Richard Abels

I. JULIO-CLAUDIAN SYSTEM:

Augustus’s military policy is enigmatic. On the one hand, Augustus added more territory to the empire than any previous Roman leader, acquiring or pacifying Egypt, north-west Spain, the Alps, most of the Balkans and parts of Austria. His legions even pushed across the Rhine toward the Elbe, but this German territory had to be abandoned after Herman’s massacre of Varus’s legions in 9 A.D. Augustus was not shy about his military achievements; as an old man he had them publicly celebrated in his Res Gestae. On the other hand, Augustus, on his deathbed, is supposed to have warned his heir to keep the empire within its present boundaries (Tacitus, Annals 1.11; Dio 56.33). Suetonius asserted that Augustus never ‘wantonly invaded any country, and felt no temptation to increase the boundaries of the empire or enhance hi military glory’ (Aug. 21) and was followed in this assessment by Dio and a host of modern historians. Tenney Frank believed that Augustus at first aimed at winning popular approval by following in the footsteps of his adoptive father Gaius Julius Caesar and adding territories to Rome through conquest. The disaster in the Teutoberg Forest (9 A.D.) sobered him; thereafter he returned to the prudent defensive policy of the republican senate. Ronald Syme believed that Augustus had conquered in order to secure defensible borders along the natural boundaries of the Danube, Euphrates, and Elbe, until the German defeat led him to retreat to the Rhine frontier. Both Frank and Syme wrote from the viewpoint that Roman imperial expansion was essentially defensive (the Romans only fought in self defense or in defense of their allies), a view that has been challenged by William Harris, P.A. Brunt, and K. Hopkins, all of whom have stressed the belligerent character of Roman republican society and culture. (Summarized from Tim Cornell, ‘The end of Roman imperial expansion,” in Rich and Shipley, 140-41.) The traditional opinion, then, is that Augustus sought military expansion in order to attain defensible borders along natural frontiers.

Tim Cornell, following Brunt, has challenged the view that Augustus was a farsighted and cautious statesman who only aimed at defending Rome. Citing Augustus’s Res Gestae, Cornell points out that Augustus was proud of his military conquests–a pride echoed in the imperialistic poetry of the Augustan age. Brunt sees Augustus’s ambitions as a continuing programme of imperial expansion. Cornell points out that the idea that Augustus sought natural frontiers in order to defend Roman territory is undermined by the weakness of the Rhine-Danube-Euphrates line: “Rivers are not effective lines of defence, nor do they function historically as boundaries between ethnic linguistic or national groups” (p. 142). Secondly, a search for defensible borders presupposes an external threat, and it is doubtful that the Principate faced any such threat (contra Luttwak, 143). Luttwak (and Brunt) see Parthia as the threat, Cornell and others (including Syme and most recently B. Isaac) deny that Parthia was aggressive in action (though, admittedly, King Artabanus III used expansionist rhetoric). Cornell, in fact, points out that it was the Romans and not the Parthians who initiated all the major military actions in the East: “In a political sense Rome did not have a Parthian problem; but it is abundantly clear that Parthia had a Roman problem” (145)
A. GRAND STRATEGY (LUTTWAK):

MOBILE ROMAN FORCES FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND TO MEET SUDDEN FOREIGN THREATS, SUPPLEMENTED BY CLIENT STATES SERVING AS FRONTIER BUFFER ZONES. Augustus was expansionist until AD 9 (Teutoberg Forest disaster), then argued for a policy of preserving rather than expanding empire. This policy was followed by A’s successors, though Caligula planned and Claudius actually conquered Britain (invaded AD 43).

Luttwak: early imperial Grand Strategy (Augustus through Nero, 27 B.C.-A.D. 68) was extremely FLEXIBLE, based on a hegemonic conception of empire. Mobile army units stationed in marching camps served as striking forces to maintain internal security and guard against external threats; client states served as buffer zones on the frontiers and were expected to cope with low intensity threats beyond Roman territory. ‘Escalation dominance’ of the legions–perceived efficacy–meant that they could deter large-scale threats without having to be used. (Cornell, correctly, points out that Luttwak ‘gave scientific precision to the theory of defensive imperialism.’ His inspiration was Cold War strategies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and as chief military advisor to Ronald Reagan he was justifying/devising American European strategy through a resort to historical analysis. LUTTWAK’S CONCLUSIONS ARE BASED ON A HIDDEN PREMISE, THAT ROME HAD A GRAND STRATEGY. HE ASSUMES THAT ROMAN EMPERORS AND THEIR ‘POLICY ADVISORS’ HAD ACTIVE POLICIES AND SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THE RESOURCES OF THE EMPIRE TO PURSUE THEIR POLICY OBJECTIVES. This view of central imperial governmental decision making has been challenged by Fergus Millar, ‘Emperors, frontiers and foreign relations,’ Britannia 13 [1982], 1-23, and J.C. Mann, ‘Power, force and the frontiers of the empire’ (a critical review of Luttwak), in JRS 69 [1979], 175-83. Millar, for instance, has emphasized that difficulties of communication, transportation, and the natural inertia of the Roman system of provincial administration meant that provincial governors had pretty much a free hand militarily (though Cornell contests this by pointing out that emperors monitored generals to insure that they did not gain too much glory).

Ferrill: Luttwak is largely correct, but by the end of Augustus’ reign the Roman strategy was already tending toward being preclusive. Cites Tacitus’s description of deployment of legions in AD 23: 8 on Rhine as evidence for perimeter defense: 4 on Danube, 2 Egypt, 2 Dalmatia, 4 Syria.

Cornell: The Pax Romana and the Pax Augusta are illusory. Augustus’s military adventures, Claudius’s conquest of Britain, Trajan’s wars in Dacia and Mesopotamia and the frequent engagement of Roman army units in low-level campaigns against minor incursions or against internal unrest suggest that military activity occurred constantly during the Pax Romana. Cornell sees a fundamental continuity between warmaking in the late Republic and in the Principate. The change, he argues, had occurred around the time of the Gracchi, and this change entailed the transformation of the Roman army from aristocratic leaders and citizen levies into generals leading professional armies. The nature of Roman war had changed from constant imperialist activity (annual levies) to larger but sporadic expeditions and constant military supervision of provincial territories. Much of the military activity that marked the last century of the Republic involved not foreign policy but civil war. Ironically, Augustus’ aggressive imperial policy represented a radical but temporary departure from what had preceded and what was to follow it. Cornell suggests that Augustus’ warlike policy was influenced by his desire to revive the traditional Roman virtues (see Livy), his need to justify the expense of a standing, professional army, and his desire to emulate and surpass his adoptive father Caesar. Military commands also provided opportunities to Augustus and his relatives to gain military glory and prestige (after A.D. 19 triumphs were restricted to members of the imperial family!!). In other words, Augustus fought wars to legitimate himself and his heirs. It was Tiberius who reverted back to the earlier policy of pacification in preference to expansion. Cornell resolves the paradox of a Principate which had a standing army that was constantly engaged but which also promoted the idea of the Pax Romana was that the army had become professional, the citizenry had been civilianized, and a “huge gulf separated [the educated classes of the empire, our source for the PR] from the world of the frontier provinces and the life of the soldier” (167). War simply did not impinge itself as much on the consciousness of the elite in the first century A.D. as it had a century before. The Principate was a civilian society in which military activity was foreign to the experiences of the majority of the population.

