By Steven H. Sandman

 

Most readers are probably familiar with the German word Luftwaffe, knowing it translates into English as “air force,” and that it is most often used to define the Nazis’ air war efforts during the Second World War. Fewer, however, are aware that as the war progressed so too did the Luftwaffe’s responsibilities on the ground. In fact, by mid-1944 the German “air force” had fielded approximately 400,000 ground troops in four armed components: 1) some 21,000 anti-aircraft (“Flak”) guns and crews; 2) eight parachute divisions (actually elite light infantry by that late date in the war, with two more still to come before V-E Day); 3) the Hermann Göring Parachute-Panzer Corps; and 4) 22 field divisions.

 

 

All of those formations were significant in one way or another to the overall development of the war in Europe, but it was the last category, the Luftwaffe’s field divisions, which marked that service’s full entry into the arena of large-scale ground combat. In fact, no other air force before or since has ever been tasked to develop such a huge group of infantry divisions intended to fight shoulder to shoulder with those of a regular army. That the Luftwaffe was drawn in such a direction represents perhaps the sorriest chapter in its ill-fated history.

 

The First Steps

The Luftwaffe was forced to form its first non-parachute infantry units out of sheer, desperate self-preservation. In December 1941, as the Red Army launched its first massive counteroffensive on the eastern front, the German air force was in desperate shape. It was overextended along a fighting front that stretched from the Arctic to the Black Sea. Its air formations had been seriously depleted by the losses suffered during the previous six months of intense offensive action, and was further weakened by the transfer to the Mediterranean of Luftflotte 2 just days prior to the start of the Soviet counterattacks.

 

As the Soviet effort gained momentum, the Luftwaffe command found itself in a new situation: advances by Red Army spearhead units and partisan bands were for the first time endangering its airfields and command and control facilities. But the regular army and Waffen SS, the other two service components of Hitler’s ground forces, were of course also fighting for their survival and had no units to spare to support the suddenly exposed Luftwaffe. The air force was told it would have to “draw upon its own resources” to save itself.

 

Accordingly, all personnel not absolutely critical to the maintenance of their units were drawn from the anti-aircraft, signals, supply, command staff, security and ground crew echelons. They were formed into ad hoc companies and battalions and immediately thrown into action. Of course, the officers, NCOs and men who were thus sent into the trauma that is modern ground combat for the first time had only the usual Luftwaffe basic training. Their combat capabilities were therefore largely limited to static, point-defense.

 

The First Actions

The first battalion-sized commitment of the Luftwaffe’s new infantry component took place in the Army Group Center sector of the eastern front during January 1942, at Rzhev. That was followed in March by the airlifting of several Luftwaffe infantry battalions into the Demyansk pocket, where they were used to defend the critical resupply airfields. Those same battalions were organized into Brigade Schlemm (after its commander, Maj. Gen. Alfred Schlemm), which fought as part of 2nd Panzer Army and then 4th Army before being disbanded in June. Another Army Group Center air force unit during the same period was Luftwaffe Battalion Moscow, which was for a time expanded into Luftwaffe Regiment Moscow before being disbanded.

In the Army Group North sector, Group Meindl (also named after its commander, Maj. Gen. Eugen Meindl), a regimental-size unit, was formed during the spring of 1942. It was disbanded in December, but was perhaps the best of all the early Luftwaffe infantry units in that it had the distinction of being mentioned twice in armed forces high command reports during its existence.

 

In the far north in Finland, where no serious Soviet threat to Luftwaffe ground installations ever really took place, Luftflotte 5 still jumped on the infantry bandwagon by mobilizing Luftwaffe Battalion 1 to guard its airfields.

Only in the Ukraine, behind Army Group South, did the Luftwaffe fail to form any infantry unit that winter. It seems since that was the first area of the front across which the Germans had been forced onto the defensive, it also became the first sector to stabilize. The crisis levels reached by Army Groups North and Center were never duplicated in the south that winter, so the emergency formation of Luftwaffe ground units was skipped.

 

These first Luftwaffe infantry improvisations can be considered successful within their limited scope. Unfortunately for Germany’s later war efforts, however, those first successes became magnified in the mind of the Luftwaffe’s commander-in-chief, Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring, into something rivaling the performance of the army’s best units. Göring’s new mindset would cost his service much blood later on.

Dispositions of the Luftwaffe Field Divisions Winter 1942-43

USSR, Army Group North: 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 21

USSR, Army Group Center: 2, 3, 4, 6

USSR, Army Group South: 5, 7, 8, 15

France: 16, 17, 18, 19 (to Italy, 6/44)

Italy: 20

Balkans: 11, 12

Norway: 14

 

The Creation of the Field Divisions

A second manpower crisis hit the overextended Germans late in the summer of 1942. This time Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of staff of the armed forces high command, proposed to help solve it by transferring 20,000 surplus personnel from the navy and 50,000 from the air force into the army’s replacement system.

