Date:

149–146 B.C.

Location:

near modern Tunis, Tunisia.

Forces Engaged:

Roman: 80,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry. Commanders: Manius Manilius, later Scipio Aemilianus.

Carthaginian: inside the city: undetermined. Commander: Hasdrubal of Numidia.

Mobile force: 25,000–30,000 troops. Commander: Hasdrubal.

Importance:

The capture and destruction of the city of Carthage ended the Third Punic War, finally destroying that nation’s power.

Historical Setting

For many years two powers slowly grew in strength and ambition, one on the southern coast of the central Mediterranean, the other directly north on the Italian peninsula. Carthage grew wealthy by the sea, her ships trading from Spain in the west to Lebanon and Egypt in the east. Her income allowed her to hire the best mercenaries in the world, primarily from colonies she established in Iberia. Rome, on the other hand, grew strong through the hardiness of her farmer citizenry, upon which rested the city’s economic and military strength. They coexisted peacefully until 254 B.C., when a dispute over the island of Sicily brought about the First Punic War. After twenty-four years of fighting the Romans prevailed, although both sides were seriously weakened. After twenty-four years of peace they began fighting again, this time in a dispute over allies in Spain. The Second Punic War lasted seventeen years, with the great Carthaginian Hannibal rampaging through Italy but unable to capture Rome itself. Rome again prevailed, when Scipio invaded Carthaginian territory and forced Hannibal to return to defend his homeland. After the Roman victory at Zama in 202 b.c. Carthage was forced to surrender her navy and pay a heavy indemnity.

Under the leadership of Hannibal, who proved to be as talented an administrator as he was a commander, the indemnity was paid well ahead of schedule and Carthage once again focused on trade. The city-state began once more to strengthen and grow wealthy, for the land she possessed, unlike today’s Tunisia, was among the most productive farmland of its age. Although Hannibal was forced through political pressure to flee Carthage and die in exile, his home city scrupulously followed the terms of the peace Rome had imposed in 201. Fifty-two years of peace, however, was not a guarantee of avoiding another war with Rome.

The Numidian King Masinissa, whose country abutted Carthage to the west, indirectly provoked the Third Punic War. Through his alliance with Rome in the previous war, he was able to gain permission to reacquire lands Carthage had taken from Numidia. Since Carthage was originally established on Numidian land and with its cooperation, Masinissa could theoretically have occupied all of the territory Carthage controlled. Rather than attract too much attention from Rome, the Numidian king reclaimed small pieces of territory at a time when Rome was occupied in other parts of the Mediterranean world. In 155 B.C. Carthage complained to Rome about their ally’s acquisitions, but received little satisfaction. Three years later Rome sent an embassy to investigate, the leading member of which was the senator Cato. Seeing the renewed bounty Carthage enjoyed, Cato feared they could yet again challenge Rome’s position and from the day he returned home Cato argued with all his might that Carthage had to be destroyed.

Within Carthage, political factions struggled. In 151 a strong democratic party that took an aggressive stance expelled those citizens who favored cooperation and perhaps even union with Numidia from the city. Carthaginian complaints to Rome grew more strident as their rejections of Masinissa’s envoys grew more insulting. Masinissa also sent appeals to Rome, pressing his claims. In 151 a Carthaginian army under their leader Hasdrubal attacked Numidia, but was defeated and after being besieged in their camp was virtually destroyed by starvation. That violation of the peace terms, as well as Cato’s oratory in the Senate, convinced the Roman government military action was necessary. Hasdrubal, however, was evicted from power in Carthage and emissaries were sent to beg forgiveness on any terms to avoid war. An army had been dispatched by the time the embassy arrived, and they gave the Senate a virtual blank check to avert conflict.