B. FORCES:

THE ROMAN REVOLUTION HAD CREATED A FULLY PROFESSIONAL ARMY in place of the Republican ideal of the citizen-farmer/soldier, of a society in which the military and civil worlds were completely integrated. In the Republic legionaries were citizens, farmers, and fathers; in the Principate they were still citizens but now they were FULL-TIME SOLDIERS FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO OWN OR CULTIVATE LAND OR EVEN TO MARRY AND BEGET LEGITIMATE CHILDREN. The maintenance of a large, salaried standing army forced Augustus to institute new taxes (including a 5% inheritance tax for Roman citizens) to pay the military expenses. The legionaries of the principate were a specialized group separated from the civil society. The army was also increasingly geographically separated from the majority of civil society, as it was stationed in frontier provinces and, eventually, recruited from those same areas. Italy and the other inner provinces became demilitarized.

28 LEGIONS, c. 168,000 men, and equal number of AUXILIARIES until AD 9; 25 legions plus auxiliaries in AD 23, about 300,000 men in all. Legions were about 5300 men. Command structure of the legion: legate (general), 6 tribunes, prefect of the camp (former chief centurions), chief centurion, 5 senior centurions, centurions, optiones, aquilifer (carried the eagle standard), signifer (ordinary standard bearer). Auxiliaries were organized by infantry cohorts of either 500 or 1000 men, divided into 80 men units. The cohort was led by prefects and the centuries by centurions. Cavalry were organized into alae (also either 512 or 1000 men strong) and divided into squadrons of 32 or 42 men. In the first century the commanders of the alae were Roman prefects and squadron commanders were decurions.

No central reserve, but Augustus created PRAETORIAN GUARD as imperial, elite guard: 9 cohorts (nearly 4500 men) stationed in Italy (3 in Rome). The PG was led by an equestrian Prefect. Each PG served 16 yrs (vice legionary’s 20 and auxiliary’s 25). By AD 100 the PG numbered 9,000 men. In addition, emperors had personal German bodyguard; 3 Urban Cohorts, under Prefect of Rome, serving as police force; as 7 cohorts of vigiles, paramilitary fire brigade (led by equestion Prefect).

NAVAL POWER: deemphasized (seen as unRoman, despite Octavian’s victory at Actium); partly due to the lack of an enemy in the Mediterranean. Two major naval bases: Misenum (near Naples) and Ravenna, each with 10,000 sailors under equestrian commanders.

RECRUITMENT: legionaries were citizens; auxiliaries were not, though auxiliaries received citizenship upon the completion of their 25 year tours of duty. From the time of Augustus on, central Italy virtually ceased producing troops, except for the praetorian guard and the urban cohorts. Northern Italy remained, however, a big recruiting area, supplying about 65% of legionaries during the first half of the first century. Most troops were volunteers, though conscription (dilectus) was occasionally used if necessary.

Augustus established the ordinary term of service for a legionary at 16 years as a ranker and four more as a veteran. At the end of his term of service, a legionary was discharged with a grant in land or cash worth 3,000 denarii (200 iugera). The ordinary soldier’s pay was 225 denarii (900 sesterces) a year. Soldiers were prohibited from marrying, farming, or owning land. They were married to their legions.

C. STRENGTHS OF ROMAN SYSTEM:

Strength of the Roman imperial army was in its discipline and training, its engineering ability, and its LOGISTICS. The military was especially good at siege warfare, with various type of ballistae and catapults. The Roman army also built excellent roads, fortifications, and bridges (Caesar’s over the Rhine; Trajan’s over the Danube: stone piers set 170 feet apart, each 150 feet high, 60 feet wide. As Luttwak and Ferrill point out, the military was most effective against enemies with fixed assets that might be threatened.

LOGISTICS: Roman logistics was one of the wonders of the ancient world. Even during the Principate the grain supply for the army was centrally controlled. Ferrill cites (Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 26) an example from the fourth century when Constantius ordered that 3 millions bushels of wheat be gathered along the borders of Gaul and another 3 million to the east of Gaul to supply the troops he was levying to fight against his rebellious nephew Julian.

Each legion had assigned to grain agents, frumentarii, who served both as requisition officers and spies.
II. THE SECOND CENTURY SYSTEM: PAX ROMANA
A. GRAND STRATEGY (LUTTWAK):

PRECLUSIVE DEFENSE. Second century (Pax Romana). By reign of Hadrian (117-138) the borders of the Roman Empire were clearly defined as most of the client states were absorbed in Rome’s provincial system. Roman emperors from Vespasian through the Severi (69-235) adopted a grand strategy of border defense, based on a geographically rational defensive perimeter (defined by desert edge, rivers, oceans) bolstered by a system of fortifications (most famous being Hadrian’s Wall in Britain, 73 miles long, 20 feet high, 8 feet wide, with 30 foot wide/9 foot deep fosse). The legions and auxiliaries (29-33 legions + auxiliaries, approx. 300-350,000) were now stationed in permanent stone fortresses along the frontier. (6,000 mile land perimeter.)

The basic strategic doctrine was FORWARD DEFENSE rather than a static “maginot line” (offensive tactically/defensive strategically). The system comprised linear barriers or limites (walls, pallisades, ditches) that were to serve as base lines for mobile forces; guardposts, auxiliary forts, and legionary fortresses; watchtowers and outpost forts either built in the walls or located beyond the border; network of ROADS and rivers to serve as internal lines of communications; communications by fire and smoke signals.

Luttwak:

The security policies of Vespasian and his successors, which reached a logical culmination under Hadrian and his successors, may be seen as an attempt to transform the empire into a marching camp writ large. The metaphor is perfectly applicable: the network of imperial border defenses created under these policies, like those of the marching camp, were intended to serve not as total barriers but rather as the one fixed element in a mobile strategy of imperial defense. (Grand Strategy, p. 57).

Roman strategy in the second century was generally defensive, except for the reign of Trajan (98-117), who conquered Dacia (Romania) in 101-2, 105-6, and annexed Armenia and Mesopotamia (down to the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon) in 114-117. Hadrian abandoned the eastern conquests because of the difficulty of consolidating and defending them.

B. ROMAN FORCES:

Number of legions fluctuated between 29 and 33 (under Trajan). Since these troops were now stationed in fixed positions along the border with the territorialization of the army, auxilia were used more widely for offensive warfare, and units known as vexillationes were detached from the legions when expeditionary forces were needed.

RECRUITMENT, STATIONING, AND ACTIVITIES
Main changes were in recruitment, stationing, and activities. Volunteers were expected to obtain a letter of recommendation from someone with military service or political clout, would then present himself for an interview (probatio), which established his legal and physical qualifications (citizenship, minimum height of 5’8″ [ideally--Vegetius] and 5’5″ by the late period [Theodosian Code], have all fingers and toes, basic soundness of body and mind). He then received a posting, a bonus for upping, and had to take a military oath to perform with enthusiasm whatever the emperor commands, not to desert, or to shrink from death on behalf of the Roman state.

From the time of Hadrian on, soldiers were recruited from the provinces in which they were to be stationed. (By Hadrian’s time only 1% of the legionaries came from Italy.) Most were stationed in legionary fortresses for their entire careers. Around these fortresses villages would develop for the unofficial families of the soldiers. (Officially soldiers were not permitted to marry; they did, of course, however.)

