Tags
Allied Aircraft of the Desert War I
30 Monday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
30 Monday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
30 Monday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
30 Monday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
No historian doubts that the battle of Stalingrad ranks among the most important engagements of World War II. Indeed, the significance of the battle between August 1942 and February 1943 was readily apparent to contemporaries. In an article published on 2 February 1943, the day the German Sixth Army finally surrendered, Washington Post columnist Barnet Novet called it the equivalent of the Battle of Verdun and the First and Second Battles of the Marne, combined. In November 1943, during the Tehran Conference, British Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill presented Soviet Premier Josef Stalin with the Sword of Stalingrad on behalf of King George VI and the British people, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in 1944 that the battle was the turning point of the war.
Scholars and veterans have questioned, however, whether Stalingrad represents the most significant turning point of the war, and whether it ranks as the single most critical battle on the Eastern Front. Some opine that the successful Soviet defense of Moscow in November and December of 1941 was a more important battle (see Albert Seaton’s The Battle for Moscow), whereas others point to the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 as more critical. In a November 1943 Moscow speech, Stalin suggested that Kursk was decisive, and modern authors David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House argue in The Battle of Kursk (1999) that Kursk represented “a turning point in the war strategically, operationally, and tactically.” Moreover, German and Soviet generals shared this view in their memoirs (see works by Heinz Guderian, F. W. von Mellenthin, Erich von Manstein, Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky, and Georgii K. Zhukov), although all of them also suggested that the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad were critical, as well.
Despite these debates, however, many historians remain convinced that the battle for Stalingrad represents the decisive turning point of World War II in Europe. Michel Henri summarized the case well in The Second World War (1975), and it has been reinforced by Antony Beevor’s Stalingrad (1998), Geoffrey Roberts’ Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle That Changed History (2002), and Stephen Walsh’s Stalingrad, 1942–1943: The Infernal Cauldron (2000). These authors hold that Stalingrad was significant because of massive German personnel losses, the psychological blow to German morale of losing an entire army for the first time in the war, the corresponding lift in Soviet and Allied morale as the myth of German invincibility was shattered, the political and diplomatic impact on neutral nations and at the 1943 Tehran Conference, and the inability of Germany after Stalingrad to launch strategic offensives on a scale matching those of 1941 and 1942.
Finally, if contemporary accounts have any meaning, there is little doubt that ordinary Germans marked Stalingrad as a significant downward turn in their fortunes. All German radio broadcasts were suspended for an unprecedented three days of mourning following the defeat, and it became readily apparent after the battle that Germany was suddenly fighting for survival rather than victory.
References
Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad. New York: Viking Press, 1998.
Glantz, David M., and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
Henri, Michael. The Second World War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1975.
Roberts, Geoffrey. Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle That Changed History. London: Pearson Education, 2002.
Seaton, Albert. The Battle for Moscow. Chicago: Playboy Press, 1980.
Walsh, Stephen. Stalingrad, 1942–1943: The Infernal Cauldron. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2000.
30 Monday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Germany’s drive to Moscow had staggered and come to a frozen, weary halt on the outskirts of the city. The Wehrmacht’s Third and Fourth Tank Groups had penetrated as far as Istra, fewer than 25km (15 miles) north of Moscow, while the Second Panzer Army and the Fourth Army were further away on the south and west. Throughout the first week of December the Germans made repeated efforts to regain the momentum and take Moscow. But their exhaustion and losses, their overstretched supply lines, the seemingly limitless Soviet manpower resources, and above all the vicious, numbing cold – which froze solid exposed flesh, turned oil to sticky sludge, and made metal parts as brittle as icicles – defeated every attempt. With the German units ordered to hold their positions at all costs, the Soviets now went on the offensive, led brilliantly by Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, the man who would, in three and a half years, drive his armies into the Germans’ own capital, Berlin.
Only a year later, the Germans suffered their worst defeat yet, at Stalingrad. After capturing most of the totally destroyed city in a series of campaigns in the autumn of 1942, they were cut off and finally forced in January 1943 to surrender, against Hitler’s explicit orders. They had endured three months of exceptionally brutal street fighting. Of an original force of over 285,000 men, only 91,000 exhausted, hungry, and frozen men were left to surrender.
The German defeat at Stalingrad was a turning point of huge importance in the war. In practical terms, of course, it meant that the Soviets retained their access to the oil and food of southern Russia and the Caucasus. It also marked an end to the Germans’ drive across Eastern Europe and the beginning of their long retreat back to Germany. But possibly even more important was the symbolic significance of the battle, for both Germany and the Soviet Union. For the Soviet people, it was a huge morale-booster at a time when Leningrad was still suffering under its two-and-a-half year siege. The American journalist Alexander Werth, who spent some of the war years in the Soviet Union, attended a victory party in Stalingrad held shortly after the Germans’ surrender.
‘Here was a big spread, and with plenty of vodka, and my neighbour was a red-nosed colonel who had already had a good number of drinks. “We’ve done them in,” he cried, “half a million of them! Here, come on, drink to the heroes of Stalingrad – Do dna, bottoms up!” … He beat his chest. “Look,” he cried, pointing to his Red Star, “yesterday I received this from our great government! Zhukov – I worship Zhukov. He planned the whole thing, he and our Great Stalin. Halkin-Gol, where we routed the Japs that was just a rehearsal. But Stalingrad, that was the real stuff! Hitler’s best divisions were destroyed there. And who destroyed them? We Russian people did it!’”
