20 minutes to fit the charge. Luckily, the CMB remained undetected.
The new charge fitted, Agar swept in to attack. Increasing speed, he slipped through the guard ships. Approaching the Oleg at full speed, he fired his torpedo at a range of 800 yards, turning away to starboard afterwards. As No. 4 sped away, her crew saw a white fountain of water leap up the Oleg’s port side just abaft the forward funnel. The explosion was the signal for the Russian ships to open a wild, heavy fire at the CMBs wake. Most shots fell wide, but three heavy shells fell close enough to throw up No. 4′s stern and cause her to temporarily reduce speed.
Agar’s last sight of the Oleg showed her settling by the head, heavy black smoke pouring from her funnels. The torpedo had been fired at 0005 hours. By 0030, the CMB was far enough away to reduce speed and set course for Terrioki, which she reached at 0145.
The sound of the firing was heard at Biorko. No cause could be ascribed for it until a signal was received from Agar reporting the events of the night. Later a plane took off from the improvised landing strip at Biorko and flew over the area and this reconnaissance revealed the Oleg lying on her port side near the north-east end of Kotlin Island. It also revealed that the blow had come too late for Fort Krasnaya Gorka. The Red Flag was once more flying over it.
But if this successful attack was too late to save the fort, it had the effect of setting the Rear Admiral thinking. He sent a signal to Lt. Agar to come over to Biorko. When Agar arrived, Cowan discussed with him the feasibility of a raid on Kronstadt itself to neutralise the two battleships. After due consideration, Agar considered it was possible. A signal was then sent to the Admiralty, requesting a flotilla of CMBs, a request duly granted.
A flotilla of eight boats under the command of Commander Dobson, R.N., set out in tow from the CMB base at Osea Island. One — No.67 — was lost en route, the others reached Biorko on August 2.
They were the 55ft. boat, armed and commanded as follows:‑
No. 31 Commander Dobson and Lt. McBean 2 torpedoes
No. 79 Lt. Breaner 1 torpedo
No. 88 Lt. Dayrell-Reid 2 torpedoes
No. 24 Lt. Napier 1 torpedo
No. 72 Sub-Lt. Bodley 1 torpedo
No. 62 Lt.-Cmdr. Brade 2 torpedoes
No. 86 Sub-Lt. Howard 2 torpedoes
The cruiser Vindictive, which had been converted for aircraft carrying, took on the task of acting as mother ship to the flotilla. No time was lost in getting down to arranging a plan for action, for it was desirable to strike before the news of the CMBs arrival leaked through to Kronstadt. The earliest moonless nights would be between August 17 and 24. A plan of action was drawn up to be put into operation as soon as opportunity arose.
It was decided that the best way would be for the boats to attack in two groups of three, with a short interval between attacks for the first group to clear the harbour. The seventh boat would deal with the guard ship. Lt. Agar would pilot the boats through the line of forts guarding the North Channel. While the raid was on, he would lie outside the adjacent military harbour to attack any craft which might attempt to come out. To assist the boats in achieving surprise, an air raid would be mounted by the Vindictive’s mixed bag of planes, to start just before the boats entered the basin.
The actual date of the raid was fixed by the weather. On August 15, strong westerly winds resulted in the tideless waters of the Baltic being raised three feet in Petrograd Bay. By the 17th, this was a bonus not to be missed. On that afternoon, a reconnaissance flight was made over the basin, Commander Dobson going along to have a view of his targets.
The first group of boats would go for the priority targets, the Petropavlosk, the Andrei Pervosvanni, and the submarine depot ship Pamiat Azova. The second wave would repeat the attack if they failed. If the first wave succeeded, the second would attack the dry dock gates and the mine laying cruiser Rurik. She to be attacked last as her 300 mines would make a very unpleasant explosion.
At 0030 hours that day, the boats from Biorko rendezvoused with Lt. Agar in No. 7 off Inonini Point. The services of two 2 local smugglers as pilots had been obtained by suitable payment. One went in Agar’s boat, the other with Commander Dobson.
The flotilla moved off at 20 knots, a speed at which the CMB’s engine were not too noisy. Agar could see the spray from No. 24 behind him, but soon lost sight of the other boats. As they approached the line of forts, their wash was sighted and a spasmodic fire from machine guns and light artillery was opened on them. The forts did not, however, use searchlights. Agar’s pilot elected to pass over the submerged concrete breakwater about the middle of the chain. No damage was sustained from the fire of the forts, but at this time the force suffered its first setback. Lt. Howard’s No. 86 had an engine breakdown just before reaching the forts and had to be left behind.
As the boats began their turn to starboard to pass round the east end of Kotlin Island, the sound of anti-aircraft guns and the beams of searchlights indicated that the air raid was underway and the attention of the port’s defences well occupied. Arriving off the entrance to the basin, Agar found that the boats of the first wave had already arrived. Not long after sailing, the three boats led by Dobson had got so far over to starboard that they found themselves close to the north shore of Kotlin Island. Their local pilot turned away to port and passed through a gap in the breakwater closer inshore than Agar. This was made possible by the three-foot increase in depth. As a result of this, the boats arrived a little ahead of schedule.
The first boat to go in was No. 79 Lt. Bremner, at 0140 hours. He was equipped with wire-cutting gear and guncotton charges to deal with any boom or chain, but found no obstructions. No. 79 was able to accelerate across the basin and fire her torpedo at the Pamiat Azova. The noise of the aircraft engines helped to drown the noisy CMB engines and complete surprise was achieved. The explosion of the torpedo was the first indication to the Russians that the attack was on.
Dobson’s No. 31 followed No. 79 but swung away to port to attack the battleships. As he did so, the defences began to come to life in the harbour. The basin was swept by machine-gun fire and searchlights were exposed. No. 31 was able to get a good shot and both torpedoes struck the Andrei Pervosvanni. By now the basin was like the proverbial hornet’s nest. The last boat, No. 88, found herself under heavy fire. Sub-Lt. Steel was firing back with the Lewis gun as Lt. Dayrell-Reid swung the boat round to port. From behind his gun, Steel suddenly realised that the boat was swinging too far to port for her shot at the battleships. A quick glance revealed that the lieutenant was slumped across the wheel, shot in the head.
Abandoning the Lewis gun, Steel managed to get the body off the wheel and brought the boat back to starboard. He just managed to reach the aiming position and fire the torpedoes before the boat was too close.
One torpedo struck an anchor chain but the other struck the Petropavlosk under the forward turret. The CMB was so close that, as she turned away to port, water and debris from the explosion fell around her. Steel took No. 88 to join No. 31 in the waiting area at the south end of the basin, and both boats then left the basin. For some reason, No. 79 was late leaving, with disastrous consequences.
The attack by the first wave had been lucky. Now began a series of misfortunes. The first was to No. 24. As planned, Lt. Napier attacked the guard ship, the destroyer Gavril anchored outside. For some reason, the torpedo missed and No. 24 was struck by a shell which split her in half as she turned away.