The main problem was to keep up morale and to maintain fighting capability in the absense of engagements. This was done by constant training, regulations, inspections, and detailed exercises and duties. Cleanliness was held at a premium, and much effort was directed to camping the camps tidy. Each camp had a medical corps with orderlies and doctors and hospitals. To provide recreation and amenities for the soldiers, public baths were normally provided for.
III. THE THIRD CENTURY CRISIS, 235-284:
POLITICAL ANARCHY (26 emperors + numerous would-be usurpers; only one emperor died of natural causes), MILITARY CHAOS (anyone with an army marched on Rome, sacking countryside and towns on the way)–CIVIL WAR EXACERBATED BY THE RISE OF POWERFUL FOREIGN ENEMIES (SASSINID PARTHIA AND BETTER ORGANIZED GERMAN THREAT ON DANUBE AND RHINE FRONTIER; lowpoint is in 260 when emperor Valerian is captured by Parthians and tortured to death). NO GRAND STRATEGY WORTH MENTIONING, THOUGH LUTTWAK DOES MANAGE TO CALL WHAT WAS PRACTICED A ‘ELASTIC DEFENSE’ APPROACH: TRY TO INTERCEPT ENEMY ANYWHERE ONE CAN.

The third century crisis did produce some energetic emperors–Gallienus (253-68), Claudius Gothicus (268-70), and Aurelian (270-5) did much to restore order and power to the central authority. Gallienus is credited by Luttwak (following Jones) with the establishment of a mobile central army (cavalry) drawn from Moors and Dalmations. Based at Milan this comitatus served as a field force to meet emergencies. Ferrill points out: 1) Milan was Gallienus’s frontier, so that this is NOT the genesis of a defense-in-depth system, 2) cavalry had always been important in Roman warfare, 3) Gallienus’s cavalry reserve disappeared by the reign of Diocletian. Aurelius’s contributions included fortifying Rome (272) with a 12 mile, 20′ high wall, with massive battlements, and by defeating Zenobia and thus restoring imperial control over the eastern provinces.
IV. LATE ROMAN MILITARY (from Diocletian to 476)

A. SOURCES:

1) Notitia dignitatum et administrationum omnium tam civilium quam militarium in partibus Orientis et Occidentis:

Army lists for the numbers and dispositions of troops in the east and the west. It survives in Renaissance manuscript copies of a lost ninth-century codex. Document most likely compiled a chief notary in the West ca. 408 (the material for the Eastern empire reflects conditions around 408). The data for the Western Empire was updated and revised down to 423. PAPER STRENGTHS–probably a financial/administrative document.

2) Flavius VEGETIUS Renatus, De re militari (383 X 450). Manual.

Most influential handbook on warfare and military organization throughout the Middle Ages. Vegetius produced a summa on Roman warfare by culling earlier Roman sources for what they have to say about training, recruitment, strategy, tactics, siege warfare. The purpose of the manual was, literally, to reform the Roman army by returning it to what it had once been: a highly disciplined and drilled professional force. Point: military victory comes from training and drill; the best armies are those with integrated tactical arms. Ferrill sees this work as a meditation on what was wrong with the late Roman army, a lament, especially, for the deterioration of the infantry.

3) De rebus bellicis (Anonymous, 337 X 378). Imaginative manual that emphasizes technological innovation as solution to the military problem.

The De rebus bellicis urged the introduction of ingenious new weapons to restore Roman military might. Among the weapons proposed in this work are a warship propelled by a drive shaft based on the watermill powered by oxen; a moveable armored shield for siegework; a rotating, horsedrawn catapult. Highly ingenious and highly impractical–sort of the Leonardo approach to warfare.

4) AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS. AM was a fourth-century historian and army officer of Greek extraction who was born in Antioch and who wrote a massive continuation of Tacitus down to his present day (ca. 390). What has survived is the material for AD 354-378. This is an extremely valuable source for late Roman military history.

5) THEODOSIAN CODE. Compendium of Roman law issued in 438. Great source for conditions of service, problems of desertion, recruitment, etc.

6) ZOSIMUS. 5th century Greek historian; Procopius, John the Lydian and Agathias, 6th century Byzantine historians. Latter two provide numbers of troops for fourth century army.
B. GRAND STRATEGY: DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH (LUTTWAK AND FERRILL)
Evidence–ZOSIMUS (mid fifth century):

By the foresight of Diocletian the frontiers of the Roman empire were everywhere studded with cities and forts and towers, in the way I have already described, and the whole army was stationed along them, so that it was impossible for the barbarians to break through, as the attackers were everywhere withstood by an opposing force. But Constantine RUINED this defensive system by withdrawing the majority of the troops from the frontiers, and stationing them in cities which did not require protection.
Discussion:

After Diocletian (284-305) attempted–but failed–to restore a preclusive defense system, CONSTANTINE THE GREAT (305-337) reconstituted Roman grand strategy, substituting a DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH for PRECLUSIVE defense. Constantine organized a large mobile field army (comitatenses), probably in excess of 100,000 men, by withdrawing forces from the frontiers (limitanei) and stationing the field armies in central locations.

DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH IS A STRATEGY BASED ON THE IDEA THAT THE BORDERS CANNOT BE MADE IMPENETRABLE AND THAT INVADERS WILL BREACH THE FRONTIERS. TO DEFEAT THESE INCURSIONS THE STATE WILL BUILD STRONG POINTS ALONG THE FRONTIERS AND ALONG THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION (roads and rivers) REACHING INTO THE INTERIOR. THESE FORTS SERVE AS THREATS TO THE ENEMIES LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND AS POCKETS OF RESISTANCE AND LOGISTICAL DEPOTS. THE MAIN RESISTANCE WILL COME FROM MOBILE FIELD FORCES THAT WILL, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SMALLER FORCES IN THE FORTS, ENGAGE THE ENEMY WITHIN ROMAN TERRITORY. The enemy can get in, but once in, cannot then escape.

Luttwak emphasizes the major benefits of this strategy: 1) it is cost effective, 2) the centralized field armies protected the power of the emperors who controlled them. He also points out (and Ferrill harps on) its major weakness–it sacrifices territory to the enemy and creates within the borders of a state a de facto buffer zone. This will inevitably lead to demoralization of the local population and an erosion of the logistical base.
C. FORCES AND DEPLOYMENT

DIOCLETIAN (284-305) appears to have doubled the number of legions, increasing the size of the army dramatically, to about 400-500,000. (John the Lydian in the 6th century gives the figure 435,266.) To raise troops Diocletian made military service hereditary and instituted a new system of conscription based on land tax: burden fell exclusive on agricultural population, as landowners were responsible for send specified quotas of soldiers.

Diocletian deployed his troops mainly on the border, but he also had a small field army made up of the praetorian guard (disbanded in 312), lanciarii (cavalry lancers), Ioviani and Herculiani (elite infantry, personal following of emperor), and scholae (mounted imperial guard–mainly German). Together these forces were the emperor’s comitatus. When Diocletian needed a large expeditionary force, he used vexillationes drawn from the legions.

Diocletian’s command structure placed praetorian prefects immediately below the emperors (Augusti and Caesars). These praetorian prefects were immensely powerful, combining both military and civilian authority: a pp was responsible for leading troops, overseeing public post and arms factories, levying men and material for public works, and supervising provincial governors.