For the Germans, obviously, the battle had the opposite effect. German historian Walter Goerlitz called Stalingrad ‘a second Jena and … certainly the greatest defeat that a German Army had ever undergone’.
German Forces Lost at Stalingrad
There may have been 294,000 men trapped at Stalingrad, including Hiwis (Soviet auxiliaries working with the Germans) and Romanians. Of only 91,000 men (including 22 generals) taken prisoner by the Soviets, fewer than 5,000 survived the war and Soviet captivity. The last Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad were not released until 1955. Including casualties in Allied units and the rescue attempts, Axis forces lost upward of half a million men. The Stalingrad Campaign may have cost the Soviets 1.1 million casualties, more than 485,000 dead.
The effect of the Battle of Stalingrad on the German war effort has been hotly debated. It is frequently seen as the turning point in the European theater of war, the decisive defeat from which the Wehrmacht could never recover, but militarily Stalingrad was not irredeemable. The German front lines had been largely recreated in the time the remnants of the Sixth Army surrendered. Stalingrad was more important for its psychological than its military value. If any single battle denied Germany victory, it was Kursk, still six months and several German successes away.
The Nazi state proclaimed four days of official national mourning, with all theatres, cinemas and cabarets closed. It was an appropriate response: it was in fact the beginning of the painful death of the Third Reich. For the next 26 months the Germans would be fighting an entirely defensive war, ever closer to home. Even future German offensives -like Kharkov in 1943 and the Ardennes in 1944 and 1945 – would be essentially defensive manoeuvres.
29 Sunday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Christopher W. Brooks. Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 468 pp. $130.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-521-32391-8.
Reviewed by Tim Stretton (St. Mary’s University)
Published on H-Albion (November, 2009)
Commissioned by Margaret McGlynn
The Long Arms of the Law
For decades now the law has enjoyed a walk-on part in most political, constitutional, social, economic, and gender histories of early modern England. With this stunning new study Christopher Brooks shows what can happen if it is given a leading role. The result is much more than an exercise in compensatory history–say, a beefing up of attention to legal history to match the influence of religious history. It boldly integrates the law in all its forms into the political and social histories of the period from 1485 until 1642, providing fresh insights into topics ranging from the reformation of religion and resistance to the innovations of Charles I to popular protest, poor relief, and relations between husbands and wives and masters and servants. In subtle but fundamental ways its arguments reshape the contours of the early modern landscape and call into question a number of recent theories about the nature of English social relations and accepted chronologies of change.
One of the underlying arguments of this book is that legal culture infused early modern English society to a degree not seen before or since. To establish the extent of this influence Brooks maps out in careful detail the astonishing range of ideas, institutions, jurisdictions, personnel, laws, and regulations that the banner of “the law” encompassed in Tudor and early Stuart England, as well as the relationships it helped to define. The book is divided into two parts, deftly combining a chronological approach with a thematic one. The first eight chapters analyze the law from the center outwards, beginning with the nature of legal thought and practice in the fifteenth century and running through the upheavals of the break from Rome, and the jurisdictional clash produced by the retaining of ecclesiastical justice, the legal issues raised by multiple kingdoms beginning with Wales, the dramatic expansion in litigation and lawyers in the decades after 1570, and the constitutional issues raised during the reigns of James and Charles Stuart that reached their climax in the 1640s. Organizing this familiar history around the law produces unexpected insights and reveals the richness and the fluidity of ideas circulating and evolving in a profession that on its face, and in much of its own rhetoric, can appear conservative and unchanging. Brooks relies heavily on two under-used sources: moots and readings on statutes at the Inns of Court, which illuminate lawyers’ views of law, doctrine, and jurisdiction; and the charges judges and powerful citizens read on circuit to assize and quarter sessions juries and assembled audiences, which provide a sense of how legal values were presented to the community. These speeches, delivered in their thousands all over the country, presented an idealized vision of justice that could border on propaganda, but their ubiquity would have made the ideas they extolled familiar to the majority of ordinary citizens.
Brooks elaborates on this point in the second part of the book, which focuses more broadly on the effect of the law on different groups and classes of people in the wider community. A sustained analysis of local jurisdictions, from manor courts, leet courts, borough courts, church courts, and piepowder courts, to the enforcement of statutes and regulations by magistrates and local constables underlines just how deeply the tentacles of the law penetrated into English communities. Justice touched everyone in this society, making the legal profession’s collective belief in the importance of due process familiar to all but the most marginal members of society. For Brooks the implications of this saturation of society and culture with the different interwoven strands of the law are self-evident. Firstly, there was no obvious divide between elite and popular concepts of order, because everyone was familiar with the justice system and so many made use of it or appealed to it; for example, the litigants who went to law in the hundreds of thousands and the agitators in violent rural protests who overwhelmingly couched their demands in terms of the right application of existing law, rather than in calls for the overthrow or rejection of the legal system. Secondly, the dominant ideology of lawyers and legal officials, which Brooks teases out through what amounts to a collective biography of a profession, was surprisingly benign. The majority of early modern jurists believed that human law derived from the community, following logic familiar from Aristotle and Cicero, and that it should serve the community, without regard for social standing. And in practice the wider community did shape the common law and equity, through their interactions with the system and their demands for justice and an expanding range of legal remedies. Everyone was aware that wealth could influence justice, and Brooks is sensitive to the limited rights and legal relief available to the desperately poor. Nevertheless, on balance the system was sound at its heart and difficult to characterize as an elaborate elite conspiracy to control the masses. Neighbors could be fractious, suing each other in record numbers, lawyers often disagreed and occasionally fell to blows, certain judges succumbed to crown pressure during the personal rule of Charles I, and individual examples of corruption were not unknown. However, the rule of law “provided a playing-field on which the poor and the middling could co-exist with the rich” (p. 428) and the lawyers and judges who implemented the law espoused noble aims and went a considerable way towards meeting them.
