Baron Frederick Bianchi duke of Casalanza

King Joachim Murat

After Napoleon’s exile to Elba in 1814, the leaders of the allied coalition met at Vienna to hammer out a European peace. The powers of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England attempted to secure the territorial gains that their armies had made during the last years of war. The defeat of the “Corsican Ogre” did not, however, eliminate the legacy he left to Europe. In France Louis XVIII received a lukewarm reception. In Italy, the restoration of the Habsburgs irritated an Italian population who had spent the past 20 years free of Austrian domination.

In the ongoing negotiations at Vienna Prince Metternich tried to gain European recognition for Austrian annexation of Lombardy and Venetia, the former the center of the Kingdom of Italy. He hoped to place members of the extended Habsburg family on the thrones of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany. The only bone of contention among the allies was the fate of the Kingdom of Naples.

King Gioacchino, as French Marshal Joachim Murat was known in Naples, remained a thorn in the side of the allied coalition. Although he had defected in 1814, his reluctance to commit his army against Eugène was not forgotten. Murat was a loose cannon, a French marshal crowned by Napoleon, not the legitimate king. Despite his duplicity, Murat retained sympathy for the former emperor, and his conscience, it appears, got the best of him. He hotly and publically denounced the restoration of the monarchy in France, and for that the allies grew weary of him. The Austrians and English developed plans to overthrow Murat in favor of the true king of Naples.

Ferdinand IV, the former Bourbon king dethroned in 1806, spent the Napoleonic Wars in Sicily, protected by the English. Although Ferdinand was not well respected by his peers, he was the legitimate monarch. More than Austria, the English wanted Murat out of Naples. Murat’s delegation to the Congress of Vienna was refused entrance, and the king realized that he was in a bind. By the spring of 1815 Murat had tried to reach an understanding with the British, but to no avail. With few options his opportunity arose unexpectedly in March 1815, when Napoleon escaped from Elba and returned to France.

Rattled with guilt, Murat wrote to Napoleon, boasting he would raise Italy in revolt. Napoleon replied that Murat should not act but wait. It is unclear whether Napoleon ever intended to employ Murat; his pusillanimous acts had fallen hard upon the emperor. Yet Murat was determined to raise his standard in Italy despite Napoleon’s words. The Neapolitan army prepared to march north. Murat stated loudly and pubically to one of his generals his plans for Italy:

I want to be the person who the Italians salute as their sovereign. By rapidly crossing the Pô I will fall on the Austrians and take them unawares: Venice is open and has a poor army, the Piedmontese hate the House of Savoy, the Milanese abhor the Austrians, the Ligurians are under the domination of Sardinia, Tuscany will follow my banner and the Romans will break from their apathy. I will fight Austria and then march to France.¹

Murat was too impetuous. He prepared to take the offensive when Napoleon was just arriving in Paris. If Murat had had any sense, he would have waited until Napoleon’s position was stable. By failing to coordinate with Napoleon, Murat built his own coffin, allowing the Austrians to move against him with little concern for events in France.

The Neapolitan army in 1815 mustered some 30,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 56 guns. Divided into four infantry divisions, including one of guard, and two cavalry divisions, one also of guard, the army was a formidable force in Italy. A good portion of the soldiers had seen action in the various campaigns between 1808 and 1814, yet their discipline was lax. The generals were experienced, and some rather good, especially Giuseppe Lecchi, who had formerly served in Eugène’s Italian army. Interestingly enough, among the army leadership, 10 generals were French, and 13 of the colonels were also foreigners, all of whom had served the French Empire in some capacity during the past decade.²

The Austrian army in central and northern Italy was larger than Murat’s, comprising almost 50,000 infantry, 4,800 cavalry, and 66 guns. In Piedmont another Austrian corps of 30,000 men anxiously watched the French border. The entire army in Italy, however, was not largely composed of troops who fought there in 1813–1814. They were a combination of line regiments, some who took part in the previous campaign and others raised in northern Italy or transferred from Germany in 1814. The commanders also differed from those who fought the year before. Feldmarschall Leutnant Baron Bianchi commanded the army. Among his abteilungen commanders, none had served in Italy, and of the eight divisional commanders, only two generals, Eckhardt and Rebrovich, had experience in Italy.³