The second wave had already had the misfortune to lose the services of No. 86. Fifteen minutes after the first wave had gone in, Lt. Brade’s No. 62 swung into the basin and collided with No. 79, which was just coming out. He struck No. 79 on the port side, almost cutting her in half. With no reverse gear, No. 62 could not back out. Instead Brade kept her going ahead and managed to turn so that he pushed No. 79 ahead of him out of the basin. Lt. Lt. Bremner ordered his two-man crew to clamber aboard No. 62 while he set the fuses of the guncotton charges to ensure No. 79′s destruction. Shortly after he had clambered aboard No. 62 and Brade had got clear of No. 79, the latter blew up.
Since he still had his torpedoes, Brade decided to have a go at the Gavril. This vessel seemed to have a charmed life for, once again, the torpedoes missed her. As No. 62 was heading away, a shell struck her. It completely wrecked the engines and holed the boat so badly that she sank shortly afterwards.
The last boat, Sub-Lt. Bodley’s No. 72, entered the basin and headed for the dry dock, intending to torpedo the gates. She got halfway there when a shell splinter struck the cockpit. Nobody was hurt, but the splinter struck and distorted the torpedo-firing mechanism, jamming it. Unable to fire his torpedo, Bodley turned away and sped out of the basin. Running back round the eastern end of the island, he passed the forts and found the disabled No. 86. A towline was rigged, and Bodley towed her to Terrioki.
Agar’s No. 7 was the last to leave. Since no craft had come out of the other basin, No. 7 still had her torpedo, and Agar decided to use it on a clump of small craft lying inside this basin. It exploded doing considerable damage. At about 0210 hours, Agar set course for base.
With the forts now thoroughly alerted, the CMBs would have had an uncomfortable passage. They were helped here by the aircraft, which carried out a series of low flying attacks on the forts. These attacks, together with the use of smoke floats, enabled the boats to get past the searchlights and shellfire without damage.
Rear Admiral Cowan had provided a backing-up force of light cruisers and destroyers at the head of the bay, which had moved in after the attack started. They met No. 31 and No. 88, and the wounded Lt. Dayrell-Reid was transferred to the Delhi’s sickbay where he died a little later. The surviving boats returned to Terrioki where they refuelled and except for No. 7, returned to Biorko.
A reconnaissance flight over the basin later in the day revealed that the Pamiat Azova was lying on her port side, and the two battleships were sitting on the bottom. They could only sink about three feet but were going to be out of action for a long time. The cost for this had been three CMBs lost, four officers and four ratings killed, and three officers and six ratings taken prisoner. Amazingly, despite the difficulties of taking off and landing on the improvised airstrip at night, there were no aircraft casualties.
Cmdr. Dobson and Sub-Lt. Steel were awarded the VC. Lt. Agar was also awarded a VC for his attack on the Oleg, but as this was cloaked in security it has been called “the mystery VC”. Several D.S.O’s, D.S.G.’s, D.S.M.’s and D.F.C.’s were also awarded.
Although the CMBs disappeared from the Navy, one of the boats engaged in these events has survived. CMB No. 4 was acquired by her builders, Thornycrofts, and preserved in their yard. When the boatyard was closed down, she was handed over the Imperial War Museum. Her hull is now in storage awaiting suitable exhibition space.
Admiral Bacon, in his book on the Dover Patrol, summed up the verdict on CMBs considering that they had great potential value “provided their general unreliability and fact of special use was recognised.”
21 Tuesday Apr 2009
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by Erwin Sieche
On 6 August 1914 an Anglo-French naval agreement was signed, giving France the general leadership of naval operations in the Mediterranean. The remaining British Mediterranean forces, namely one or two armored cruisers, four light cruisers, sixteen destroyers and the mobile defenses of Gibraltar and Malta would be placed under the orders of the CinC of the French fleet and both Gibraltar and Malta would be open as bases to the French.
One day after the French Declaration of War against Austria-Hungary on 11 August 1914 the French fleet under Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère entered Malta. He had orders to sail as soon as possible with all available French and British ships, pass ostentatiously in view of the Italian coast while preserving amicable relations with the Italians, and undertake whatever operation he thought best against an Austrian port.
Lapeyrère decided immediately on a sweep into the Adriatic to surprise the Austrian vessels enforcing a blockade of Montenegro. The Allied forces comprised the French battleships COURBET (flagship), JEAN BART, the cruiser JULIEN DE LA GRAVIÈRE, the French 1st battle squadron comprising DIDEROT, DANTON, VERGNIAUD, VOLTAIRE, CONDORÇET, the 2nd battle squadron comprising VÉRITÉ, RÉPUBLIQUE, PATRIE, JUSTICE, DÉMOCRATIE, the 1st cruiser squadron with JULES MICHELET, ERNEST RENAN, EDGAR QUINTET, the 2nd cruiser squadron with LÉON GAMBETTA, VICTOR HUGO, JULES FERRY and 5 destroyer squadrons, the British element comprised the armored cruisers DEFENCE and WARRIOR and three destroyer divisions. This overwhelming force succeeded in cutting off and sinking the lonely Austro-Hungarian 3rd class cruiser ZENTA off Antivari [Bar], being on perimeter patrol, on 16 August. According to the great number of Anglo-British warships there was considerable confusion in fire-control leading in an excessive amount of firepower employed in sinking the small cruiser while her consort, the destroyer ULAN, managed to escape north.
On 29 November 1914 the submarine CUGNOT managed to intrude into the Bocche di Cattaro [Boka Kotorska] as deep as into Topla Bay but was chased out by the destroyer BLITZ, the torpedo boat Tb 57T and the seaplane E.34.
A fortnight later the submarine CURIE lay in wait off the harbor barrage of Pola [Pula] to wait for her chance to intrude. Two days later, on 20 December, during an attempt to sneak into the harbour she got entangled in the outer wire net barrage and could not free herself. Forced to surface to get fresh air, she was sunk by gunfire of the destroyer MAGNET and the Tb 63T, taking with her three while 23 men were rescued. In the inter-war period the French named a submarine after the drowned 2nd officer, Pierre Chailley. Another sub received the name [Gabriel?] O’Byrne after the commander of the CURIE, who had died in France after having being released from A.-H. POW in 1917. The Austrians raised the wreck step by step from 39 m depth between 21 December 1914 and 2 February 1915. It had suffered only little damages and because of the urgent need for ocean-going submarines she was repaired and commissioned as A.-H. U 14 on 1 June 1915.
On 21 December 1914 the A.-H. sub U 12 (Lerch) scores a torpedo hit on the French battleship JEAN BART off Saseno [Sazen Island]. The JEAN BART has to proceed to Malta for extensive repairs.
On 24 February 1915 the French destroyer DAGUE, while escorting the transport WHITEHEAD to Antivari [Bar] sinks after hitting a mine.
On 27 February 1915 the U 12 (Lerch) was unsuccessfully attacked off Cape Menders [Rat Mendra] by a French BRUMAIRE-type sub with two torpedoes.
On 4 April 1915 the U 5 (Schlosser) unsuccessfully chased a French armored cruiser of the VICTOR HUGO type off Paxos.