The combination of the organic nature of legal knowledge and the innovations spurred by litigants’ demands mark out the law as an important agent of change. Indeed, legal ideas and institutions helped drive even the largest-scale social and political transformations, such as the rise of the state and the eventual triumph of the idea of individual liberty. In a society where successive monarchs distributed lucrative monopolies in acts of patronage, and guilds fiercely asserted their exclusive rights to control production and markets, it was lawyers and judges who expressed unease at restrictions on trade and consistently advocated greater economic freedom for individuals. Legal rhetoric also provided an important alternative to hierarchical depictions of society that emphasized unequal relationships of obligation and deference, through the common law emphasis on personal liberty and equality before the law and the civil lawyers’ championing of equity. In the more private realm of the household, Brooks argues that patriarchalism, such a powerful idea in the political rhetoric of the early seventeenth century, had little purchase with lawyers and judges. Instead they invoked the emerging logic of contract when conceptualizing or intervening in relationships between wives and husbands, parents and children, and masters and servants.
Not every reader will be convinced by all of Brooks’ wider arguments, or share his clear admiration for the intellectual traditions of the common law and his appreciation of the integrity and decency of most of the men who administered it. Such a sustained focus on the law naturally requires a focus on records produced by lawyers and legal institutions, and just as a history of a prison written from prison records might give the private beliefs of inmates short shrift, so too a number of Brooks’ conclusions about ordinary people have to remain largely implicit. Nevertheless, the depth of his erudition and the sophistication and originality of his arguments make this a book that no one seeking to understand English society can afford to ignore.
Throughout his career Brooks has charted a course beyond the traditional limits of legal history, with its tendency to focus on legal technicalities and the genealogy of doctrine, to explore the workings of law in wider society. The prominence of his own works in the footnotes of this one demonstrates how few historians have so far followed his lead, something that is bound to change in the wake of this book. But the dearth of quality scholarship on the role of law in society is largely due to the technical knowledge and skills it requires. Brooks’ ability to penetrate the fog of the law’s technical language and to explain complicated legal instruments, procedures, and fictions in elegant and accessible prose therefore make this an invaluable work of reference as well as a book that deserves, and demands, to be read from cover to cover.
29 Sunday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Max Lieberman. The March of Wales: A Borderland of Medieval Britain 1067-1300. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2008. viii + 146 pp. $65.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-7083-2116-4; $35.00 (paper), ISBN 978-0-7083-2115-7.
Reviewed by David Crouch
Published on H-Albion (November, 2009)
Commissioned by Margaret McGlynn
The Limits of Border Studies
This is a difficult book to classify, for it fits easily neither the category of monograph nor textbook, and has some of the characteristics of both genres. Perhaps the best solution is to take it as a pair with, or perhaps a taster for, Dr. Lieberman’s forthcoming monograph, taken from his Oxford DPhil thesis, “The Medieval March of Wales: The Creation and Perception of a Frontier, 1066-1283,” to be published in the series, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought. The book reviewed here is not so narrow a study. It provides a summary of scholarship on the development of the March of Wales and is keen to point out questions (though without necessarily resolving them) which are still to be settled by scholarship, such as the nature of colonization and the impact of a bureaucratic state on frontier communities. Its intention is to be comprehensive. The book first offers a chronological treatment of the development of the March, up to the extinction of the native dynasty of Gwynedd in 1283 and the absorption of its principality into the royal demesne. The next chapter looks at immigration and urbanization within the newly conquered lordships and the effect of constant warfare on their economies. The third chapter deals with ethnicity and its attendant features of language, law, and manners. It is the last two chapters which add something extra: a contextualization of the Welsh March in the setting first of the British Isles, and then in the much broader field of Europe. In all this Dr. Lieberman is following on in the wake of Sir Rees Davies, the director of his doctoral studies, whose abiding enthusiasm for the history of medieval Wales did not render him in the least parochial. It was he who did so much to make the idea of “British” studies as fashionable as it has been over the past two decades.
I want however to start with the final chapter of the book, where we find the influence of a different British scholar. A broad context of frontier studies is laid out for us in a thoughtful and engaging chapter. Dr. Lieberman focuses for comparison here on the Neumark of Brandenburg, a difficult area of study. It is a region which was fought over historiographically for well over a century by armies of scholars, in much the same way as it had been warred over by Slavonic and Germanic raiders and colonizers throughout the Middle Ages. The political and racial purposes of rival nineteenth- and twentieth-century German and Polish scholars to justify or contest the territorial ambitions of imperial Germany was the point at issue for earlier generations. Postwar scholarship may have been freed from that deterministic concern, but the scholars of a new Europe have been equally concerned to find in Brandenburg and its Neumark evidence of the sort of cultural transference and shifting identity which fits the “frontier thesis” based on the work of Frederick Jackson Turner, a thesis which envisions borders as zones of interaction, not lines on a map. Here Dr. Lieberman is treading close behind Robert Bartlett. In his Making of Europe (1993), Bartlett used the Germanic aristocratic colonization process east of the Oder to demonstrate how a European model of organization was imposed with the expanding lordship of a particular dynasty, but where Bartlett juxtaposed Albert the Bear of Brandenburg with John de Courcy of Ulster, Dr. Lieberman offers a comparison with the March of Wales. In terms of Germany he doesn’t go far beyond Bartlett and the literature he used. He even revisits the same case study of the rise of the von Wedel family. The shallowness of the synthesis here is a pity, as this is where the potential to offer larger insights is most obvious. Since Bartlett wrote there has been a lot of work on the area of Brandenburg and Pomerania, taking a wider Germano-Slavonic perspective, led by Jan M. Piskorski.[1] But what Dr. Lieberman does do is reflect productively on how Bartlett’s thesis works in a broader survey of British borderlands, and introduce some criticism of the oversimplicity of Bartlett’s analysis from the British perspective. He attempts to set out the case for Anglicization, rather than Europeanization being the issue.