CONSTANTINE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GREAT REORGANIZATION OF THE ROMAN ARMY THAT REDEFINED IT IN LATE ANTIQUITY.

I. CONSTANTINE’S REFORMS: basic distinction among COMITATENSES (mobile field armies, divided into infantry, cavalry, and mixed cohorts–military elite); LIMITANEI/RIPENSES (frontier garrisons, increasingly poorly trained and of questionable military value–the dregs of the army); SCHOLAE (imperial guard–five regiments, each 500 strong, in the West; seven regiments in the East–ca AD 400: Notitia Dignitatum–crack troops, largely recruited from Germans; declined in military value after Theodosius I, when emperors ceased to take field, and became parade ground elite). Constantine also divided civil and military control.

A. Numbers: Notitia Dignitatum provides at least paper numbers Western armies, ca. 423, and Eastern armies, ca. 408 (Jones, Later, vol. 3:table 15):
Western comitatus 113,000 limitanei 135,000 scholae 2500
Eastern comitatus 104,000 limitanei 248,000 scholae 3500
Total Western forces: 248,000 % limitanei 54%
Total Eastern forces: 352,000 % limitanei 70%
Total imperial forces: 600,000

These numbers agree with the figure given in the 6th century by Agathias. They represent, probably, the PAPER strength of the armies (the fiscal cost of these forces) rather than the true combatant strength.

In addition to the regular troops, late Roman emperors made extensive use of FEDERATES (contingents supplied according to treaty by tribes along the borders– the remnant of old CLIENT STATE system). FEDERATES WERE TO BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AFTER THE BATTLE OF ADRIANOPLE, AD 378. BY THE MIDDLE OF THE FIFTH CENTURY, THEY WERE, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THE ROMAN ARMY. See below.
D. COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE LATE ROMAN ARMY

Military command structure (distinct from civil administration, which after Diocletian was organized into 4 prefectures, divided into diocese and small provinces):

a. Sector commands: comites and duces were sector commanders for the limitanei. (Comites, the title given to some key sector commanders, e.g. of Egypt, were higher in dignity; the title implies that they had control over units of comitatenses.)

b. Field Army:

1. Comitatenses: Under Constantine there was a Commander of the infantry (magister peditum) and a Commander of the cavalry (magister equitum) who served under the emperor. By the end of the fourth century there were magistri militum for each of the four praefectures, and two senior magistri militum attached to the emperor.

2. Palatini/scholae–emperor’s central army: magister militum praesentales and various comites
E. RECRUITMENT. Army was recruited from both Roman citizens (all

adult males within the empire after 212 AD) and from barbarians.

I. Recruitment from citizens: volunteers, if they met the prescribed

standards, were welcome; but the popularity of military service had dropped to the point that army needs could no longer be met by volunteers. Most soldiers came from conscription:

1) main source: conscription based on the land tax (instituted by Diocletian). Annual levy that fell only on the rural population. Landlords (and villages of peasants) were required to meet a quota of soldiers from among their tenants, or to commute this obligation for a sum of 25 or 30 solidi;

2) sons of soldiers who by Diocletian’s law were obliged to follow the profession of their father (NOT systematically enforced,

3) periodical impressments in cities

a. Military service was very UNPOPULAR. Despite good pay (in theory),

exemption from the poll tax, and other benefits (food and clothing), many did not want to serve. The length of service and the stationing in places far away from the recruit’s home led to massive desertion during the transportation period. It also led to self-mutilation, as a series of laws from the Theodosian Code testify. (Cutting off a thumb to avoid service was punishable in the mid 4th century by death by fire; by 400 such recruits were accepted, but the recruiting source was obliged to provide an additional soldier.)

Landlords much preferred to commute the obligation rather than use up their available labor. Pressure from landlords led to an exemption being granted to coloni, citizen farmers bound to a tenancy.
II. Barbarians in the Roman armies (Jones): great majority were volunteers; prisoners of war and quotas from federate tribes were also enrolled. Barbarian prisoners of war were settled in small villages under Roman prefects. These laeti were bred to supply troops to the armed forces. (Constantine, supposedly, settled 300,000 Sarmatians as laeti in villages in Italy and the Balkans).

a. UNDER CONSTANTINE FRANKS AND ALAMANS DOMINATED THE SCHOLAE AND BARBARIANS WERE WELL REPRESENTED IN THE ELITE ‘PALACE’ FORCES (barbarians were deemed to be better fighting material). There were many barbarians in the comitatenses; few among the limitanei. The desirability of Germans for the armed forces underlies the decision of the Emperor Valens to welcome in the Gothic refugees of 376.

b. From the references collected by Ramsey Macmullen, (Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988] 201-04), it seems that the from the time of Constantine on, Germans formed the bulk of the Roman military forces. The civil wars of the fourth century pitted German auxiliaries of emperors against the German auxiliaries of pretenders. As Macmullen points out (176), from 312 on the soldiers credited with ‘Roman’ victories were forces mustered from outside the empire: “No general wanted regular Romans. By the mid-fourth century the typical fighting force, as opposed to a more or less useless mass of men merely in uniform, appears to have been half imported. A generation later, imported soldiers formed the majority. Notorious, before the century was over, barbarian commanders of essentially barbarian armies had gained control over the empire’s fate. …The sack of Rome was a purely domestic event.”

c. There was some debate in the late 4th century over the wisdom of

relying on barbarian recruits, especially after Adrianople when Theodosius recruited heavily among the Germans to make up for the losses suffered by the army. THE POINT TO MAKE, THOUGH, IS THAT GERMANS IN REGULAR UNITS, SUBJECTED TO ROMAN DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING AND COMMANDED BY REGULAR ROMAN OFFICERS (OFTEN BARBARIANS THEMSELVES) WERE LOYAL AND RELIABLE TROOPS. ONE MUST NOT THINK IN TERMS OF DIVIDED LOYALTIES: THERE WAS NO GERMAN NATIONALISM IN THE 4TH CENTURY. FEDERATES WERE A DIFFERENT MATTER.
D. PAY, RATIONS, TERMS OF SERVICE (in theory, based on Jones).

I. Pay: Soldiers received remuneration in the form of food, fodder, and cash. The annual pay of the common soldier was 4-5 solidi a year (bread for a year, at 3lbs a day–soldier’s ration–cost 1 solidi; meat rations, 2lb a day=2 s.; clothing=1 s per garment). In addition to regular pay (which was not always so regularly paid!) soldiers received bonuses on the accession day and birthdays of the emperor and his family. They received from STATE MILLS uniforms (shirt, tunic, cloak; boots were produced by levies, though there was a state boot factory in 344); from STATE ARMORIES, weapons manufactured by state factories. (Issues of uniforms were gradually commuted into cash payments, beginning in the second half of the fourth century.) Horses were either bought on contract or supplied by imperial stud farms.

a. Officer pay: little is known of officer pay, except that it also was in the form of cash and rations. We do know that it was considerably higher than that of regular troops, and that it was often supplemented by embezzlement, kickbacks, and bribes.

II. Rations: Rations for limitanei were supplied by the civilian authorities: the praetorian prefect through the vicars and provincial governors, who directed curial collectors to issue to the quartermasters (actuaries) of the regiments the supplies listed in their warrants. Comitatenses units were supplied in bulk by the provincial authorities in which the units were billeted. Armies on campaign were supplied by praetorian prefects.

