Sir George Prevost, governor in chief of Canada, planned to fight defensively rather than attack the United States.

By MIRIAM GREENBLATT

Washington Irving, who was just beginning to emerge as America’s first successful native-born author, had several times described President James Madison in unflattering terms. To Irving, the president was a man with “his forehead full of wrinkles, a face which has the appearance of a midnight lamp.” It was true that Madison was short and unprepossessing in appearance. Yet on June 1, 1812, when he finally sent his war message to Congress, there were good reasons for him to have a wrinkled brow.

For one thing, the nation’s armed forces were small in number and ill-prepared for combat. Earlier in the year Congress had authorized the acceptance of 50,000 volunteers for a year’s service. But by the time war was declared, fewer than 5,000 men had signed up. In all, the U.S. Army contained perhaps 7,000 troops. That meant the state militias would have to fight, too. But, as would emerge on several occasions, the governors of the various states were reluctant to allow their militiamen to fight outside their own state’s borders. And there would be times when the commanding officers of the militia would simply refuse orders to commit their men, even when the regular troops were threatened.

The armaments and supplies for both militiamen and regular troops would also be at best of uncertain quality throughout the war. After the Revolutionary War, most Americans had not seen much purpose in maintaining a first-class army, so there were precious few new arms of any kind. Many of the heavy artillery pieces that would be used by the Americans in the War of 1812, in fact, had been captured from the British during the Revolution. As for guns, most of the American troops would be armed with the old muzzle-loaded muskets of the kind used in the Revolutionary War. Militiamen, furthermore, all tended to carry their own favorite weapons, so there could be little standardization when it came to spare parts and ammunition.

All other supplies—especially food—conformed to the same low standard. When food was not in short supply it was close to inedible. As it happened, it was during the War of 1812 that “Uncle Sam” emerged as a symbol of the government because of food supplies. Samuel “Uncle Sam”Wilson, a meat provisioner and inspector working for the army around Troy, New York, would stamp the purchased containers of salted meat with a “U.S.” Allegedly those opposed to the war began to claim that the letters stood for “Uncle Sam”—a way of mocking the government. (The name first appeared in print in a Troy newspaper in 1813.) As the usage spread, “Uncle Sam” became a symbol of the United States itself. (The first cartoons with Uncle Sam in his traditional costume did not appear until the 1830s.)

The militiamen, of course, were little more than weekend soldiers— men who spent at most a few hours each week practicing some simple drills and perhaps taking target practice. To make matters worse, even the regular soldiers were poorly trained and without battle experience. Many were not really interested in a military career. They had simply signed up for one year to see what army life was like. As soon as their enlistment term was over, they would take off for home—even if a major battle was set for the following day.

Most of the army’s officers were equally disappointing and unreliable. Winfield Scott, one of the few American army officers to emerge from the War of 1812 as a hero, described the situation this way: “The old officers [those who had fought in the Revolutionary War] had very generally slunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking.” An example of such an officer was Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, who would be given command of the campaign against Canada. He was so stiff in the joints and out of touch with his surroundings that he was commonly known as “Granny.”

The War Department was likewise inadequate and unprepared. Congress had refused to fund any enlargement of the department, so the entire staff consisted of Secretary William Eustis and eight clerks.

In addition, the country was sharply divided over the war. Not a single member of the Federalist Party in Congress voted in favor. New England in particular vehemently opposed the conflict. In Hartford, Connecticut, flags were lowered to half-staff when news of the war’s declaration was received, and the state vowed not to send its men to fight. Massachusetts and Rhode Island announced that their citizens would not fight, either. (In fact, as the war went on, New England volunteers provided 19 regiments to the regular army.)

Only the West and the South were truly enthusiastic. There, people marched in parades and drums beat out a call for recruits. “The hour of national vengeance has arrived,” frontiersman Andrew Jackson told his Tennessee militia. They were going to fight “for the establishment of our national character . . . for the protection of our maritime citizens impressed on board British ships of war . . . to seek some indemnity for past injuries, some security against future aggression by the conquest of all the British dominions upon the continent of North America.”