Reading backwards through the book in fact helps clarify where Dr. Lieberman is coming from, if you prefer working from the wider perspective to the particular. The penultimate chapter is a contextualization of the Welsh March in Great Britain, and here we encounter again the idea of Anglicization as a mechanism. It is here that he illustrates the pervasive power of the model of the English state to destabilize neighboring realms. He takes as his earliest example the ability of Mercia to organize under Offa and raise a massive frontier ditch to contain the Welsh middle kingdom, Powys. The famous dyke is taken as a lesson in how a centralizing powerful monarchy can influence less organized neighbors. Shires, hundreds, and hidation follow wherever English lordship intruded, as indeed they did elsewhere, in northern England and ultimately Ireland. Even where the colonizing lord was not the king, the apparatus of the English state was often adapted by him for his own use in his new lordship. Here the dominant influence is another Oxford scholar, James Campbell, and his thesis of the precocious nature of the pre-Conquest English state.
The remainder of the chapters–the first three in fact–are what we would expect. We have studies of ethnicity within the March, its economic development under the impulse of a colonizing aristocracy, and its political development. Here Dr. Lieberman is revisiting the ideas and conclusions of Rees Davies, and the nature of the book as a synthesis is most evident. It becomes much more obviously the textbook, seeking to explain themes in the light of current scholarship. Which really leads to the question one wants to ask about this book. For whom is it intended? It originated in a series of lectures to undergraduates at Oxford, but there are few universities outside Wales where the medieval Welsh March is routinely taught. I would hazard that not even all Welsh universities teach it. The book is accessible enough for sixth formers, but what A-level or baccalaureate course needs it? Though it may appeal to those studying the broader field of the medieval frontier, it would only be as ancillary reading. It lacks the thoroughness and intellectual independence to be a monograph. The reviewer is therefore bemused as to whom to recommend the book. I should certainly assure the potential reader that I got something out of it. The book has clarity and errors are rare. The standards of production of the University of Wales Press are high, and there are many useful maps. Whether or not I agreed with the overall thesis and emphasis of the book, it is full of telling details, some of them–those to do with the area of Dr. Lieberman’s area of doctoral study–unfamiliar.
Note
[1]. Accessible to the Anglophone in “The Medieval Colonization of Central Europe as a Problem of World History and Historiography,” German History, 22 (2004): 323-342.
28 Saturday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Magyarized Romanians gave Hungary a king – Matthias Corvinus
The history of the Romanians in Transylvania diverges from that of Wallachia and Moldavia. After conquering the voivodates of Menumorut, Glad, and Gelu in the ninth century the Magyars seem to have occupied only the highest levels of feudal society, replacing the old voivodes. They organized the region only in the eleventh or twelfth century, after it had been reconquered by the Hungarian king and saint, Stephen. The first mention of a “prince” (principe) of Transylvania and of the first county (comitat), Bihor, on the Hungarian border, dates from 1113. Nine more counties appeared in the twelfth century, and in 1176 a second principe is mentioned. With feudalization the nobility in Transylvania was gradually Magyarized, so that by the fifteenth century the nobles (cneaz) of Haţeg and voivodes of Maramureş were no longer true Romanians. Magyarized Romanians gave Hungary a king (Matthias Corvinus), a voivode of Transylvania (Janos Hunyadi, also known as John Hunyadi or Iancu of Hunedoara), and a Catholic primate (Nicolaus Olahus), as well as numbers of soldiers, dignitaries, and scholars.
The displacement of the Romanian aristocracy from political life really began after 1365—66. In a decree King Louis I (called the Great) required royal confirmation of noble rank, made Catholicism a qualification for holding titles and for ownership of land, and denied the rights and privileges of the clergy to members of the Orthodox church. Religion thus became a primary criterion for nobility, whereas the previous dynasty, that of Arpad, had accepted religious and linguistic pluralism in Transylvania. The establishment of an official religion was due in part to the radical religious policies of the Angevin dynasty and in part to the renewed conflict between Rome and Orthodox Byzantium and to Louis’s loyalty to the papacy. No doubt the king was also motivated by Wallachia and Moldavia’s having recently thrown off Hungarian rule. Magyar mistrust of the Romanian aristocracy in Transylvania was on the increase—especially since the support of the Romanian nobles in Maramureş, hostile to Hungary, had made Moldavian independence possible.