The soldier’s rations (according to a sixth-century Egyptian papyrus source, the only table of rations we have) included bread (3lbs), meat (2lbs), 2 pints of wine, and 1/8 pint of oil. On campaign the soldier would receive biscuits instead of bread and salt pork instead of fresh meat.

III. Billeting.

a. Limitanei–lived in permanent forts on border.

b. Comitatenses–billeted in cities, usually given one-third of the

living space in private houses. Though only the magistri had a right to demand a bath, many officers coerced their hosts to provide them–illegally–with wood, bedding, and baths.

IV. Terms of service and promotion

a. Length of service: Ordinary term of service was 20 years to achieve an honorable discharge; 24 years for a veteran’s discharge. Some NCOs stayed on for as many as 48 years. Veterans enjoyed fiscal privileges (immunity for themselves and their wives from the poll tax; discharge allotments of land with oxen and corn or cash bounties)

b. Personnel Support: army fortresses and field forces had in the 5th century regimental chaplains (most soldiers were still pagans) and regimental doctors. There were army hospitals with army doctors and orderlies.

c. Promotion: promotion was both through seniority and by acts of bravery. Common soldiers could rise through the ranks and be commissioned as officers. Those selected were given their rank through an audience with the emperor in which they ‘adored the sacred purple.’ This made them into protectores. The protectores formed a Corps of Officer Cadets open to ordinary soldiers and to the sons of officers. They served on headquarters’ staffs and were used for miscellaneous duties, such as rounding up recruits or arresting important persons. A protector would eventually be given command of a regiment (becoming a tribune or prefect).
F. THE REALITY: CORRUPTION, PECULATION, EXTORTION, PAPER TROOPS

(Jones & Macmullen): Macmullen (193): “while the ethic prevailing in the legions had traditionally permitted extortion as a routine by and among the noncommissioned officers and lower ranks, it was only in the third century that whole regiments and armies (meaning, surely, colonels and generals) were seen to put profit before war. “THE EMPIRE AS A WHOLE SUFFERED FROM THE PREVALENCE OF VENALITY” (196). Libanius (addressing the emperor in 390) bemoaned that even soldiers in rural billets were all ‘on the take,’ all ‘selling protection’ against rent and tax collectors. The general, of course, received the biggest share, but the protection money trickled down to the rank and file.

I. PAY: Synesius, Libanius, and other 4th century writers describe hungry soldiers clad in ‘bits of boots and ghosts of great-coats’ (Libanius), because their officers had pocketed their soldiers’ rations and pay.

Only the scholares were paid on time and lived well. Limitanei‘s and even the field forces’ pay was often in arrears, as high ranking officers detoured money into their own pockets and actuaries demanded and took kickbacks. The results were mutiny–Justinian’s armies in Africa and Italy mutinied for back pay–and, more commonly, soldiers bullying and extorting money from civilians.

Dishonest officers (Macmullen 161) created another problem. Some pocketed money earmarked for their men’s uniforms and equipment. Many accepted payment from their men for extended–in some cases permanent–leave. One of the greatest problems was the failure to report deaths or desertions, since this meant that senior officers could draw for themselves the wages and benefits allotted to these ‘paper troops.’ Conscription, as Macmullen points out, became an accepted excuse for a shakedown.

II. DISCIPLINE: “The regular army, we are told [by Ammianus], lacked

discipline, energy, and courage. It excelled only in its ‘lust for plunder.’” (Macmullen Corruption 175). As Macmullen points out (ibid), Vegetius, Claudian, Ambrose, Symmachus, Libanius, Synesius and the author of the Augustan History ALL comment on the lack of drill, discipline, practice among soldiers, and the problems of drunkenness, inadequate armor, and readiness to run away. Macmullen: “No general wanted regular Romans.”

DISCIPLINE WAS SCANDALOUSLY LAX among late fourth and early fifth

-century LIMITANEI and, increasingly, among the COMITATENSES of and the 5th and 6th centuries. MANY SOLDIERS BECAME FULL TIME FARMERS AND TRADESMEN. Jones cites the case of a comitatensis of Alexandria who weaved baskets from dawn until 1500 and then put on his uniform and went on parade. He did this for 8 years. Another soldier from southern Egypt described himself in a legal document as a soldier of regiment x, by profession a boatman.

RAMSEY MACMULLEN POINTED OUT THE IN THE LATE EMPIRE THE CIVILIAN

POPULATION WAS INCREASINGLY MILITARIZED (military uniforms became fashionable among the aristocracy; private citizens carrying weapons became common) WHILE THE MILITARY BECAME INCREASINGLY CIVILIANIZED.

THE EARLY FIFTH-CENTURY MILITARY WRITER (AND ANTIQUARIAN) VEGETIUS DIAGNOSED THE MILITARY PROBLEM OF THE EMPIRE AS DUE TO A LACK OF DISCIPLINE AND PRESCRIBED A RETURN TO THE (IDEALIZED) DRILL AND MANUAL OF ARMS OF THE EARLIER IMPERIAL ARMIES.

Jones does point out, however, that the FIELD ARMIES of the early fifth century were still formidable military forces capable of defeating larger barbarian armies (Stilicho’s victories of Pollentia, Verona, and Faesulae), and the Byzantine armies of Justinian conquered Italy and Africa because of their tactical superiority (Belisarius’s army in N. Africa in 533 numbered only 15,000 troops). THE ONLY BATTLE THAT A BARBARIAN DEFEATED A REGULAR ROMAN ARMY IN THE 4TH AND 5TH CENTURIES WAS ADRIANOPLE, WHICH WAS EXCEPTIONAL BECAUSE OF THE POOR LEADERSHIP OF THE EMPEROR VALENS, WHICH LED TO THE ROMANS BEING CAUGHT BETWEEN THE GERMAN CAMP AND THE GERMAN CAVALRY RETURNING FROM ITS FORAGING EXPEDITION. But, again, one must ask what was the difference by 400 AD, at least in the West, between a ‘Roman’ and a ‘barbarian’ army?
G. BARBARIANS AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE ROMAN ARMY, 410-500: (Goffart 31-34; Geary, Before France and Germany, ch. 1-2; Roger Collins, Early Medieval Europe, 1991):

I. CULTURAL INTEGRATION. Germans (Goths, Alemmans, Burgundians, etc.) living within the Roman provinces or across the borders in Late Antiquity had been “ROMANIZED” through long contact with the empire. Geary stresses that Roman leaders, needing recognizable states with which to deal, helped create, through gifts and diplomacy, and define stable tribal units. In a sense, Rome created and categorized the varieties of Goths (Visigoths, Ostrogoths, etc.) and saw them as having a political unity that they had not possessed until they had encountered the Romans. Germania was defined in relationship to the Roman territorial borders: without the Romans there would have been no more unity among the ‘Germans’ than among the ‘Gauls’ before Julius Caesar.

