The loss of Libya was an unwelcome surprise to the British. Any available troops from the Delta were rushed up to the border to contain any possibility of the Germans pushing on into Egypt. But until the capture of Tobruk, with its vital port facilities, Rommel felt he could not advance eastwards. By default, the strategic initiative passed to the British. Back in London, the prime minister demanded swift action to recover the lost territories and relieve Tobruk. By May 1941, Wavell had assembled the XIII Corps (Lieutenant General Sir Noel Beresford- Peirse) consisting of the 4th Indian Division and a reconstituted 7th Armoured Division, plus the 22nd Guards Brigade.

Wavell remained unhappy at the state of his forces, and did not want to rush into an offensive against the Africa Corps. Such delays did not endear him to Churchill, who continued to press for aggressive action. In May, Wavell acceded to Churchill’s demands and assembled a mixed force of armour and infantry under Brigadier Gott to secure the tactically important Halfaya Pass and the strong points around Fort Capuzzo and Sollum. Code-named Operation Brevity, it was hoped that success here would act as a springboard for further offensive action into Libya, including the relief of Tobruk.

After some initial success, the British were halted, and a subsequent German counterattack unceremoniously chased them back across the frontier. On 27 May, the Germans regained Halfaya Pass, and under Rommel’s promptings began to improve their defences in case of a subsequent British attack. The following day, Wavell signalled to the combined chiefs of the Imperial general staff a detailed list of the shortcomings of British weapons and equipment in North Africa:

While Wavell’s complaints were largely justified, he understandably failed to make the point that a major reason for British failure lay in the poor tactics adopted by the British and the inability of the separate arms of service to cooperate with each other on the battlefield. While the Germans were swift to adapt to desert conditions, the more experienced British were slow and rigid in their entire operational approach.

The British were equipped with the powerful 3.7-inch anti-aircraft gun, which – like the German ’88′ – was extremely effective against armoured vehicles, but unlike the Germans the British lacked the imagination to use this weapon in an anti-tank role. Another area in which the British lagged behind the Germans lay in the location and repair of broken-down or damaged tanks. The Germans sent out salvage teams directly behind the main force, and as a consequence were able to get these damaged tanks back into action with minimal delay. The British, by contrast, methodically sent their vehicles back to rear bases to be repaired, which prevented them from returning to the battle, until it was lost.