Political life in Transylvania was open only to the privileged classes, and without noble leadership the Romanians participated less and less, until they were completely excluded. The leaders of the Bobilna Uprising (1437) wanted to form a kind of peasant order or estate, and called for recognition of “the commune of Hungarians and Romanians in these parts of Transylvania” (universitas regnicolarum Hungarorum et Valachorum in his partibus Transilvaniae). But when the uprising was put down by the aristocracy, the opposite effect was achieved. A “brotherly union,” the Unio Trium Nationum, granted the Hungarian, Saxon, and Szekler nobility a political monopoly and denied the Romanians any place in the political life of the principality. This segregation of the majority population became still stricter in the sixteenth century. First the peasants were made absolute serfs (1514, 1517), and then four privileged religions—Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Unitarianism—were recognized. Eastern Orthodoxy was only tolerated. When Hungary came under Ottoman domination (1526) and Buda and Transylvania became a pashalik and an autonomous tributary principality, respectively (1541), the status of the Romanians remained unchanged. Within the new state the Hungarian political leaders still would not recognize the Romanians as a “nation” equal in rights to the Hungarians, the Saxons, and the Szeklers. Like the Christian peoples of the Balkan states, the Romanians of Transylvania had no political leaders and no political standing, and the only institution that could represent their interests was the Orthodox Church.
Monasteries are mentioned in Transylvania as early as the eleventh century, when Ahtum, successor of Gelu, endowed an Orthodox monastery at Cenad. We have no evidence for hierarchical organization until 1370, when a metropolitanate with jurisdiction over Oltenia, the Banat, and southern Transylvania was set up at Severin by the patriarch in Constantinople. In 1391 the patriarch established an exarchate in Transylvania headed by the abbot of the Peri monastery in Maramureş; in 1455 an Orthodox episcopate was established at Muncaci. Sometime in the sixteenth century came another episcopate at Vad, and in 1557 yet another at Geoagiu. During this time the Transylvanian Orthodox church was closely tied to those of the other two principalities. Princes of Wallachia in particular had constantly supplied money, books, religious objects, gifts, and even churches. Prince Neagoe Basarab built two, at Zarneşti and Almaşul Mare; the monk Nicodim of Tismana founded Prislop monastery in Hajeg (1398); and many princes endowed the church at Scheii Braşovului. Michael the Brave and Sigismund Bathory signed a treaty in 1595 that placed the Orthodox church of Transylvania under the canonical jurisdiction of the Wallachian metropolitan. Thereafter metropolitans of Transylvania were consecrated at Tirgovişte in Wallachia. At Alba Iulia Michael built a new church for the metropolitan of Transylvania, and Moldavian and Wallachian princes continued to support the metropolitanate throughout the seventeenth century with annual gifts and subsidies. And they continued to build churches: Constantin Brancoveanu built three, at Fagaraş, Simbata, and Ocna-Sibiului.
But Orthodoxy, tolerated but not officially recognized, its clergy denied the rights accorded those of the “accepted” religions, could not offer Romanians the institutional framework in which to become a nation that was recognized politically. Michael the Brave did obtain some economic privileges for Orthodox clergy. But neither his brief reign over Transylvania in 1599-1601 (in 1600 he also ruled Moldavia in addition to Wallachia) nor the sympathy for Orthodoxy of the two Rakoczi princes who ruled Transylvania in the mid-seventeenth century could rescue it from inferior status. In 1691 the Habsburg empire took over Transylvania, but this too promised nothing good for the Romanians, for Leopold I undertook to respect all Transylvania’s laws, including those naming the three privileged nations and four privileged religions.
The Romanians’ desire to escape their unprivileged status and Austrian interest in strengthening Catholicism over Protestantism gave rise to the idea that, by joining the Catholic Church, Romanians might enter a privileged category. The Habsburg court sent Jesuit envoys to propose a “church union,” and the Orthodox hierarchy quickly embraced it. In 1697 a synod under Metropolitan Teofil agreed to conditions for uniting Eastern Orthodoxy with Roman Catholicism. Orthodox Christians would accept Catholic dogma while retaining Orthodox ritual and calendar; in exchange they asked that members of the new Uniate Church be granted full civil rights as loyal citizens and be admitted to Catholic schools. After a second synod, convened in 1698 by Teonl’s successor Anghel Atanasie, reaffirmed the desire for union, Emperor Leopold issued a diploma (1699) extending to Uniate clergy the rights and privileges enjoyed by Catholic clergy. He freed them from serfdom, exempted them from taxes and tithes, and made them eligible for the nobility. At the insistence of Atanasie, now a Catholic bishop, Leopold in 1701 issued a second diploma extending these privileges to all Uniates regardless of social condition—even to peasants.
The “church union” was really politics under cover of religion, as Romanians sought to escape their inferior status by using the Catholic Church. But the privileged nations quickly spotted the threat posed to the established regime, and in 1698 and 1699 they objected to the inclusion of Uniate Romanians in the ranks of privilege. As a result Leopold’s second diploma never went into effect, so that the Romanians ended by gaining much less than they had asked for and much less than Leopold had promised them.
27 Friday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Written by Leon Engelbrecht
Simply spell-binding! In the words of that mangler of English, George W Bush, “unputdownable”.
Former British Army military policeman Tony le Tissier is arguably the finest English-language historian of the Battle of Berlin. As the last British commandant of Spandau prison he had the opportunity to live in Berlin and thoroughly explore its surrounds.