The Senate demanded that their army should be allowed to do anything it wished, all territory and possessions of Carthage to become Roman-controlled, and 300 hostages surrendered. The ambassadors agreed to this total surrender, a deditio in fidem. In return for their surrender, Rome guaranteed the Carthaginians freedom, their own laws, nominal control over all their territory, and possession of personal and public property. Unfortunately, the arrival of the army brought even more difficult conditions. The Roman commander Manius Manilius obliged the city to surrender all its weapons of war; they did. Reportedly armor and weapons for 200,000 men were turned over to the Romans, as well as 2,000 catapults. One final condition was unacceptable: the demand that the city of Carthage be destroyed and all the inhabitants removed inland. “Whenever you look on the sea, you remember the great fleets you once had, the spoils you captured, the harbours into which you brought them, to fill your dockyards and arsenals” (Appian, quoted in Dorey and Dudley, Rome against Carthage, p. 161). Carthage responded by declaring war on Rome.

The Siege

Carthage could not hope to take the war to Rome, only to force the Romans away from their capital. Carthage was the best-fortified city of its day, completely walled for its 21-mile perimeter and with access to the sea for resupply. The city was divided into northern and southern halves (Megara and Byrsa respectively). In spite of the earlier surrender of weapons, the citizens began producing new swords, spears, shields, javelins, and catapults at a prodigious rate. The women of the city cut their hair to serve as rope for the catapults. In their desperate situation, the Carthaginian government pardoned Hasdrubal and he took command of an army of 25,000 to 30,000 outside the city, based in the province of Byzacena to the south and southwest. The main city there, Nepheris, dominated the supply route to the farmland beyond.

Rome had 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry on site, with the port city of Utica (which had surrendered without a fight) just to the northwest to serve as a base. They had no siege engines, however, and three direct assaults against the western walls proved disastrous. A foray across the Lake of Tunis to gather wood ran into serious Carthaginian cavalry opposition, but ultimately sufficient wood was gathered to build two rams. The Romans had some success against the southern fortifications, but the defenders rebuilt the walls, then sallied to destroy the rams. As the summer of 149 grew hotter, the Roman camp between the lagoons became too unhealthy, so they relocated to the southern end of the city. Roman ships anchored there to provision the army, but they were almost completely devastated by Carthaginian fire ships. By year’s end the Romans had made little progress.

In 148 b.c. Manilius changed his strategy somewhat. He moved his camp from south of Carthage to the northern flank. Rather than press the siege he instead gathered supplies and made plans to attack Nephiris, where Hasdrubal’s force was based. On Manilius’ staff was the young Scipio Aemilianus, adopted grandson of the Scipio Africanus who had won glory in the Second Punic War. He advised against the Nephiris attack but was overruled. When Manilius was on the verge of defeat at the hands of the Carthaginian cavalry commander, Himilco Phameas, Scipio’s timely arrival with reinforcements covered the Roman retreat. He then played a key diplomatic role. Masinissa’s offer of assistance early in the conflict had been brusquely rebuffed; now the Romans needed all the help they could get. Masinissa invited Scipio to join the Roman delegation visiting him. When they arrived, they found Masinissa dead (he was in his eighties) and his three sons awaiting Scipio, who was charged with choosing the successor. He chose all three: one to rule in the palace, one as minister of foreign affairs, one as minister of justice, each according to his talents. Scipio brought Foreign Minister Gulussa with him back to the Roman camp, along with a large cavalry force.

The arrival of Numidian reinforcements had a profound effect on Himilco Phameus, who perhaps sensed a change in the winds and defected to the Romans. That was the one high point of 148 for the Roman campaign. Mani-lius had decided to attack other Carthaginian cities both to keep his army busy and to allow them some booty to maintain their morale. These attacks had mixed success and Carthage even spared some manpower to aid at the siege of Hippo and some money for an uprising in Macedonia. With Roman fortunes at a low ebb, Scipio campaigned successfully in Rome for the command appointment; the people overwhelmingly backed the Scipio name, and he seemed to be in the mold of his adopted grandfather. Scipio took charge in the spring of 147.

