By David Glantz

The four most prominent Soviet sources which refer to the operation demonstrate the historiographical dilemma and represent how many of these forgotten operations appear in Soviet works. Zhukov notes the existence of Operation MARS in his memoirs, and he apparently played a major role in its planning and conduct, along with the two participating front commanders, I. S. Konev, and M. A. Purkaev. Konev’s memoirs ignore the operation (and others he participated in, by beginning in January 1943). Zhukov reports the parameters of the plan, which called for the destruction of German forces in the Rzhev salient. Then, after returning to his description of the Stalingrad victory, he briefly mentions the failure at Rzhev and dismisses the operation as simply a diversion, although it began on 24 November (five days after the commencement of the Stalingrad operation and one day after the encirclement of German 6th Army) and continued through mid-December.

 

The second major source, that of M. D. Solomatin, commander of the 1st Mechanized Corps, mentions the necessity of tying down German reserves within the context of the Stalingrad battle and provides a superb and detailed description of the role of his corps in Operation MARS. His account mentions the actions of his corps and cooperating 41st Army formations and mentions the fact that other Kalinin and Western Front forces were designated to participate in the offensive, whose aims, he described, were to “destroy the German-Fascist Olenino-Rzhev Group” in cooperation with Western Front forces.

 

Katukov’s memoirs mention the operation, but provide little detail. Katukov commanded 3d Mechanized Corps subordinate to 22d Army. He states briefly, “3d Mechanized Corps received an order to go over to the attack with cooperating rifle units. The Rzhev-Sychevka offensive operation of Kalinin and Western Front forces began on 25 November.” After commenting in general on the course of operations, the heavy fighting, and the adverse weather conditions, Katukov laconically noted, “on 20 December, the Rzhev-Sychevka operation was completed.” A. Kh. Babdzhanian, who commanded the 3d Mechanized Brigade of Katukov’s corps, mentioned the operation only briefly in his memoirs by quoting a conversation with his army commander, V. A. Iushkevich, who said, “We will conduct a rather serious offensive together with Western Front forces —we must liquidate the enemy Rzhev grouping.” A final source, a history of Soviet cavalry forces, mentions joint operations by cavalry forces (20th Cavalry Division of 2d Guards Cavalry Corps) and Soviet 6th Tank Corps in penetration operations south of Rzhev, during which the cavalry division reached the German rear, where it operated for a month before being rescued by elements of Katukov’s mechanized corps (also mentioned by Katukov).

 

These sources, taken alone, indicate that a modest operation occurred, perhaps diversionary in nature, and that at least three armies (22d, 41st, and one Western Front army), supported by up to four mobile corps (1st and 2d Mechanized, 2d Guards Cavalry, and 6th Tank Corps), took part in the operation. These forces were of significant—but not overwhelming — size.

 

German archival intelligence and operational reports, however, cast the operation in a vastly different light. Records of the 9th Army affirm that the Kalinin Front’s 22d and 41st Armies, supported by 1st and 3d Mechanized Corps, participated in the operation. According to these records, however, so also did the front’s 39th Army, and subordinate to 41st Army was the elite Stalin 6th Rifle Corps. Moreover, three of Western Front’s armies (20th, 30th, and 31st) also took part, supported at various times by 6th, 7th, and 8^th Tank Corps, and 2d Guards Cavalry Corps. At the same time, immediately to the west, 3d Shock Army struck at German forces at Velikie Luki and achieved success (which Soviet historians have reported on in detail). Further, 2d Mechanized Corps was available to support either 41st Army operations against Belyi or 3d Shock Army (which it ultimately supported). Detailed German order of battle reports indicate that the Soviet mobile forces were at or well above establishment armored strength, and that offensive preparations had been thorough.

 

At Stalingrad, the Soviets committed six armies (21st, 24th, 51st, 57th, 65th, and 5th Tank), containing or supported by nine mobile corps (1st, 4th, 16th, 26th, and 13th Tank; 4th Mechanized, and 8th, 3d Guards, and 4th Cavalry Corps), against the 6th and part of the 4th Panzer Army and Romanian 3d and 4th Armies, while 62d and 64th Armies defended in the city. In the Rzhev-Sychevka operation, Zhukov committed six armies (20th, 22d, 30th, 31st, 39th, and 41st), supported by up to seven mobile corps (1st, 2d, and 3d Mechanized, 5th, 6th, and 8th Tank, and 2d Guards Cavalry Corps), against two thirds of 9th Army, while 3d Shock Army struck simultaneously at 9th Army elements at Velikie Luki, and three more Soviet armies (29th, 43d, and 4th Shock) protected the flanks. While armies are admittedly of varying size, Soviet strength and favorable correlation of forces at Rzhev probably approximated that of Stalingrad.

 

On 24 November, 22d and 41st Armies, spearheaded by 1st and 3d Mechanized Corps, attacked and penetrated German defenses north and south of Belyi, and within days, were driving salients deep into the German rear area. Deteriorating weather conditions and heavy German resistance finally halted the attacks and contained Katukov’s and Solomatin’s mechanized corps. Meanwhile to the east, Konev’s armies pounded German defenses along the Osuga River to no avail. Heavy Soviet combined tank and infantry assaults struck German defenses repeatedly, but were repelled with heavy losses after only minimal Soviet gains. Elsewhere, to the north 39th Army forces also struck German defenses northeast of Rzhev, slowly driving the defenders back, and, just west of Rzhev, 31st Army forces struggled forward to cut the rail line from Rzhev to Olenino. The heavy fighting continued into December as German mobile reserves encircled and destroyed the bulk of Solomatin’s mechanized corps along with supporting 6th Rifle Corps; drove back Katukov’s mechanized corps; and contained 31st and 39th Armies assaults north of the Rzhev-Olenino rail line. In mid-December, Zhukov and Konev launched one more attempt to break through and rescue Solomatin’s force, but the attempt also ended in bloody failure. Total Soviet losses in the operation are unknown, but those recorded in German reports were high (an estimated 15,000 dead in Konev’s sector alone, and 1,655 tanks destroyed from 24 November to 14 December) and included four general officers.

 

Two factors differentiated operation URANUS from operation MARS. First, at Stalingrad Soviet armies chose Romanian sectors in which to conduct their initial penetration operations, and they penetrated Romanian defenses rather easily. At Rzhev, however, experienced German divisions (like the 102d) were dug into well-prepared defenses. Unlike the case at Stalingrad, the Germans also had the 5th Panzer Division deployed in defenses opposite Konev’s main assault. Second, at Stalingrad, the Germans had burned up their armor in city fighting and had only two panzer divisions in reserve (22d and 1st Romanian). At Rzhev, however, German 9th Army had four mobile divisions in their immediate operational reserve (1st and 9th Panzer, Grossdeutschland and the 14th Panzer-Grenadier) and three other panzer divisions (9th, 19th, and 20th) within striking distance in a matter of days. This spelled doom for the Soviet offensive.

 

The Germans successfully prevented the Soviets from accomplishing their objectives, thereby winning the battle. They had, however, taken losses they could ill afford, and it had been a close-run effort. General Von Kluge recommended to Hitler that the salient should be abandoned, in order to economize on manpower and to prevent a possible renewed, successful offensive. Hitler resisted strongly, reluctant to give up any won ground and hoping to retain the salient for a future thrust towards Moscow. The sobering realities of the crumbling front as well as the shock of the Stalingrad disaster prevailed, and the Germans began a staged withdrawal in the beginning of March 1943. By the 23rd of that month, the withdrawal was complete.

 

One other marked characteristic differentiates Operation URANUS from Operation MARS. The former was fully recorded by historians; the latter was not!