This, combined with an interest in history, resulted in several excellent books on the climactic battle of the European section of World War Two: the 1945 Battle of Berlin. Notable among these are Zhukov at the Oder about the battle before the city; Race for the Reichstag about fighting in the city; and Slaughter at Halbe about the destruction of the German 9th Army in the Spreewald (Spree forest) south of the city. I addition edited survivors’ accounts With our backs to Berlin as well as Death was our Companion and translated Helmut Altner’s Berlin Totentanz (Berlin Dance of Death).
All of that knowledge is synthesised into this must-have book – and more. Berlin Battlefield Guide is very literally a tour guide to the Oder and Berlin battlefields. Organised into 15 day trips, it can only be described as indispensable to anyone visiting the city and wishing to experience Zhukov’s triumph and Hitler’s Götterdämmerung; and, perhaps more importantly, can be considered critical to understanding the battle.
Amply supplied with extracts of topical topographic maps and well illustrated with photographs – both then and now – the book is an almost perfect substitute for understanding the geography of the battle for those of us who have not had the pleasure of visiting the German capital.
Maps are generally the main weakness of most campaign histories, being monochrome, partial and sometimes inaccurate. Le Tissier’s detailed, full-colour and scaled, maps are therefore a joy to study. Even better, they are fully-annoted: the author has marked visiting spots as well as points of interest. Both are fully described in the accompanying text.
To illustrate: Tour “A” is a day-trip to the Seelow heights and Reitwein spur in the Oderbruch, scene of Zhukov at the Oder. Stop “A1” is at the Seelow Museum, just east of the town with the same name. Here is a former East German museum and Soviet monument as well as a well-tended war cemetery. “In the far corner is an observation point overlooking the Oderbruch valley below with a small concrete table model of the terrain. The photographs show a typical Soviet memorial and an impeccable graveyard. The view from the observation spot is indeed stunning – and helpful for it overlooks the former Reichstrasse 1, the main Soviet axis-of adcance. Le Tissier amplifies the experience by including a annoted topographic map of the same view showing the German defences (down to company/battalion level, using current map symbols) and the Soviet order of attack (at the regimental level).
Topographic maps are of less use in cities, and for the town tours Le Tissier substitutes sketch maps showing the routes he describes. He urges the visitor to obtain a tourist map of the city to augment these. Sadly they are not as detailed as the rural maps and less annoted. A pity, but still much better than anything this reviewer has ever seen. The text and photographs, however, make up for this
defect. One can thus follow the various Soviet attacks to the government district where Hitler awaited his fate beneath the wreck of the Reichskanzlei (Reich’s Chancellery).
The massive Zoo and Humboldthain flak towers receive their due as does Army Headquarters along the Bendlerstrasse, headquarters of the botched July 20 coup against Hitler. In the courtyard here, now a memorial, Colonel Claus Graf von Stauffenberg and his fellow conspirators were shot early in the morning of July 21. A few months later the signals bunker in the same courtyard served as General Helmuth Weidling’s headquarters. Weidling, commander of the 56th Panzerkorps of the 9th Army had the misfortune of being appointed Berlin defence commandant when his retreat from the Oderbruch took him into the city. (The bulk of the Army fell back south of the city to die in the Spreewald and one other corps retreated north.) It was he who surrendered the city to Zhukov on May 2.
The flak towers were impressive structures that deserve more recognition than they have to date received. These massive forts were fitted with artillery ranging from 20mm to 128mm and largely manned by teenaged Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) under Luftwaffe control. The Zoo (Tiergarten) towers were demolished, but the Humboldthain complex still exists, half buried in wartime rubble.
Le Tissier also provides a glimpse of Hitler’s Germania – his plans for post-war Berlin as epicentre of a Nazi world. Also well documented is the area of the Führerbunker as well as the escape routes tried by its denizens, including Nazi party boss Reichleiter Martin Bormann, SS Brigadeführer (SS Major General) Wilhelm Mohnke and Traudl Junge, the latter Hitler’s favourite secretary. (Mohnke commanded the government district). The Friedrichstrasse railway bridge looks rustic now but was a scene of utter carnage on the night of May 1st/2nd. A breakout attempt led by SS Brigadeführer Dr Gustav Krukenberg (commanding the 11th SS Panzergrenadierdivision) was slaughtered there.
Moving into the postwar era, Le Tissier also guides us to the the famous “Checkpoint Charlie”, the remnants of the Berlin Wall and Spandau prison where Nazis such as Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess and Germania architect (and armaments minister) Albert Speer were imprisoned.
Along the way we pass the scene of the 1953 anti-Soviet riots that Stalin had suppressed with T34 tanks, the German-Russian museum at Karlhorst where the final German was signed on the night of May 8, and the Schöneberg town hall balcony where US President said “Ich bin ein berliner (I am a jam doughnut. The correct German is: Ich bin Berliner.)
Out of town again, this time to Potsdam and the Wannsee. Here is the country house where SS Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann in 1942 chaired the so-called Wannsee conference where the fate of Europe’s Jews, gypsies and others were determined: extermination. Nearby is Schloss Cecilienhof, venue in July 1945, of the Potsdam conference. The lawn outside is still graced by a large flowerbed in the shape of a red Soviet five-pointed star in a white circle. (Le Tissier photographed it while it was flowering.) Literally down the road from here is the Glienicke bridge where Cold War spy exchanges took place ad the KGB prison where those destined for exchange were kept prior to release.
Back in Berlin, those wishing to learn about repression in the German Democratic Republic can visit Stasi headquarters in Normannenstrasse and the camouflaged Hohenschönhausen Prison in Genslerstrasse.
