Edward J. Erickson

There is a conspicuous void within the historiography of the First World War concerning the story of the Turkish war effort and particularly with the overall picture of the Ottoman Empire’s strategic direction of the war. For the researcher who does not read Turkish, any serious attempt to explore these subjects in depth will usually fail in the face of an almost complete absence of materials that present the Turk’s participation in the war in a continuous and unitary fashion. The researcher will also find that most of the available materials deal with the operational and tactical level of the campaigns with little analysis of overall Turkish strategy. The picture that emerges is episodic and incomplete since there is no overall framework on which to hang an understanding of the Turkish conduct of the war. This is a shortfall of no small consequence for both serious amateurs and for professional historians of the First World War.

Given the overall backwardness of the empire, the nature of the its economy, its lack of modern lines of communication, and its sprawling geography, the Turkish war record in the First World War was an astounding achievement. During the war Turkey labored under many disadvantages. Nevertheless the Turks maintained their belligerent status almost until the bitter end of the First World War, outlasting Russia and Bulgaria and matching Austria-Hungary. Turkey absorbed punishing attacks from the Allies and sustained proportionately large casualties. Yet Turkey’s armies never mutinied and the Turks inflicted huge numbers of casualties on their enemies. The Turkish soldier, Mehmetcik, often died where he fought. Mehmetcik literally translates as “the Mehmet” and was the Turkish equivalent of “Tommy” or “Doughboy.” Turkey managed to field and sustain large fighting forces simultaneously on four fronts (and at times on a fifth) for most of the war, an accomplishment unmatched by any belligerent, save Great Britain. This was no small challenge and was an almost impossible strategic condition under which to engage in war. But Turkey, with its abysmal interior lines of communications, somehow consistently and successfully dealt with this unfavorable situation. Overall, the story of Turkey in the First World War is an incredible saga of fortitude and resilience. That these noble qualities are inextricably interwoven with the ineptitude and blunder of the Young Turks should not detract from the army’s accomplishments. Turkey’s story is not so much a story of failure, or of a crumbling antiquated empire, but rather a remarkable story of a long fight against impossible odds. It is story that begs to be told.

Although the campaigns on the Turkish fronts associated with the well-researched and well-written British and Australian official histories have been captured in great detail by historians, those campaigns fought on other fronts, against other enemies, are notably absent from available histories. The Gallipoli, Mesopotamian, and Palestinian campaigns, for example, are thoroughly covered from the Commonwealth perspective and are also well covered by popular histories. However, historical appraisals of the Turkish view of these campaigns are nonexistent in western languages. Similarly, except for a single book published in 1953, a balanced and complete overview of the brutal campaigns in Caucasia is hard to locate. Farther afield, books about the Turkish contribution to the defeat of Romania and the operations in Galicia are impossible to find.

Of particular significance is the fact that a definitive history of Turkey’s overall war effort, strategic direction, and command of forces has never been written. The solitary western work to attempt this subject was written in French in 1926 and is outdated today. The five-volume Turkish General Staff series, written by Turkish General Farhi Belen, titled The Turkish War in the First World War is superb but unfortunately has never been translated into English. Subsequent staff studies of the various campaigns and battles by the Historical Division of the Turkish General Staff have slowly trickled out from Ankara over the past thirty years. These too, if they can be found, are written in Turkish and present a partial picture of the unfolding events.

Because of the inadequacy of reliable western historical resources it was inevitable that an inaccurate picture of the Turkish Army at war has taken root over the past eighty-five years. This began when apologists sought to explain how and why the backward Turks had badly knocked about the more sophisticated allied armies during the war. Over the years, this picture has become peculiarly flawed by inaccurate histories portraying the Turks as prone to desertion, predisposed to massacre, and commanded mostly by Germans. Later, even popular cinema such as Lawrence of Arabia, The Light Horsemen, Gallipoli, and All the King’s Men added more inaccuracies to this view. And in the last half of the century, a determined assault on the actual events of 1915 and 1918 has been waged by the descendants of the Armenians and Greeks subjected to Ottoman brutality.

All of this has given rise to myriad myths about the conduct of the First World War by the Turkish Army. One of the most prevalent myths is that the Turks held a numerical advantage over the allies during many of the important campaigns and another is that the Germans commanded many of the major operations. Another myth is that the Turks kept very poor records. Still another is the idea that Turkish units often “came apart” under pressure, disintegrating and crumbling because of mass desertion. Finally, there is the idea that the Turks wanted to regain their shattered and crumbling empire. None of these are true. In fact, in most cases, quite the opposite is true, showcasing the inaccurate picture that most westerners have of these people at war. Indeed, the Turkish Army in the First World War was a formidable fighting machine much feared by its enemies.