On 27 April 1915 the A.-H. sub U 5 (Trapp) torpedoed the French armored cruiser LÉON GAMBETTA after a two-day intense chase off Santa Maria di Leuca, causing 684 fatalities including the French C-in-C of the 2nd light division, Rear-Admiral Sénès. Only 137 French sailors survived. The cruiser sank on position 3945′N/1830′E.
On 5 June 1915 four different Allied task forces attacked the Austrian coast: GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI, VARESE, FRANCSCO FERRUCCIO, VETTOR PISANI escorted by the French destroyers COMMANDANT RIVIÈRE, BISSON, BOUCLIER, MAGON shelled Ragusa Vecchia [Cavtat]; the British cruiser DUBLIN escorted by the Italian destroyers IMPAVIDO, INDOMITO, INSIDIOSO, INTREPIDO, IMPETUOSO fired on Donzella; QUARTO escorted by ANIMOSO, ARDENTE, AUDACE, ARDITO bombarded Lagosta [Lastovo Island]; NINO BIXIO escorted by the Italian destroyers FRANCESCO NULLO, IRRIQUIETO, and the French COMMANDANT-BORY, PROTET shelled Lissa [Vi Island] and Sant’ Andrea [Svetac Island].
On 5 December 1915 the French sub FRÉSNEL (Jouen) ran aground at the Bojana estuary [Usce Bojane] due to bad navigation, is detected by the A.-H. destroyer WARASDINER and destroyed by gunfire.
On 30 December 1915 the French sub MONGE (Morrillot) is rammed by the cruiser HELGOLAND, forced to surface because of damages and finally sunk by gunfire of the A.-H. destroyer BALATON. Commander Roland Morillot remained in the boat to ensure that it sinks and does not fall into enemy hands; in 1947 the ex-German type-21 sub U 2518 was named after him.
On September 15th, 1916 the two A.-H. seaplanes L.132 (Konjovics, Sewera) and L.135 (Zelezny, Klimburg) force by bombing the French sub FOUCAULT (Dévin) to surface. L.135 finally sinks the sub while the 27 survivors were clinging to the two planes now floating, to be finally saved by the alarmed Tb 100M. This was the first sinking of a submarine by airplanes in naval war history.
On 18 March 1916 the A.-H. sub U 6 (Falkhausen) sinks the French destroyer RENAUDIN off Cape Laghi [Sqepi i Selitis, Albania], 47 dead. The destroyer goes down on position 4117′N/1922′E.
The very same day the French sub AMPÉRE (Dévin) scores two torpedoes hits on the A.-H. HOSPITAL SHIP No I–the former Lloyd steamer ELEKTRA–off Cape Planka [Rat Ploca] causing two fatalities. The damaged hospital ship has to be beached in Borovica Bay for further repairs.
In the night of December 22./23., 1916 A.-H. destroyers SCHARFSCHUETZE, REKA, DINARA and VELEBIT attacked the drifters patrolling the Otranto barrage which applied for help to the French destroyers CASQUE, PROTET, COMMANDANT-RIVIÈRE, COMMANDANT-BORY, DEHORTER and BOUTEFEU which were escorting a convoy from Brindisi to Taranto. Because of communication problems only CASQUE and COMMANDANT-RIVIÈRE attacked, but CASQUE’s boiler rooms were hit immediately and she had to slow down to 23 knots. For further assistance the Italians ABBA, NIEVO and PILO left Brindisi shortly followed by the British cruiser GLOUCESTER escorted by IMPAVIDO and IRRIQUIETO. The French and the Italian groups met during darkness, ABBA rammed CASQUE, some moments later BOUTEFEU rammed ABBA. While the damaged vessels had to be taken into tow the Austrians escaped in the darkness.
The return from the Otranto battle, May 15, 1917, brought the British cruiser DARTMOUTH within the range of the German sub UC 25 which had already laid mines off Brindisi.
At 13.30 UC 25 torpedoed DARTMOUTH approximately thirty-six miles off Brindisi, for some time the ship was considered to be lost, but was manned by a rescue crew later and finally towed into port. On receipt of the news that DARTMOUTH had been torpedoed, the French destroyer BOUTEFEU went to assist, only to hit one of UC 25′s mines some minutes later.
On 19 May 1917 the French sub LE VÉRRIER runs an unsuccessful torpedo attack on the A.-H. destroyer BLITZ off Cape Planka [Rat Ploca].
On February 13, 1918 the submarine BERNOUILLI (Audry) is lost with all hands after hitting a mine off the Bocche di Cattaro.
On 22/23 April 1918 the A.-H. destroyers TRIGLAV, UZSOK, DUKLA, LIKA (II) and CSEPEL encountered the British destroyers JACKAL and HORNET, the Australian TORRENS and the French CIMETERRE. HORNET was badly damaged in the ensuing fight but the alarm went up and the Austrians turned for home, pursued by JACKAL who had lost her mainmast.
On 20 September 1918 the submarine CIRÇÉ (Viaud) is torpedoed 7 nm north west of Cape Rodoni [Sqepi i Skenderbeut, Albania], by the A.-H. sub U 47 (Seyffertitz) and lost with all hands.
Appendix:
The ordre de bataille
of the French Adriatic Division
on 1st June 1915
1st Destroyer squadron: Bouclier, Commandant-Rivière, Magon, Bisson, Protet, Commandant Bory
2nd Destroyer squadron: Carabinier, Spahi, Mameluck, Enseigne-Henry, Aspirant Herber, Lansquenet
Submarines
Marceau, submarine depot ship
Cugnot, Messidor, Papin, Monge, Ampère, Fresnel
Torpedo boats and submarines from Toulon
Torpedo boats: Borée, Arverne, No. 281, No. 288, No. 349, No. 30, No. 368, No. 369
Submarines: Cigogne, Argonaute
21 Tuesday Apr 2009
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The final moments of the Camerone epic as Lt. Maudet with his legionnaires bayonet-charge the Mexicans.
Camerone, a point on the long, vulnerable French line of communication to Puebla from the coast. Mexico City was entered 3 weeks after Puebla fell on 17 May but the Foreign Legion action was to be the one moment of glory in a wearisome guerrilla war lasting till French evacuation in 1867.
A schematic reconstruction of the fight at Camerone. Amazingly the Mexicans had men in the farmhouse yet took nine hours to win it.
‘Baionnette au canon!’ shouted the lieutenant. The five men still standing fixed bayonets. ‘En avant! Vive la Legion !’ With a yell they burst through the ruins and into the dust and smoke. Only two men survived the wounds they received in that final charge but the nine-hour minor action of Camerone fought in Mexico on 30 April 1863 has become an epic of the French Foreign Legion. They celebrate it every 30 April as Camerone Day and remember the sacrifice of 65 officers and men of 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, not in the service of France, but as soldiers of the Legion.