Murat’s advantages were twofold. First and most significant, the Austrian army was dispersed throughout central and northern Italy. The Neapolitan army had the advantage of concentration of force. If Murat marched rapidly, he could drive the Austrians from central Italy, keeping them off balance, and then continue into Lombardy and Venetia before they could gather their forces. It was a bold plan, but certainly within the realm of possibility. Only one assumption was made for the successful conduct of the campaign. Murat believed that as his army moved north, they would be joined by popular revolutions in the Italian states, and the armies of these states would join with the Neapolitans. Murat’s second advantage lay in the relative inexperience of the Austrian commanders in Italy, though this should not be overstated. The Austrians had little experience in Italy, but the soldiers and the generals had seen service in Germany since the war of 1809.

On 13 March orders were issued to the Neapolitan army. Assembled along the eastern coast of Italy, the divisions were deployed on the frontier of the Papal Marches, opposite Ancona. From there they would proceed north along the road to Bologna and across the Pô into Venetia. Murat requested permission from the Pope to gain passage through the Papal States. The Pope refused, fearing Austrian repercussions more than Murat’s actions. Nevertheless, Murat’s divisions marched into the Papal Marches, where they entered Ancona on 19 March 1815. Murat dawdled there for almost a week while his army filtered across the border. This was perhaps the critical time for the Neapolitan king. During the week that passed he received news from Milan that the Austrian army was assembling and preparing to march south. Not disturbed by this news, Murat’s army advanced on Rimini on 29 March.

Austrian strategy called for the main army to cross the Pô and move against Murat in the Papal Marches. A second and smaller army in Tuscany under General Nugent was to march with the Tuscan army and Austrian auxiliaries from Florence and join the main army, catching Murat in between.

On 30 March the first battle between Austrians and the Neapolitans occurred at Cesene, not far from Bologna. Trying to prevent Murat from reaching Bologna, 5,000 Austrians deployed before the town. General Carascossa, commanding the 1st Neapolitan division, attacked with almost 10,000 men. By employing a flanking maneuver against the Austrian right, Carascossa forced them back. The town of Cesene, still held by 3,000 Papal troops, surrendered to Carascossa later that day. It was Murat’s first victory.

From Cesene, Murat divided his army into two wings. The objective of the right, consisting of the three infantry divisions and the light cavalry division, 28,000 men, and 40 guns, was Bologna. After capturing the city Murat planned to move on Modena, Reggio, and Ferrara. The two guard divisions formed the left wing, with only 5,400 men and 16 guns. They were directed on Florence, keeping Nugent and his small force at bay.

The advance of the Neapolitan Guard was quite successful. Nugent’s column was outnumbered almost two to one. Commanding only nine companies of line, four of Jaeger, and a squadrons of Hussars, his force totaled barely 2,000 men. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had merely 1,000 infantry and 150 dragoons to add to this number. Against them the Neapolitan divisions would have little trouble. Nugent, however, was a rather clever officer. He knew that to commit his column was to commit suicide. Instead he would try to stay one step ahead of the Neapolitians, playing cat and mouse as he had the year before when he was on the Pô.

The Neapolitan Guard reached Florence on 7 April. Nugent abandoned the town, withdrawing to Pistoia to the northwest. Generals Livron and Strongoli-Pignatelli, commanding the guard, moved on Pistoia. As they approached the town, a message arrived from Murat that the guard divisions were not to be committed any further in Tuscany. They would remain for the moment in Florence, as a reserve, and then march to Bologna. Luck was with Nugent. He had ordered the evacuation of Pistoia once the Neapolitan advanced guard appeared, but the withdrawal of the two divisions gave him some time to reorganize and coordinate his efforts with Bianchi.