 

Göring, who viewed the Luftwaffe as his personal fiefdom of men and materiel, immediately and bitterly opposed the suggestion. Maintaining his personal power and prestige, which were already declining below what they had once been, was his main concern. But he also objected to seeing his airmen, who had a reputation for being more dedicated National Socialists than most in the regular army, given over to the older service. (After all, the Luftwaffe had been entirely a Nazi-era creation and its doctrines reflected that.) The Reichsmarshal therefore made a counter proposal to his Führer. He said he would provide 200,000 new infantrymen if he was allowed to form them into entirely new divisions that would remain in the Luftwaffe.

 

Hitler, for several reasons, immediately accepted Göring’s offer. First, by that point in the war, having been disappointed by its failure to conquer the Soviet Union, and having sacked several of its senior officers, the Führer was already describing the army as “reactionary,” “Wilhelmine,” and not entirely prepared for the all-out struggle for survival then beginning in the east. Second, given his obsession with numbers, the more divisions Germany had in the field the better it seemed to Hitler no matter what the actual combat power of those units might be. Third, and perhaps most important, the creation of the field divisions allowed him to extend his political policy of divide and rule. That is, he ran Germany by creating competing and overlapping power centers, among which only he had the authority to be final arbiter. Thus the Waffen SS, along with the expanding Luftwaffe ground forces, could serve as counterweight to any future attempts by the army to end the Nazi regime.

 

On 17 September 1942, Göring called upon Luftwaffe officers of all ranks to volunteer for positions in the new field divisions; two days later the same invitation was issued to the rank and file.

 

The authorization of the field divisions caused an immediate and severe strain in the army’s supply system. It was the army that had to provide the new units with all their needed weapons (except for anti-aircraft guns, which the Luftwaffe provided from its own stocks), munitions, vehicles, horses, etc. Given the critical situations then developing in North Africa and the USSR, the timing of the new demands could not have been much worse.

 

To the Front

Between 15 October 1942 and 15 May 1943 the Luftwaffe formed 22 field divisions. They were consecutively numbered, with the last being disbanded before its formation was completed. In addition to the field divisions, four field corps headquarters (1st through 4th) were also established in November 1942. One of them, the 1st, was made responsible for overseeing the raising of the field divisions.

 

The original intention was to use the field divisions on relatively quiet fronts, such as in Norway and the pre-Overlord western front, and in static warfare positions such as the Leningrad area in the east. The idea was that the army divisions thus released from the line could then be used for offensive action. But that initial deployment scheme largely had to be abandoned after the difficult winter battles of 1942-43. Two-thirds of the field divisions went to the eastern front, and for the most part they were not used there to man narrow, quiet sectors. On the contrary, desperate circumstances dictated the new units be immediately thrown into the worst crisis areas of the front.

 

Structural Problems

Without doubt, the poorest performing components of the field divisions were their light infantry regiments. Though relatively well equipped, their efficiency was greatly reduced because of their having to perform various engineering and support missions. This problem was especially acute in the first eight divisions, which were really only large brigades in strength. The overburdening of the infantry regiments had dire consequences. The diversion of their manpower for non-infantry tasks caused the divisions’ front lines to be even thinner than what was already passing for normal in the army. Reserves within the divisions, when any were available at all, tended to be weak.

 

The field divisions’ artillery regiments could not be said to be well equipped. Not only was it smaller than its army counterpart, it was equipped largely from foreign-made guns captured from Czechoslovakia, France and the USSR. Those guns ranged in various sizes from 75mm to 155mm, so providing ammunition and replacement parts quickly became a logistical nightmare. The artillery component is the backbone of every infantry division, so the deficiencies here created only more problems for the infantry in the line.

 

The high command also failed to provide sufficient reconnaissance and engineer assets for the field divisions. The company sized units of those types that were all that was included in most of the field divisions could not possibly perform their specialized tasks at divisional scales. Had those critical combat support units been of proper battalion size, they could have lifted some of the burdens off the infantry while also serving as reserves in a pinch.

 

Since radio communications played a critical role in Luftwaffe air operations, it is perhaps most surprising that the field divisions were each authorized only one signals company, rather than the army’s  standard battalion. This fact alone goes a long way toward explaining these divisions’ ineffectiveness in fluid situations.