The Legion had been sent to Mexico because its officers had petitioned the Emperor Napoleon III to use the force on the expedition and save it from a soul-destroying routine of road-building in Algeria. It was for service outside France that the corps had been originally formed in 1831. France was involved in Mexico because of a civil war won by Benito Juarez, a Zapotec Indian and passionate believer in Mexican independence. A bitter enemy of hereditary power and wealth, anti-clerical and fiercely xenophobic, Juarez had sent home the Spanish Minister, expelled the Papal Nuncio and suspended payment of all foreign loans. By the October 1861 London Convention, France, Britain and Spain agreed to send a punitive expedition to Mexico. Undeterred, Juarez mobilized all males aged between 21 and 60. Britain and Spain continued to give support to the anti-Juarist faction, but let France bear the lion’s share of military action.
The French regular forces broke the Juarists in conventional fighting so the Mexicans changed to guerilla tactics. The Legion had missed most of this fighting when its three battalions under Colonel Jeanningros landed at Veracruz on 31 March 1863. Morale was high, the land was said to be rich, the women beautiful and willing, and food and drink plentiful. But disappointment came rapidly; the Legion battalions were broken up and posted in static garrisons. The French commander General de Division Elie F. Forey stationed the Legion on the grimmest part of the 260 -mile route up from Veracruz to Mexico City. In the unhealthy plains near the sea many men died from fever. Morale plunged and in the heat the Legionnaires discarded their kepis (low peaked caps) and took to wearing local sombreros. Their only work was to guard the route, check through supply convoys and protect them from Mexican irregulars.
On 29 April a special convoy came up from Veracruz. It consisted of 60 carts and 150 mules and, besides munitions, carried three million francs in gold to pay the 26,000-strong French army which had been besieging 22,000 Mexicans in Puebla for the past six weeks. The duty company for the escort to Puebla was the Legion’s 1st Battalion’s 3rd Company. Its paper strength was 112 men and three officers, but 50 men and all three officers were down with fever. The battalion adjutant, the paymaster and a 1st Company lieutenant volunteered to officer the depleted escort. They set out from the village of Chiquihuite at 0100 on 30 April.
The men who made up the escort were neither the romantic figures of popular fiction, nor the vicious thugs who feature in some ‘factual’ accounts of the Legion. They had been students, weavers, bookbinders and blacksmiths. There was a saddler, two sailors, a wood gilder, several waiters, two tilemakers and a draper in the ranks. Nationalities were varied, but the bulk came from Spain, Italy and Germany.
The officers were Legion products too. Captain Jean Danjou, son of a Carcassonne tradesman, was 28 years old, prematurely balding and sported a full ‘military’ moustache. An efficient adjutant, he was also a very brave fighting officer. When a musket exploded and shredded his left hand during Crimean War fighting at Sevastopol in 1855, he had coolly fixed a tourniquet and continued to command his company. Now he wore a jointed wooden hand covered with a white glove. Sous-Lieutenant Jean Vilain was only 20. Joining up for adventure he received a battlefield commission in Italy at the Battle of Magenta (1859). He had already won the Legion d’Honneur in the Crimea. Like Vilain, Sous-Lieutenant Clement Maudet had been promoted from the ranks at Magenta. A journalist actively opposed to Napoleon III’s rise in 1848, he had preferred the Legion to prison.
Danjou took his company forward of the main convoy to reconnoiter the route. He knew that the Mexicans with their excellent intelligence system must realize the convoy’s value. What the French did not know was the unusual strength of the guerilla force. Indeed, Danjou had refused an extra platoon offered by the Foreign Legion outpost at Chiquihuite for fear of leaving it more exposed to a hit-and-run raid. Colonel Milan had assembled a Mexican force at Jalapa to capture Puebla-bound siege artillery in Soledad, but the convoy presented itself as an excellent target of opportunity for the 300 regular cavalry, 350 irregular horsemen and three infantry battalions of 300-400 men. The cavalry were armed with 1850s-pattern Remington and Winchester rifles, but many of the infantry had nothing but old flintlock muskets. The Legionnaire weapon was the 1849 Minie rifle, a rifled single-shot muzzle-loader firing a French-invented pointed bullet with a hollow base which the exploding gases expanded to engage the barrel rifling. It was an accurate long-range weapon and in the hands of highly trained troops.
Danjou divided his escort into two extended files to cover either side of the road. The captain marched in the middle beside the company’s two mules loaded with rations and spare ammunition and a small rear party followed the formation. At around 0700 they moved through the ruined hamlet of Camerone, and about a mile beyond Danjou called a halt for breakfast. The water for coffee was almost ready when the sentry sighted Mexican cavalry on the move. The water was tipped out and the men stood to. Over the skyline appeared hundreds of riders. Realizing that he was very vulnerable in the open Danjou decided to pull back to Camerone. He took his company through some thorn scrub which was difficult going for horsemen, but in the confusion the two supply mules bolted and 16 men became separated and were captured.
The story of the fight which followed has become the focal point of every Camerone Day celebration held by the Legion. It has been told innumerable times and in the telling has changed a little. Few contemporary accounts remain, but-the events to follow were recorded by the Swiss-born Count de Diesbach de Torny then a Lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion’s 5th Company.
When the Legionnaires reached Camerone the village seemed to be occupied, for a Legionnaire was wounded by a shot. Danjou divided the company into two platoons to clear the village. They swept in on the left and right and linked up on the far side without meeting any opposition, then searched the houses for a quarter of an hour, but found them deserted. Now the Mexican cavalry began to appear and though they gave ground it required bayonet charges and steady rifle fire to drive them off. In the lull that followed Danjou took his men back towards the village, but as they were nearing it they were again attacked. Forming a square (a tactic often employed in North Africa) the company repulsed this charge with steady volley firing. Though under constant harassment the square was able to move off. towards the hacienda (estate) of Camerone.
The hacienda had been built with an eye to protection against bandits, but was deserted and partly ruined. The two-storey farmhouse took up the whole length of one of the four adobe (sun-dried brick) walls which enclosed an open courtyard. It was a rambling, dilapidated building with
windows looking out on the road and doors opening into the yard. The other three walls, each about 50 yards long, were lined with outhouses, stables and a barn and the yard was entered by double gates in the west wall. Danjou discovered that the enemy had reached the hacienda before him. Despite several attempts to eject them the Mexicans managed to hold a room in the upper floor of the farmhouse which had a large window overlooking the yard. The Legionnaires held a room in the NW corner of the farmhouse, and the main gate, which was barricaded and defended by a section; a section covered a breach in the SE angle of the wall and the remaining men were positioned to cover the roofs. By 0900 the 49 defenders were in their makeshift battle positions.
Before their attack, the Mexicans called on the Legionnaires to surrender. ‘We’ll die before we surrender’ was Danjou’s reply and the fight began in earnest. The horsemen raised clouds of dust and the Legionnaires, unfed since early morning and with empty water canteens, began to suffer from the heat and dust. Two men tried to reach the well on the far side of the house, but they were shot and one lay writhing from his wound and shrieking with pain. A friend who tried to crawl to his assistance was shot by the Mexican snipers in the farmhouse.