South-east of the city is the Spreewald and the grave of the 9th Army as well as that of their foes. The forests also cover the German Army General Staff’s headquarters (the “Zeppelin” and Maybach” complexes at Waldstadt near Zossen) as well as the nearby post-war headquarters of the Soviet Group of Forces Germany at Wünsdorf. Further away, at Falkenhagen, towards Seelow, lies Speer’s Tabun and Sarin nerve gas factories. The underground Tabun factory with its 5m thick walls became the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear blast proof command bunker during the Cold War.
All this and more in one volume! Have you ordered yours yet?
Berlin Battlefield Guide – Third Reich &Cold War
Tony le Tissier
Pen & Sword
Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK
2008
27 Friday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Dead German children in uniform photographed by an American war correspondent in the Hurtgenwaldforest. Allied soldiers were horrified at having to fight and kill children as young as ten.
The nearly simultaneous Allied offensives from the east and west during early 1945 were wreaking catastrophic destruction on the German armed forces, and the capture of territory was severely interrupting the German economy, as well as the ability of the remaining forces to maintain a sound defence. In February 1945, the Wehrmacht forces on the western front had been whittled down to an estimated 65 infantry and 12 Panzer divisions; in the east, 103 infantry and 32 Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions faced the massive Red Army fronts, whose reserves alone outnumbered them several times. German losses in the east were estimated by the Soviets to be 295,000 dead, 86,000 prisoners, 15,000 guns and mortars, 2995 tanks, 26,000 machine guns, 34,000 motor vehicles and 552 aircraft. By the end of March, the only territory west of the Rhine still held by the Germans was the rapidly diminishing salient near Landau in the Palatinate, north-west of Karlsruhe. In the east, Kurland and East Prussia, with 51 divisions between them, had effectively been written off, cut off and surrounded by the Soviets.
Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief architect and Minister for Armaments and War Production – one of the most intelligent and practically-minded of the Nazi inner circle – delivered a memorandum to Hitler on January 1945, in which he stated quite bluntly: ‘The war is lost.’ With the Ruhr in ruins from the continual bombing and Silesia now under the Soviets, Speer reported, Germany had at best a two-week supply of coal for railways, factories, and powerplants; production capabilities for 1945 were one quarter what they had been in 1944 for coal, and one sixth for steel. Fuel was in such short supply that a fighter group with over 37 aircraft stationed at Krefeld could fly only sorties of 100km (60 miles) one out of three days, and then with only 20 of its planes. Speer told of seeing a column of 150 trucks from the 10th Army in northern Italy in October 1944 being pulled by oxen. In his memorandum, Speer concluded: ‘After the loss of Upper Silesia, the German armaments industry will no longer be able even approximately to cover the requirements of the front for ammunition, ordinance, and tanks … From now on, the material preponderance of the enemy can no longer be compensated for by the bravery of our soldiers.’ Most of the major German cities were subjected to terrifying air attacks and Berlin was almost constantly bombed, from the Americans during the day and the British at night.
While the German leadership was quite accurate in their perception of geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, the degree of willful blindness on Hitler’s part about the anti-German alliance is revealed in Fuhrer conference notes from 27 January, the day Zhukov’s Belorussian Front reached and crossed the Oder:
Hitler: ‘Do you think the English are enthusiastic about all the Russian developments?’
Goring: ‘They certainly didn’t plan that we hold them off while the Russians conquer all of Germany … They had not counted on our … holding them off like madmen while the Russians drive deeper and deeper into Germany, and practically have all of Germany now.’
JodI: ‘They have always regarded the Russians with suspicion.’
Goring: ‘If this goes on we will get a telegram [from the British] in a few days.’
The telegram never came. Instead, a number of elements within the German armed forces and some in the Nazi party hierarchy began efforts of their own to contact the British and Americans with peace proposals. The most notorious was R:wdolf Hess’ rather bizarre, and still partly inexplicable, solo flight in a Messerschmitt 110 fighter to Scotland in May 1941. Since the turning of the military tide between 1942 and 1943, and now in the spring of 1945, with the Red Army almost literally at the gates of Berlin, the number of such plots increased. Two days before the Fuhrer conference, OKH Chief of Staff General Guderian had contacted Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and pleaded with him to attempt to secure an immediate armistice with the West, so that Germany’s remaining resources could be diverted to the east, and Berlin spared. However, Ribbentrop quickly tattled on the general, which led to another of Hitler’s frequent eruptions of vitriol against his treasonous general staff. Albert Speer, too, was by this time searching for a way to end the war before Germany was utterly destroyed and occupied by the Russians. So desperate was he that he actually initiated a scheme in mid-February – eventually abandoned – to assassinate Hitler, Goring, Hitler’s personal secretary Martin Bormann, and Robert Ley, the head of the Party Political Organisation.