 

 

 

 

 

A Comparison of Luftwaffe Field & 1944 Army Infantry Divisions

	Field Divisions	1944 Infantry Divisions
Machineguns	552	656
Mortars	32	76
Anti-Tank Guns	12	21
Infantry Guns*	10	24
Self-Propelled Assault Guns	0	14
Field Artillery	24	48
Light Anti-Aircraft	44	12
Heavy Anti-Aircraft**	12	0
Total Manpower	12,500	12,300
Infantry	4,900	4,900
Motor Vehicles	600	615

NOTES

*75mm and 150mm guns

**88mm guns

 

Personnel Problems

Göring wanted his new forces to be staffed entirely with Luftwaffe personnel, from the commanding generals down to the private soldiers. The problem with that lay in the fact that at the time the Luftwaffe had only two other fighting ground combat divisions: the 7th Flieger and the Hermann Göring. That was a completely insufficient base from which to draw cadres for 22 infantry divisions, especially in terms of filling the senior slots. The decision to keep the army from providing the field divisions with any significant number of instructors and command personnel more than any other factor condemned the new units to mediocrity and worse.

 

The commanders of the field corps and divisions were drawn mostly from the flying formations, the anti-aircraft artillery and general staff. The large majority of those officers had, at best, only company-level experience commanding infantry combat operations. Leading infantry corps and divisions in modern combat is not a skill that can be learned in a brief time or mastered through courses of instruction. The priceless factor of direct experience at all levels of ground command, along with knowledge of logistics, tactics and the orchestration of different combat arms, was almost totally lacking in these men. That same deficiency also extended into the field divisions’ NCO corps, most of whom were simply promoted from the ranks and likewise lacked the tactical skills necessary for infantry fighting.

 

Yet another problem for the field divisions was caused by the decision to have them retain Luftwaffe uniforms, with their blue color and distinctive markings, as battle dress. That allowed the Soviets to quickly identify them in the line, while at the same time clearly delineating their sector of the front between adjacent army units. Thus these inexperienced and weak units often drew the brunt of Soviet attacks onto themselves.

 

Fate of the Field Divisions

1st Destroyed near Leningrad, January 1944.

2nd Disbanded 1/44; sub-units destroyed in Bagration offensive, 7/44.

3rd Disbanded 1/44; sub-units destroyed in Bagration offensive, 7/44.

4th Surrounded and destroyed in Vitebsk, Belorussia, 7/44.

5th Destroyed in southern Russia early in 1943.

6th Surrounded and destroyed in Vitebsk, Belorussia, 7/44.

7th Mauled on the Chir River defense line; dispanded 5/43; survivors transferred to the 15th Field Division.

8th Mauled on the Chir River defense line; dispanded 5/43; survivors transferred to the 15th Field Division.

9th Mauled in Soviet offensive near Leningrad 2/44, disbanded.

10th Mauled in Soviet offensive near Leningrad 1/44, disbanded.

11th Still active on V-E Day on the southern sector of the eastern front.

12th Trapped in the Courland pocket in Latvia, it ended the war there.

13th Mauled in Soviet offensive near Leningrad 2/44, disbanded.

14th Stationed in Norway and Denmark, this unit never saw combat.

15th Mauled at Taganrog in the autumn of 1943, disbanded

16th Mauled at Caen, 7/44; reformed, it fought until V-E Day in the west.

17th Destroyed in France, 8/44

18th Destroyed in the Mons pocket, 8/44

19th Mauled in Italy, 6/44; it was reformed into a Volksgrenadier division, finishing the war on the western front.

20th Mauled in Italy, 6/44; it was disbanded 1/45.

21st Trapped in the Courland pocket in Latvia, it ended the war there.

22nd Disbanded before being committed to action.

 

Given all these problems, it is not surprising that the Luftwaffe field divisions were allowed to remain under their parent service’s control only until 1 November 1943. At that time they were transferred into the regular army (less their anti-aircraft guns, which were kept by the air force), and redesignated as ”field divisions (light).” Out of the approximately 250,000 original members of the units, some 90,000 had already become casualties by that point. Unfortunately for those soldiers serving in them, their units’ continued existence in the army led to few improvements in performance. By the end of the war, only three field divisions were still in existence.

 

Sources

Jagolski, Georg. Die Luftwaffe Feld divisionen, 1942-45. Self-published, 1987.

Keilig, Wolf. Das Deutsche Heer, 1939-1945, 3 vols. Bad Neuheim, Germany: Podzun Verlag, 1956.

Madeja, Victor. “The Luftwaffe Land Army,” Strategy & Tactics magazine, no. 20, Jan/Feb 1970, pp. 3-10.

Mitcham, Jr., Samuel W. Hitler’s Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II. New York: Stein & Day, 1985.

Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart. Das Heer, 1933-1945, 3 vols. Frankfurt a. M., Germany: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1969.

Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939-45. New York: Praeger, 1964.