Not long before he was killed, Danjou made every man swear not to surrender. Some popular accounts say the men swore the oath on his wooden hand, others that the men cheered in reply. Whatever the form of the oath; its exactor died at about 1100 shot in the head by a marksman from the farmhouse. Sous-Lt. Vilain, who outranked Maudet by a day, assumed command. He rallied the men and their morale soared when they heard the sound of drums and bugles which they took to be the regiment marching to their assistance. It was a short-lived hope; the new arrivals were three Mexican infantry battalions from Veracruz, Jalapa and Cordova, another thousand attackers.
They were better suited to the fighting than the cavalry, encumbered by riding boots and heavy sabres. A breach was battered in the east wall opposite the gates and the Legion section brought under fire from the rear. More men had joined the Mexicans in the upper floor of the farm and now they could shoot into the whole of the courtyard. At about 1400 Vilain was killed by a bullet in the forehead and Maudet took over. When the Mexicans again called on the Legionnaires to surrender, Maudet did not have time to give a formal reply, one of his men yelled back an obscene answer.
The Legionnaires were now reduced to crouching behind walls and barricades where they fired at the Mexicans who swarmed around them in the dirt. Men were suffering agonies from thirst and some wounded were reduced to drinking their own blood. Despite their sufferings the Legionnaires were putting up a very effective defence, so the Mexicans decided to save lives by smoking out their enemies. They brought up heaps of straw and set light to it, but while this added to the discomfort of their enemies it did not force them into the open.
At around 1700 there was a pause in the fighting. Now there were only 12 Legionnaires standing and one of them, a Spaniard called Bartolloto, translated the words of a speech they could hear being addressed to the Mexicans. It was Col. Milan. He told his men that at all costs the resistance must be crushed; failure to do this would bring undying disgrace. He was going to order a general assault.
The Mexicans attacked with renewed fervour and swarmed into the courtyard by every window, breach and gate available. At the main entrance only one Legionnaire remained alive. Corporal Berg, a Jew who had lost his lieutenant’s commission in the French Army for arguing with a senior officer, fought with his rifle and bayonet until dragged away wounded and unconscious by the Mexicans. In the SE corner Corporals Pinziger and Magnin with Legionnaires Kunasec and Gorski were now attacked from both front and rear. They were soon overwhelmed. By 1800 only Maudet, Corporal Philippe Maine a Frenchman, Polish Legionnaire Katau, Wenzel (German), Constantin (Austrian) and the Swiss, Leonhart, were still on their feet. Their Miniè rifles were so hot from firing that the barrels burned their hands. They fought for another quarter of an hour, from the ruins of a collapsed shed, but after they had exhausted ammunition stripped off the dead and wounded the end was inevitable.
They followed Sous-Lt. Maudet out through their barricade and across the courtyard in V-formation and such was the force of this final charge that it nearly cleared a path through the surrounding Mexicans. Maudet was at the head of the V, and, as the Mexicans fired, Legionnaire Constantin threw himself in front of the officer. He fell riddled, and seconds later Maudet fell mortally hit in the thigh and jaw. The Mexicans closed in and it seemed like the end. But Col. Milan who had watched the amazing charge rode forward and beating back his men with the flat of his sword saved three of the Legionnaires. Milan probably qualifies as the Legion’s most gallant foe, for enraptured by the battle he completely forgot about the bullion convoy yet ordered that the wounded survivors be carried by litter to a hospital 50 miles away.
Of the six, only Cp. Maine and Legionnaire Katau survived their wounds along with Cp. Berg. In addition 16 wounded were captured and some survived captivity. In all there were 32 survivors some of whom had been captured in the opening stages of the action. The Mexicans lost about 300 men of whom 200 were killed, but despite this they treated their prisoners well and exchanged them on a one-for-one basis. Maudet was buried with full military honours. Col. Milan, who withdrew his crippled force to Jalapa, was heard to mutter : ‘No son hombres; son demonios !’ (‘They are not men; they are devils’). The enormous disparity between Legion and Mexican losses was due mainly to the aimed and co-ordinated shooting of professional soldiers under cover against masses of less cohesive troops trying either to swamp them with ill-disciplined and hesitant rushes or pick them off with individual sharpshooters.
On the following morning Col. Jeanningros of the Legion arrived with a relief force, alerted by the convoy which had turned back on hearing firing ahead, and found Camerone a corpse strewn, smoking ruin. The company drummer was discovered alive, but with eight bullet wounds, under a pile of bodies, and he gave his version of the action. Danjou lay where he had died and before he was buried Jeanningros unhooked the bloodstained wooden hand. He said that he felt a sense of reverence as if he was touching something holy, and carried the hand with his belongings during the Mexican campaign. From captivity Cp. Berg was able to smuggle out a letter to his colonel telling him of the battle. He ended it ‘The 3rd Company is no more, but I must tell you that it contained nothing but good soldiers.’
When the news reached Paris the French and their Emperor were impressed by the courage and dedication of the Legion. As a tribute to this band of foreigners Napoleon ordered a memorial stone to be erected at Camerone. It reads:
Ils furent ici moins de soixante
Opposes a toute une armee.
Sa masse les ecrasa.
La vie plutôt que 7e courage
Abandonna ces soldats français.
Le 30 avril 1863.
Of the survivors Corporals Maine and Berg were promoted to sous-lieutenant. Maine rose to captain, but Berg died in a duel. Some accounts even say that it was fought with Maine, but how he died has not clouded the mystique of Camerone.
During the remainder of their five-year stay in Mexico (until US pressure and Mexican resistance led to abandonment of the installed Emperor Maximilian and evacuation) all French troops passing Camerone were ordered to present arms. Today all that remains of the hacienda are the vague outlines of some of the buildings and part of a wall. A railway line runs through the courtyard where the Legionnaires made their final charge.
Each new recruit who arrives in the present-day Legion depot at Aubagne (12 miles east of Marseilles in S. France) is told the story of Camerone. He learns that a Legionnaire does not surrender, and even when all hope has gone he dies facing the enemy with his weapon in his hands. Each 30 April the 1st Regiment parades Danjou’s wooden hand where it ‘takes the salute’ at the depot. An account of the action is read to every Legion unit on Camerone Day, and ex-Legionnaires remember the day all over the world. Though the wooden hand remains in its glass-sided box with the 1st Regiment, the ashes of the Camerone dead are held in rotation by the chapel of each Legion regiment. They are held in a reliquary carved in the shape of a Mexican eagle, which features in the 1st Regiment’s badge.
20 Monday Apr 2009
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Reaching 70 Easting at 16:22, the lead cavalry troops of 2nd “Cougar” Squadron knocked out a screen of eight Iraqi T-72 tanks. Three kilometers beyond, T-72s could be seen in prepared positions at 73 Easting. This was the Iraqi Brigade Assembly Area.
Fearing the loss of surprise, E-Troop’s commander, Captain H.R. McMaster, decided not to wait for heavier units to come forward and engage the Iraqis. McMaster ordered E-Troop to advance and engage the Iraqi tanks in a hasty attack.
E-Troop consisted of 13 M3 Bradleys, two M106 mortar carriers, one M577 command track, a M981 FIST-V, and 10 M1 Abrams tanks from 3d Squadron’s M- (“Mike”) Company.