He arrived to confront a crisis. Manilius had gained some success against the Megara section of the city, but his men had been cut off and morale was low. Scipio went to work, expelling the multitude of camp followers and focusing the army on its task: no rewards without victory. In the meanwhile, Hasdrubal was recalled to take charge of the city’s defenses, leaving Diogenes (probably a Greek mercenary) in charge of the mobile force. Scipio launched an attack on Megara with early success, but withdrew under pressure. Hasdrubal responded by concentrating his force in Byrsa, then torturing Roman prisoners on the walls. This was intended to stiffen his troops’ defensive resolve, but it instead motivated the Romans. Even with Megara’s defenses lightened, Scipio realized that an assault on Byrsa was necessary, since the harbor was there. He spent the summer building fortifications: a series of palisaded ditches with sharpened stakes at the bottom, a wall facing the city with regularly spaced observation towers, and a four-story tower in the center. This completely isolated Carthage from landward approaches.

Scipio next began attempts to block off Carthage’s seaward supplies. He began building a mole across the mouth of the harbor. The Carthaginians responded by digging a new outlet to the sea due east from their circular harbor. They also began building ships out of whatever material they could find. When both fleet and outlet were complete they sallied, but inexplicably did not attack the empty Roman ships. When they finally mounted an assault on the third day, the Romans were ready and drove them back. Unfortunately, a bottleneck in the new outlet kept many Carthaginian ships exposed, and the Roman ships dealt with them harshly. Scipio then assaulted the outer quay protecting the commercial harbor, bringing in catapults and rams. This strategy suffered a setback when a night attack from the city destroyed most of them, but Scipio patiently rebuilt them and constructed fortifications as well. He finally managed to breach the walls, then breach them again after the first repair.

Scipio maintained pressure on the city but could not insert his men through the breach. He spent the remainder of 147 capturing what towns still remained loyal to Carthage, and defeated their mobile force at Nephiris after a twenty-two-day siege. That left the city of Carthage completely alone, with no source of supply. This provoked an offer to negotiate from Hasdrubal, but he would not concede to Scipio’s demand that the city be razed. In the spring of 146 Scipio invoked the Carthaginian gods to abandon the city, and then he launched his final assault. It came from the weakened walls near the outer quay and this time the Romans did break through. Hasdrubal set the harbor buildings alight but it did not slow the Romans down. What did slow them was the sack of the temple of Apollo, whose golden dome proved too inviting to the soldiers. When reinforcements entered the fray, the slow work of reducing the Byrsa citadel proceeded. Tall houses along narrow lanes proved to be individual fortresses, and the fighting was house-to-house, room-to-room, hand-to-hand for six days. Scipio finally ordered the houses burned to allow easier passage, and many noncombatants died in the conflagration. That proved the final blow to Carthaginian resistance. On the seventh day they surrendered wholesale, 50,000 men, women, and children giving themselves up to slavery. Hasdrubal and his family, along with 900 Roman deserters, were all that remained in the temple of Esmun. He did not display the valor of his earlier namesakes, but crawled to Scipio begging mercy as the deserters decided to die in the flames of the temple. Seeing his dishonor, Hasdrubal’s wife called out to him: “‘Wretch!’ she screamed, in a voice which raised itself above the universal din, ‘is it thus you seek to save your own life while you sacrifice ours? I cannot reach you in your own person, but I kill you hereby in the persons of your children.’” (Abbott, History of Hannibal, pp. 292–293). She stabbed his two sons, threw them into the flames, then dived in after them.
Results

Scipio rewarded his men with time to plunder the city at their leisure. That done, the remainder of the city was set ablaze and burned for ten days. The city-state of Carthage became the Roman province of Africa, of which a new Carthage built and settled by Romans was the capital. As the original city burned, however, Scipio wept. His tutor, the historian Polybius, spoke to him. “‘Is this not a splendid sight?’ He grasped his hand and said: ‘A splendid sight indeed, Polybius, and yet I am in fear—I know not why—that someday the same order will be given to destroy my own country’” (Appian, quoted in Dorey and Dudley, Rome against Carthage, p. 174).

Control of the North African farmland provided the storehouse of grain for Rome for the next several centuries. Not until the Vandals conquered the region in the fifth century A.D. did it cease being Rome’s granary. It became so once again, however, when Belisarius captured the province for the Eastern Emperor Justinian a century later.

References:

Jacob Abbott, History of Hannibal of Carthage (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1876); T. A. Dorey, and D. R. Dudley, Rome against Carthage (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972); Gilbert Charles Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage, trans. Dominique Collon (New York: Taplinger, 1969).