Such eleventh-hour efforts to end the war, of course, came to naught. The Allies insisted unanimously on Germany’s unconditional surrender. There is perhaps some truth in the argument that by insisting so stubbornly on this principle, the West prolonged the war. But it is doubtful that, even in these dire straits, Hitler would have considered any of the necessary means to end the war and remove Germany as a military threat to the West. Never was the dilettantism and military incompetence of the Third Reich’s highest leadership as apparent and disastrous as in this last phase of the war. Hitler, who had assumed overall command of the army in November 1941, liked to think of himself as a genius of the bold tactical thrust. In military studies, he spurned the professionals’ and experts’ advice to exercise caution or consider practical realities. His failed gambit in the Ardennes forests in Belgium and northern Luxembourg in December 1944 – ordered despite the warnings of his generals had left most of western Germany highly vulnerable, with its remaining forces stretched dangerously thin. Even more worrying, however, was the effect of the offensive’s failure on the Eastern Front. Hitler’s general staff had warned that an offensive of the size he demanded would mean committing huge numbers of reserve troops and tanks which, as well as risking them in a venture which could fail, would deprive the hard-pressed army groups trying to hold on to the Vistula and Narew in Poland and East Prussia of their much-needed reinforcements. A massive Russian offensive was expected at any time: 225 divisions and 22 armoured corps, estimated Guderian’s chief of intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen. ‘Who prepared this rubbish?’ shrieked Hitler, according to Guderian. ‘Whoever he is he should be shut up in a lunatic asylum!’ At this point, Guderian lost his temper (a frequent event in those last months) and screamed back: ‘If you want General Gehlen sent to a lunatic asylum then you had better have me certified as well!’
26 Thursday Nov 2009
Posted in Uncategorized
Tags
Paul, Catherine’s only legitimate child, detested his mother. Catherine raised Paul’s sons and toyed with the idea of bypassing him for the throne, but did nothing concrete before her death in 1796. Rightly paranoid over his mother’s intentions, Paul had established his own court and military units outside St. Petersburg. Though Catherine’s husband Peter III may not have been Paul’s father, Paul shared his unstable personality and obsession with military discipline. Diagnosing mental disorders in historical figures is a dangerous enterprise, but Paul displayed many characteristics of an obsessive-compulsive. Convinced that everything connected with his mother’s regime was corrupt, he insisted on discipline, control, and rectitude. This did produce noteworthy improvements in Russia’s notoriously slow and venal bureaucracy. And Paul was correct that late in Catherine’s reign, discipline had slipped in the Russian army. Almost everything Paul did, though, undermined his support among Russian elites. He lowered the prestige of the influential guards regiments, relying instead on Prussian-style troops he trained and outfitted while introducing German innovations to uniforms and drill. He emphasized meticulous parade-ground show over practical effectiveness. His capriciousness meant bureaucrats and officers might be exiled to Siberia or dispatched to the frontier for the least infraction. In a small matter that symbolized a larger shortcoming, he regulated building decoration and clothing colors in St. Petersburg.
Paul’s arbitrary and unpredictable behavior extended to foreign policy at a time when European international relations were increasingly unstable. Soon after the French Revolution began in 1789, it generated serious pressures for war. The revolutionary regime was enraged by noble émigre ´s conspiring against it abroad and saw foreign war as a means to unite France behind the revolution. At the same time, other European governments feared their own populations might be infected by revolution. In April 1792 France declared war on Austria and was soon at war with Prussia as well.
Clumsy but massive French armies achieved striking successes. In 1792 they pushed France’s borders outward, conquering the Austrian Netherlands (now Belgium), the west bank of the Rhine, and the small state of Savoy between France and Italy. Britain grew alarmed over the French danger and prepared for war. Revolutionary France, confident it could spread revolution by force of arms, declared war on Britain, Holland, and Spain, drawing most of Europe into war in 1793. French society moved toward total mobilization. By the end of 1794, Prussia tired of war and left the coalition to concentrate on partitioning Poland. While Catherine agreed with Britain in early 1795 to provide troops for the war against France, this achieved little result. French forces in northern Italy under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, then only a rapidly rising general, decisively defeated the Austrians in 1796–1797. Austria had to surrender the Austrian Netherlands and accept a French puppet state in northern Italy. Thus by the time of Catherine’s death and Paul’s accession, the first coalition against revolutionary France was disintegrating. Paul ended Catherine’s halfhearted intervention against France.
Russian Military Development
Russia also grafted on some of the new tactical thought. The veteran Suvorov, who was dismissed in disgrace on the death of Catherine the Great, was recalled in 1799 and inflicted a succession of defeats on the French in Italy. A great trainer of troops, he emphasised speed and shock, spurning rigid linear formations in favour of units entering the fray as they arrived on the battlefield. He is often cited as an advocate of the bayonet, but he was no denigrator of firepower. He used lines against regular armies, while favouring shallow regimental squares for their flexibility. He covered his advance with skirmishers, and kept his artillery well forward to ensure close co-operation with the infantry. Although retrospectively seen as a father figure in Russian military thought, Suvorov’s immediate impact was eclipsed with his death in 1800. Paul I (1796–1801) spurned the emerging independent Russian military tradition, which traced itself from Suvorov through Rumyantsev back to Peter the Great, and instead embraced the sterile formalism of Prussian drill. He reduced the Jäger and the light cavalry and ran down the general staff. But he did reassert central control of the army, curbing the independence of regimental colonels, inculcating new standards of professionalism and giving attention to the soldier’s welfare. The last theme was developed by a fresh reformer, Barclay de Tolly, appointed minister of war in 1810. Barclay drew up regulations for the handling of higher formations. The divisional organisation, suppressed by Paul, was revived, and in the spring of 1812 the armies of the West were organised in twelve infantry and five cavalry corps. The artillery, upholding its relatively greater importance in the Russian army, received a new manual in 1812, instructing it to fight en masse and to co-operate with the other arms. The conception of the 1812 campaign, which is also attributed to Barclay, was Petrine. The withdrawal into Russia mirrored that of 1709, and, like Peter, Tsar Alexander aroused in his people a sense of nationalism and a determination to drive out the enemy.