Armored battles in the open desert are generally decided very quickly; 73 Easting was no exception. The 2nd ACR surprised the enemy and penetrated the Iraqi positions so quickly that they were unable to recover. Superior American night vision equipment turned the poor weather into a U.S. advantage.
E-Troop attacked forward and destroyed the Iraqi tanks at 73 Easting at close range. Unlike previous engagements, the destruction of the first Iraqi tanks did not result in the wholesale surrender of Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqis stood their ground while their tanks and armored personnel carriers of the Tawakalna Division attempted to maneuver and fight. E-Troop destroyed more than 20 tanks and other armored vehicles, a number of trucks and bunkers, and took a large number of prisoners with no losses to themselves. In 20 minutes, E-Troop had advanced in constant heavy contact with Iraqi armor from 67 Easting to 74 Easting.
Other 2nd ACR Troops, I- (“Iron”), K- (“Killer”), and G- (“Ghost”), joined the fighting at 73 Easting. By 16:40, G-Troop had assumed a fixed position on a ridge overlooking a wadi at and parallel to the 73 Easting phase line, north of E-Troop’s battle. During the fight, the Republican Guards’ Tawakalna Division’s 18th Brigade had gotten tangled up with their own 12th Armored Division, and both enemy units were trying to retreat through the same narrow piece of terrain, a shallow valley between two ridgelines, leading straight into G-Troop. At 18:30, the first of several waves of Iraqi T-72 and T-55 tanks advanced into the wadi in a bid to escape, directly into G-Troop. The fighting was fierce, as wave after wave of tanks and infantry charged G-Troop. The other troops and tank companies were fighting largely against dug-in soldiers and stationary tanks, not the armored charges faced by G-Troop that night. The fighting was so intense that, more than once, only the calling in of artillery and helicopter gunships saved G-Troop. At one point one Military Intelligence (MI) Platoon from the 2nd ACR’s Command and Control Squadron was forced to stop its intelligence support of the battle and return fire on Iraqi soldiers that had exited a burning BMP and charged the MI platoons position while their uniforms were on fire. This indicated the determination of units of the Republican Guards. During the six-hour battle, the G-Troop fire support team called in 720 howitzer and MLRS rounds. By 21:00, G-Troop was desperately short on ammunition and a tank company, “Hawk,” was sent in to relieve them. G-Troop lost one M3 Bradley to Iraqi IFV fire and one soldier, Sergeant Nels A. Moller, the gunner of the Bradley, was killed. Reportedly, the Bradley had depleted its supply of TOW missiles and was laying fire with its 25 mm cannon until a malfunction possibly caused by flying shrapnel forced Moller to climb out on top of the Bradley to try and free the jam when it was hit by 73 mm cannon fire from an Iraqi BMP-1.
Film – M1a1 Abrams Tanks in action Iraq-73 Easting
20 Monday Apr 2009
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In the mounted Caracole formation, each rank of a troop of horse goes forwards in turn to fire its pistols at the enemy then retires to the rear of the formation to reload, preferably stationary. This was a complicated action that demanded steadiness of both horse and rider under fire. It was not helped by contradictory advice in drill books on how to perform the manouevre.
A pistoleer practises firing techniques in this depiction of early period pistol combat. He practises firing at the enemy rider and his horse, while below two heavy horse lancers continue their fight with pistols after their lances have been broken.
It was the arrival of firearms that brought Medieval warfare to an end. Although the armourers responded with a better quality metal and the mounted knight sacrificed speed and impetus for heavier and thicker plate to resist bullets, the battle of Pavia in 1525 probably marked the end of the dominance of noble, heavy cavalry, as the flower of French aristocracy was brought crashing down by massed shot. The longbow and then the arquebus made the battlefield the province of the foot soldier, as the serried ranks of steady missile armed men proved concentrated firepower could stop a mounted charge in its tracks. Added to this commoners could kill nobles. Despite pikemen being needed for defence if the cavalry got through the shooting, this marked both a technological and philosophical revolution, beginning the swing from impact melee to firefight.
The rate of change was a slow one. This was not due to the inherent conservatism of the mounted elite but the slow emergence of Swiss pikemen as a battlefield phenomenon. The Swiss had used some pikes as early as 1339 at the Battle of Laupen, but the real impact of the pike, which had helped Alexander conquer his known world, came late in the fifteenth century when the Swiss defeated Charles the Bold of Burgundy in three battles whose impact echoed across Europe. The huge Swiss pike block, protected at first by crossbows and handguns and then by arquebuses, became the dominant instrument for waging war, and was widely copied. It was an offensive weapon, which steamrolled its way over its enemies on foot and brushed aside those on horseback, and it could defend itself against cavalry from any direction.
The Swiss met their match in prepared battlefield works at Marignano in 1515 and Bicocca in 1522, when their crushing advance faltered in the face of artillery and massed firearm infantry. They suffered high casualties and realized that they, like their mounted adversaries, had failed properly to adapt to the rapid expansion in the use of gunpowder weapons.
It was the Spaniards who successfully blended the pike and firearms in the creation of their famous tercios, which were the next to dominate the battlefield. But the adoption of the musket made the tercio more defensive through its increase in firepower range: the formation was slow, cumbersome and was prone to interference by cavalry. Cavalry could stop the tercio by surrounding it, but if it was to be destroyed the massive square had to be broken into. If enemy cavalry could get into it then they could impose the hand-to-hand melee in which they were so effective: the cavalry needed to breach the tercio.
Breaching a formed tercio could be done by a massed charge with the lance, especially if the cavalry formation was dense enough to prevent horses from shying away from the points of the pikes, and if the speed of the advance into contact was sufficient to carry it into the packed ranks despite the casualties. But cavalry commanders were reluctant to try it. Instead they decided to do it with shot themselves. Early attempts to equip mounted troops with firearms proved impractical and inefficient. The handgun or petronel braced against the flat of the chest, or sometimes with its barrel lodged in a cradle incorporated into the armour on a horse’s neck, seemed to do little for the rider’s ability to aim and hit his mark, or for the horse’s willingness to be controlled when the gun went off.
There were many experiments with arquebus, hackbut and dragon, but the handling of the lighted match and the complicated processes of firing and reloading were two-handed operations necessitating mounted troops to be both proficient musketeers and experienced horsemen capable of controlling their mounts with only their knees and heels. Another technique of firing was required.