CULTURAL INTERACTIONS WAS NOT ONE SIDED. Along the Rhine and Danubian borders of the empire, Germans were Romanized through commercial contacts, military arrangements, diplomacy, etc. ‘Romans,’ on the other hand, were increasingly ‘barbarianized.’ This may be seen in fashion in the adoption of ‘German’ trousers in the 4th century empire: in 397 the emperor Honorius decreed that trousers and German footwear not be word within the city of Rome. This law had to be reissued in 399 and 416, attesting to the popularity of German wear. In terms of material culture, the Germans along the border and the Romans across it may have been virtually indistinguishable. Roman and barbarian soldiers possessed the same equipment and uniforms, as can be seen from artistic representations of the imperial bodyguard from the time of Theodosius (ca. 388). For example, ‘German’ belt buckles found in 4th cemetery military graves actually were standard issue among Roman soldiers, manufactured by Romans. THE ‘GERMANIZATION’ OF THE ROMAN ARMY MAY BEST BE SEEN IN JULIAN’S ARMY IN GAUL DECLARING HIM EMPEROR THROUGH THE GERMAN PRACTICE OF RAISING THE NEW KING ON A SHIELD.
II. GERMANS FIGHTING FOR ROME

a. Barbarians in the Roman field armies. See above.

TOWARD THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY ROMAN FIELD ARMIES/AUXILIA LED BY ROMANIZED GERMAN COMMANDERS AND FEDERATE FORCES LED BY ROMANIZED BARBARIAN CHIEFTAINS BEGAN TO MERGE. THE CASE OF ALARIC IS INSTRUCTIVE HERE.

ALARIC, the leader of the Visigoth federates that sacked Rome in 410, had been granted the title of MASTER OF THE SOLDIERS THROUGHOUT ILLYRICUM by Emperor Theodosius in 397. After taking Rome, Alaric demanded to be named “Master of the Soldiers” (magister militum) of the West. Alaric’s great Roman opponent, STILICHO (master of the soldiers in the imperial presence–commander in chief–from 395-408) was the son of a Romanized Vandal.

b. FOEDERATI. Development from client system. Federates were barbarian tribes allied to empire, could be called upon to provide contingents for distant operations (e.g. bedouin force from Syria defended Constans against the Goths in 378). Constantine, who favored Germans for his imperial guard, the scholae, made a treaty in 324/32 with Gothic chieftains for 40,000 western Goths to defend Constantinople as federates. (Macmullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988] 202; Eusebius Vita Const. 4.5, Amm. 21.10.8).

After 378 (ADRIANOPLE) the situation was altered. Because Valens permitted in 200,000 Goths in 376 and was subsequently defeated by them in battle, THEODOSIUS (379-95), after indecisive warfare with the Goths, made treaty with the Visigoths and allowed them to settle in Thrace as a federate people under their own king and with their own laws and customs. The Burgundians and Alans were later given the same privilege. Theodosius’s army that defeated the pretender Eugenius in 394 relied heavily on the federate forces of Alaric and Gainas. Eugenius also relied on federates. After the civil war, Stilicho, needing troops to oppose Alaric, stripped the frontiers of soldiers and replaced them with federates (Macmullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988] 204).

THESE FEDERATE BANDS, UNLIKE THE EARLIER FEDERATES OUTSIDE THE EMPIRE OR THE GERMANS SERVING IN THE ROMAN ARMY, PROVED UNRELIABLE, LOYAL TO THEIR OWN CHIEFS RATHER THAN EMPIRE AND ALWAYS WILLING TO MOVE AGAINST EMPIRE TO GAIN BETTER DEAL.

Again, the example of ALARIC is instructive: “Nothing shows better how weakened had become the resistance against the barbarians, taken into the empire since 380, than the settling of German federates in 397, under a king provided with a Roman office” (Demouget, quoted by R. Macmullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988], 204). Macmullen concludes: BY THIS DATE [410], IN ANY MILITARY SENSE, THE EMPIRE WAS NO LONGER A SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE SACK OF ITS ANCIENT CAPITAL BY ALARIC–A HIGH IMPERIAL OFFICIAL AND EVEN A BORN ROMAN, SO FAR AS THE WORD HAS MEANING–HAD NO QUALITY OF INVASION ABOUT IT AT ALL. HE AND HIS MEN WERE THE ROMAN ARMY, AND HAD BEEN FOR DECADES.” (Macmullen 204).

Western empire in the 5th century tended to use federates more and more (while East, increasingly, reacted against barbarian soldiers, strengthening instead the border garrisons with local recruits). Jones attributes this to heavy losses suffered by Roman armies during the great barbarian invasion of Italy by Alaric, 407-410, and subsequent invasions by Vandals, Alans, etc., and endemic civil war.

The sources indicate that late Roman generals, acting under and on behalf of Roman emperors (who after Theodosius ceased to take the field themselves), were in command of armies largely composed of FEDERATES and bucellarii (generals’ personal followings of barbarian soldiers). The great fifth-century generals, Stilicho, Constantius, Boniface, and Aetius all relied upon bucellarii. Liebeshuetz points out that this personalization of the military ‘recalls the last century of the Republic’ and was a consequence of the core of these armies having been recruited personally by the commander (269). Such armies could easily into personal forces, which explains the tendency of the imperial government to lose control of its armies during this period
H. DISAPPEARANCE OF ‘ROMAN’ ARMIES.

Liebeschuetz (267): “The thesis of this chapter is that in the course of the first half of the fifth century, the regular army, that is the class of units listed in the Notitia, became unimportant as compared with the federates. The thesis is not that within fifty years every unit mention in the Notitia had disappeared. Some, perhaps a considerable number, may well have survived as garrison troops into the Gothic and Merovingian periods. But what I hope can be shown is that regulars ceased to be the decisive elements in field armies. The men who increasingly came to decide battles were barbarian federates.”

One of the paradoxes of Roman military history is that the Roman army in the late 4th century had close to 600,000 men in the field (or at least on the books), yet the LARGEST expeditionary force ever raised by Rome was the 65,000 men of Julian’s Persian campaign (361-63). Stilicho could only muster about 20,000 men to fight the major threat of Alaric in 407. Justinian dispatched only 10,000 troops with Belisarius to reconquer Italy in 536. (He received reinforcements of 6500 a year later.) Belisarius’s forces in Africa numbered about 15,000 regular troops and 1000 allies. Even though the Gothic armies numbered only around 20-30,000 combatants, nevertheless, the Romans found themselves outnumbered consistently. Why?

Jones explains this by pointing out that the Empire had huge borders–over 6,000 land miles, and its disposable military force was slight. Even the comitatenses were divided regionally and over time became more of internal garrison forces than true mobile striking armies. With poor and slow communications, it was dangerous to withdraw the forces from one area to face a threat in another. The only forces, according to Jones, that remained truly mobile and formidable in the field were the praesential armies (imperial guards) of Italy and Constantinople, but these numbered only about 20,000 in all.

Roger Collins noted that “one of the most striking features of the period between the years 395 (death of Theodosius the Great) and 476 is the lack of reference in the literary sources relating to both the eastern and western halves of the Empire to specifically Roman armies” (Collins 75). The sources indicate that Roman generals, acting under and on behalf of Roman emperors (who after Theodosius ceased to take the field themselves), were in command of armies largely composed of FEDERATES and bucellarii (generals’ personal followings of barbarian soldiers).

The few references we do have to field armies in the early fifth century are to their being withdrawn from parts of the Empire, either by would-be usurpers or by emperors fighting these rebels. In 407 the field army was removed from Britain; in 411, from Spain; in 432, from N. Africa (to serve in a civil war fought in Italy).