While Livron and Strongoli were in Tuscany, Murat and the main army reached Bologna. The forced marching over the past weeks had resulted in some desertion, yet the progress of the campaign kept the soldiers’ morale generally high. On 2 April, as Murat approached Bologna, he was joined by another 7,000 troops from the 4th Reserve division. Any troops lost to desertion were replaced by these reinforcements.

At Bologna, Bianchi assembled 10,000 men. The appearance of Murat with almost four times that number convinced him to withdraw farther north. In two columns he made his way to Modena, closer to the Pô and the main Austrian army. Murat pursued Bianchi, with Carascossa’s division and the light cavalry. D’Ambrosio’s 2nd division was ordered to Ferrara and Lecchi’s 3rd division marched to Bologna and then north toward the Pô. Murat’s intention was to move his forces to the Pô, where they could prevent the main Austrian army from crossing. The dispersal of divisions was a critical error as Murat now pursued Bianchi with equal strength. His fear of Austrian forces sallying across the Pô clouded his judgement and he lost an opportunity to annihilate the Austrian column.

When Murat arrived before the city, he found Bianchi in a strong position defending the Panaro River. The Austrian line was anchored by two small villages, one on each flank, and a suburb of Modena in his center. Determined to take the city, Murat ordered Carascossa to deploy two regiments to the flanks, supported by cavalry. Under cover flying columns were to cross the Panaro and assault both Austrian flanks. This was meant as a diversion rather than the main attack. As Bianchi reacted to the threat to his flank, Murat plan personnally to lead an attack across the Panaro against Bianchi’s center at San’Ambrogio.

The battle began on the morning of 4 April. The two flanking columns forced their way across the Panaro against stiff resistance. Bianchi tried to reinforce his flanks when General Guglielmo Pepe’s brigade charged across the bridge at San Ambrogio, the Modena suburb. After determined resistance by the Austrian defenders, the town fell to the Neapolitans. Bianchi, with his flanks threatened and his center breached, withdrew his army to the safety of Modena. Despite the desperate fighting, the Austrians lost only 700 men and 1,200 prisoners. Murat’s divisions suffered, according to Neapolitan claims, 300 casualties and 200 prisoners.

Choosing not to remain in Modena, Bianchi retreated to Reggio and then upon the Pô, where General Niepperg was approaching with 12,000 men. Once united, Bianchi and Niepperg would have roughly 20,000 men against Murat’s 10,000 at Modena. Worse still for Murat, a second Austrian column was assembling around Legnago, with another 20,000 Austrians. The balance of the Austrian army was still at Mantua and Verona, preparing to march to the Pô. In addition to these forces Nugent’s Austro-Tuscan column was very much intact.

The strategic situation was rather grim for Murat by the end of the first week of April. He lacked backbone and certainly Napoleon’s clarity of thought. He decided to push his divisions farther forward to the Pô, hoping to arrive there before any of the Austrian columns north of the river could effect a crossing. Knowing that he would be too late to prevent Bianchi and Niepperg from uniting, Murat opted to place small garrisons in Reggio and Capri, guarding the northern and western approaches to Modena. As it stood by 10 April, Carascossa’s 1st division was at Modena with the light cavalry. D’Ambrosio’s 2nd division was at Ferrara with a garrison at Ochio-Bella. Lecchi’s 3rd division was some miles north of Bologna around Cento. The 4th division remained at Bologna, where they were joined by both divisions of the guard. Once more it was in his dispersal of the Neapolitan army that Murat sealed his own fate.

Murat became increasingly nervous about the concentration of Austrian troops north of the Pô. Instead of coming at him from one direction the Austrians threatened his army from several. To compound matters, the spontaneous Italian uprising that he had counted on never coalesced. The citizens of north central Italy, in Bologna, Ferrara, and Modena, were not particularly thrilled to see Murat’s army. It was only a year earlier that the Neapolitans had marched along the same route, not as liberators, but as allies of the Austrians. The region that Murat was currently occupying was one of the major centers of the former Kingdom of Italy. The population did not soon forget Murat’s treachery, not to mention the animosity northern Italians felt for those of southern Italy.

