Once the Warsaw Uprising began, the British Government viewed it with a great deal of indifference. The government-in-exile did gain permission to use the Polish Flight 1586 in Brindisi for a renewed airdrop effort, but the first mission on the night of 4 August was disappointing. It took the Polish-piloted Halifax bombers up to six hours to fly from Brindisi to Warsaw, carrying less than four tons of supplies each, and even dropping their cargo from 9 0m only 12 containers landed in Polish-held drop zones. Royal Air Force leaders were quick to use aircraft losses en route to claim that the mission was too costly and would be feasible only if Stalin granted refuelling rights at nearby Soviet bases in the Ukraine, but the British request on 2 0 August was denied. Instead, throughout August the RAF kept up a minimal air supply effort to Warsaw that succeeded only in delivering token amounts of weapons and supplies.

Oddly, most histories of the uprising fail to note that the RAF made two large-scale bomber raids on the port of Konigsberg on the nights of 26 and 2 9 August. Each raid involved over 170 Lancaster bombers delivering 2.5 tons of bombs each, against a target that did not support the Allied advance on the Western Front or have any critical German industries. The distance from RAF bases in Lincolnshire to Konigsberg was 1,354km, which was 74 km less than the distance to Warsaw. These two raids demonstrate that the RAF did have the ability to operate in strength over central Poland and had RAF Bomber Command been used to conduct re-supply missions over Warsaw instead of attacking pointless secondary targets, the AK might have received enough arms to blunt the German attacks.

As the uprising dragged into its second month and the appeals of the Polish Government-in-exile became ever more desperate, the British and the Americans grudgingly agreed to provide more support. Two South African and two RAF bomber squadrons joined Polish Flight 1586 in making resupply runs to Warsaw. During the uprising, a total of 199 night sorties were flown from Italy to Warsaw, with 39 aircraft lost (17 Polish, 22 RAF/ SAAF) to deliver about 100 tons of weapons and food. A typical container held 136kg, such as a British 2in. mortar with 20 rounds or a PIAT with eight rounds; two Bren light machine guns with ammunition; 10 rifles or Sten guns; three pistols; four grenades; 100 cans of food preserves and six boxes of biscuits – enough to augment the weaponry of a single AK platoon. Although there is no doubt that the weapons provided – particularly the PIATs – allowed the AK to hold out longer, the RAF delivered only enough equipment to outfit perhaps 15 per cent of the insurgents in Warsaw. In addition to German night fighters and flak, the RAF also had to contend with active Soviet efforts to disrupt the airlift. Not only did the Soviets deny refuelling rights to the RAF, but also a number of Allied aviators noted that their aircraft were repeatedly fired upon by Soviet anti-aircraft and fighters during their supply runs to Warsaw.

Although the Western Allies had requested permission to use Soviet airfields for refuelling after their resupply missions to Warsaw in early August, Stalin did not grant this until 10 September. Since June 1944, Stalin had granted the American Eighth Air Force bombers the use of airfields in the Ukraine in order to conduct ‘shuttle-bombing’ raids, known as Operation Frantic, against German targets in Eastern Europe. After much argument, the government-in-exile was finally able to persuade the Americans to conduct one mission to Warsaw. At 1355hrs on 18 September, the USAAF flew 107 B-17 bombers and 62 P-51 fighters to Warsaw and dropped 1,248 containers. Only one B-17 was lost on the operation. Unfortunately, the area held by the AK was now so small that they could recover only 21 containers. The vast majority landed in German-held territory.