In fifth-century Gaul we find “a gradual contraction of the Roman military presence over the course of several decades, with at the same time an increased dependence on mercenary or federate troops to preserve an ever dwindling enclave of direct imperial rule” (Collins 75).

What happened in Gaul, which along with Italy, remained the focus of imperial attention, was a model for what happened elsewhere in the West: THE ROMAN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION SIMPLY CONTRACTED, LEAVING RULE OF WHOLE AREAS TO BARBARIAN FEDERATE TRIBES (e.g., Visigoths in Aquitaine in 418).

The military career of the Magister militum FLAVIUS AETIUS (flourished from c. 411 until he was murdered by the emperor Valentinian III in 454), hero of the victory at CHALONS in 451 over ATTILA THE HUN (reigned from 435-453) shows the basic trend. Aetius is best remembered as the Roman general who defeated Attila the Hun. This is ironic, since, as Liebeschuetz points out, “Aetius’s achievements would have been impossible without his following of Huns. … [it] looks as if the not only the success of Aetius’ army, but even his position of commander-in-chief of the western empire, depended on the fact that he had at his personal disposal a strong force of Hun federates” (Rich 270).

Aetius’s fortunes were made when he established personal relations with the Huns while a hostage in their court (423-25) on behalf of the usurper John. Aetius’s career really began with his leading a large force of Huns to aid John in 425. It climaxed in the battle of Chalons in 451, in which he led an army that consisted almost entirely of federate forces. (The king of the Goths commanded one wing, Alans were in the center, and Aetius led the ‘Roman’ forces on the other wing; but Aeitus’s ‘Roman’ forces seem to have been made up of Franks, Sarmatians, and other barbarian federates.)

Aetius’s basic policy was to rely upon foreign mercenaries. In the 420s-440s Aetius drew largely upon the HUNS to MAINTAIN IMPERIAL CONTROL OVER GAUL against the VISIGOTH FEDERATE KINGDOM (the other provinces were left to defend themselves as best they could). The Huns under Attila profited from the Empire by 1) supplying mercenary troops against German federates and against rebels, and 2) by extorting annual money payments by threatening raids into the Balkans. The money payments were stopped in 450 by the new emperor of the East, Marcian, and Attila responded by invading Gaul. AETIUS REVERSED HIS POLICY AND FORMED A COALITION WITH VISIGOTHS AND BURGUNDIANS TO OPPOSE THE HUNS. The result was the VICTORY OF CHALONS (451), which forced Attila to withdraw from Gaul.

In 452 Attila invaded Italy. This time THERE WAS NO ORGANIZED ROMAN RESISTANCE. Rather than an army, Rome dispatched Pope Leo I and two senators to attempt to negotiate with Attila. Christian sources say that Leo prevailed on Attila to withdraw; more likely, the malarial infested swamps around Ravenna were more persuasive. Attila died in the following year, and his Hunnic empire collapse. In 455 when a VANDAL fleet under King GAISERIC sailed from N. Africa and sacked the city of Rome, again the Romans could mount no military opposition. THE IMPLICATION OF ATTILA’S AND GAISERIC’S UNOPPOSED INVASIONS OF ITALY IS THAT BY THE MIDDLE OF THE FIFTH CENTURY THERE WAS NO ROMAN ARMY LEFT TO DEFEND ITALY.

Liebeschuetz concludes that the bulk of the field army/armies by 450 in the West consisted of federates. Regular units remained, but these consisted largely of garrisons in towns and fortresses. L attributes this reliance on barbarian troops to the demilitarization of Roman society in general, to the resistance of landowners to the conscription of their work force, and for the willingness and availability of large number of barbarian soldiers, who were renowned for their military qualities (Rich 273-74). More than this, the Roman authorities were shifting the burden of defense to the localities and private commanders. The Roman army in the fifth-century was, in essence, privatized.

I. LANDLORDS AND WARLORDS: BUCELLARII AND THE ‘PRIVATIZATION’ OF THE MILITARY

Dick Whittaker observes that the “twin process of soldiers becoming landlords and landlords becoming soldiers” in the late empire facilitated 1) the collapse of the frontiers, 2) the integration/fusion of German ‘barbarian’ and Roman culture, 3) the breakdown of law and the growth of a new culture of private powr in which ‘the poor became increasinly dependent of the arbitrary will of the landed rich” (Rich 281). As soldiers became landlords and landlords became the masters of soldiers, private individuals became the heads of military retinues of bucellarii. Though by law bucellarii were required to take an oath not only to their employers (a private contract), but one as well to the emperor (public). But, as Whittaker points out, ‘the public oath was of limited relevance if the patron rebelled, or if imperial rule was not recognized: the loyalty of the soldiers than became private obsequium [a personal following]‘ (295). Archaeologically, one of the key developments of the fifth century was the increasing ‘nucleation of rural sites. … Small farms disappeared, many vici (villages) were abandoned or removed to old Iron Age hittop sites, while larger villas … survived, expanded and were often fortified. … [There is evidence] of concentration of property holdings, the increased isolation and inaccessibility of estates and the compulsion on peasants to seek the refuge of the rich’ (292).

Increasingly in the fifth century, the “remnants of the Roman army operated in towns,” and bands of bucellarii in the service of local great men, their patrons, controlled the countryside. The Roman sources term these bands as ‘robbers,’ but it seems probable that they were actually the private forces of local magnates maintaining order and control outside of Roman public authority.

This process was not restricted to ‘Roman’ landlords. It was true also of German chiefs, many of whom were ‘Roman’ generals or federate chieftains. The distinction between ‘Roman’ and ‘German’ itself was disappearing as the cultures merged.
V. DISINTEGRATION OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE

During the course of the fifth century the Roman army and empire in the west disintegrated. Part of the reason had to do with historical circumstances. STILICHO’S ULTIMATELY UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ALARIC IN 406-408 ENTAILED THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE WESTERN FRONTIERS. EVEN BEFORE THIS CIVIL WARS, ESPECIALLY THEODOSIUS’S CONFLICT WITH THE WESTERN USURPER EUGENIUS (resolved by the former’s victory at the River Frigidus in 394) LEFT THE STRONGPOINTS IN THE ALPINE PASSES LARGELY UNMANNED. Stilicho followed a policy in the early 400s of relying upon federates and recruiting from among Germans, especially for the Western armies entrusted to him by the child emperor Honorius. THE FIFTH CENTURY WITNESSED THE CONTRACTION OF ROMAN CENTRAL RULE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ROMAN FORCES FROM THE PROVINCES. Romans withdrew from Britain in 407 (this was not a conscious policy decision, but the result of the pretender Constantine’s attempt to seize the purple and to defend Gaul against Vandals, Alans, Burgundians, etc. that had poured unopposed over the Rhine in 406-07; that the Roman army would never returned to Britain was probably not foreseen in 407); the Vandals, virtually unopposed by Roman troops, conquered all of Africa by 455; Visigoths took Spain by 457 and southern Gaul by 460. Northern Gaul remained “Roman,” under a Romano-Gallic aristocrat, Syragius, until CLOVIS, king of the FRANKS, defeated and killed him in 486. Even the army of Italy was replaced by federates by 480. The army of the Danube continued to exist until c. 475, when it disbanded due to cessation of pay.