If Murat had taken a moment to review the situation calmly, he might have realized that his army was in a perfect position to conduct Napoleon’s classic strategy of the central position. With Bianchi and Niepperg already on the south bank of the Pô , and the other Austrian columns still north of the river, Murat could have concentrated at least four or five of his divisions against Bianchi, while the others watched the Pô. Instead, and despite his chain of successes, Murat decided to disperse his army and defend the entire river. His advantage of interior lines was wasted, allowing Bianchi to coordinate his own efforts against the Neapolitan king.

During the second week of April Bianchi launched his counterattacks. His own column advanced against Capri, forcing Carascossa to withdraw from Reggio to Modena. The second Austrian column, of two divisions under Feldmarschall Leutnant Mohr, moved from Rovigo to Ochio-Bella and established a bridgehead across the Pô. With 20,000 Austrians at Ochio-Bella and moving toward Ferrara, General d’Ambrosio decided that discretion was the better part of valor and withdrew his division toward Bologna. Lecchi, whose own division was pressed by light Austrian attacks to his front, found himself with Bianchi to his left and Mohr to his right. He too withdrew to Bologna.

Murat’s position was now worse than it had been one week earlier. He had two divisions at Modena and the remainder of the army at Bologna. Bianchi was advancing against the former, and Mohr the latter. Fearing Mohr would cut him off from the east and force the army to retreat through Tuscany, Murat ordered a retrograde movement from Modena and Bologna, continuing south. He planned to take up defensive positions based on the small fortified towns of the Papal Marches. A second line would be established along the Tronto River, the official border of the Neapolitan kingdom. The army was therefore ordered to march from Bologna to Cesene and then upon Rimini and Ancona.

Bianchi kept his forces in contact with the Neapolitans as they withdrew. Knowing that pursuit through the Papal Marches would be slow and indecisive, Bianchi detached Niepperg’s abteilung, ordering him to follow Murat’s army but not commit to a general action. With the remainder of the Austrian army Bianchi marched into Tuscany; in Florence he was joined by Nugent’s column. From his position in Tuscany Bianchi ordered his troops to cross the Apennines, moving east, hoping to catch Murat in flank before he reached the Tronto. Reinforcing Nugent’s column to 4,000 men and leaving a large garrison in Florence, Bianchi also detached Prince Weide-Runkel’s abteilung. Both Runkel and Nugent were ordered to Rome and then Naples. When Bianchi resumed his advance from Florence, he had roughly 15,000 men.

The last two weeks of April found the Neapolitan army in retreat, fighting rear guard actions along the way. Neipperg pressed Murat’s retreat, conducting minor skirmishes with Lecchi’s division forming the rear guard. The Austrian general, however, refrained from committing his entire command to battle. The Neapolitans arrived at Rimini on 23 April and continued their retreat toward Ancona, which they reached a few days later. During this time Murat received word of Bianchi’s advance through the Appenines and of the Austrian columns bearing down on the Neapolitan border on the west coast. He ordered the 4th division, with fewer than 5,000 men, west to protect the approaches to his capital, centered on the fortress of Gaeta. With the remainder of his army he was resolved to turn and fight.

The Neapolitan army had deteriorated considerably over the past weeks. During the advance and because of his string of victories the Neapolitan soldiers had surpassed their reputation, performing well and in most cases remaining disciplined. Desertions were only a few hundred, which for the Neapolitan army was quite an achievement. The retreat from the Pô , and the forced marches to Ancona demoralized the army, and several thousand soldiers deserted, even from the Guard regiments. Of the 37,000 who marched north in March, roughly one-third were gone, as a result of combat or desertion. Despite the poor condition of the army and the declining morale of its generals, Murat decided to retake the offensive.