The answer was the invention of the wheellock, which did away with match as the means of ignition. It depended upon winding up a clockwork, serrated-steel disc or wheel. A short length of chain connected the wheel’s spindle to a powerful mainspring, so when the spindle was wound by use of a spanner, this chain, under tension from the mainspring, wrapped around it. The action was then locked by a standard trigger mechanism. When he wished to fire the rider clicked the dogshead, which held a piece of pyrites in a set of screw-up jaws, down onto the wheel. On squeezing the trigger the spring was unlocked, the chain whipped back, unwrapped and caused the spindle to revolve. The rapidly rotating serrated wheel grated against the pyrites and produced sparks. These ignited the priming charge in the pistol’s pan, firing the main charge in turn through a touchhole in the barrel. Wheel-locks were highly robust but they did have certain drawbacks. For example, if they malfunctioned, a gunsmith with special tools had to repair them. Also the pyrites, a soft mineral, broke, chipped or wore away and needed frequent replacement. Small fragments often worked their way into the mechanism. Wheel-locks worked well and could usually be relied upon to fire first time, but reloading. in action was difficult, hence the tendency to carry a carbine on a sling and a pair of pistols slotted into holsters strapped over the pommel of the saddle, perhaps with another tucked into a boot. The rider could load and span all his weapons while awaiting the order to advance, and go into action with carbine and pistols ready to fire. He had only to point and pull the trigger.
Reiters to the Fore
Contemporary tests with wheel-locks recorded an 85 per cent success rate for hitting a man-sized target at 27 m (30 yards) and reasonable rates of penetration of 2-mm (.07-inch) steel plate, although we are not told what a ‘reasonable rate’ was, nor whether these were pistols or petronels. Tests performed by the author with an accurate reproduction wheel-lock petronel showed accurate shooting was possible at 9 metres (10 yards), and even up to 18 metres (20 yards) it was ‘reasonable’ , averaging about 80 per cent. Beyond that accuracy was haphazard, with a dramatic drop to around ten per cent.
A flintlock pistol fared somewhat better but was more prone to misfires. Perhaps it was a case of better marksmanship but the period advice about touching your enemy with the muzzle before pulling the trigger says more about the general efficiency of the weapon than any test. Even if the range was short, pistol-armed horsemen were instructed to close the distance with the tercio and deliver enough shot to make a breach in it, into which their supporting lance armed colleagues could charge and cut up the enemy at close quarters.
Wheel-lock and Caracole
Pistol-armed horse became the new innovation, fashionable and practical. The desire to charge was subsumed in the interest of winning back tactical supremacy, and by extending the use of these new weapons to the heavily armoured horse as well as the light cavalry, the dual function of shooting and close combat was achieved. Fully-armoured, cuirassier horse equipped with a brace of pistols who could shoot their way into a formation and then fall upon it with the sword became a common battlefield sight and these mounted pistoleers, called reiters, soon became feared throughout Europe.
But this new technique of fighting on horseback had serious implications for cavalry tactics and formations. At St Quentin the cavalry adopted a deep formation rather than their usual deployment in lines. Unlike the Swiss pikes or the later infantry column this was not done to increase the mass of a moving block in order to maximize the impact of a charge. It was based on a drill-manual based idea of increasing the rate of fire the reiters could deliver. The best-known advocate of mounted firepower was probably Cruso, whose Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie was reprinted many times in different languages across Europe. His theories were put into practice by many of the great captains of his age. Military manuals for the cavalry of this period are full of complex techniques for performing tactical manoeuvres to bring maximum firepower to bear on various enemy formations and arms. The most favoured system was called the caracole.
The caracole was performed by first drawing up the riders in a column at least six ranks deep and anything from six to 20 files wide. This cumbersome formation would slowly trot towards the enemy. They would get to within 28 metres (30 yards) and fire first one pistol and then the second. Exactly how this was done depended on which drill book was being followed. Some advocated firing by ranks, others en masse, which would seem dangerous for those at the front. Some argued fire should be discharged forwards, either one pistol at a time or even both together; others advised turning the horse first right and firing the left-hand pistol sideways, and then turning left to shoot the right-hand pistol. Having fired, the cavalry retired to reload, and there were different opinions about how best to do this. Some preferred wheeling by ranks, some by facing to the side and riding Indian file to the rear of the block, while others argued that counter-marching each file was better. We have the advice, but unfortunately there is insufficient evidence as yet to say which method was most widely employed, though there is a reference to some rear ranks firing into the air when ordered to shoot en masse.
Although cumbersome and slow moving, seldom being performed faster than the trot, the major problem with the caracole was that although it delivered shot it could never deliver enough to do much harm. Cavalry battles became slow and noisy affairs and although they could, in theory, disrupt an enemy formation they apparently did not cause many casualties, unless the cavalry commander was able to bring overwhelming numbers of units into action.
Even with enough numbers it was difficult for cavalry to defeat foot. The arquebus and the musket could outrange their pistols and deliver heavier balls with greater force, and as foot could also bring to bear a better density of fire, the chance of the cavalry winning such a duel, even though they could ride off and reload in relative safety, was minimal. The attempt to turn the cavalry into mounted firepower succeeded only in rendering them tactically useless. Despite the outstanding performances of heavy lancers at Mook in 1574 and Gembloux in 1578, the majority of troopers were now armed with pistols and the lance began to disappear. The Dutch formally banished it 1597.The long thrusting cavalry sword, the medieval estoc and its descendants, also vanished, and riders relied upon shorter swords in the close quarter melee; or even their pistol butts. In the drive to increase firing efficiency, hand-to-hand combat skills went unpractised by individuals and commanders. Even if breaches had been made in enemy formations few units were any longer proficient in charging into contact, and heavy lancers were more or less ‘troops of show’ ,fit more for parades rather than the bloody business of the battlefield. Horsemanship went into decline. With the cavalry unable or unwilling to close for combat and ‘reduced to the pointless popping of petit pistols’, this great experiment is sometimes referred to as ‘the debilitation of the horse’.
Pistol-armed cavalry were so widely adopted that they even made a significant appearance in the Polish Army, which had always been fiercely proud of its cavalry-charging tradition. Unlike many of their European counterparts they did not wholly relinquish the lance and could and would still charge into action. At the Battle of Klusino in 1610 there was a telling incident when the Swedish and Russian reiters tried to retire after performing a grand caracole. The Poles went in with swords, at the gallop. They bowled over many in the huge block and broke it to pieces, scattering them and driving large numbers from the field. At least in one corner of Europe the cavalry had not been entirely debilitated, but in general the end of the sixteenth century saw fewer great battles. The slow movement of both the tercio and the reiters, and their reliance upon firepower, coupled with the rising popularity of artillery and fieldworks, put the emphasis firmly upon defence. The close quarter melee became a last-resort gamble.
20 Monday Apr 2009
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Davidov in 1830
(February 7-8, 1807)
From Denis Davidov’s Memoirs
Translated by
Greg Troubetzkoy
Augereau’s corps was toppled and hotly pursued by our infantry and Prince Golitsyn who had galloped with the central cavalry to support the foot soldiers. The pitch of their fervor reached improbable heights: one of our battalions in the heat of pursuit went way over the enemy position and appeared at the church a hundred steps away from Napoleon himself, which is mentioned by all Frenchmen in their war diaries of that time. It was a critical moment. Napoleon whose resolve grew incrementally with multiplying dangers ordered Murat and Bessières together with the three Haupoult divisions, Klein, Grouchy and the horse-guard to strike at our troops rushing in with shouts of HURRAH. This movement was necessary to save even part of Augereau’s corps and to forestall our general onslaught. More than 60 squadrons galloped around to the right of the fleeing corps and rushed against us, waving their swords. The field was engulfed in a roar and the snow, ploughed over by 12,000 united riders lifted and swirled from under them like a storm. Brilliant Murat with his carousel-like costume followed by a large suite, was ablaze ahead of the onslaught with a naked saber and flew directly into the thick of the fight. Rifle and canon fire and leveled bayonets were unable to stem the deadly tide. The French cavalry crumpled and stomped on everything, broke through the first line of the army and its impetuous rush had reached the second line and our reserve, but here it broke against the cliff of a stronger will. The second line and the reserve stood their ground, did not waver and turned back the awesome tidal wave with thick battery and rifle fire.
