Date: A.D. 451.

Location: Follow Route Nationale 19 from Paris for 139 km. to Mery sur-

Seine, 29 km. from Troyes. 95.

War and campaign: The Hun Invasion of Gaul.

Object of the action: The Romans were attempting to repulse the

Huns from northern Gaul.

Opposing sides: (a) The Roman Master of the Soldiers, Aetius,

and the Visigoth king, Theoderic. (b) Attila the Hun commanding

his barbarian army.

Forces engaged: Uncertain.

Casualties: Not known.

Result: Neither side gained a clear victory, but the Hun impetus was checked for the first time.

In A.D. 451 Attila, the King of the Huns, was still the terror of the entire Roman Empire after eighteen years of rule over his barbaric horde of nomads based to the north of the Danube. The Huns, who, centuries before, had ravaged the Chinese Empire, although not large in numbers or physique, appeared to be militarily invincible: living in the saddle, their horsemanship and mobility in the field were incredible, and their powers were yet further enhanced by the acquisition of Roman horses of superior size and endurance. Worse still for Rome, the attractions of civilised life meant nothing to them, in contrast to the Germanic invaders who had preceded them into the Empire. They were destroyers, pure and simple, living as devouring parasites in every society at which they struck. For long Attila had been content to exact a tribute in gold, but in 450 the new eastern Emperor Marcian suspended payment. Surprisingly, Attila decided to attack in the west first. His reasons were twofold. First, he conveniently had a pretext, for the Emperor Valentinian’s repressed and half-crazed sister Honoria had secretly sent him her ring and a request for marriage. Attila, who already had numerous wives, took up the offer, demanded his bride and half Valentinian’s Empire as her dowry. The request was refused. At the same time, the Ripuarian Franks who were settled in north-west Gaul were without a king, and the rival candidates appealed to Attila and to Rome. This in particular directed Attila to Gaul rather than Italy, though it is possible that concerted action was planned with Geiseric the Vandal king, now dominating North Africa, who may have been supposed to attack Italy. At any rate, Attila must have known that his most formidable opponents were not the Romans themselves, but the powerful Visigothic kingdom of Theoderic in Aquitaine.

The Visigoths, who a generation before had captured and sacked Rome, under Alaric, were still a danger to the Empire, and Rome had in fact employed Huns as mercenaries against them to defend Provence. But the Visigoths were now in conflict with Attila’s Vandal allies, and would certainly oppose Attila himself. They were by now relatively civilised, their nobles at least were educated men, and they were Christians.

The native peasantry of Gaul looked on Roman and Visigoth armies alike as oppressors, and had been in a state of rebellion for many years, under the name of Bagaudae. From them Attila might expect welcome as a deliverer.

He entered Gaul in early summer of 451, in three columns, striking at Arras, Metz and Strasbourg. Over a dozen cities, including Trier, Cologne, Mainz and Strasbourg, were sacked and burned. From Paris, which was miraculously saved, he moved towards the south and besieged Orléans, strategically controlling an important crossing of the Loire. Meanwhile the Roman forces had been gathering in the south. The Roman commander-in-chief was Aetius the Patrician, Master of the Soldiers, and for the past twenty years virtual ruler of the Western Empire. As a young man he had lived as a hostage among the Huns, had spent a period of exile with them, had on several occasions employed them as mercenaries, and knew Attila personally. Aetius had crossed the Alps with a token force only. Through the mediation of the powerful Gallic senator Avitus, living in retirement on his estates at Clermont, the Visigoth king Theoderic at Toulouse was given eloquent warning of the common danger, and mustered his forces. The united army advanced on Orléans, and Attila raised the siege which had lasted five weeks. On 14 June he began his retreat towards the Seine, clearly planning to give battle in the wide plains of Champagne, where his cavalry could be used to full advantage. Aetius pursued his rearguard and inflicted severe casualties on the motley forces of the Huns and their allies. The Roman and Visigoth army had now been strengthened by the adhesion of Sangibanus, King of the Alans, another barbarian people settled in Gaul, but he was suspected of being ready to change sides.

Attila moved back on the Seine and halted at Méry. It was an ideal position for him. When the Romano-Gothic force arrived Attila realised that he was outnumbered, and decided to wait till the early afternoon before giving battle. In the meantime a small Visigoth force under Thorismond, son of King Theoderic, managed to occupy a small prominence overlooking the plain, the only hill of any size and thus a tactical position of immense importance, overlooking the Hun left flank.

Aetius and Theoderic put the suspect Alans in the centre, and took the left and right wings respectively for their own forces. Attila put the Huns in his centre, the Ostrogoths facing their Visigoth kinsmen on the left wing, and the Gepidae and other contingents on the right. After the initial exchange of missiles Attila’s cavalry charged the centre, the allied weak spot, broke through and wheeled round to take the Visigoths in the rear. In the clash King Theoderic was struck by a missile and trampled to death in the mêlée. Attila took this as a sign of victory, but the result was to bring on a furious charge from the dead king’s son Thorismond from his position above/the plain. The rest of the battle had been indecisive so far but Attila and the Huns were now forced to retreat and were pursued right up to their encampment. Thorismond was thrown from his horse and narrowly escaped, causing the pursuit to lose its impetus. It was now dusk and he rode back with his men to the Goth camp, to which Aetius also had come, after managing to hold out on the Roman left wing. Thorismond was formally elected king by the army in succession to Theoderic and swore revenge against the killers of his father.

Attila, in the safety of his camp, was prepared for the worst, barricaded by wagons. He had even prepared his own funeral pyre. It was the first time that his invincibility had been shaken in pitched battle. The Visigoths were breathing fire and slaughter, and were prepared either to fight him again or to starve him out. But the next morning the Visigoth and Roman contingents dispersed and went their separate ways. Attila remained in his camp for several days, sullenly suspecting a trap. Eventually he came out, retired north across the Rhine and went back to his primitive cantonments on the Danube.

What had happened was the work of the diplomatic Aetius, who had feared that the Visigoths, if completely victorious over Attila, would present an intolerable menace to Rome once more. He had preyed on Thorismond’s fears that if he did not return at once to Toulouse he might be ousted from the throne. So the Visigoths left. Aetius preferred to maintain a balance of terror. The next year Attila descended on Italy itself, destroying numerous cities, including Aquileia, Padua and Verona, and occupied Milan. Here a deputation led by Pope Leo somehow persuaded him, perhaps by preying on his superstitions, to leave Italy. The next year, after a barbarous revel to celebrate yet another marriage, this chieftain who still claimed the Emperor’s sister and her dowry, died from a haemorrhage on the marriage bed. After his death his ill disciplined and motley armies disintegrated, and the Huns were never again a serious threat to Rome.

Although the battle in Champagne in June 451 did not completely finish off Attila, its importance cannot be underestimated. It was the first time that he had not conquered, and he suffered serious casualties, a matter of vital importance to him as the number of actual Huns was always small, and the number of subject allies he could compel to serve him depended largely on the myth of his invincibility. The battle showed that the Germanic barbarians—the Visigoths—could choose civilisation rather than barbarism. The co-operation of Roman and Visigoth was a promising augury for the future, and saved Europe from becoming a desert, like those which the Huns had created in central Asia and which took centuries to recover from the effects of a few years of domination, if they did recover at all.