Murat now used his central position to pounce upon the seperated Austrian columns. Leaving Carascossa and part of the light cavalry to keep Niepperg at bay, Murat advanced with the other two divisions and the Guard against Bianchi. The decision to fight was quite bold, considering the state of the Neapolitan army, and it was also perhaps too late. If Murat had used the central position when at Bologna, he would have had a greater chance for victory. The Neapolitan army at the beginning of April was in good condition and morale was high. By turning tail and then deciding to fight on the kingdom’s border, Murat ignored every lesson he had learned during the past 20 years.

The Battle of Tolentino by Vincenzo Milizia

Bianchi was camped in the Appenines at Tolentino. His position was rather strong, with his center in a valley and his left flank protected by rough, wooded and hilly terrain. His right was protected by the Chienti River. After detaching troops to garrison towns in the Appenine passes, Bianchi’s army mustered 11,200 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and 28 guns.⁴ Against him Murat hoped to concentrate 23,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry, and 48 guns.⁵ The numerical superiority of the Neapolitan army reinforced Murat’s resolve to fight.

On 1 May, the Neapolitan army arrived before the Austrian positions at Tolentino. Murat dispatched Livron’s Guard cavalry to clear the front of the Austrian posts. Bianchi did not attempt to counter Murat’s initial movement but only directed one of his brigades to occupy the town of Montemillione in the hills on his own left. With this position in Austrian hands and the Chienti to his right Bianchi’s flanks were thoroughly secure. After both armies deployed, the commanders spent the night preparing for the following day’s battle.

Bianchi had no intention of taking the offensive. He felt his position was secure enough to fend off Murat’s assaults until reinforcements could arrive. The specific deployment of the Austrian army at Tolentino is unclear; however, it appears General Stahremberg’s brigade was at Montemillione, Eckhardt and Startenthal’s brigades in the center, and Taxis’ on the right. The entire front of the army was covered by jaegers with the formed regiments in the second line and cavalry on both flanks.

The Neapolitan army was deployed somewhat differently. On Murat’s right, facing Montemillione, d’Ambrosio’s 2nd division was placed without cavalry support. The king felt the terrain was ill suited for cavalry and left d’Ambrosio to his own devices. In the center Lecchi and the Guard infantry were in the first line, and the Guard cavalry in reserve. The light cavalry was placed on the left. Although his army outnumbered Bianchi’s, the terrain was extremely rough and well suited for defense. Ironically enough, the Austrian jaegers had the advantage in this hilly country.

On the morning of 2 May, Murat attacked Montmillione. DAmbrosio’s division was charged with taking the town while Lecchi’s division pinned the Austrian center. The assault on Montemillione did not progress well. D’Ambrosio’s division was riddled by fire from Austrian jaegers while Hussar Regiment #5 Prinz Regent von England assailed the battalions as they advanced. The entire division was repulsed. Murat took personal charge, rallying the shaken regiments. After some time a second attack was launched, supported by the Guard cavalry, who, struggling over the wooded hills, threw back the Austrian light infantry and cavalry. Leading d’Ambrosio’s regiments, Murat broke into Montemillione, throwing out the garrison after heavy fighting. General d’Ambrosio was wounded in the action and replaced by General d’Aquino, a brigade commander in his division.

The loss of the town forced Bianchi to withdraw closer to Tolentino. The battle, however, was not yet over. Detached Austrian units recalled by Bianchi filtered into the town during the night of 2–3 May, increasing Bianchi’s strength to almost 15,000 and certainly compensating for the days’ losses. Murat also prepared to receive reinforcements. Carascossa was marching on Tolentino with one brigade, leaving the other to protect Ancona. Niepperg had tried to take that town but was bloodied in the attack by the Neapolitan division.

Murat decided that for the coming day’s battle d’Aquino and the 2nd division were to remain on the right, pressing their advantage on the high ground. Despite events of the previous day Murat still did not deploy cavalry to support d’Aquino. The Guard cavalry was returned to the reserve with the Guard infantry in the center. The light cavalry also remained on the left, but Lecchi’s division was removed from the line.