And in that last phrase was summed up the true motive and goal of the war’s most vocal supporters: to conquer Canada. It was not just the bordering land and lakes that they coveted. Many Americans sincerely believed that only by conquering Canada would the British once and for all be removed as a threat to the United States. And only by conquering Canada would the Indians be removed as a threat on the western frontier. As John Randolph, the maverick representative from Roanoke, Virginia, described the “cant of patriotism” he so despised: “Like the whippoorwill, but one monotonous tone—Canada! Canada! Canada!” There was another reason why Jackson and so many other Americans believed that conquering Canada was the way to win the war. The United States was ill equipped to challenge Great Britain at sea. The American fleet numbered only a half dozen frigates, three sloops, seven brigs, and about 70 gunboats (these last too small and light to be of much use). In contrast, the British navy contained hundreds of warships with cannons capable of attacking both American ships and seaports. An American victory at sea seemed impossible.

A victory on land, however, was a different matter. Americans assumed that Britain’s long struggle with France had drained Britain’s resources and that Canada would thus have few soldiers and supplies with which to fight Americans. The most populated part of Canada, moreover, was the province of Quebec, where most of the people were of French descent. How could the British depend on their loyalty? There were the Indians, of course, but General Harrison’s victory at Tippecanoe showed that they would be no problem. Two years earlier, Henry Clay had proclaimed to Congress, “The conquest of Canada is in your power. I trust I shall not be deemed presumptious when I state that I verily believe that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.” Taking Canada would be a breeze— or so the War Hawks promised. Reality proved otherwise.

Unlike the United States, Canada had two capable men heading its armed forces. Both were experienced soldiers, although with very different ideas as to how the war should be run.

Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost was the governor of Lower Canada (the area north of Vermont that included Montreal) as well as commander in chief of all provinces. Prevost, 44 years of age, was a prudent man, more diplomat than soldier. He was very much aware that his troops were short of rifles and that the lengthy Canadian coastline would be difficult to protect with the limited forces at his command. His plan was to fight a defensive war. In a message to his subordinate, Isaac Brock, Prevost argued that the numbers did not “justify offensive operations being taken, unless they were solely calculated to strengthen a defensive attitude.”

General Brock was the governor of Upper Canada (the area north of Lake Huron, Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario).A muscular, handsome man in his early forties who stood six feet two inches tall, Brock prided himself on being hard as nails. He made his own interpretation of Prevost’s order.

For the previous five years, ever since the Chesapeake incident in 1807, Brock had been preparing for war. He put himself in the boots of his enemy and anticipated what the enemy’s plan might be. The natural place for the Americans to attack Canada was at Montreal, Canada’s major city. Taking Montreal would block the St. Lawrence River and prevent the British from sending reinforcements from Quebec. Once British supply lines to Upper Canada were cut, the Americans could move east from Montreal into Lower Canada and capture Quebec. However, if the Indians were to attack the Americans on their left flank as they moved north toward Montreal, the invasion would fail. Brock favored attack rather than defense.

Brock’s assumptions about American actions were right on the mark. President Madison put Maj. Gen. Henry “Granny” Dearborn in charge of the attack on Canada—and Dearborn decided to strike at Montreal. His plan called for four invasion forces to cross the border simultaneously. The first force would move from Fort Detroit into the area north of Lake Erie and take care of the western Indians. Two other forces would start out from Sackett’s Harbor and Fort Niagara in New York and pin down the British troops north of Lake Ontario so they could not be used to defend Montreal.

The last column would march northward along Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River and seize Montreal. Madison’s choice of Dearborn was a poor one. So was Madison’s choice of Brig. Gen. William Hull to lead the attack from Fort Detroit. Hull was fat and red-faced from too much eating and drinking. He was almost two decades older than the British generals, and although he, too, had participated bravely in many of the battles of the Revolutionary War, he had never planned a military campaign.

Even before war was officially declared, Hull had gathered 2,000 regulars and militia and begun to march north from Urbana, Ohio, to Fort Detroit, across 200 miles of unbroken wilderness. A contingent of troops was sent ahead to hack their way through the underbrush so that the remaining soldiers and supply wagons could get through. Unfortunately, many of Hull’s men caught malaria in the swamp-filled forests, while others dropped dead from exhaustion. In addition, news of the official declaration of war did not reach Hull until July 2 because Secretary of War Eustis sent the message through ordinary mail. In contrast, the British ambassador in Washington sent the news via express rider. So both Prevost and Brock received word of the outbreak of hostilities on June 24 and were ready to act before Hull was.