Then this cavalry pursued in turn by our horsemen right through the ranks of the first line (which at first had been crumpled and stomped but which again got up on its feet and was firing back) was now flowing back even beyond the line which had occupied in the beginning of the day. The pursuit of the cavalry was breathtakingly successful and followed through to the hilt.
The enemy batteries left on that line were seized by our several squadrons and the gun crews together with the carriage wheels were hacked to pieces while the draught horses and their drivers had galloped away in a panic.
In this hand-to-hand engagement and the flowing back and forth of the cavalry, the following generals – Haupoult of the cavalry, Daleman of the guard, Desjardin of the infantry and Corbineau all fell on the field of battle. Marshal Augereau himself, along with Division General Hudelet and Brigade General Lochet were wounded; several other brigade generals and staff officers such as Lacuyet, Marois, Bouvier and others shared the same fate. Two squadrons of horse guard grenadiers composing the tail of the retreating enemy cavalry were intercepted by ours and laid down their lives between the church and the second line. The 14th regiment of the line lost all its officers and the 24th of the line had only five left alive. The whole corps of Augereau, three cavalry divisions and the mounted guard represented only fragments of their former selves. Six eagles were captured by us.
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The French Cavalry at Eylau by Graham Morris
20 Monday Apr 2009
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Shimonoseki Incident
The nineteenth-century American journalist Edward H. House spent much of his career telling and retelling the story of the 1863–4 Shimonoseki incident, in which ships of four Western nations bombarded Chōshū domain, allegedly in retaliation against earlier Chōshū attacks on the Westerners, then forced Japan to pay a $3 million indemnity. House had two goals: to get the United States to return its share of the indemnity and to correct the standard recollection of the event, which in his view laid unjustified blame on Japan and whitewashed the Western powers’ motives. He succeeded in the former goal but failed in the latter. Getting a nation to return loot, he found, was easier than correcting an entrenched historical narrative.
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Takasugi Shinsaku
Born Sept. 27, 1839, Hagi, Nagato province, Japan died May 17, 1867, Shimonoseki
Noted Japanese imperial loyalist whose restructuring of the military forces of the feudal fief of Chōshū enabled that domain to defeat the armies of the Tokugawa shogun, the hereditary military dictator of Japan. That victory led to the Meiji Restoration (1868), the overthrow of shogunal government and the restoration of power to the emperor.
Like most other imperial loyalists, Takasugi originally was strongly antiforeign, but he finally concluded that the expulsion of all Westerners from Japan was impossible, and he became an advocate of Western military techniques. His about-face almost resulted in his assassination, but he was vindicated in 1863, when attempts to expel foreigners from the Shimonoseki Strait resulted in the Shimonoseki Incident (1864)—the demolition of all Chōshū forts along the strait by warships from Britain, France, The Netherlands, and the United States. The loyalist faction in Chōshū then chose Takasugi to help construct a new Western-style army.
Takasugi’s reforms completely transformed Japanese fighting techniques. Although commoners were theoretically forbidden to carry weapons, he formed a series of peasant militia units led by young extremist samurai and trained in Western-style military discipline. The most famous of these units, the Kiheitai (“Irregular Troop Unit”), remained under Takasugi’s personal control.
Alarmed at the growing radical tendencies in Chōshū, the shogun in 1864 sent a punitive expedition to the fief. The Chōshū forces were defeated and a conservative government installed. As soon as the shogun’s army left, however, Takasugi’s irregular units attacked and defeated the conservative government’s forces and reinstalled a radical group in power. In August 1865 the shogun sent another expedition, this one with orders to level the fief. By this time, however, Takasugi had brought his militia units, equipped with Western arms, under strict central control; the shogun’s army was routed, and the balance of power in Japan was drastically altered. In January 1868, samurai from Chōshū and Satsuma fief overthrew the shogun and declared a new central government under the Meiji emperor.
One of the first acts of the new imperial government was to develop an army along the lines already begun by Takasugi, whose untimely death occurred before he could assume an important role in the new administration.
The Namamugi Incident
The period between the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s Black Ships at Shimoda in 1853 and the Meiji Restoration in 1868 was a tumultuous and dangerous time for the foreigners who lived in Yokohama.
Japan was in the heat of an internal struggle for power, precipitated by Perry’s arrival, between the Toku-gawa Shogunate and those who advocated the return of the Emperor to the throne. Many of the followers of the latter group, led by the Satsuma and Choshu clans (in present-day Kagoshima and Yamaguchi Prefectures), fervently pursued the exclusionist sonno-joi ideology (expel the barbarians, revere the Emperor). This manifested itself in numerous attacks, often fatal, on the foreign residents of Japan.
One of the most notorious such attacks was the so-called Namamugi Incident, which took place in 1862 in the village of the same name located just off of the old Tokaido road, in present-day Tsurumi Ward. Charles Lenox Richardson, a British merchant visiting Yokohama from Shanghai, was on horseback headed for a sightseeing trip to the Kawasaki-Daishi temple with three British companions.
On route, at Namamugi, they encountered the 1000-strong procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu, the powerful daimyo of Satsuma, who was on his way back to southern Japan from the capital, Edo. The tourists looked on at the procession from horseback and did not dismount when ordered to (whether this was due to miscommunication or due to arrogance is still unclear), which enraged the retainers of Lord Shimazu. On the grounds that the foreigners were not showing the proper respect to their lord, the samurai unsheathed their katana and attacked, cutting down Richardson and seriously wounding two of his companions.
This incident had a great impact on political and everyday life at the time. Foreigners became increasingly angry at the number of attacks against their ranks and called for their governments to take action, while at the same time they felt increasingly vulnerable and worried for their own safety. Defences in the residential areas of Yokohama were quickly reinforced.
Events culminated in the Anglo-Satsuma War, in which British warships were sent to Kagoshima to “settle” the dispute one year later in 1863. Kagoshima was shelled relentlessly, and it is estimated that 180,000 people were displaced in what became a showcase of the “barbarians” superior military power.
The war served as an important psychological turning point for both sides. Having witnessed with their own eyes the stark realities of what Western technology could do, the incident provided the impetus for the Satsuma clan to do an about-face with regards to their exclusionist ideology, and they became champions of modernizing Japan in the Western model. The British also sustained substantial losses in the battle, and they were forced to acknowledge the strength of the Satsuma clan, while also facing jeers from other nations for their “defeat” at Kagoshima.