In an attempt to turn Bianchi’s entire position, Murat ordered Lecchi to cross the Chienti with 2,000 men and conduct a flank march to Tolentino. Murat sought a tactical maneuver sur la derriere. It was far too late, however, for any such finesse, and certainly there were too few troops available to have any decisive consequences.

The second day of battle began with an assault on Bianchi’s center. The Guard infantry moved forward in attack columns, supported by Lecchi’s other brigade, roughly 8,000 infantry. The Austrian center also boasted about 8,000 men. Austrian jaegers took their toll on the Neapolitan battalions as they advanced. As the light troops withdrew, the Austrian regulars poured crushing vollies into the Neapolitan line. The Guard was unable to withstand the fire and forced back. Three more times they attacked, but each time met the same fate.

On Murat’s right d’Aquino’s division advanced against Stahremberg’s brigade. He was supposed to have coordinated his movement with the Guard, but d’Aquino had to resupply his troops first. By midmorning he was able to press the attack. Denuded of cavalry, d’Aquino was forced by the presence of Austrian Hussars to conduct the advance in square. As each regiment moved forward, it soon found the terrain inhospitable to the formation. The division became disordered, and instead of advancing adjacent to each other the squares approached the Austrians in echelon. Although the hussars were unable to assail the squares, the Austrian jaegers and line troops found them excellent targets. The Neapolitan battalions were battered by the withering fire of cannons and musketry and repulsed with heavy losses.

As d’Aquino tried to rally his division Stahremberg counterattacked. The disordered battalions of the 2nd division were scattered by the unexpected Austrian assault. Now it was the Neapolitan right that was threatened. With night falling Stahremberg halted his advance and pulled back to his original line. Overall, the battle was poorly handled, ill coordinated, and indecisive. Lecchi’s flanking manuver never materialized, and Murat never commited his cavalry reserve. The Austrians lost only 900 men, whereas the Neapolitans suffered 4,000 casualties.

In camp Murat met with his generals, who argued that the army should withdraw. Although Carascossa arrived, he was merely in time to participate in the retreat. Messages from Naples had been received over the past days, and Murat knew that Nugent and Runkel were bearing down on his capital. He reluctantly agreed with his commanders and issued orders to retreat. Part of the army would remain in the Abruzzi, keeping Niepperg at bay, while the rest would march on Naples, hoping to arrive before the Austrians.

The effects of the battle and the subsequent retreat led to the complete demoralization and disintegration of the Neapolitan army. The 2nd division was merely a cadre, as were several regiments of the Guard. Murat’s dream of uniting Italy melted away. Marching as fast as possible, he was able to assemble the remnants of the army at Capua, only to find that the English had recently arrived in the Bay of Naples and were bombarding the city. On 18 May, King Gioacchino (Murat) entered Naples, to find great disorder in the capital. Although he had 5,000 troops at his disposal, the Austrians were closing around the city with five times that number. There was no alternative but to negotiate.

The Austrians and English were in no mood to treat with Murat, but they did talk with General Carascossa. The allied demands were that Murat abdicate and leave Naples with his family for France. Ferdinand IV would return, restoring the Bourbon monarchy to Naples. Having little choice, Murat and his family left Naples by ship on 20 May. Three days later Bianchi entered Naples. The Italian campaign of 1815 ended 55 days after it began, and almost three weeks before Napoleon took the field in Belgium on his way to Waterloo.

NOTES

1.	Baron A. Lumbroso, La Campagne de Murat en 1815 (Paris: 1899), 11.
2.	Ibid., 17. For a complete order of battle for the Neapolitan army refer to Appendix IV.
3.	For the Austrian order of battle, refer to Appendix IV.
4.	Giovanni Benadduci, La Battaglia di Tolentino nell’anno 1815 (Tolentino: 1890), 36. For the specific Austrian order of battle at Tolentino, refer to Appendix IV.
5.	Ibid., 37. For the specific Neapolitan order of battle at Tolentino, refer to Appendix IV. Note that both Neapolitan and Austrian totals include artillerists and trained personnel.

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