The East resisted the trend to rely on barbarian federates. This may simply represent the greater financial resources of the East. CERTAINLY, THE EAST WAS MORE CAPABLE OF PAYING SUBSIDIES TO THE BARBARIANS AND SENDING THEM WESTWARD.

THE GREAT WALLS OF CONSTANTINOPLE ALSO MUST HAVE DETERRED BARBARIANS. ONE MUST ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROBABLE SUPERIORITY OF THE EASTERN ARMY BY 450. Theodosius’s victory over the Western army at the River Frigidus in 394, according to Ferrill, demoralized the Western forces.

What happened in the West was that the CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION GRADUALLY CONTRACTED, GIVING UP MORE AND MORE OF ROMAN TERRITORY TO THE RULE OF BARBARIAN FEDERATES. The result was a LOSS OF THE LOGISTICAL AND TAX BASE, which in turn, meant that the emperors had fewer resources with which to maintain control over the remaining areas of direct imperial rule. THE FALL OF ROME WAS REALLY THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY SYSTEM. What survived was a cultural and administrative tradition adopted by the new ROMANIZED “BARBARIAN” SUCCESSOR KINGS. Collins (91): “The ‘Fall of the Roman Empire in the West’ was not the disappearance of a civilization: it was merely the breaking down of a governmental apparatus that could no longer be sustained.”

ANY EXPLANATION OF THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE IN THE WEST MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ITS SURVIVAL AND CONTINUATION FOR ANOTHER THOUSAND YEARS IN THE EAST (THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE). A.H.M. Jones’s explanation of the ‘Fall’ begins by noting that the HEAVY TAXATION NEEDED TO PAY FOR ARMY AND OTHER ‘IDLE MOUTHS’ (120,000 citizens on the bread dole in Rome, 80,000 in Constantinople; senators and their households, decurions [administrators in the cities], civil servants, clergy) OVERSTRAINED THE RESOURCES OF EMPIRE AND BECAME THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE EMPIRE; THERE WERE TOO FEW PRODUCERS AND TOO MANY CONSUMERS OF THE IMPERIAL REVENUE. Disaffection was a result. The peasantry, upon whom the taxes fell disproportionately, found the burden so great that they were constantly on the verge of starvation. As a consequence, the population decreased, marginal lands went out of production, and the tax base eroded. The landed aristocracy, extremely wealthy, paid little taxes and felt little positive loyalty to the state. The culture of public service that characterized the Principate had all but died in the Third Century Crisis. In the West, landed aristocrats looked to their own safety and prosperity first. This passivity extended to military matters: the imperial authorities could not call upon local citizens to rise up in mass against the invaders. These local citizens, instead, looked to the government to protect them, and when this protection was not forthcoming, repudiated the central authority that had failed them.

For Jones the reason the West fell and the East survived was that the former simply did not have the economic resources or manpower to weather the storm. In the East there was 1) greater commercial wealth, meaning greater imperial revenues, and 2) a vigorous class of small landowners, taxpayers and conscripts for the military, who had a ‘stake’ in the survival of the state. In the West there was a far greater dichotomy between the wealthy senatorial class and the masses of poverty stricken peasants (coloni), who worked their estates. The former found it easier to reach an accommodation with the barbarians, and became their advisors and ‘hosts.’ The latter didn’t care who exploited them. For them all the empire meant was taxes and oppression. (This is essentially the point of view of the 5th-century Christian polemicist SALVIAN, who blamed the disasters of his age on the immorality of his contemporaries. Salvian’s On God’s Governance of the World (ca. 440) compares the virtues of the Germans favorably to those of the Romans, and explains that the common man didn’t fear the Germans or care when they took over the reins of empire.) MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE WEST EXPERIENCED FAR GREATER EXTERNAL PRESSURE THAN DID THE EAST. THE WEST, BECAUSE OF THE PLAINS OF GAUL, THE LONG RHINE/DANUBE BORDER, AND THE FEWER NUMBER OF DEFENDERS, WAS THE EASIER TARGET FOR INVADING TRIBES (AND THE EASTERN EMPERORS WERE WILLING TO PAY BARBARIANS, SUCH AS THE OSTROGOTHS, TO GO WEST). THE WEST FELL BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO RESIST THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS.

Jones’s explanation is tempting, though one must be aware how little solid evidence we have for the social and economic structure of either the East or the West during the 5th century. Still, it is a plausible explanation.
VI. THE ARMIES OF THE SUCCESSOR KINGDOMS

The barbarian armies that conquered the Western Roman empire pose a paradox to the student of military history. Byzantine military manuals of the 6th century assessed their strengths and weaknesses. They had a reputation for bravery and savagery, BUT THEY WERE ALSO SEEN TO BE IGNORANT OF TACTICS, WEAK IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (LACK OF EFFECTIVE SIEGE CRAFT AND BODY ARMOR), AND DEFICIENT IN THE PATIENCE NEEDED FOR A TACTICAL RESERVE (Thomas Burns, History of the Ostrogoths 1984, 186-87). NOR DID THEY HAVE ANY IDEA OF LOGISTICS BESIDES LIVING OFF OF THE LAND (or receiving Roman subsidies and supplies, if they were federates.) Their armies, moreover, were SMALL. Theodoric the Great, conqueror of Italy 488-89 and Ostrogothic king of Italy, led an army of maybe 30-40,000 men (Burns). Contamine (11) provides estimates of other barbarian forces: Alamans in 357–25,000; Visigothic coalition at Adrianople 378, 18,000; Gaiseric’s Vandals in Africa 429, 16,000 fighting men.

TACTICS WERE RUDIMENTARY. BARBARIANS FAVORITE TACTIC WAS TO FORM A WEDGE AND RUSH THE ENEMY, HOPING THAT THEY WOULD BREAK. IF THIS ATTACK FAILED, THE BARBARIAN ARMY WOULD LOSE ALL COHESION AND WOULD FLEE.

CONTAMINE’S CHARACTERIZATION (12): ‘SMALL ARMIES, RUDIMENTARY TACTICS, AN ALMOST NON-EXISTENT LOGISTIC’

These characterizations are undoubtedly true of the Germanic bands that sought entry into the Roman empire in the late fourth century. But the armies of the successor kingdoms were heirs not only to Germania but to Romanitas. The armies of the Frankish Merovingian and Carolingian kings of Gaul, culminating in the military forces of Charlemagne (768-814), the first man to bear the imperial title in the West (crowned emperor by the pope in Rome in AD 800) since the deposition of the boy emperor Romulus Augustulus in 476. In studying Charlemagne’s careful logistical planning, his recruitment of troops by public levy and by use of military followings of his great nobles, and his emphasis on sieges and campaigns of maneuver rather than battle-seeking (on which see Vegetius), Charlemagne was following in the footsteps of late Roman military chiefs such as Theodosius, Stilicho, Alaric and Aetius as much as Germanic ‘barbarian’ chieftains. Indeed, the military institutions of the Frankish kingdoms in Gaul, the Visigothic kingdom in seventh-century Spain, and the Ostrogothic kingdom in sixth-century Italy owed much to Roman military practice and institutions in the late empire. Just as Roman law evolved (or degenerated) into the simplified Roman law codes known as ‘barbarian law codes’, so Roman military institutions devolved into the military systems of the successor kingdoms.

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